Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Policy Discussion Thread -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (6738)	4/13/2004 11:08:11 AM
From: lorne	Respond to of 15987

Questions about former UN weapons inspector's film By Mark Turner Published: April 12 2004 22:01 \| Last Updated: April 12 2004 22:01 news.ft.com Scott Ritter, formerly the top United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq, has long argued that claims that Saddam Hussein possessed biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programmes were massively exaggerated. His public campaign against the US-led invasion of Iraq made him a hated figure of the American right, which still demonises him as an apologist for the ousted Baghdad regime. Now, at the very moment when the absence of weapons of mass destruction in post-Saddam Iraq should make Mr Ritter feel vindicated, he faces new questions about his relationship with Baghdad after he quit his UN job in 1998. Mr Ritter has admitted accepting $400,000 from Shakir al-Khafaji, an Iraqi-born Detroit businessman, in order to finance a documentary film titled In Shifting Sands. The film's principal theme - highly controversial when it was released in 2001 - was that UN weapons inspectors had "defanged" Iraq. Today, an investigation by the Financial Times and Italian daily business newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore reveals that Mr Khafaji belonged to a select group to whom the Baghdad regime awarded "allocations" for millions of barrels of oil under the UN oil-for-food programme between 1995 and 2002. These allocations were then sold on to international traders for profit. The oil-for-food programme was set up in such a way that beneficiaries' names were not recorded by the UN. This allowed them to claim they had not received money from the Iraqi government. Mr Ritter insists he never received any money from the Iraqi government. "I would never take any money from anyone that was derived from any business relationship with the Iraqi government, whether a legal business relationship or an illegal business relationship," he added. There is no evidence Mr Ritter did receive any money from oil allocations. Mr Khafaji told the FT/Il Sole that he never mentioned the allocations to Mr Ritter. But, by his own admission, Mr Khafaji or his family did profit from the sale of oil allocations awarded at the same time that he was financing Mr Ritter's film. Without Mr Khafaji's money Mr Ritter's film would never have been made. Mr Khafaji told the FT/Il Sole that he sold allocations to Augusto Giangrandi, the head of an Italian company called Italtech. Italtech resold the oil to a Houston oil trading company called Bayoil, or its subsidiaries. Bayoil "lifted" - that is to say, collected from Iraqi oil terminals - almost 30m barrels from Italtech in only three months in 2001. The relationship between the two companies was the subject of an Il Sole/FT investigation published last week. The article also documented the ties between the owners of Italtech and Bayoil, and Carlos Cardoen, a renowned Chilean arms dealer who was involved in arms trafficking to Iraq in the 1980s. A copy of a fax from Italtech files, dated November 4 2000, shows that David Chalmers, the owner of Bayoil, entered into communication with "Mr Shakir" over fees related to the oil allocations. "As per my conversation with Augusto, you may indicate to your associates in Jordan we have an interest to purchase their allocations as follows: 1 million barrels Kirkuk destination Europe; 2 million barrels Basrah light destination US; 500,000 barrels Basrah light destination US," it reads. "We would indicate a premium of $0.26 per barrel for Kirkuk and $0.30 per barrel for Basrah light. Payment: $0.15 per barrel against