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To: T L Comiskey who wrote (43640)4/24/2004 8:04:40 AM
From: T L Comiskey  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
White House Says Iraq Sovereignty Could Be Limited
By Steven R. Weisman
New York Times

April 23, 2004

WASHINGTON, April 22 - The Bush administration's plans for a new caretaker government in Iraq would place severe limits on its sovereignty, including only partial command over its armed forces and no authority to enact new laws, administration officials said Thursday.

These restrictions to the plan negotiated with Lakhdar Brahimi, the special United Nations envoy, were presented in detail for the first time by top administration officials at Congressional hearings this week, culminating in long and intense questioning on Thursday at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on the goal of returning Iraq to self-rule on June 30.

Only 10 weeks from the scheduled transfer of sovereignty, the administration is still not sure exactly who will govern in Baghdad, or precisely how they will be selected. A week ago, President Bush agreed to a recommendation by Mr. Brahimi to dismantle the existing Iraqi Governing Council, which was handpicked by the United States, and to replace it with a caretaker government whose makeup is to be decided next month.

That government would stay in power until elections could be held, beginning next year.

The administration's plans seem likely to face objections on several fronts. Several European and United Nations diplomats have said in interviews that they do not think the United Nations will approve a Security Council resolution sought by Washington that handcuffs the new Iraq government in its authority over its own armed forces, let alone foreign forces on its soil.

These diplomats, and some American officials, said that if the American military command ordered a siege of an Iraqi city, for example, and there was no language calling for an Iraqi government to participate in the decision, the government might not be able to survive protests that could follow.

The diplomats added that it might be unrealistic to expect the new Iraqi government not to demand the right to change Iraqi laws put in place by the American occupation under L. Paul Bremer III, including provisions limiting the influence of Islamic religious law.

Democratic and Republican senators appeared frustrated on Thursday that so few details were known at this late stage in the transition process, and several senators focused on the question of who would be in charge of Iraq's security.

Asked whether the new Iraqi government would have a chance to approve military operations led by American commanders, who would be in charge of both foreign and Iraqi forces, a senior official said Americans would have the final say.

"The arrangement would be, I think as we are doing today, that we would do our very best to consult with that interim government and take their views into account," said Marc Grossman, under secretary of state for political affairs. But he added that American commanders will "have the right, and the power, and the obligation" to decide.

That formulation is especially sensitive at a time when American and Iraqi forces are poised to fight for control of Falluja.

In another sphere, Mr. Grossman said there would be curbs on the powers of the National Conference of Iraqis that Mr. Brahimi envisions as a consultative body. The conference, he said, is not expected to pass new laws or revise the laws adopted under the American occupation.

"We don't believe that the period between the 1st of July and the end of December should be a time for making new laws," Mr. Grossman said.

As envisioned by Mr. Brahimi, the caretaker government would consist of a president, a prime minister, two vice presidents or deputy prime ministers and a cabinet of ministers in each agency. A national conference of perhaps 1,000 Iraqis would advise it, possibly by establishing a smaller body of about 100 Iraqis.

His plan would supplant an earlier American proposal that would have chosen an Iraqi assembly through caucuses.

Since last November, when the June 30 transfer of sovereignty was approved by President Bush and decreed by Mr. Bremer in Iraq, the United States has insisted that Iraq would have a full transfer of sovereignty on that date.

Mr. Grossman, however, referred in testimony on Wednesday to what he said would be "limited sovereignty," a phrase he did not repeat on Thursday, apparently because it raised eyebrows among those not expecting the administration to acknowledge that the sovereignty would be less than full-fledged.

The problem of limiting Iraq's sovereignty is more than one of terminology, several administration officials said in interviews this week.

The proposed curbs on Iraqi sovereignty are paving the way for what officials and diplomats say is shaping up as another potential battle with American allies as the United Nations is asked to confer legitimacy on the new government.

"Clearly you can't have a sovereign government speaking for Iraq in international forums, and yet leave open this possibility that we'll do something they won't particularly like or disagree with," said an administration official. "There's got to be something to be set up to deal with that possibility."

Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the foreign relations panel, and Senator Jon Corzine, a New Jersey Democrat, pressed Mr. Grossman on that point.

European and United Nations diplomats said that because the main task of the caretaker government would be to try to secure the support of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Iraqi Shiite leader whose supporters are unhappy with some of the laws enacted by the Iraqi Governing Council, there may have to be a change in these laws.

Under the basic legal framework pressed by Mr. Bremer, Islam is only one of many foundations of the law. Ayatollah Sistani's supporters want Islam to govern such matters as family law, divorce and women's rights. Mr. Bremer had at one time threatened to veto any such changes, but even some administration officials acknowledge that the idea of telling the new Iraqi government it cannot enact new laws is unrealistic.

A European official familiar with Mr. Brahimi's thinking said the envoy wants the caretaker government and its consultative body "to find a consensus on the fundamental law to make sure Sistani is invested."

