WHAT TO DO IN IRAQ?:
... AND THE REAL ROAD AHEAD
By AMIR TAHERI - NY Post Opinion
May 4, 2004 -- WHAT to do about Iraq? I was bombarded with this question during a recent visit to the United States.
The question is based on two assumptions. First, that Iraq is about to plunge into one of the nightmare scenarios discussed by self-styled experts on TV. Second, that there is some kind of magic wand that one could wave to transform Iraq into a paradise of freedom and prosperity.
Both assumptions are false.
The nightmares are often peddled by those who had opposed the liberation because they didn't wish to see a U.S.-led coalition bring down a Third World dictator. The doomsayers' initial prediction was that, deprived of its oppressor, Iraq would plunge into civil war. That has not happened, so they now warn of chaos, and predict a nationwide insurrection against the Coalition.
But is Iraq really plunging into chaos? Anyone in contact with Iraqi realities would know that the answer is: No.
Yes, a variety of terrorist, insurgent and ordinary criminals are active in the country. Parts of Baghdad remain unsafe. Some roads, especially in the desert area bordering Jordan and Syria, are prone to attacks by bandits. And, as in many other parts of the world where criminal gangs operate, there is also some hostage-taking. But most of Iraq's 18,000 villages and 200-plus towns and cities remain as safe, if not safer, than those in some other Arab countries.
The Coalition faces a problem in Fallujah. But Fallujah accounts for no more than 4 percent of Iraq's Sunni Arab community. Other major Sunni cities - Mosul, Ramadi, even Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown - remain calm.
Fallujah has become a problem for specific reasons. It is at the heart of a region that has been the center of Sunni military elites since the creation of Iraq in 1921. It is also the capital of several Sunni Arab tribes with branches in other nations, including Syria and Jordan. And Saddam invested heavily there, especially by building housing for army, police and secret service personnel working in Baghdad. Ba'athist military and their families account for some 30 percent of the city's population. It is the Iraqi city that most resents Saddam's fall and the end of its privileges.
Yet even in Fallujah there is no evidence that a majority of the people regret liberation or want Saddam back. There are perhaps 2,000 insurgents, including dozens of non-Iraqi fighters, in the city. The fact that more than half of the city's inhabitants have left their homes shows that, though they may wish the occupation to end, they don't wish to side with the insurgents.
Those who claim that Iraq is in chaos also point to Najaf, where Muqtada al-Sadr, a 30-year-old Shiite cleric, is hiding in a number of holy shrines and mosques along with his so-called Army of the Mahdi. But talk to anyone in Najaf and you'll soon know that the overwhelming majority of the city's population wants Sadr to get the hell out. (After more than two weeks of contacts with Iraqi Shiite leaders and opinion-makers at various levels, this writer has not found anyone who supports Sadr and his shenanigans.)
Sadr is abusing the old Shiite practice of "bast," which consists of taking sanctuary in a holy shrine. But Najaf is a city of 500,000 people, while Sadr's followers number 3,000 at most.
And Sadr's quarrel with the Coalition is personal rather than principled. He resents not being given a share in the Governing Council, and is unhappy that he and 18 close associates are wanted for murder. His strategy is a typical desperado's: He hopes to force the Coalition out of Iraq, provoke chaos and, if not secure a chunk of power for himself, avoid prosecution for murder.
The Coalition would do well not to force its way into either Fallujah or Najaf. In each, it faces a group of armed men holding larger civilian populations hostage. In Fallujah, the insurgent Ba'athists are using Saddam's typical tactic of using human shields. In Najaf, Sadr and his gang use the Shiite shrines for the same purpose.
There is no nationwide insurrection in Iraq. Nor is Iraq suffering from a general breakdown in law and order. To be sure, it is no bed of roses. But the violence and insecurity are within the remit of normal in a post-liberation situation, and remain manageable.
As things stand, the Coalition does not need more troops. In fact, it should speed up withdrawals from the dozen or so cities and towns where its troops are deployed for policing, a task for which they are neither trained nor equipped. Disbanding the Iraqi army and national police was a major mistake. But that is spilt milk. What's now needed is a fast-track program to train and deploy more units of the new army and police.
What of the pundits' second assumption - that some magic wand could turn that country into an Arab Switzerland overnight? There is, of course, no such magic wand. And Iraq, while capable of moving towards pluralism, will need years to develop a stable democratic system.
When President Bush announced the start of the war to liberate Iraq, he promised to stay the course until the Iraqi people built a new democratic system. Implicit in that offer was that the Iraqis should play their part in what is by far the greatest challenge they have faced since their state was created eight decades ago.
The people of Iraq have kept their end of the bargain. They did not fight on Saddam's side, allowing the Coalition to achieve victory with remarkable ease. Since then, they've continued to do what is required of them - not only by isolating insurgents and terrorists, but also by beginning to rebuild their shattered country. As a string of recent polls, complemented by personal and anecdotal information, indicates, the overwhelming majority are still prepared to work with the Coalition to achieve their dream of a new political system based on human rights and pluralism.
The real question is: Will the Coalition keep its end of the bargain? Or will U.S. and British leaders, for reasons of domestic politics, lose their nerve, throw Iraq to the United Nations or some other ineffectual custodian and sacrifice the strategic goal of a democratic Middle East to tactical electoral considerations?
What to do in Iraq? The answer is simple: Don't lose your nerve!
Yes, Iraq can become another Vietnam - not because of anything that's happening there, but because America and its allies, for reasons of domestic politics, might panic and transform victory into defeat.
NEW YORK POST |
