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Politics : GOPwinger Lies/Distortions/Omissions/Perversions of Truth -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: PartyTime who wrote (10170)	4/14/2004 11:56:10 AM
From: Asymmetric	Respond to of 173976

AN EMAIL FROM THE FRONT: Andrew Sullivan Blog: andrewsullivan.com Here's an email from a soldier I first corresponded with when he was a cadet at West Point. He's legit - and his email is worth printing in full, I think. I'm not endorsing everything he says, but it's worth hearing what a very bright and committed young soldier is going through right now: “Troop strength - I think we have consistently underestimated the number of troops it would take to pacify Iraq. Gen Shinseki's original estimates were much closer to the mark. The fact that the 1st Armored Division (my unit) has now been extended for at least 4 months shows there aren't enough troops - in order to deal with a fairly minor uprising we had to break the one-year-boots-on-ground pledge. If we had had a strategic reserve, this would not be necessary. However, the dirty secret is that there aren't any more troops to be had - at least not the active-duty armor/infantry brigades and divisions requried to fight a tough enemy. Furthermore, the frenetic destruction that occured after the fall of Baghdad set us way back in terms of reconstruction - more troops could have limited if not prevented the extensive looting. Sadir et al. - Although his uprising is seen as a ominious sign for the coalition, it does have an upside. His poorly trained and poorly equiped rag-bad militia is being chewed up by our army. His defeat and eventual marginalization will serve the coalition well. After one year of occupation, I think many Iraqis have come to see the army as rather toothless - we get blown up by roadside bombs or mortars and yet we continue to rebuild schools, enforce the laws, train police etc. Now because of Fallujah and what has been going on in Baghdad, our potency and resolve are on full display. My task force alone has killed many insurgents in the last two weeks - something that was not happening before. By confronting us in a conventional way, Sadir et al. are playing to our military strengths - and it isn't going well for them. Long term prospects - I have to admit that after one year here I am largely pessimistic. Iraqi society is sick in many ways. Sometimes it's hard to tell if Saddam was the problem or the symptom. I just don't know how a society so divided along ethnic and tribal lines, with no democratic or liberal traditions and almost zero respect for the rule of law can build any kind of society accept and autocratic one. I'm not ashamed that the US came here with good intentions and noble sentiments about the universality of our values - democracy, liberty, the rule of law etc., but I think all our efforts might be eventually futile. In essence, we have given the Iraqis an enormous gift, but they don't seem to be seizing the opportunity. You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink... The Army - Most soldiers in my unit were pretty demoralized by the extension. We were promised a one year tour and now that promise has been broken. Retention will certainly suffer. However, we are facing a difficult time in Iraq and our continued presence is necessary. What I would like to hear and I think most soldiers feel the same way - is for someone high up to say "Look, we didn't plan for this. Things have gotten screwed up and we need your continued sacrifice. This is why it is so important you stay." Instead we have gotten vague comments about "managing the troop redeployment" - as if it were some little snafu or inconvenience. The truth is, our division is now getting ready for another bloody and hellishly hot summer that none of us expected to ever go through again.”

To: PartyTime who wrote (10170)	4/14/2004 12:24:21 PM
From: Skywatcher	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 173976

U.S. Tactics Condemned by British Officers By Sean Rayment Telegrah UK Sunday 11 April 2004 Senior British commanders have condemned American military tactics in Iraq as heavy-handed and disproportionate. One senior Army officer told The Telegraph that America's aggressive methods were causing friction among allied commanders and that there was a growing sense of "unease and frustration" among the British high command. The officer, who agreed to the interview on the condition of anonymity, said that part of the problem was that American troops viewed Iraqis as untermenschen - the Nazi expression for "sub-humans". Speaking from his base in southern Iraq, the officer said: "My view and the view of the British chain of command is that the Americans' use of violence is not proportionate and is over-responsive to the threat they are facing. They don't see the Iraqi people the way we see them. They view them as untermenschen. They are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life in the way the British are. Their attitude towards the Iraqis is tragic, it's awful. "The US troops view things in very simplistic terms. It seems hard for them to reconcile subtleties between who supports what and who doesn't in Iraq. It's easier for their soldiers to group all Iraqis as the bad guys. As far as they are concerned Iraq is bandit country and everybody is out to kill them." The phrase untermenschen - literally "under-people" - was brought to prominence by Adolf Hitler in his book Mein Kampf, published in 1925. He used the term to describe those he regarded as racially inferior: Jews, Slaves and gipsies. Although no formal complaints have as yet been made to their American counterparts, the officer said the British Government was aware of its commanders' "concerns and fears". The officer explained that, under British military rules of war, British troops would never be given clearance to carry out attacks similar to those being conducted by the US military, in which helicopter gunships have been used to fire on targets in urban areas. British rules of engagement only allow troops to open fire when attacked, using the minimum force necessary and only at identified targets. The American approach was markedly different: "When US troops are attacked with mortars in Baghdad, they use mortar-locating radar to find the firing point and then attack the general area with artillery, even though the area they are attacking may be in the middle of a densely populated residential area. "They may well kill the terrorists in the barrage but they will also kill and maim innocent civilians. That has been their response on a number of occasions. It is trite, but American troops do shoot first and ask questions later. They are very concerned about taking casualties and have even trained their guns on British troops, which has led to some confrontations between soldiers. "The British response in Iraq has been much softer. During and after the war the British set about trying to win the confidence of the local population. There have been problems, it hasn't been easy but on the whole it was succeeding." The officer believed that America had now lost the military initiative in Iraq, and it could only be regained with carefully planned, precision attacks against the "terrorists". "The US will have to abandon the sledgehammer-to-crack-a-nut approach - it has failed," he said. "They need to stop viewing every Iraqi, every Arab as the enemy and attempt to win the hearts and minds of the people. "Our objective is to create a stable, democratic and safe Iraq. That's achievable but not in the short term. It is going to take up to 10 years."