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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: redfish who wrote (43559)4/23/2004 8:34:54 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Politics and Truth
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by Jonathan Schell

Published on Thursday, April 22, 2004 by TomDispatch.com and The Nation

Halfway through Tim Russert's hour-long interview with Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry on April 18, there was an exchange that revealed in microcosm some of the fundamental unspoken rules of American politics in our day. Russert played a clip from Kerry's 1971 appearance on Meet the Press following his testimony as a leader of Vietnam Veterans Against the War before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A longhaired Kerry, in uniform, was seen saying that he stood by the essence of his testimony, in which he had said that veterans had admitted that they had "raped, cut off ears, cut off heads, taped wires from portable telephones to human genitals and turned up the power." He added that under the Geneva Conventions such acts were war crimes.

Russert did not play the tape to congratulate Kerry for his truth-telling. On the contrary, he was clearly calling him on the carpet. He even suggested that "a lot" of Kerry's allegations had been discredited. In fact, every word that Kerry spoke then has been shown to be true in an abundance of testimony. Even now, new revelations pour out. For example, the Toledo Blade just won the Pulitzer Prize for unearthing the story of an army company that went on a seven-month rampage in Vietnam, routinely killing peasants, burning villages, cutting off the ears of corpses. Troops in the field can hardly engage in such conduct over a period of months without the knowledge and at least tacit approval of higher authority.

Kerry answered warily. He began by trying to make light of the clip. "Where did all that dark hair go? -- that's a big question for me," he joked. He went on to say that although some of his language had been "excessive," he was still proud of the stand he had taken. His predicament is worth pondering. The powers that be, with the approval of mainstream opinion, had sent him into a misbegotten war whose awful reality they covered up. When he helped uncover it, it was not they but he who was punished. In short, by sending young men into an atrocious, mistaken war, they created a truth so distasteful to the public that its disclosure, by discrediting the discloser, keeps them in power.

Was Kerry "flip-flopping" -- the Bush Administration's main campaign charge against him? Was he all-too-characteristically trying to back off from a position he had once taken while at the same time embracing it? And didn't this performance echo his complicated and equivocal stance on the Iraq war, in which he has said that his vote in the Senate to authorize the President to use armed force against Iraq was "not a vote to go to war" and that in 2003 he voted "for" the $87 billion supplemental authorization for the war "before" he voted "against it" (a statement the Republicans are making political hay with in a current TV ad)?

Kerry's equivocations are indeed related. For if as a soldier in Vietnam in 1968 and '69 he was brought face to face with one reality -- the human reality of the war -- then as a presidential candidate in 2004 he has been driven up against another -- the political reality that no antiwar candidate of modern times has ever made it into the White House. One might think that Kerry's good sense and bravery in opposing the Vietnam War three decades ago might stand him in good stead today. (How many Americans now think getting into Vietnam was a good idea?) But as the Russert interview shows, just the opposite is the case. It is Kerry's bravery as a soldier fighting the mistaken war, not his bravery as a veteran opposing it, that helps him in his bid for the presidency.

And so just as Kerry bowed to political reality by distancing himself from his old testimony while expressing continued pride in it, so he bowed to that same reality by voting for the Iraq authorization (while expressing opposition to "the way" the President went to war). Even today he will not acknowledge that his vote -- and the war -- were a mistake. Kerry is stuck between politics and truth. After the Congressional vote on the war, however, a peculiar thing happened. Kerry's political sails, far from filling with a fresh breeze, began to flap idly in the wind. Polls and pundits agreed: His nomination was dead in the water.

The action shifted elsewhere. For while opposition to a crazy war might not be a ticket to the White House, it was still good for something. It swelled a powerful popular movement. Huge demonstrations against the war took place in the United States, as they did throughout the world. In the time of Vietnam, antiwar sentiment propelled first Eugene McCarthy, then Robert Kennedy and later George McGovern into the forefront of Democratic politics. Now antiwar sentiment propelled Howard Dean into his brief moment of front-runnership. In the game of politics and truth, truth was sneaking in the back door. Suddenly, everyone was saying that the Democratic Party had recovered its energy, its "backbone."

But then came another surprising twist. A shrewd, or possibly over-shrewd, Democratic primary electorate, steaming with indignation against the war but apparently fearful of history's lesson that the antiwar man cannot win, shifted its allegiance from Dean to Kerry. All at once, the apparently political calculation that had underlain Kerry's vote for the war in the first place paid off, and he became the candidate.

Such is the archeology of the dilemma that Kerry and the Democratic Party face today. Their flip-flopping, which is real enough, is between the truth as they see it and politics as they know it to be. The party is an antiwar party that dares not speak its name. Its candidate is energized, but with a borrowed energy. He has a backbone, but it is a borrowed backbone.

The antiwar movement that has lent Kerry and his party this energy and this backbone faces a dilemma, too. On the one hand, it needs Kerry to win, even though he refuses to repent his vote to authorize the war. On the other hand, neither the movement nor Kerry can afford to let the antiwar energies that were and remain a principal source of their hopes and his, die down. The movement must persist, independent of Kerry and keeping him or making him honest, yet not opposing him. If truth must be an exile from the mainstream of politics, let it thrive on the margins.
____________________________________________________

Jonathan Schell, Harold Willens Peace Fellow at the Nation Institute, is the author, most recently, of 'The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People' (Metropolitan).

