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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (46120)	5/14/2004 3:19:26 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 50167

How will a change of govt in India affect Indo-Pak relations? By Najam Sethi The pundits and pollsters were all wrong. The people of India weren’t as stupid as the designers of the “Shining India” campaign believed. Sure, the shine rubbed off on a section of the urban middle class but it certainly left the rest of India dry and dusty. Sonia Gandhi’s Congress will now ally with the left and form the next Indian government. How will this development affect the trajectory of Indo-Pak relations? The Pakistani Foreign Office and the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad have given out statements to the effect that the peace process will stay on track and the composite dialogue will remain unchanged. I hope so because both countries have invested much in peace. But I fear that there may be some unexpected hurdles ahead. Mr Vajpayee seemed to have a personal stake in building a historic peace with Pakistan. He risked the Lahore summit in 1999. He braved Agra in 2001 despite the bitter experience of Kargil. Despite the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2002, he persisted with his goal and reopened negotiations with Pakistan early this year. And despite dire warnings of terrorist attacks, he went ahead and risked a cricket tour with Pakistan two months ago. In fact he staked progress on the critical issues with Pakistan on the basis of returning to power in a much stronger position than before. That is why he left the real dialogue with Pakistan until after the elections. But all that has changed now. Sonia Gandhi will lead a weak Congress coalition. The new government won’t be able to make any significant “concessions” to Pakistan for four main reasons. First, Mrs Gandhi cannot be expected to have the same personal stake in peace with Pakistan as Mr Vajpayee evinced for a host of personal and historical reasons. In fact, unlike Mr Vajpayee, she will be particularly vulnerable to opposition charges of undermining the “national interest” (because she is insufficiently Indian) if she ventures too far ahead with Pakistan. Second, she may be expected to tread cautiously as far as the composite dialogue and roadmap with Pakistan is concerned. Let’s not forget some old facts: the Congress is “responsible” for the Kashmir problem in the first place as far as Pakistan is concerned; the roots of Kashmiri alienation were laid by the Congress when it rigged the Kashmir polls in 1987; and the Congress leadership did not have the courage to follow through on an accord with Pakistan on Siachin in 1990. Third, without Mr Vajpayee’s moderate leadership, the BJP in opposition is likely to revert to its pro-Hindu, anti-Pakistan rhetoric again and put the Congress government on the defensive on such issues. Already, the RSS has blamed the BJP leadership of diluting the Hindu agenda for its drubbing in the elections. The RSS wants issues of its “core ideology” to take center stage again. Of course, the Congress has no shortage of anti-Pakistan hardliners vying for positions in foreign policy-making, who can match the BJP hardliners any day. The new Indian government may also be expected to review the whole range of issues already discussed between the BJP leaders of India and General Musharraf’s team. This is natural. Any new government would want to calibrate policy according to its own perceptions and interests. But this is likely to lead to delays in reviewing and moving ahead with the agenda already agreed upon between General Musharraf and Mr Vajpayee. This could become problematic. General Musharraf has already shown some impatience in wanting to move ahead with the composite dialogue while focusing on the “core” issue of Kashmir. Now he will have to cool his heels a bit more. And if there is no meaningful headway with the Congress government before the summer is out, especially on Kashmir, he will come under pressure from his own side to open the jihadi tap again. If that happens, the whole process could unravel in decidedly unfriendly ways. For these broad reasons, at best we may expect the status quo to be maintained between the two countries in the months ahead without any significant improvement in confidence building measures or any meaningful headway in negotiations on the composite dialogue. If there is to be a change in the status quo for better or worse, it is only likely to manifest itself later rather than sooner. *