To: Thomas M. who wrote (26395 ) 4/21/2004 5:02:35 PM From: Neocon Respond to of 93284 Something else interesting: Admiral Leahy's opinions are enlisted to inform us that a naval blockade by his forces could have ended the war. There is no discussion of how long this operation might have taken to have the effect intended or of the massive starvation and death it certainly would have caused. Leahy's belief that the bomb would never work and his desire to use a third one on Tokyo (shared by Carl Spaatz) after he was proven wrong are also never mentioned. Eisenhower is said to have attended the Potsdam conference and asked that the bomb not be used. In reality he never attended the conference, and his after the fact recollections of speaking out against the bomb at this time are unconfirmed and contradicted by other sources. Finally, General Macarthur, who later wanted to nuke the Chinese when they interfered with his plans in Korea, is portrayed as some sort of peacenik. Certainly it was clear to Allied leaders that Japan had lost the war. However the Japanese leadership was highly reluctant to accept this reality and surrender on our terms. The Japanese insisted on preserving their emperor not as a figurehead but as the actual ruler of Japan, thereby avoiding any admission of defeat. This is a pivotal fact the book ignores entirely. Like the book as a whole, Takaki's treatment of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender reveals a deep lack of understanding of the subject and a highly selective use of information in order to support a predetermined conclusion. The policy is falsely said to have been nothing more substantial than a campaign slogan, and almost all of its' main purposes are simply not mentioned. Roosevelt and many others drew lessons from the history of World War I, when a negotiated peace gave rise to the belief in Germany that the war was lost as a result of political backstabbing, not military defeat. The Nazi's exploited this belief to the fullest during their rise to power. More than anything else, the Allied policy of unconditional surrender was meant to prevent a third world war by demonstrating beyond any doubt to the people of the Axis countries that militarism leads to total disaster. The peaceful nature of Germany and Japan since 1945 has proven the wisdom of this policy. Roosevelt also wanted to avoid the event of one country in the Allied camp coming to terms with the enemy on their own and then dropping out of the war. amazon.com