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What if Kim Jong-il had been killed?
By Yoel Sano
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il returned safely to Pyongyang from a brief visit to China, officially confirmed by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) only after he was back home. But Kim appears to have had a proximate brush with death or injury en route Thursday: Two trains carrying gasoline and liquefied petroleum gas collided at the busy railway station town Ryongchon, causing a massive explosion that first reports said killed or injured 3,000 people. Later Red Cross reports said at least 54 people died and more than 1,200 were injured. Whatever the toll, Kim's train had passed through the death station only nine hours earlier.
The cause and toll may never be known, but the magnitude of the blast, the horrific casualty toll, and the close timing with Kim's journey will be enough to rattle even the most hardened traveler. Additionally, with reports of a renewed power struggle in Pyongyang, the question must be asked: Was the train explosion an accident in a deteriorating and underfunded national railway system?
Kim Jong-il's entourage to Beijing - to discuss the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons programs - included senior regime figures such as Vice Marshal Kim Yong-chun, the chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and a member of the powerful National Defense Commission (NDC); Yon Hyong-muk, vice chairman of the NDC; Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju; and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju. About 40 other economic, diplomatic, and security officials were part of the North Korean delegation.
While it is not clear whether all these leaders were aboard Kim's train, a bomb attack of the magnitude of the Ryongchon blast could conceivably have precipitated regime change in Pyongyang.
Of course, there is no evidence pointing to sabotage or an assassination attempt. Kim Jong-il's security arrangements are air-tight, and he would be highly unlikely to let fuel-laden trains pass near his own. During Kim's two rail trips to Russia in 2001 and 2002, the Russian authorities suspended traffic on entire sections of track to allow Kim's safe journey, much to the chagrin of Russian travelers, who were subject to hours of delays.
What if Kim had been killed?
Accident or not, what would have happened had Kim Jong-il and many of his top officials been killed? The answer matters, because North Korea is one of the most militarized societies on Earth, with a 1.1 million-strong army and an arsenal that is believed by some to include a small number of nuclear weapons.
Add to this the fact that Pyongyang is involved in an ongoing nuclear dispute with the United States, and the fact that it has 13,000 artillery guns capable of raining destruction on South Korea and scores of missiles capable of hitting Japan, and it becomes pretty clear that any leadership vacuum could create a dangerous situation in Northeast Asia, and perhaps beyond.
Kim Jong-il is believed to be preparing a successor from one of his three sons, Kim Jong-nam, 33; Kim Jong-chol, 23; and Kim Jong-un, 21 (see Happy Birthday, Dear Leader, who's next?, February 14), although it is unclear who has been chosen. Recent rumors have focused on the youngest son, who is said to resemble his father most. However, Kim Jong-nam cannot be ruled out - despite being disgraced by his expulsion from Japan in 2001 for trying to enter that country illegally - since he reportedly has the support of North Korea's intelligence agencies, having held a senior intelligence post in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Moreover, the KPA - support from which is crucial for any would-be successor - is believed to regard Jong-chol and Jong-un as too young and inexperienced to constitute leadership material.
North Korea has never lost its head of state to an assassination - although admittedly, there have only been two heads of state, Kim Jong-il and his father Kim Il-sung before him - so there is no precedent for an emergency succession.
The late "Great Leader", Kim Il-sung, died of a sudden heart attack in July 1994, but at that point he had been preparing Kim Jong-il for the highest office for 20 years, so the transition was relatively smooth.
By comparison, in late 1986 North Korean loudspeakers at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas unexpectedly announced that Kim Il-sung had been assassinated, and that the then-defense minister, Marshal O Jin-u, had seized power. This proved false, but in all likelihood, absent a clear successor, a military-dominated collective leadership would have taken over had Kim Jong-il perished on Thursday.
Military junta steps forward
Since constitutional amendments in September 1998 that abolished the state presidency, Kim Jong-il has officially served as head of state in his capacity as chairman of the NDC. Logically, therefore, in the aftermath of Kim's sudden demise, authority would pass to the NDC's first vice chairman, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, who is considered the second-most-powerful person in North Korea.
However, Jo is 76 (some sources say 80, or even 82), and suffering from ill health, necessitating medical treatment in France and China in recent years. He would therefore likely be only an interim leader. The NDC has two additional vice chairman, Yon Hyong-muk, 73 (who accompanied Kim on the China trip, and could have perished with him aboard the train), and Vice Marshal Ri Yong-mu, 80. The latter's advanced age also precludes him from serving beyond an interim capacity.
