To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (45506 ) 5/8/2004 12:45:46 AM From: stockman_scott Respond to of 89467 Global: Measured Bubblesmorganstanley.com By Stephen Roach (New York) Morgan Stanley May 07, 2004 The Federal Reserve has finally stepped out of its shell. By my count, about 30% of the words in the May policy statement of the US central bank were actually different from those of the prior edict. That's a bold move for an institution that usually tweaks only one or two phrases. Sadly, it's not nearly bold enough. Notwithstanding this great rhetorical flourish, the Fed, of course, did nothing. The policy rate was left unchanged for the 11th month in a row at an astonishingly low 1%. There were hints of glacial ("measured") changes to come — but merely hints. And so a rapidly growing US economy (5.5% annualized GDP growth over the past three quarters) continues to bask in the warm glow of free money. That shows up in the unusual form of a negative real federal funds rate — the 1% nominal rate less 1.7% headline CPI inflation as measured on a 12-month trailing basis. The real funds rate has, in fact, now been in negative territory for over a year; by my reckoning, that's the longest spell below the "zero line" since the late 1970s. No, this is not the 1970s in one obvious and critical respect — inflation. Back then, America was ravaged by the excesses of double-digit inflation. The CPI surged at a 10% average annual rate in 1974–75. And the Federal Reserve — my employer at the time — just didn't get it. The nominal federal funds rate averaged 8% over those same two years — seemingly high in an historical context but far too low in real terms. Unwittingly, the Fed was fanning the already intense flames of inflation. The CPI was to surge at nearly a 12 % average annual rate over the 1979–81 period before Paul Volcker finally added new meaning to the once obscure concept of real interest rates. Today, of course, the risk is deflation — not inflation. Or at least that was the emergency a year ago that prompted the Fed to push its policy lever into a position of maximum stimulus. Having led the charge in the deflation scare, I can hardly fault the US central bank for taking such extraordinary action. But the emergency has now passed — at least for the time being. As recovery takes hold and the risk of cyclical deflation subsides, a normalization of monetary policy is in order. The road to normalization can be a perilous one. That was certainly the case in 1994, as the Federal Reserve was forever "behind the curve" in its efforts to take the federal funds rate up from 3.0% at the start of the year (or "zero" in real terms) to 6.0% some 12 months later. The ensuing carnage at the long end of the curve marked the worst year in the modern history of the bond market. That was seemingly the last hurrah for the bond market vigilante — or at least so we thought at the time. A decade later, however, there is a striking sense of déjà vu. Yet this time, the nominal funds rate starts out perilously close to its zero-bound at 1%. And in real terms, the overnight financing rate is well below that prevailing in 1994. Free money, of course, makes it easy for investors and speculators. All they have to do is borrow at the short end of the curve and invest in any longer duration asset. The spread of the "carry trade" provides instant and nearly riskless gratification — that is, until the Fed gets on with its time-honored task of "taking away the punchbowl just when the party is getting good." Then the carry trades are typically unwound, and the movie runs in reverse. To the extent these yield curve bets are levered — and they always seem to be — the unwinding can get very nasty. While 2004 is not 1994, I fear that today's Fed is in danger of making an equally serious tactical blunder. By stating with great clarity that "policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured," the FOMC is virtually assuring investors and speculators that it is not about to change the allure of the carry trade in any short order. And so the impacts of an extraordinary monetary stimulus will continue to provide great support for higher-yielding, longer duration assets. Morgan Stanley's fixed income strategy team believes that today's carry trades span the gamut of assets — from credit and mortgage markets to commodities and high-yield securities. Yet the Fed couldn’t care less. By going out of the way to stress that it is going to be measured in withdrawing its extraordinary stimulus, the US central bank is doing as little as possible to discourage this folly. And so the carry trade morphs into ever-expanding asset bubbles. The one that worries me the most is the property bet. In a jobless recovery, income-short American consumers have turned the levered carry trade into "manna from heaven." Courtesy of relatively costless mortgage refinancing, homeowners have been able to extract "excess value" from their number-one asset holding — and use that newfound purchasing power to augment a seemingly chronic shortfall in earned wage income. But consumers have now crossed a dangerous line: By continuing to parlay the proceeds of this carry trade into spendable income, they have created an artificial bid in property markets that is now in serious danger of turning into a full-blown housing bubble. Recent trends in US home prices certainly hint at this possibility. The nationwide home price index surged at a 15% annual rate in the final period of 2003 — the sharpest quarterly increase on record. On a year-over-year basis, US house price inflation hit 8% — only fractionally below the all-time high. Moreover, there is increasing breadth to America's mounting property inflation — in 4Q03, housing prices were up in 48 of 50 states. Nowhere is this risk more acute than in California, where house price inflation has now hit 14%. Property markets in the state's two major metropolitan regions are on fire — a 29% YoY increase in Los Angeles county median home prices through March 2003 and a 14% increase in the nine-county San Francisco Bay area over the same period (and well in excess of that in the city of San Francisco). The California factor cannot be minimized in shaping national trends. Not only is it America's largest state — accounting for 10–12% of national economic activity by most measures — but due to a long-standing premium of property values, California accounts for about 18% of the total value of America's stock of residential dwellings, according to US Census Department data. The Fed is far too cavalier, in my view, in dismissing this as a state-specific issue. A property bubble in California is a macro event for the US economy. As such, it could be a very big deal — especially when it pops. Bubbles don't arise out of thin air. The fundamentals of supply and demand can certainly contribute to this phenomenon. But the true asset bubble — be it property, bonds, or the one we have all forgotten (equities) — is an unmistakable by-product of easy money. Carry trades and asset bubbles go hand in hand — they feed on each other. By sending the unambiguously clear signal that it is prepared to go slow in taking away the incentive for the carry trade, today's Fed is continuing its reckless strategy of condoning America's newfound asset-driven growth paradigm. This is the same approach that gave us Nasdaq 5000 a little over four years ago. And now it has mutated into a far more dangerous policy ploy. By digging in its heels and keeping the federal funds rate negative in real terms, the Federal Reserve has now pushed America firmly into a multiple-bubble syndrome. This is shaping up to be a policy blunder of epic proportions.