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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Bilow who wrote (133116)5/15/2004 10:01:02 AM
From: Hawkmoon  Read Replies (5) | Respond to of 281500
 
For North Vietnam to have refrained from violating Laotian neutrality would have been STUPID.

From their perspective it certainly would have been. Afterall, they were intent on conquering not only S. Vietnam, but also setting up a puppet communist government in Laos and Cambodia..

My point is that WE WERE STUPID in not confronting Hanoi in Laos. We were UNWILLING to expand the war in Indo-China, but the N. Vietnamese WERE NOT. They were quite content to push the envelope because the US administrations of the time TELEGRAPHED just how far we would, and wouldn't go.

And that cost us the war, and surrendered any chances of democratic reforms and economic progress in Indo-China for over 30 years.

And so long as they were willing to fight in a no-holds barred manner because their country was not at EQUAL RISK OF BEING INVADED by the South in retaliation, and we fought with our hands tied behind our backs, the South Vietnamese were not going to win that war.

I believe that our leadership was stupid mostly in failing to get out of Vietnam earlier.

No.. what you believe is that we should have just CAVED IN AND NOT CONFRONTED COMMUNIST EXPANSIONISM IN INDOCHINA.

You would have quite satisfied to permit the entire peninsula to fall to them...

What's counter-productive, you naive creton, is WHEN WE FAIL TO MEET FORCE WITH FORCE and permit the enemy to have an advantage of interior lines and safe havens.

When the enemy violates the "rules", you'd better prepared to match or exceed those violations in a manner than hits them where it hurts and causes them to reevaluate their "risk/reward" analysis.

We never threatened to fight in such a manner. And the enemy did.

Let me make this very clear. Great powers do whatever they want to do without regard to treaties all the time. This is not something that was invented by Hitler, it has always been the case and always will be.

They certainly do when folks like you don't have the guts to oppose them and fight for your values.

It's thinking like yours that contributed greatly to millions of people being subjugated to totalitarian repression and economic despair for the past 50 years.

Don't you think you owe them an apology?

Hawk

Hawk
Geezus Carl!! This is SO BASIC.



To: Bilow who wrote (133116)5/15/2004 5:30:52 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
"How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib."

newyorker.com

<<...The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists but in a decision, approved last year by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. Rumsfeld’s decision embittered the American intelligence community, damaged the effectiveness of élite combat units, and hurt America’s prospects in the war on terror...>>



To: Bilow who wrote (133116)5/16/2004 3:39:01 PM
From: Sam  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Here are Yankeedoodle's thoughts on the Taguba report, in light of Hersh's New Yorker articles, in case people missed it:

dailywarnews.blogspot.com

Note to Readers

After reading Sy Hersch’s latest article in the New Yorker, I re-read MG Taguba’s report looking for his findings that either support or disprove Hersch’s allegations that prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib resulted from DoD policy on the coercive interrogation of detainees.

I thought it might be helpful to explain an AR 15-6 report so readers unfamiliar with Army correspondence can digest the findings and recommendations. The mission of an AR 15-6 investigating officer is to establish facts and report them to the commander who appointed him. The appointing commander sets the scope of the investigation and can also direct the investigating officer to make recommendations for corrective action.

The purpose of this analysis is to examine the issue of whether Military Intelligence personnel influenced MP guards to abuse prisoners in pursuit of interrogation operations and whether there are indicators that this policy originated at the DoD level. I’m going to leave out parts of the report that are not germane to these issues.

One of the things that the American media fails to understand is that the scope of MG Taguba’s investigation was limited to the 800th Military Police Brigade and detention operations at Abu Ghraib. He did not investigate Military Intelligence interrogation policies and procedures, but he recommends such an investigation and points an accusing finger directly at specific officers and civilian contractors from the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center.

In the Background portion of the report, MG Taguba explains the circumstances surrounding his appointment as investigating officer (IO) and the scope of his investigation. In a nutshell, on January 19, 2004 the commander of US forces in Iraq, LTG Sanchez, requested that his immediate superior officer, CENTCOM commander GEN Abazaid, appoint a General Officer to investigate alleged prisoner abuse and other issues in the 800th MP Brigade. On January 24, the CENTCOM Chief of Staff directed the commander of Coalition Land Forces Component (CFLCC) to conduct the investigation LTG Sanchez had requested. In turn, the CLFCC commander, LTG McKiernan appointed MG Taguba as AR 15-6 investigating officer.

There are four significant pieces of information contained in this portion of the report.

1. The investigation was ordered by GEN Abazaid, not LTG Sanchez, as has been reported in the press. As commander of CENTCOM, GEN Abazaid reported directly to GEN Myers at JCS and Secretary Rumsfeld at DoD.

