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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: mishedlo who wrote (5465)5/3/2004 12:15:38 PM
From: Jim Willie CB  Respond to of 116555
 
more deflationary effects from debt-loaded expansion /jw



To: mishedlo who wrote (5465)5/3/2004 12:35:11 PM
From: yard_man  Respond to of 116555
 
>>At some point overexpansion hurts everyone does it not?
Even the guy not expanding<<

The Austrian school is very clear on this -- yes!!!



To: mishedlo who wrote (5465)5/3/2004 12:38:18 PM
From: Jim Willie CB  Respond to of 116555
 
Fannie and Freddie to the Rescue?
Credit Bubble Bulletin, by Doug Noland
April 23, 2004

prudentbear.com

During the first quarter, combined Fannie and Freddie Retained Portfolios declined $26.4 billion. Such a contraction causes little market disruption in a declining rate environment, as banks, Wall Street firms, REITS, hedge funds, and the like are more than happy to expand their holdings. Recall that from the yield peak of 4.38% during the first week of January, 10-year Treasury rates declined to a low of around 3.70% near the end of the quarter.

The market environment has since abruptly changed. Ten-year government yields ended today’s trading session at 4.45%. This has been the sharpest rate rise since last summer. It should, however, be noted that the 75 basis points or so jump over the past month compares to the 130 basis point increase between June 13 and July 29 of 2003. Yet we are at this point only about four weeks into this bond move.

Last week, I contemplated the possibility for “Tightening Lite” – a Fed that would move especially timidly away from recent extraordinary accommodation, prolonging the period of extreme Credit and liquidity excess. Such a dovish posture received some confirmation yesterday from governor Bernanke. The Fed’s line is clear: strong productivity gains, a vulnerable labor market, and a generally benign inflation backdrop afford the Fed the unusual flexibility to “normalize” rates over an extended period of time. This is music to the ears of leveraged players, yet it was today quickly drowned out by another deafening thud of very strong economic data.

For good reason, the bond market fears an increasingly white-hot economy that may force the Fed’s hand. Certainly, the character of the current Credit and asset Bubble-induced boom is traditionally anathema to central bankers. And while the Fed may not yet appreciate this harsh reality, the bond market is beginning to.

Yesterday, Dr. Bernanke commented that the Fed has successfully conveyed their intentions: they will move but the Fed does not today feel any sense of urgency: “I think the market heard that message and I think the market is in better sync now than they were last summer.” Yes, at least thus far, interest-rate markets are adjusting relatively smoothly, in stark contrast to Summer 2003. It is worth recalling that the dollar swap spread spiked from 35 in early July to 65 by the end of the month. Measures of interest-rate risk – implied volatilities of options on Treasury securities – surged to levels not experienced since the dark days of the LTCM crisis. It was virtual panic, as leveraged players and derivative traders rushed to unload risk. As I have explained previously, the unfolding marketplace dislocation was assuaged by an unprecedented GSE expansion, in concert with Fed promises of a protracted period of extreme accommodation.

And I don’t agree with Dr. Bernanke’s contention that last year was a case of the markets somehow out of sync with Fed thinking. Rather, the markets had begun to accurately discount the breadth and vigor of the unfolding reflation. At the same time, there was recognition of the inherent vulnerability of the contemporary (anomalous) “interest-rate” marketplace. The over-liquefied economy and asset markets were poised for boom at home and abroad; Credit demand was sure to be significant; and there was a strong inflationary bias throughout mortgage finance (the Mortgage Finance Bubble). And, indeed, the markets had it absolutely right last summer. The Fed, on the other hand, was the party not in sync (actually, way out of sync) with the realities of the environment.

And perhaps it was also a case of the Fed being caught completely flat-footed by the rapidity of the near interest-rate dislocation. Instead of commencing the rate “tightening” process one year ago as warranted, policy-maker fear was likely a factor in providing Bubble Dynamics only freer rein.

But today, months later, the Fed seems to have its “ducks in order.” The Fed is signaling a quite cautious approach to raising rates, and the Credit market is listening. This time around, the Fed is determined to lead, and the marketplace is following (with some understandable unease). And while the 10-year dollar swap spread has widened moderately, there are today few indications of market stress. I see no evidence of any panic and thus far no sign of reduced Credit Availability. There is not much that points to any meaningful de-leveraging or reduced liquidity. Junk spreads are several hundred basis points narrower than a year ago, while issuance remains heavy. The typical “canaries” in the mine continue to flutter about, although what is “typical” doesn’t seem all too relevant considering the environment.