nomination of vessel and date accepted by Somo [Iraq's state oil marketing organisation]. Balance net 10 days after lifting." The deal would have earned $1.1m. Shakir al-Khafaji was a ruthless negotiator who aggressively pursued his payments when the company fell behind, according to Italtech executives. The Italians say that one day he arrived unannounced at Mr Giangrandi's office in Abu Dhabi, accompanied by bodyguards. "It was a surprise visit: he wanted his commission. It was, let's say, unusual," says Mr Giangrandi. Another Italtech executive adds: "He knocked at the door with two tough guys. Augusto was terrified and arranged for Shakir to be paid in Geneva." Mr Khafaji acknowledges that he had problems with the payment of the commission and that he went to Abu Dhabi, but says he went there alone. A copy of an Italtech accounting document shows that on November 17 2000, Bayoil transferred $1m to Italtech's Geneva account. On the same day, it records Italtech made a "payment" of the same amount; a note, hand-written by an Italtech executive, identifies the recipient as "Shaker Al Khafagi". The original document is in the hands of the Italian authorities. Mr Khafaji says he worked alone when he sold the allocations and that he was selling them on behalf of his family. He also now says he did not have any associates in Jordan. But Mr Giangrandi says that Mr Khafaji introduced himself as Mr Ritter's "partner" and that he was "representing his allocations". Mr Giangrandi says he never met Mr Ritter. A copy of a handwritten fax dated July 10 2000, the same month that Mr Khafaji began funding Mr Ritter's film, shows Mr Giangrandi passing on Mr Khafaji's contact details to Mr Chalmers. The note says: "Dear David. This is the partner of S. R. with whom I am negotiating now the 5M B-L. He is a very influential person here, and we can do many things in the future with him. Regards, A. G." Mr Giangrandi confirmed that "S. R." referred to Mr Ritter. Mr Ritter insists he was never offered any allocations by the Iraqi government. But he does relate an incident when an Iraqi official from the UN mission in New York said he might be able to get funding for his film by "sending an oil contract through a French oil company". Mr Ritter says he "terminated the conversation at this point". Mr Ritter was having trouble finding a backer for his documentary until he met Mr Khafaji at a congressional hearing. Mr Ritter says it was agreed there would be no quid pro quo for the production. He says he told Mr Khafaji: "If you are willing to underwrite this film, the money can have no connection to the Iraqi government" and he agreed. Last January, a list of alleged beneficiaries of Iraqi oil allocations began to circulate widely, and Mr Khafaji's name was on it. He was one of only two US nationals mentioned. "I called him and asked him," says Mr Ritter. "He said he had never received any money. He said it's all BS. He said he doesn't know why his name is on there." "I choose to believe [him] over anyone else . . . Until someone demonstrates this man has done something wrong, he is a hero in my book." Asked how he would characterise anyone suggesting that Mr Khafaji was offering allocations in his name, Mr Ritter replied: "I'd say that person's a fucking liar. Quote unquote. And tell him to come over here so I can kick his ass." "The concept of Khafaji running around saying that allocations belonged to me: that is bullshit. How could Shakir even say that?" However, he added: "If he received allocations in November 2000, I would be very upset. I would be extremely upset." Reporting by Mark Turner, Claudio Gatti and Lionel Barber in New York Claudio Gatti is a New York-based reporter with Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy's leading business daily

