TIME FOR REAL QUESTIONS
10 Questions for John Ashcroft
By Judd Legum
Salon.com
Monday 12 April 2004
When the 9/11 commission grills the Attorney General Tuesday, here's what they
should ask.
Until now, Attorney General John Ashcroft has been a beneficiary of the intense attention paid to
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. The controversy surrounding Rice has taken the focus
away from Ashcroft's own counterterrorism record -- a record of misplaced priorities, missed
opportunities and mistakes. But, on Tuesday, Ashcroft will raise his right hand, take an oath and
testify publicly before the 9/11 commission.
Here are 10 key questions the commissioners should ask the Attorney General:
1) If counterterrorism was a top priority for the Justice Department prior to 9/11, why did
Ashcroft ignore the FBI's specific request in August 2001 for additional counterterrorism
resources?
That month the FBI submitted their internal budget request to the Department of Justice, seeking
248 counterterrorism agents and support staff, 54 translators to review a backlog of foreign language
intelligence and 200 professional intelligence researchers to analyze the intelligence. Yet when
Ashcroft submitted his final budget request to the White House on Sept. 10, 2001, 24 hours before the
al-Qaida attacks, he did not request funding for any of the FBI's urgent needs. In fact, Ashcroft
proposed cuts in counterterrorism efforts, including a $65 million reduction for counterterrorism
equipment grants, a $20 million reduction for border control and a $1.4 million reduction for the
National Domestic Preparedness Office. Of the 68 programs where Ashcroft proposed increases, not a
single one involved counterterrorism. In Attorney Janet Reno's budget for 2000, counterterrorism was
her first priority. What was Ashcroft's thinking that led him to remove it as a priority and to propose
extensive cuts?
2) Why wasn't counterterrorism one of the seven strategic goals Ashcroft outlined in a
May 2001 memo to his division heads?
In that memo, he outlined his major goals for the upcoming budget year. Among his priorities:
Reducing gun violence, protecting the rights of crime victims and strengthening internal Justice
Department financial systems. Counterterrorism was not mentioned. By contrast, Attorney General
Janet Reno's budget guidance of April 2000 listed counterterrorism as the area where "up-to-date
human and technological infrastructure" was critical.
By August 2001, Ashcroft had created a "strategic plan" document to spotlight his priorities. Out of
36 "objectives" Ashcroft highlighted 13 in yellow. The document explained "Highlight=AG Goal."
Although objective 1.3 was "combat terrorist activities," it was not highlighted. Tellingly, in Nov. 2001,
Ashcroft released a revised strategic plan which contained the same seven strategic goals as the
original and one addition. Now his number one goal: "Protect America Against the Threat of
Terrorism." But who had neglected it before 9/11?
3) Between Jan. 20 and Sept. 11, 2001, were the FBI field offices instructed to
increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists? If so, why hasn't Ashcroft been able
to provide any evidence to the commission proving it?
In her public testimony, Condoleezza Rice said, "The FBI tasked all 56 of its U.S. field offices to
increase surveillance of known suspected terrorists and to reach out to known informants who might
have information on terrorist activities." But Commissioner Jamie Gorelick rejected Rice's claim as not
factual, saying, "We have no record of that. The Washington field office international terrorism people
say they never heard about the threat, they never heard about the warnings...special agents in charge
around the country, Miami in particular, no knowledge of this." According to a Newsweek report,
Ashcroft rebuffed specific requests by the FBI to discuss counterterrorism with special agents in
charge. At a spring 2001 meeting with Special Agents in charge in Quantico, Virginia, Ashcroft told
then FBI Director Louis Freeh that his priorities were "violent crime and drugs," and when Freeh said
that those were not his priorities and began discussing counterterrorism, "Ashcroft didn't want to hear
about it." This confrontation may be particularly significant in light of Commissioner Tim Roemer's
comments during Rice's public testimony: "The FBI is the key here. Nothing went down the chain to
the FBI field offices." Can Ashcroft recount his conversations and meetings with FBI officials about
counterterrorism?
4) After 9/11, why did Ashcroft slash almost $1 billion from an emergency FBI request
to bolster counterterrorism efforts?
Immediately after 9/11 the FBI made a $1.5 billion request for emergency resources to combat
terrorism. But Ashcroft refused to provide two-thirds of these resources. Roughly $1 billion in funding
was denied for items such as security improvements, communications equipment and technical
support. Why? Where did the money go instead?
5) Beginning in the summer of 2001, Ashcroft stopped flying commercial airlines and
traveled exclusively by private jet because of an FBI "threat assessment." What,
exactly, did the threat assessment say? Why is the threat assessment still being
withheld from the public?
In July 2001, CBS News revealed that Ashcroft, on the advice of the FBI, "was traveling exclusively
by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines." At the time, the FBI refused to identify "what the
threat was, when it was detected or who made it." Eight months after 9/11, in an attempt to deflect
criticism, Ashcroft said his decision to stop flying commercial airlines was "because of personal
threats on his life, not out of fears about terrorist hijackings." When Ashcroft was asked by a reporter
to explain further he "walked from the room without comment." Curiously, when Ashcroft's behavior
was initially reported, a top official at the CIA said "he was unaware of specific threats against any
Cabinet member." Whatever the rationale, Ashcroft's use of private jets cost taxpayers more than
$1600 an hour. Was he aware of threat warnings? Will he now urge their immediate declassification?
6) Does Ashcroft regret the treatment of the 762 innocent foreign men detained by the
federal government in the US for months after 9/11? Does Ashcroft think those men --
many of whom were subject to verbal and physical abuse and had their due process
rights violated -- deserve an apology?