"Everybody wants to have Sistani on board," said this diplomat. "For that you'll have to pay a price."

The skeptical tone of the foreign relations hearing was set by the committee's chairman, Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, who said that without clearer answers, "we risk the loss of support of the American people, the loss of potential contributions from our allies and the disillusionment of Iraqis."

But Mr. Grossman said Mr. Brahimi's plans were still so vague that they have not yet been put in writing to be incorporated into Iraqi regulations.

Mr. Grossman was also asked what would happen if the new government wanted to adopt a foreign policy opposed by the United States, such as forging close relations with two neighbors, Iran and Syria.

The United States, he replied, would have to use the kind of persuasion used by any American ambassador in any country.

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To: T L Comiskey who wrote (43640)4/24/2004 8:06:20 AM
From: T L Comiskey  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
What Colin Powell Saw but Didn't Say
By Sidney Blumenthal
The Guardian

Thursday 22 April 2004

The rush to war in Iraq echoes Reagan's Iran-contra scandal
"History? We won't know," George Bush tells Bob Woodward. "We'll all be dead." But in his book, Plan of Attack, Woodward's facts move the past from the shadows, adding significant new documentation to the story of the rush to war in Iraq.

The serious constitutional issues and governmental abuses, the methods and even the continuity of some personnel that Woodward catalogues evoke memories of the Reagan Iran-contra scandal. That involved a network of aides outsourcing US foreign policy to circumvent the separation of powers - selling missiles to Iran to fund the Nicaraguan contras. The Iraq war was conceived by the president and his war cabinet in an apparent effort to evade constitutional checks and balances. In Iran-contra, the national security council, CIA and Pentagon were stealthily exploited from within; in Iraq, they were abused from the top.

When the Iran-contra scandal was revealed, the Reagan administration was placed into receivership by the old Republican establishment. Neoconservatives and adventurers, criminal or not, were purged, from Elliott Abrams to Richard Perle. Now they are at the centre of power.

Woodward reports that in July 2002 Bush ordered the use of $700m to prepare for the invasion of Iraq, funds that had not been specifically appropriated by Congress, which alone holds that constitutional authority. No adequate explanation has been offered for what, strictly speaking, might well be an impeachable offence.

Woodward also reports that the battle plan was unfurled for Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the US. On its top, it was stamped "Top Secret: Noforn" - "No Foreign", not to be seen by anyone but Americans with the highest security clearance. Following Bush's instructions, the vice-president, Cheney, and the secretary of defence, Rumsfeld, briefed Bandar, who responded by promising to lower oil prices just before the election. As we can now see, prices have skyrocketed, giving oil-producers windfall profits upfront, and ultimately exaggerating the political effect of any subsequent drop in prices.

While Bandar was treated as an ex-officio member of the war cabinet, the secretary of state, Colin Powell, was kept in the dark. "Mr President," the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, gently suggests, "if you're getting to a place that you really think this might happen, you need to call Colin in and talk to him." So after Bandar had been told of the battle plan, Bush decided to inform his secretary of state, a frequent squash playing partner of the Saudi prince. After all, he was bound to learn anyway.

Powell had sought to warn Bush on Iraq: if you break it, you own it. "Time to put your war uniform on," says Bush. Powell snaps to attention.

Powell is obviously Woodward's source. Powell believed the government had been seized by a "Gestapo office" of neoconservatives directed by Cheney. "It was a separate little government that was out there," writes Woodward of Powell's view. The only precedent is Iran-contra.

Powell was appalled by the mangling of intelligence as Cheney and the neocons made their case to an eager Bush and manipulated public opinion. But Powell had put on his uniform for his commander-in-chief. In the White House, his capitulation was greeted with a combination of glee and scorn. Powell would make the case before the world at the United Nations. Cheney's chief of staff, I Lewis "Scooter" Libby, gives him a 60-page brief that Powell dismisses as filled with "murky" intelligence. Powell goes to CIA headquarters himself, where he discovers that "he could no longer trace anything because it had been 'masticated over in the White House so that the exhibits didn't match the words'." He hastily constructs his own case, which turned out to be replete with falsehood.

Powell played the good soldier, not taking his qualms and knowledge to the Congress or the American people. The most popular man in the country, he never used his inherent veto power to promote his position. Rather than fighting his battles in earnest when it counted, before his army was put in harm's way, he chose to settle scores by speaking to Woodward.

Bush tells Woodward that he is "frightened" by detailed questions. He admires Cheney for not needing to explain in public. Pointedly, Bush says, unlike Tony Blair, "I haven't suffered doubt." Asked if he seeks advice from his father, the former president, Bush says: "He is the wrong father to appeal to in terms of strength. There is a higher Father that I appeal to."

Bush gazes upward for guidance, or turns to Cheney. Judgment Day may not come before election day. Here on earth, the Republican establishment that rescued Reagan after Iran-contra has become superannuated and powerless. There is no one to intervene.

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Sidney Blumenthal is former senior adviser to President Clinton and Washington bureau chief of Salon.com
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