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (6738)	4/13/2004 2:50:24 PM
From: Hawkmoon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15987

Btw, for those who read my posts, you might recall my having discussed the writings of Hernando De Soto, a Peruvian economist. It's my opinion that his work is a must-read for those who would seek to understand why capitalism has not yet work in undeveloped countries. Here's an interview with him that might help explain his views better: cceia.org Hawk

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (6738)	4/14/2004 2:02:41 AM
From: Nadine Carroll	Respond to of 15987

Twofowler, I simply reject the logic that doing nothing, and holding out one's hopes for "exhaustion" on the part of the Palestinians, is not a credible solution. It may indeed be the best of a bad lot of choices. Look at the Palestinians. Look at their leaders, immutable save by death. Look at their chosen priorities and values. Where is what they want to build, compared to what they want to destroy? What positive overtures could Israel or anyone else make to them that wouldn't be taken for weakness? Who would respond positively now? Who could respond positively? Sometimes there are no good answers.

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (6738)	4/14/2004 2:08:08 AM
From: Nadine Carroll	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15987

Barry Rubin puts it better than I can: Fighting the con game By BARRY RUBIN Behind the scenes of the apparently deteriorating situation in Iraq are clues revealing the region's most basic problems. For example, the intensive battles between Shi'ite forces and occupation troops take place on the eve of the turnover of power to an interim government and elections. Why is this happening now, when ambitious Iraqi politicians could simply wait for foreigners to get into office? Ostensibly, fighting began over a plan to arrest Sadr, the thuggish son of a great Shi'ite hero murdered by dictator Saddam Hussein a quarter-century ago. Yet for Sadr, his Iranian sponsors, and the Sunni Muslim terrorists supporting either Islamist revolution or a return of Saddam Hussein, the goal is to sabotage progress. If a new regime establishes itself this could end forever their hopes of seizing the country or continuing the struggle for total victory. If the foreigners leave, they lose their best scapegoat, those against whom they can mobilize hysterical mass hatred. In short, the Iraq situation roughly parallels that of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2000. An imminent solution would benefit Arabs. But implementation – with an Israeli withdrawal, peace and a Palestinian state; a democratic Iraq and Anglo-American withdrawal – would destroy the militants their ambitions and ideological agenda. Toward this end, they are ready to wreck their societies, suffer huge number of casualties, and delay a solution by many years. Of course, they have an alternative strategy available in both the Palestinian and Iraqi cases: Play along, make a deal, get the foreigners out, and then go for power. Arafat could easily have signed a treaty, gotten a Palestinian state, and then worked on the next stage of eliminating Israel entirely. But this is not so attractive, for several reasons. Once the situation is stabilized it is harder to stir up passions for battle. If the situation of your people improves materially, they may not want to fight on and sacrifice the material gains they have made. Moreover, the scapegoat of "occupation" will be lost, while their people might believe in the good intentions of Americans or Israelis rather than demonize them. Suicide bombers are not going to be recruited under such circumstances. Finally, there is the international scene to consider. Launching a war, using terrorism and then playing the victim has worked very well for Yasser Arafat. As co-author of a recent biography of Arafat I know very well that it is impermissible in American journalistic and intellectual circles to say he was to blame for the peace process's collapse by employing a strategy of terrorism. In Europe and elsewhere the situation is far worse. THE BROADER point is to explain why so many Western and Israeli schemes to fix the Middle East fail and even make things worse. These may include the Oslo peace process, withdrawal from south Lebanon, promoting democracy, regime change in Iraq, paying off Iran not to build nuclear weapons, stopping international terrorism by solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and many other ideas produced daily in op-ed pieces. Here's what they have in common: They make concessions to prove that the West or Israel want to alleviate Arab or Muslim grievances. But this effort is misinterpreted as weakness (inviting more militancy), foolishness (encouraging trickery), or an evil plot (fostering additional antagonism). They create a process which provides benefits, thus encouraging the other side to fulfill its commitments and see the outcome as attractive. But this produces a period in which the militants can complain that they have not yet gotten the desired outcome, while ridiculing the benefits as nonexistent. By turning to violence (or breaking their promises) they can subvert the benefits and extend the timetable, thus having a cause for carrying on their battle under better conditions for themselves. They overestimate moderates and the appeal of material benefits. The peacemakers believe that those who want to end the conflict – a "silent minority" – can restrain the militants. Yet perhaps this "silent minority" is unarmed. Using religious, nationalist, and xenophobic appeals, activists can stir up the people against their own material interests. Moreover, leaders care nothing about the material well-being of their people, worrying that in a post-conflict situation they will either lose power or never gain it. They subvert the process – and who is going to stop them? They use appeasement and self-blame to keep the process going. Since would-be peacemaking politicians have a greater political stake in the process than their opponents, as the situation deteriorates they (or their successors) are tempted to offer more concessions and blame victims instead of the perpetrators. If extremists resort to terrorism this "proves" that the American, Spanish, or Israeli government is following wrong policies, and should be replaced. Sadr and other Iraqi radicals are thus resorting to policies which have worked up to a point for Arafat, Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria, among others. To wreck, lie, stall, bully, and subvert is a way to retain power and popularity, even if it does not produce total victory. Understanding and rejecting this con game is as important as fighting its practitioners. jpost.com

To: Hawkmoon who wrote (6738)	4/17/2004 11:40:40 PM
From: TimF	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15987

I was not specifically asserting that nothing should be done and that we should "hope for exhaustion". But I'm not proposing an alternative either. Not being able to think up another plan that I think will work doesn't mean that I am required to agree to your plan. Tim