2. LTG Sanchez specifically requested an investigating officer in the rank of Major General, indicating that the focus of the investigation would be an officer in the rank of Brigadier General.

3. The scope of the investigation is limited to the 800th MP Brigade.

4. A criminal investigation of prisoner abuse by US Army Criminal Investigation Command was already underway.

Next, MG Taguba reviewed a survey of detention and interrogation operations conducted by MG Geoffrey Miller, entitled “Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism, Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq. In his report, MG Taguba summarizes MG Miller’s assessment and comments that the detainees at Abu Ghraib are significantly different in their potential intelligence value, and that using the facility guard force to facilitate interrogation operations is both doctrinally unsound and damaging to the smooth operation of the detention facility.

I would like to know more about MG Miller’s report, such as who directed that he conduct the survey and whether his specific recommendation “that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JDIC) that ‘sets the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees/detainees’” was implemented. The answers to both of those questions would indicate whether or not the policy of coercive interrogation was directed from the DoD level.

MG Taguba also reviewed and commented on a comprehensive review of detainee operations throughout the Iraq theater of operations conducted by MG Ryder. While noting that commanders in the 800th MP Brigade were not formally tasked to “set conditions” for interrogation operations, “it is obvious from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses this was done at lower levels.”

In the portion of MG Taguba’s report entitled “Preliminary Investigative Actions,” MG Taguba describes his team composition, training, methodology and provides a timeline of investigatory actions.

The “Findings and Recommendations” portion of the report are divided into four parts corresponding to the four specific lines of inquiry MG Taguba was directed to undertake by his appointment orders. Part One addresses prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib; Part Two addresses detainee escapes, riots and accountability; Part Three addresses training, procedures, and command climate within the 800th MP Brigade; and Part Four includes specific findings of fact and recommendations for corrective action.

In his Part One findings, MG Taguba makes clear that COL Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade was the commander of Abu Ghraib from November 19, 2003 to February 6, 2004. In addition to the abuses committed by members of the 800th MP Brigade, MG Taguba found abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. He also found that Military Police guards acted at the request of Military Intelligence officers to “set physical and mental conditions for the favorable interrogation of witnesses.” In paragraph 11 of the Part One findings, Taguba lists five witness statements that directly say the MPs were acting under the direction of Military Intelligence personnel.

In Paragraph 8 of the Part One Recommendations, MG Taguba recommends an inquiry under the provisions of AR 381-10, Procedure 15, to determine the culpability of Military Intelligence personnel.

In Paragraph 9 of the Part Three findings, MG Taguba found that an “ambiguous” command relationship between the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th MI Brigade was “exacerbated” by a Fragmentary Order issued by CJTF-7 on November 19th, 2003. The FRAGO made COL Pappas responsible the operation of Abu Ghraib and placed the MP guards under his command. The FRAGO was rescinded on February 6, 2004.

In Paragraph 18 of the Part Three findings, MG Taguba documents disciplinary actions taken against officers and senior NCOs of the 800th MP Brigade for misconduct. GOMOR is an acronym for General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand. This was really one fucked up unit.

In Paragraph 2 of the Recommendations portion of Part Three, MG Taguba recommends the commander of the 205th MI for a GOMOR for failing to properly supervise his soldiers, failing to ensure those soldiers were trained in Internee Rules of Engagement and failing to ensure they treated internees in accordance with Geneva Convention protections.

In Paragraph 4 of the Recommendations portion of Part Three, MG Taguba recommends relief-for-cause and a GOMOR for the commander of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center for lying to investigators, and for the same command failures as the commander of the 205th MI Brigade.

In Paragraph 11 of the Recommendations portion of Part Three, MG Taguba recommends termination of employment and security clearance for a civilian contract interrogator for lying to investigators about his conduct of interrogations and knowledge of abuses, and encouraging MP guards to abuse prisoners in pursuit of interrogation operations.

In Paragraph 12 of the Recommendations portion of Part Three, MG Taguba recommends termination of employment for a civilian contract interrogator for lying to investigators and not possessing a security clearance.

In Paragraph 13, MG Taguba recommends a Procedure 15 inquiry to determine the extent of Military Intelligence personnel culpability in the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib. “I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowitz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of their culpability.” Emphasis in the original.

AR 381-10 is the basic regulation governing US Army intelligence activities. It contains procedures that intelligence personnel must follow to obtain and maintain legal authority to conduct intelligence collection activities, as well as prohibited activities. AR 381-10 implements Federal law regarding intelligence collection as it applies to the US Army. Procedure 15 is an AR 381-10 inquiry, punitive in nature, to determine if any persons assigned to US Army Intelligence violated Federal law in the course of their duties.

