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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Suma who wrote (46210)5/14/2004 10:29:42 AM
From: jlallen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Which predictions are those?



To: Suma who wrote (46210)5/14/2004 12:47:19 PM
From: Skywatcher  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Shaft the Reservists, Spare the Spooks
By Steve Weissman
t r u t h o u t | Perspective

Tony Taguba told the truth. The two-star general who investigated the
"systematic and illegal abuses of detainees" at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison told
Senators Tuesday exactly what he knew as truthfully as a serving military officer
could. But did he tell them the whole truth?

"Who gave the order to soften up these prisoners, to give them the treatment?"
asked Senator Robert Byrd, the West Virginia Democrat. "Was this a policy? Who
approved it?"

"Sir, we did not find any evidence of a policy or a direct order given to these soldiers to conduct what
they did," said Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba. "I believe that they did it on their own volition. I believe that
they collaborated with several MI interrogators at the lower level."

Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican and former POW in Vietnam, similarly asked if the
abuses resulted from an overall military of intelligence policy to "soften up detainees for interrogation?"

Again, Maj. Gen. Taguba denied finding evidence of an official policy. "I think it was a matter of
soldiers with their interaction with military intelligence personnel who they perceived or thought to be
competent authority that were giving them or influencing their action to set the conditions for a
successful interrogations operation."

In other words, Gen. Taguba found no policy to do what the world saw in the Abu Ghraib prison
photos. He found no direct order to commit those atrocities. And he certainly found no valid order,
since torture, humiliation, and coercion of military or civilian captives violates both the Geneva
Conventions and the Pentagon's own Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Who, then, did Gen. Taguba hold responsible?

A by-the-book military professional, Taguba leveled his strongest condemnation at Brigadier General
Janis Karpinski, who commanded the 800th Military Police Brigade, a National Guard unit that provided
the prison guards. He also slammed Lt. Col. Jerry Phillabaum, the top reserve officer at Abu Ghraib,
and Col. Thomas M. Pappas, commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, the unit that ran
interrogations at the prison. In Taguba's view, the three failed to show leadership, provide training, or
maintain discipline and supervision.

The actual perps, the ones who did the dirty, he limited to the obvious suspects – a small group of
reserve prison guards, low-level Military Intelligence people, and civilian translators and interrogators.

Gen. Taguba failed to see the forest for the trees.

To be fair, he hinted at the bigger picture. His report and testimony revealed how Maj. Gen. Geoffrey
Miller, then the prison camp commandant at Guantánamo, had made an official visit to Abu Ghraib last
August. Calling on his work at Gitmo, Miller recommended that the prison guards be reorganized to
help set "the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees." As a
result, the U.S. ground commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Suarez gave Military Intelligence control over part
of the Abu Ghraib prison and MP guard force.

Taguba saw this as a bad idea, contrary to Army doctrine and an invitation to friction, poor
communication, and the breakdown of command that followed. He did not see that the transfer of
authority was evidence of an overall military and intelligence policy, one that explicitly called for
increasing the disorientation and humiliation of prisoners as part of their interrogation.

Dr. Stephen Cambone, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and a long-time protégé of
Secretary Rumsfeld, had urged Miller's visit to Abu Ghraib specifically to improve the collection of
intelligence about the growing insurgency. On his visit, Miller brought with him a list of the Stress and
Duress techniques that he used on captives at Guantánamo, where the Bush Administration rejects
applying the Geneva Conventions to "enemy combatants."

"We're going to 'Gitmo-ize' the operation," he told Brig. Gen. Karpinski, according to her
recollection. "We can do this the hard way or we can do it my way."

Gen. Taguba agreed that holding prisoners naked for long periods and other coercive measures were
a systematic part of interrogation at Abu Ghraib. But he largely ignored how closely some of those
measures paralleled the techniques Miller used at Gitmo.

Taguba showed even less curiosity about what crime buffs might call "the physical evidence." If
there were no policy to use Gitmo-style Stress and Duress in Iraq, where did the hoods, electrodes,
and dog leashes come from? It seems highly unlikely that Pvt. Lynndie England, one of young women
photographed with the masturbating Iraqis, brought them in her trick bag all the way from West
Virginia.

Beyond the physical, it is hard to image that Pvt. England and her fellow guards learned on their
own - or from low-level spooks - to play so masterfully on the sensitive feelings that Muslems have
toward nudity and sexuality.

Taguba's blindness was, in part, built into his assignment, to look into what the prison guards were
doing, primarily at Abu Ghraib. Ask a limited question, get a limited answer. A two-star general, he
was never meant to look above the one-star, brigade level, and did not investigate Maj. Gen. Miller,
Maj. Gen. Barbra Fast, the Military Intelligence chief in Iraq, or his CO, Lt. Gen. Suarez.

Nor did he look seriously into the interrogation process, recommending instead a separate inquiry
into the work of Military Intelligence officers. Maj. Gen. George Fay is conducting the investigation and
could report as early as the end of this month.

Fay's boss - Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of Army Intelligence - has already announced that "a
group of undisciplined military police" committed the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Alexander also denied any
evidence that Military Intelligence officers told them what to do.

Seven reserve MPs currently face court martial, while the Pentagon last week shifted Gen. Taguba
to a new, deeply unpromising assignment as deputy assistant secretary for reserve affairs.

A veteran of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and the New Left monthly Ramparts, Steve
Weissman lived for many years in London, working as a magazine writer and television producer. He
now lives and works in France, where he writes for t r u t h o u t.