This article was originally published in the May 10 issue of The Nation

Copyright C2004 Jonathan Schell

commondreams.org



To: redfish who wrote (43559)4/23/2004 8:52:43 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (4) | Respond to of 89467
 
Colin Powell, the Leader who Might Have Been
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by James Goldsborough

Published on Thursday, April 22, 2004 by the San Diego Union-Tribune


Three former four-star generals have gone on to become secretary of state. Of the three, one is legendary, one was a flop and so ran for president, and the third is Colin Powell.

Powell admits he is a source for Bob Woodward's new book on the Iraq War, called "Plan of Attack." According to Woodward, Powell was kept out of the loop and only reluctantly went along with war plans. Powell refers to war planners close to Vice President Dick Cheney as the "Gestapo" and accuses Cheney of having war "fever." When President Bush decides on war, Powell asks if he understands the consequences. He warns Bush that "If you break it (Iraq), you own it."

We broke it and now we own it.

These self-serving comments have caused a stir, and Powell is doing some backtracking. He denies that he was out of the loop and says he doesn't recall the Gestapo reference. He says he talked to Woodward "on instructions from the White House," which is disingenuous because he has helped Woodward on other books.

Trying to have things both ways, Powell fails twice, appearing both irrelevant and disloyal. If he was the reluctant warrior, then he was used by the so-called Gestapo. If he was as gung-ho as the others, how can Woodward describe him as semi-despondent "because he knew that this was a war that might have been avoided?"

Powell's a soldier, his defenders say. He was outvoted on the war, so he saluted and did the mission.

There are three answers to that:

It depends on the mission.

He's not a soldier any more.

You don't do the mission, then complain when it flops.

Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall proved that ex-soldiers could become statesmen. In France, Charles de Gaulle proved the same thing. The military habit of saluting and following orders is not a DNA imprint. A retired officer is not neutered. He can become a civilian leader, even a great leader.

Marshall, chief army planner in World War II, as secretary of state became the chief civilian planner of the Cold War. Representing a Democratic president (Truman) and working with a Republican Congress – he launched the Marshall Plan, the greatest rescue mission in history. He began the negotiations that led to NATO, our first peacetime alliance. He won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Eisenhower and Marshall had something in common that Powell lacks. Neither was a political general. They earned their stars (each became a five-star general) the usual way. Leaving the military, neither became involved in partisan politics. Eisenhower could have run as a Democrat.

Marshall clashed openly with Truman, most noticeably in 1948 over recognition of Israel. He retired after the election of that year, but Truman brought him back as defense secretary when the Korean War broke out.

Powell's career resembles more that of another four-star general who became secretary of state, Alexander Haig. Both men owed their stars to politicians, who jumped them up the chain of command because of political service. Haig was a protégé of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Powell rose to prominence under Caspar Weinberger, describing himself during the Iran-Contra affair as Weinberger's "faithful Indian companion."

One need not be a retired officer to be a weak secretary of state. One thinks of Dean Rusk, a career foreign service officer, during the Vietnam War. But a military career that blossoms thanks to being a faithful Indian companion is not the best way to hone leadership skills.

Haig had no such skills and was fired. George Shultz, who replaced Haig (who later ran for president), was an improvement. The State Department kept its integrity under Shultz, while the White House, CIA and Pentagon endured Iran-Contra.

From what Woodward tells us, Powell's view on the Iraq War was no different from that of Robin Cook, the British foreign secretary. Cook disagreed over war, resigned and spoke out against it. Jack Straw, his successor, lately has been speaking out.

Powell was to be the voice of reason in Bush's Cabinet. A man who might have been president himself, standing higher in polls than Bush, he was ballast to the people Woodward says he calls Gestapo.

He brought a military man's prudence – the so-called Powell Doctrine – into an administration full of civilian war hawks. Pragmatic, appealing, eloquent, he gave Bush badly needed credibility. He might have used that to influence events rather than becoming window-dressing.

The argument for remaining in place when you disagree is to influence policy. Yet Powell's presentation to the United Nations on the eve of war, which was bellicose and unfounded, served as a call to war. He blames the CIA for supplying him misinformation, but it was his presentation. Where is his sense of responsibility?

After four years as secretary of state – twice as long as Marshall – Powell's only legacy is a kind of lofty irrelevance, a quality with which he also has infected the State Department. One thinks of Noel Coward's lament on his friend Anthony Eden, following the Suez debacle: "a tragic figure, cast in a star part well above his capabilities."

© Copyright 2004 Union-Tribune Publishing Co.


commondreams.org



To: redfish who wrote (43559)4/23/2004 9:45:13 AM
From: redfish  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
The attack in Spain three days before the election was the perfect "set up" for the coming attack in the US.

We all remember the accusations of cowardice when the Spanish decided not to re-elect the prime minister who got them into the Iraq quagmire.

When Al Qaeda "spikes" the ball in the US (it needn't be a spectacular attack, any attack at all will do), it will produce a national fervor to prove that we are not like the Spanish ... that we won't let terrorists dictate who we vote for.

The Bush administration will stoke the fervor with orange alerts and warnings that November 2 polling places may be targets of further attacks.

Millions of Americans will then express their indignation and defiance by turning out in huge numbers (people who have never voted in their lives will wait patiently for hours at polling places) to re-elect the current administration ... exactly the result Al Qaeda has in mind.