Coupled with the Hersch piece, MG Taguba’s AR 15-6 report and a few other news items I’ve posted recently, it seems to me that there was indeed a blanket policy of coercive interrogation applied to the Iraqi detainees in US custody at Abu Ghraib. The media is missing the story here. The scandal isn’t the lower-ranking MP soldiers we’ve seen in the infamous pictures or their piss-poor leadership – and I’m not defending either of them.

The issue is a blanket policy of coercive interrogation. Somebody made the decision to apply that policy through Military Intelligence channels. Presumably, the decision-maker made a conscious cost-benefit analysis, weighing the potential intelligence value of detainees against the damage that would result if word of the abuse that results from such a policy were made public, especially in light of the administration’s War on Terror.

It also appears that the administration, as well as the media, is going to try to pin the blame for this shameful decision on a few low-ranking soldiers and ignore the larger issues of incompetence – not to mention illegality – of policies originating at the highest level in the Defense Department.

The media and Congress should pursue the recommendations MG Taguba made in his report, specifically the Procedure 15 against members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and see where those policies originated in the chain of command.

There is also a report in the Army Times that MG Taguba has been unexpectedly reassigned from his duties at CFLCC to the Pentagon. Big surprise.



To: Bilow who wrote (133116)5/17/2004 12:12:15 AM
From: Sam  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
This is the most thoughtful article I have read on the current situation in Iraq and what might be the best we can aim for in a "new" Iraq. It is far from perfect, as Galbraith himself says, but no plan will be at this point. Galbraith is a former Senate Foreign Relations committee staffer and a Clinton appointee who (IMHO) can be expected to hold a senior position at the Dept of State in a Kerry administration, if there is one. I have to admit that I didn't know some of the history that he writes about here.

nybooks.com

How to Get Out of Iraq
By Peter W. Galbraith
1.
In the year since the United States Marines pulled down Saddam Hussein's statue in Baghdad's Firdos Square, things have gone very badly for the United States in Iraq and for its ambition of creating a model democracy that might transform the Middle East. As of today the United States military appears committed to an open-ended stay in a country where, with the exception of the Kurdish north, patience with the foreign occupation is running out, and violent opposition is spreading. Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic Western-style democracy.

Much of what went wrong was avoidable. Focused on winning the political battle to start a war, the Bush administration failed to anticipate the postwar chaos in Iraq. Administration strategy seems to have been based on a hope that Iraq's bureaucrats and police would simply transfer their loyalty to the new authorities, and the country's administration would continue to function. All experience in Iraq suggested that the collapse of civil authority was the most likely outcome, but there was no credible planning for this contingency. In fact, the US effort to remake Iraq never recovered from its confused start when it failed to prevent the looting of Baghdad in the early days of the occupation.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Americans like to think that every problem has a solution, but that may no longer be true in Iraq. Before dealing at considerable length with what has gone wrong, I should also say what has gone right.

Iraq is free from Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. Along with Cambodia's Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein's regime was one of the two most cruel and inhumane regimes in the second half of the twentieth century. Using the definition of genocide specified in the 1948 Genocide Convention, Iraq's Baath regime can be charged with planning and executing two genocides —one against the Kurdish population in the late 1980s and another against the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s. In the 1980s, the Iraqi armed forces and security services systematically destroyed more than four thousand Kurdish villages and several small cities, attacked over two hundred Kurdish villages and towns with chemical weapons in 1987 and 1988, and organized the deportation and execution of up to 182,000 Kurdish civilians.

In the 1990s the Saddam Hussein regime drained the marshes of southern Iraq, displacing 500,000 people, half of whom fled to Iran, and killing some 40,000. In addition to destroying the five-thousand-year-old Marsh Arab civilization, draining the marshes did vast ecological damage to one of the most important wetlands systems on the planet. Genocide is only part of Saddam Hussein's murderous legacy. Tens of thousands perished in purges from 1979 on, and as many as 300,000 Shiites were killed in the six months following the collapse of the March 1991 Shiite uprising. One mass grave near Hilla may contain as many as 30,000 bodies.

In a more lawful world, the United Nations, or a coalition of willing states, would have removed this regime from power long before 2003. However, at precisely the time that some of the most horrendous crimes were being committed, in the late 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations strongly opposed any action to punish Iraq for its genocidal campaign against the Kurds or to deter Iraq from using chemical weapons against the Kurdish civilians.