In the mortgage arena, Subprime lending is booming. The marginal borrower has virtually unparalleled availability of Credit. There is, as well, a major shift to adjustable-rate mortgages. The Fed has nurtured this trend by leaving the funds rate at 1% and inducing rampant housing inflation (a steep yield curve and high prices are strong inducements for ARMs). This is a significant factor in shifting interest rate risk from the financial sector to households, tucked away to come back to haunt another day. All around, complacency abounds.

Yet, a key issue remains unresolved: In a rising rate environment, where within the financial sector comes the aggressive expansion to sustain requisite huge Credit growth? There is, after all, another Trillion dollars of new mortgage Credit coming this year. Moreover, there will surely be a significant liquidation by the leveraged community, as well as hedge-related selling from the derivative players. Recalling last year’s “rescue,” Fannie and Freddie combined to expand their Retained Portfolios by an unprecedented $160 billion during the three months July through September. Are they able and willing to provide a repeat performance?

And while last year’s huge balance sheet expansion was in the midst of intensifying scrutiny, the GSEs are directly under the microscope these days. Even Fed chairman Greenspan has recently testified to Congress that he believes GSE debt growth should be restrained. And OFHEO is camped out at Fannie’s headquarters. Meanwhile, Freddie is trying to wind down months of piecing together a balance sheet (truly amazing). One could presume Fannie and Freddie are not well-positioned today for aggressive balance sheet expansion, but with these institutions…

A rather intriguing (and probably more in line with their corporate ethos) scenario would have the GSEs tempted (hankering?) to flex their considerable muscle. For months, they’ve been the shiftless punching bags for unrelenting (and deserved) shots from the Administration, some members of Congress, the regulators, and the Fed. For months, their expansion and buying in the market was not critical. But rates are now moving sharply higher. Accordingly, their purchases are being transformed to the status of “instrumental to marketplace liquidity.” And, perhaps, the GSEs are desirous of a little fist-to-cuffs payback. Their opponents may find themselves suddenly and unexpectedly exposed.

And now I will completely regress to outright indecorous conjecture. But it is an election year, and the months are quickly passing. It is already nasty, and why not anticipate a totally ruthless campaign season. And we have Fannie’s former revered CEO and Chairman (and old friend of Robert Rubin) heading Senator Kerry’s Vice-presidential selection committee. And Fannie’s Franklin Raines is a long-time Democrat that served under President Clinton. I surely would not suggest that the GSEs would act in the marketplace with political motivations, although I certainly do protest the fact that these institutions have grown to such enormous size and unparalleled financial power to have the clear capacity to influence political outcomes (including elections).

The GSEs have too much to lose to refrain from their usual “buyer of first and last resort” marketplace liquidity operations. They fully appreciate that the fragile structure of the Credit system is not conducive to an impassioned game of chicken. Yet it does makes sense to me that they would these days enjoy making a forceful point to both the Administration and to the Fed that the GSEs are indispensable players to the current economic and financial boom. As such, they would have a strong incentive to let it be known that they don’t appreciate being pilloried and bullied – that it’s time to back off. And while their powerful lobby has likely postponed regulatory oversight legislation until next year, they still have much to fight for. They are not the type to be caught unaware of an opponent’s soft-spots.

It will be interesting to follow comments from both the Administration and Fed over the coming weeks and months. And looking at the current landscape, I think we can all now better appreciate the backlash against powerful financial institutions that wreaked havoc during the Great Depression. Once Bubble dynamics take hold and powerful financial institutions evolve to the point of immense power over markets, asset prices and economic vigor – hence, the political process - the prospects of reining them in prior to some type of collapse are slim-to-none.