As such, the defense minister, Vice Marshal Kim Il-chol, 71, who is also an NDC member, would be in a better place to head a collective leadership.
Given that the North Korean military is thought to be more hawkish toward the United States on the nuclear issue, and indeed on regional security matters, any increase in military influence in Pyongyang could be detrimental to resolving the nuclear crisis any time soon - or perhaps ever. Indeed, the dispute is proving difficult enough to solve even without the military in charge.
International diplomacy over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program has thus far been conducted by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has had relatively little input from the KPA. Were an interim military-dominated leadership to step in, these negotiations - already moving at a glacial pace - could break down altogether.
The conservative military establishment is also thought to be far less amenable to the economic reforms that Pyongyang has been pursuing since July 2002, fearing that these might lead to civil unrest and disorder. In addition, although the military generates its own revenue from the sales of weapons abroad through its own conglomerates, the armed forces still account for about 30 percent of North Korea's gross domestic product.
A move to greater economic liberalization could shift budgetary priorities away from the military toward the civilian sector. Unsurprisingly, the military does not want this.
However, North Korea's neighbors would almost certainly prefer a stable military junta in Pyongyang, at least for the short term, than a total breakdown of authority and armed clashes between rival military factions that could conceivably occur, and which could spill over into South Korea or China. Given the amount of weaponry in North Korea, a post-Kim Jong-il civil war within the North could be devastating in terms of human life.
Preparations for a collective leadership
With all this in mind, Kim may be preparing the ground for a collective leadership, given that his three sons are either discredited or too young. The US-based International Strategic Studies Association, citing Japanese sources, reported recently that Kim was grooming his 32-year-old nephew - the eldest son of his brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek - as an interim successor at the head of a group leadership that would include Kim Jong-chol and Kim Jong-un.
This is a new line in the Byzantine succession saga, but it seems unlikely to work, given that it risks empowering the Jang family to a level where the leadership could slip from the control of Kim Jong-il or his sons. Jang Song-taek has already been regarded as one of the most powerful men in North Korea, thanks to his marriage to Kim Jong-il's sister Kim Kyong-hui, which has led him to occupy the powerful post of first vice director of the ruling Korean Worker's Party's (KWP) organization and guidance department.
Additionally, Jang's eldest brother, Jang Song-u, is the commander of the military region surrounding Pyongyang, while a younger brother, Jang Song-gil, is also a general. Two other Jang brothers hold posts at North Korean academic and ideological institutions. If Jang Song-taek's son (whose name is unknown outside North Korea) is indeed being groomed as the heir-apparent, even on an interim basis, Kim Jong-il risks seeing his nephew becoming too powerful, to the detriment of his own sons' positions.
It is the economy, stupid!
Kim is likely aware of this possibility, and this may partially explain recent Japanese and South Korean newspaper reports that Jang has been removed from his party post after falling from Kim's favor. Another possible bone of contention leading to Jang's ouster was the economy, with Jang disagreeing with Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju over the future direction of economic reforms. According to this theory, Pak wanted to pursue more aggressive capitalist practices to revive North Korea's crumbling economy. Jang opposed such moves.
Jang's lack of public appearances of late, and the fact that Pak accompanied Kim to China this week, suggest that the premier now has the upper hand, at least on the economic front. Indeed, while in China Kim toured that country's equivalent of Silicon Valley and also visited what was described as a "model farm". Korea-watchers believe that Kim's interest in such sites highlights his desire for North Korea to emulate China's economic progress.
If this is indeed the case, North Korea has a long way to go. In some ways, the train tragedy underscores the imbalance of economic development between North and South Korea, coming only weeks after the South inaugurated its new high-speed railway (admittedly built with French technology). That said, North Korea may point to a deadly explosion that killed more than 100 people in Taegu while the city's subway was under construction as proof that these things happen to even its advanced, capitalist neighbor.
The train collision may also raise questions about whether North Korea's railway system will be ready any time soon to serve as part of the long-awaited Eurasian transport corridor, the "iron Silk Road", that will allow South Korean and Japanese goods to reach European markets via the inter-Korean railroad and thence the Chinese or Russian networks. Although the train collision was a one-off, it only takes one such incident to raise doubts about safety.
Yoel Sano has been studying, writing and consulting about North Asian security for many years. He can be reached at yoelsano@lycos.com.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. |
