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Strategies & Market Trends : Booms, Busts, and Recoveries -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: elmatador who wrote (48247)	4/9/2004 2:30:01 AM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 74559

Hi Elmat, would you please stop with the alarmist press. You must learn to appreciate the complicated nuance of the enveloping new era and world order, and the fact that all is in fact under control. The game is going precisely according to plan. It is just that the plan was not announced for security reasons. Stop fussing. Chugs, Jay Message 19997550 stratfor.biz Geopolitical Diary: Wednesday, April 7, 2004 Apr 08, 2004 Two surprises have overtaken the coalition forces in Iraq. Both are big ones. The secular -- as opposed to jihadist -- guerrillas, who appeared to have been defeated in the Sunni Triangle after the Ramadan offensive in October and November 2003, have clearly reorganized and launched a new offensive west of Baghdad. The Shia, on whom the Americans have built their Iraq policy, have -- at least in part -- risen. If the current trend is extrapolated, the U.S. position in Iraq will become untenable in the coming weeks. The best that the United States will be able to do is to create secure enclaves and give up any hope of controlling most of Iraq. It is fortunate for the United States that extrapolation is not a reasonable way to forecast war. If it were, there would be serious cause for concern. What appears to have happened is that two forces have converged -- and it is not clear to us that this convergence was accidental. The guerrilla offensive west of Baghdad is combined with the rising of a Shiite faction in Baghdad and to the south. The Sunni guerrillas represent the minor problem. They do not appear to have the vast numbers needed to sustain an offensive in which they will absorb major casualties and use up supplies at a rapid pace. Given the intensity of that assault, the movement is self-containing. Indeed, it is interesting that rather than pursuing a more prudent strategy, they seem to be intent on maximizing short-term effectiveness even if it undermines long-term sustainability. The real issue is the Shiites. If this is a general uprising of the armed militias of all the Shiites, the seriousness of the uprising cannot be overstated. The United States does not have the ability to contain them. At the moment, it does not appear to be a general uprising. It seems to be a rising by one -- fairly marginal -- Shiite movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, which is in opposition to more important mainstream movements, particularly those loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. If this is all that is going on, then the Shiite rising is also self-containing. The stronger al-Sadr gets, the more dangerous he becomes to other Shiite groups and leaders. In due course, it will be in their self-interest to crush al-Sadr, or at least collaborate with the United States in crushing him. That is the biggest "if" of this offensive and the real heart of the matter. To be more precise, the real question is: What are the intentions of al-Sistani and his Iranian backers? The United States has built its Iraq strategy -- post-guerrilla war -- on the assumption that the Shiites would cooperate with the United States. Al-Sistani has made it clear in recent months that he does not like the U.S. plan to hand over power to an interim government prior to a general election. His concern is that the Americans will be able to shape a regime that limits Shiite authority over the new government by crafting a non-elected government that leaves Shiite power underrepresented. The assumption has been that al-Sistani is simply maneuvering for political advantage, but that he has bought into the existing framework. In this scenario, al-Sadr is simply a marginal player about to be squeezed out of the game, working in tandem with another marginal group and hoping to break a deal that would leave them both out in the cold. If this is the case, then it is good news for the United States. It would mean that al-Sistani will deal with al-Sadr while the United States deals with the Sunni guerrillas. But the United States has said that al-Sistani has not been helpful. This could have been designed to give him political cover in the Shiite community. Alternatively, al-Sistani might be playing another game: driving home to the United States the idea that, except for him and his organizations, the United States faces tough cases. He might not be prepared to act against al-Sadr because he wants the United States to feel the pressure that he is containing. He might welcome al-Sadr's rising because it puts him in a position to force a new transitional plan. A final alternative -- which we don't think is true, but it would be the worst-case scenario -- is that the split between al-Sadr and al-Sistani is purely for appearance and that al-Sadr is doing al-Sistani's bidding, serving as the vanguard of a Shiite rising designed to collaborate with the Sunnis and drive the Americans out. We don't think this is the case, but if it is -- oh, boy! We think the reality is that al-Sistani is quite content to let al-Sadr play the loose cannon for a while. Al-Sistani wants the Americans to recognize the tenuousness of their situation and the consequences of not fulfilling private promises to the Shiites about their postwar power. Al-Sadr is exactly what he appears to be -- a loose cannon with a limited number of followers -- and that is what al-Sistani is going to use as a lever against the Americans. Clearly this all came as a surprise to the United States. L. Paul Bremer was supposed to head for Washington for meetings, but canceled the trip after the fighting broke out, indicating that he did not expect the upsurge. That is troubling for the United States because it appears that intelligence, which had improved significantly last fall, is declining again. The rotation of forces is likely not helping military intelligence. It is our view at this moment that the crisis remains self-containing. But if al-Sistani has reached an agreement with the Sunnis -- that's al-Sistani, not al-Sadr -- then all bets are off.