I will include some notable dialogue from chairman Greenspan’s testimony Wednesday before the Senate Joint Economic Committee:



To: mishedlo who wrote (5465)5/3/2004 12:54:11 PM
From: Jim Willie CB  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
excellent exchange between Greenspan and Rep Ron Paul

Congressman Ron Paul: “I find it interesting that you, as (well as) the previous Chairmen of the Federal Reserve, I remember four total, they’ve always advocated that we in the Congress spend less, and really the advice hasn’t been taken. Currently, our national debt is going up over $700 billion, and we’re pursuing, once again, a policy of guns and butter, and nobody seems to have much concern. But I think the Fed participates in this as long as you control a monopoly control over money and credit, and you can accommodate the Congress. I mean, if we spend, and nobody is going to buy those Treasury Notes, we know if you want the interest rates at 1 percent, you’re going to buy them. So, in a way, you’re complicit in what we do here in the Congress. But I don’t see that coming to an end with the monetary system that we have.

I do have a question dealing with your statement in the first paragraph about rising wealth contributing to the recovery. This last recession has been written about quite extensively as being unique. It came about not because you raised interest rates, as it is traditionally for the Fed to raise rates, we go into a recession, then there’s liquidation, and debt is wiped off the books, then there’s a restoring. This time, it just stopped because people ran out of steam, there wasn’t enough consumer purchasing power, and we had a recession. But you very quickly, and efficiently came in and lowered interest rates very aggressively, and prevented the conventional liquidation and the corrections that have come in the previous recessions.

And Congress didn’t hesitate for a minute to follow in its Keynesian path and rapidly and excessively raise spending. But, in addition to this, we have this very unusual and unique form of financing for our houses, which has caused tremendous inflation in our housing prices, through the financing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which in some ways the Fed participates, in some ways foreign central banks participate extensively in this. Anyway, we have a housing bubble, housing prices go up, and that I assume participates in this wealth, because the consumer has gone out and borrowed sometimes more than their equity. Equity prices are soaring. That to me is like saying we had great wealth when the NASDAQ was 5,000, then all of a sudden that great wealth dissipates rather quickly. So I do not see how we can say that we have true wealth without savings that’s created artificially by the excitement of easy money, and easy credit, and artificially rising prices, because people go out and get into further debt. To me, it seems like the bubble leaked, and you patched it up quickly, but we’re back on the same track again of very excessive spending, excessive borrowing, and we never had the liquidation. What really were you thinking about when you were talking about the rising wealth that has helped in this recovery?”

Chairman Greenspan: “The wealth, the term wealth in this context is a technical, statistical term, which is related solely to the question of the market value of net assets of households. Now, one can argue whether or not the market values that are placed on claims on physical assets are high or low, remember that all judgments of wealth essentially are discounted values of forward expected returns. And that’s a people’s sense of risk aversion is a critical fact in determining where stock prices are, and hence, where that wealth is. But, having said that, whatever it is does impact by all of the statistical analysis we are able to adduce on consumer expenditures. And the reason for that is that people, when they become wealthy, wealthier in paper terms, as you would put it, do have collateral to borrow and to spend, and they do. And that has, indeed, been an important factor in consumer expenditures over the last decade.”


Congressman Paul: “My question is, is it real collateral, that’s the question.”


Chairman Greenspan: “Well, the point at issue is, it gets to the more fundamental question, if you’re sitting out there with a big steel plant, and you say that is wealth, the question is, it’s people’s judgment as to what are the amounts of steel and the profitability that will be engendered to enable what’s the value, the ongoing value of that steel plant. And people’s views can change quite dramatically, even if the physical plant doesn’t change one iota, even if, indeed, the amount of steel they’re producing and selling doesn’t change. What I’m trying to get at here is, you’re raising the much broader question with respect to how are assets valued in the marketplace, and we have rational or not rational procedures by which those evaluations are made.”


Congressman Paul: “I’m afraid we’re confusing debt with assets. That’s my contention.”


Chairman Greenspan: “No, debt and assets are two wholly different things. And the Federal Reserve I would say does not make that mistake.”


My comment: The Greenspan Fed specifically avoids the critical issue of true economic wealth creation. Instead, aggressive interventionist policy is focused on the blatant manipulation of financial wealth and asset prices generally. This flawed and reckless central banking has nurtured cumulative monetary disorder, irreparable price distortions, and endemic misallocation of resources. A painful adjustment period – call it financial crisis and Depression – is unavoidable specifically because of the ever-widening disparity between our perceived financial wealth and the true economic wealth-creating capacity of our maladjusted Bubble economy.