canyonman, something to ponder......please read & comment, thanks, Chucky.
Fighting the con game
By BARRY RUBIN
Behind the scenes of the apparently deteriorating situation in Iraq are clues revealing the region's most basic problems.
For example, the intensive battles between Shi'ite forces and occupation troops take place on the eve of the turnover of power to an interim government and elections. Why is this happening now, when ambitious Iraqi politicians could simply wait for foreigners to get into office?
Ostensibly, fighting began over a plan to arrest Sadr, the thuggish son of a great Shi'ite hero murdered by dictator Saddam Hussein a quarter-century ago. Yet for Sadr, his Iranian sponsors, and the Sunni Muslim terrorists supporting either Islamist revolution or a return of Saddam Hussein, the goal is to sabotage progress. If a new regime establishes itself this could end forever their hopes of seizing the country or continuing the struggle for total victory. If the foreigners leave, they lose their best scapegoat, those against whom they can mobilize hysterical mass hatred.
In short, the Iraq situation roughly parallels that of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2000. An imminent solution would benefit Arabs. But implementation – with an Israeli withdrawal, peace and a Palestinian state; a democratic Iraq and Anglo-American withdrawal – would destroy the militants their ambitions and ideological agenda. Toward this end, they are ready to wreck their societies, suffer huge number of casualties, and delay a solution by many years.
Of course, they have an alternative strategy available in both the Palestinian and Iraqi cases: Play along, make a deal, get the foreigners out, and then go for power. Arafat could easily have signed a treaty, gotten a Palestinian state, and then worked on the next stage of eliminating Israel entirely.
But this is not so attractive, for several reasons. Once the situation is stabilized it is harder to stir up passions for battle. If the situation of your people improves materially, they may not want to fight on and sacrifice the material gains they have made.
Moreover, the scapegoat of "occupation" will be lost, while their people might believe in the good intentions of Americans or Israelis rather than demonize them. Suicide bombers are not going to be recruited under such circumstances.
Finally, there is the international scene to consider. Launching a war, using terrorism and then playing the victim has worked very well for Yasser Arafat. As co-author of a recent biography of Arafat I know very well that it is impermissible in American journalistic and intellectual circles to say he was to blame for the peace process's collapse by employing a strategy of terrorism. In Europe and elsewhere the situation is far worse.
THE BROADER point is to explain why so many Western and Israeli schemes to fix the Middle East fail and even make things worse. These may include the Oslo peace process, withdrawal from south Lebanon, promoting democracy, regime change in Iraq, paying off Iran not to build nuclear weapons, stopping international terrorism by solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and many other ideas produced daily in op-ed pieces.
Here's what they have in common:
They make concessions to prove that the West or Israel want to alleviate Arab or Muslim grievances. But this effort is misinterpreted as weakness (inviting more militancy), foolishness (encouraging trickery), or an evil plot (fostering additional antagonism).
They create a process which provides benefits, thus encouraging the other side to fulfill its commitments and see the outcome as attractive. But this produces a period in which the militants can complain that they have not yet gotten the desired outcome, while ridiculing the benefits as nonexistent. By turning to violence (or breaking their promises) they can subvert the benefits and extend the timetable, thus having a cause for carrying on their battle under better conditions for themselves.
They overestimate moderates and the appeal of material benefits. The peacemakers believe that those who want to end the conflict – a "silent minority" – can restrain the militants. Yet perhaps this "silent minority" is unarmed.
Using religious, nationalist, and xenophobic appeals, activists can stir up the people against their own material interests. Moreover, leaders care nothing about the material well-being of their people, worrying that in a post-conflict situation they will either lose power or never gain it. They subvert the process – and who is going to stop them?
They use appeasement and self-blame to keep the process going. Since would-be peacemaking politicians have a greater political stake in the process than their opponents, as the situation deteriorates they (or their successors) are tempted to offer more concessions and blame victims instead of the perpetrators. If extremists resort to terrorism this "proves" that the American, Spanish, or Israeli government is following wrong policies, and should be replaced.
Sadr and other Iraqi radicals are thus resorting to policies which have worked up to a point for Arafat, Hizbullah, Iran, and Syria, among others.
To wreck, lie, stall, bully, and subvert is a way to retain power and popularity, even if it does not produce total victory. Understanding and rejecting this con game is as important as fighting its practitioners. |
