Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Sarmad Y. Hermiz who wrote (130934)	5/2/2004 12:26:37 AM
From: arun gera	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Sarmad: >I had been wondering why the Shiia have been so complacent. I think now I know. Their religious leaders are all on the payroll of the US.> B. Raman states the same in this article saag.org ."There are already indications of differences in the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition with those opposed to Chalabi accusing him of having secretly signed an agreement with the DIA that a Government headed by him would denationalise the oil industry in Iraq, thereby paving the way for its take-over by US companies and would re-imburse to the US the expenditure incurred by it on the overthrow of the regime from the oil export earnings. Teheran also nurses strong suspicions about Chalabi because of his alleged links with elements opposed to the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It remains to be seen whether Rumsfeld would prevail in getting Chalabi installed as the head of the so-called interim Iraqi authority and if so, how long he would last." (Citation ends) 3. A year ago, the Disinformation Division of the DIA, with the help of compliant Western journalists, had enacted for dissemination to the rest of the world seeming scenes of jubilation as a statue of Saddam Hussein was brought down. The total number of people, who had participated in those scenes for the benefit of the correspondents, was not more than about 200, but the journalists and their cameramen had photographed them in such a way as to make it appear to the viewers as if thousands had participated. In an article on the scene, I had pointed out that all those, who had gathered there at the instance of the DIA's Disinformation Division, were beating their chest, indicating thereby that all of them were Shias and that not a single Sunni could be seen in the commandeered crowd. 4. The entire scene was organised, on payment by the DIA through Chalabi, by a 30-year-old Shia with a large following in the slum areas of Baghdad. His Shia followers used to be called Sadrists. His name is Moqtada Al-Sadr, son of Ayatollah Muhammed Sadeq Al-Sadr, who, along with two other sons, was killed allegedly by the Saddam Hussein regime in 1999. He is the same man, who is today in revolt against the US occupation forces. His so-called Mehdi Army is fighting against the occupation forces in the streets of the Shia majority areas of a Baghdad suburb called Al-Sadr City and in many towns of southern Iraq. It has joined hands with the anti-US Sunni resistance fighters and Pakistani, Chechen and other foreign terrorists, who have already been putting up a determined fight against the US troops in the so-called Sunni Triangle since May last year. 5. What has happened since April last year which has driven the Sadrists, who used to be the beneficiaries of the clandestine funds of the DIA distributed through Chalabi, to take to arms against the coalition troops? Why have they become so virulently anti-US within a short period of one year? What are the implications of the current serious upsurge in fighting all over Iraq to the future of the country and to the US attempts to pacify it? 6. Any analysis to find answers to these questions has to go back to the conflicting policies followed by the CIA, under its Director George Tenet, and the DIA, under Rumsfeld's orders, pre-April,2003, to secure the support of the Shias for the USA's plans to have Saddam overthrown. Their attempts were essentially focussed on two leaders of the Shia community---the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, of Persian origin, who was backed by the CIA, and Moqtada Al-Sadr, of Arab origin, who was backed by the DIA, at the instance of Rumsfeld, on the urging of Chalabi. 7. While the CIA's funds used to go to Al-Sistani, those of the DIA were going to Al-Sadr through Chalabi. The mutual suspicions and jealousies between the pro-Teheran followers of Al-Sistani, who constituted the Badr Army, the militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Al-Sadr, who constituted the Sadrists group (the Mehdi Army had not yet come into the picture), had started affecting internal security in the Shia majority areas immediately after the invasion of Iraq by the coalition troops.

To: Sarmad Y. Hermiz who wrote (130934)	5/2/2004 1:44:19 AM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Sarmad Y. Hermiz; Re: "I had been wondering why the Shiia have been so complacent. I think now I know. Their religious leaders are all on the payroll of the US." I think this is highly unlikely. Look at the accomplishments of the Bush administration. I think that you are crediting them with being far more intelligent than they actually are. I think that a more realistic explanation for the Shiite rebellion delay includes the following: (a) From a military point of view: The Shiites really didn't like Saddam much, so they weren't as pissed off right from the start. This meant that jittery CPA soldiers, at first, didn't shoot as many people in their neighborhoods, so their anger took longer to rise up. In addition, since it was not expected that the Shiite regions would cause problems, fewer CPA forces were stationed there, so there was naturally fewer opportunities for jittery soldiers to shoot civilians. (b) From a political point of view: The Shiites are the majority in Iraq, so as long as it is reasonable to expect that the US truly will implement a Democracy, they were more inclined to wait for that time. If an insurgency throws the Americans out, then it is not unlikely that another dictator from the Sunni areas, which are those parts of Iraq where the military training and talent are concentrated, would take over. The soporific effect of this hope died away as US promises kept being postponed, but it takes time to organize a guerilla force, so the Shiites were late to the party. (c) From a religious point of view: It is said that the Shiites expect the political leaders of a country to be debased, so there may be less of an inclination to fight against them. I really don't believe that this is true or false as I do not know enough about it. The viewpoint is espoused in the article I recently linked in (but did not quote the relevant passages) here: #reply-20058187 (d) From a leadership point of view: The Shiites had no real political leader, while the Sunnis had Saddam. This meant that the Sunnis had a more direct connection to an anti-US campaign. Furthermore, the religious leaders the Shiites did have were inclined to avoid getting into politics. I've seen Sistani's website, and he mostly talks about what kinds of foods are okay to eat and other religious, as opposed to political or military, topics. This lack of leadership meant that the Shiites were slow to organize for guerilla war. By the way, before the war I repeatedly stated that the guerilla war would take some time to build up in Iraq. This is because, historically, guerilla warfare usually doesn't get going strong for some time until after an occupation begins. It takes time to organize a rebellion. Expecting people to just spontaneously take up arms is unrealistic. Humans are pack animals and most require a leader to lead them to a fight. Just getting the leaders figured out is part of the delay in guerilla fighting. And there is another reason for the delay, and that is that men who have just been defeated really aren't that much inclined to repeat the experience. It takes a while for the feeling of anger to build up to the point where it overcomes the feeling of fear. -- Carl