A earlier report, released by Fine in June, documented how hundreds of detainees' due process
rights were violated by federal officials who imprisoned them without charges or evidence. Of the 762
individuals who were the subject of Fine's review "none was ever charged with terrorism-related
crimes." Nevertheless, when questioned about the situation before Congress last June, John Ashcroft
said he had "no apologies," adding, "we must be vigilant." What message does Ashcroft believe he is
sending to the world about the protection of legal rights and civil liberties that are at the heart of the
American example?
7) In Oct. 2001, Ashcroft appeared with President Bush at a press conference to
unveil a list of 22 "most wanted terrorists." Thirty months later at least 20 of those
individuals are still at large. Why is the war on terrorism lagging?
On Oct. 10, 2001 Ashcroft, President Bush and FBI Director Robert Mueller appeared at FBI
headquarters to announce the creation of the Most Wanted Terrorists list. Bush called the 22
individuals placed on the list "the most dangerous [terrorists] -- the leaders and key supporters, the
planners and strategists." Bush added, They must be found. They will be stopped, and they will be
punished." But only one person on the list -- Khalid Shaikh Mohammed -- has been captured. (One
other individual on the list, Muhammed Atef, may be dead). Yet despite capturing or killing less than 5
percent of the individuals who, by their own admission, are the world's most dangerous terrorists,
Ashcroft continues to repeatedly tout the success of his counterterrorism efforts against al-Qaida. In a
speech in Oct. 2003, Ashcroft bragged that two-thirds of al-Qaida's leadership worldwide is either in
custody or dead." It seems that, when success proves elusive, Ashcroft simply changes the definition
of success. Were resources moved from the war on terrorism to the war in Iraq? Would additional
resources assist in the capture of the terrorists on the Most Wanted list?
8) Why, in the days after 9/11, did Ashcroft, along with White House and State
Department officials, allow two dozen members of the bin Laden and Saudi royal families
to circumvent FAA restrictions forbidding flights and leave the country without full FBI
questioning?
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks all domestic aircraft were grounded. While some commercial
flights slowly resumed, private aviation was completely prohibited for weeks. Despite the fact that 14 of
the 19 hijackers were Saudis, Craig Unger's new book, "House of Bush, House of Saud," reveals
numerous Saudi citizens -- including two dozen members of the bin Laden family -- were permitted to
violate the ban so they could quickly return to Saudi Arabia. Not one of the bin Ladens were
questioned by the FBI or the Justice Department before departing, even though many had direct ties to
Osama bin Laden and might have provided valuable information about Osama's finances, associates
and supporters. U.S. officials later learned from a captured al-Qaida operative that one of the men
permitted to leave without questioning, Saudi Prince Ahmed, "knew beforehand that an attack was
scheduled for American soil" on 9/11. On Sept. 19, 2001, as Saudis with close associations to
Osama bin Laden were permitted to freely leave the country, Ashcroft said he had "a responsibility to
use every legal means at our disposal to prevent further terrorist activity by taking people into custody
who have violated the law and who may pose a threat to America." But instead of focusing on the
Saudis who likely had valuable information, Ashcroft launched a dragnet that avoided Saudis. Why?
9) Condoleezza Rice testified that, during the summer of 2001, "there were 70 full
field investigations underway of [al-Qaida] cells." Why didn't Ashcroft demand that the
National Security Adviser organize daily meetings at the White House of the highest
officials with national security responsibility, including himself, to force information from
the bureaucracy to the top and locate the terrorist threat? Why did Ashcroft not raise the
subject of those field investigations at the one Principals Meeting of national security
officials that discussed terrorism (specifically, the Predator drone aircraft) before 9/11?
Rice has insisted that Principals meetings on the al-Qaida threat were unnecessary. She testified
that she did not believe "bringing the principals over to the White House every day...was a good way to
go about this. It wasn't an efficient way to go about it." Yet the only knowledge she had of the 70
investigations into al-Qaida cells operating in the United States was from the still classified Aug. 6
President's Daily Brief. That memo was not enough to induce Rice to act. She testified that reading
there were 70 investigations into al-Qaida cells operating domestically, at a time al-Qaida had publicly
declared war on America, suggested to her that she did not need to do more. She explained that the
Aug. 6 PDB contained "no recommendation that we do something about this." In contrast, during the
Clinton administration, frequent high level meetings conducted by then National Security advisor
Samuel Berger in 1999, spurred action that disrupted the al-Qaida Millenium plots. Will Ashcroft
produce and declassify the memos on these 70 investigations? Detail any discussion he ever had with
Rice or President Bush about the investigations? If not, why not?
10) If there were structural impediments to information sharing among federal
agencies prior to 9/11, why did you testify under oath before the Congress in May 2001
that the National Security Council was a "highly effective instrument" in coordinating
federal agencies dealing with counterterrorism?
The Bush administration has repeatedly attempted to deflect responsibility for the intelligence
failures prior to 9/11 by claiming that structural impediments to information sharing among agencies
precluded effective counterterrorism efforts. Condoleezza Rice testified, "If anything might have helped
stop 9/11 it would have been better information about threats inside the United States...[but] structural
and legal impediments...prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. So the attacks came." But Ashcroft told the Congress in May 2001 that the
National Security Council was a highly effective instrument in facilitating coordination among the
pertinent federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities." Why did the Justice Department and
the NSC fail to coordinate federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities prior to 9/11?
Attorney General Ashcroft, what is your responsibility -- and the responsibility of National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice and President Bush -- for this failure?
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