On August 20, 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. Five days later, the Iraqi military initiated a series of chemical weapons attacks on at least forty-nine Kurdish villages in the Dihok Governorate (or province) near the Syrian and Turkish borders. As a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I (along with Chris Van Hollen, now a Maryland congressman) interviewed hundreds of survivors in the high mountains on the Turkish border. Our report, which established conclusively that Iraq had used nerve and mustard agents on tens of thousands of civilians, coincided with the Senate's passage of the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, which imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq for crimes against the Kurds. The Reagan administration opposed the legislation, in a position orchestrated by the then national security adviser, Colin Powell, calling such sanctions "premature."

Except for a relatively small number of Saddam Hussein's fellow Sunni Arabs who worked for his regime, the peoples of Iraq are much better off today than they were under Saddam Hussein. The problems that threaten to tear Iraq apart—Kurdish aspirations for independence, Shiite dreams of dominance, Sunni Arab nostalgia for lost power—are not of America's making (although the failure to act sooner against Saddam made them less solvable). Rather, they are inherent in an artificial state held together for eighty years primarily by brute force.

2.
American liberation—and liberation it was—ended the brute force. Iraqis celebrated the dictatorship's overthrow, and in Baghdad last April ordinary citizens thrust flowers into my hands. Since then, however:

• Hostile action has killed twice as many American troops as died in the war itself, while thousands of Iraqis have also died.

• Terrorists have killed the head of the United Nations Mission, Sergio Vieira de Mello; Iraq's most prominent Shiite politician, the Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim; and the deputy prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Sami Abdul Rahman, along with hundreds of others.

• Looting has caused billions of dollars of damage, most of which will have to be repaired at the expense of the US taxpayer.

• $150 billion has already been spent on Iraq, an amount equal to 25 percent of the non-defense discretionary federal budget. (By contrast, the first Gulf War earned a small profit for the US government, owing to the contributions of other nations.)

• Discontent with the US-led occupation boiled over into an uprising in the Shiite areas of Iraq on the first anniversary of liberation and a persistent insurgency in the Sunni Triangle degenerated into a full-scale battle in Fallujah. Many on the US-installed Iraqi Governing Council strongly opposed the US military response, and the US-created security institutions—the new Iraqi police and the paramilitary Iraqi Civil Defense Corps—refused to fight, or in some cases, joined the rebels.

• US credibility abroad has been undermined by the failure to find weapons of mass destruction. Spain's elections, Tony Blair's sinking poll results, and the prospective defeat of Australia's Howard government underscore the political risk of too close an association with the United States.

• Relations with France and Germany have been badly hurt, in some cases by the gratuitous comments made by senior US officials.

• The United States does not now have the military or diplomatic resources to deal with far more serious threats to our national security. President Bush rightly identified the peril posed by the nexus between weapons of mass destruction and rogue states. The greatest danger comes from rogue states that acquire and disseminate nuclear weapons technology. At the beginning of 2003 Iraq posed no such danger. As a result of the Iraq war the United States has neither the resources nor the international support to cope effectively with the very serious nuclear threats that come from North Korea, Iran, and, most dangerous of all, our newly designated "major non-NATO ally," Pakistan.

With fewer than one hundred days to the handover of power to a sovereign Iraq on June 30, there is no clear plan—and no decision—about how Iraq will be run on July 1, 2004. Earlier this month, the Bush administration praised itself generously for the signing of an interim constitution for Iraq—a constitution with human rights provisions it described as unprecedented for the Middle East. Three weeks later, as I write, the interim constitution is already falling apart.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

As is true of so much of the US administration of postwar Iraq, the damage here is self-inflicted. While telling Iraqis it wanted to defer constitutional issues to an elected Iraqi body, the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority could not resist trying to settle fundamental constitutional issues in the interim constitution. The US government lawyers who wrote the interim constitution, known formally as the Transitional Administrative Law, made no effort to disguise their authorship. All deliberations on the law were done in secret and probably fewer than one hundred Iraqis saw a copy of the constitution before it was promulgated. To write a major law in any democracy—much less a constitution—without public discussion should be unthinkable. Now that Iraqis are discovering for the first time the contents of the constitution, it should come as no surprise that many object to provisions they never knew were being considered.

Iraq's Shiite leaders say that the National Assembly due to be elected in January 2005 should not be constrained by a document prepared by US government lawyers, deliberated in secret, and signed by twenty-five Iraqis selected by Ambassador Bremer. In particular, the Shiites object to a provision in the interim constitution that allows three of Iraq's eighteen governorates (or provinces) to veto ratification of a permanent constitution. This, in effect, allows either the Kurds or the Sunni Arabs, each of whom make up between one fifth and one sixth of Iraq's population, to block a constitution they don't like. (It is a wise provision. Imposing a constitution on reluctant Kurds or Sunni Arabs will provoke a new cycle of resistance and conflict.) The Shiite position makes the Kurds, who are well armed, reluctant to surrender powers to a central government that may be Shiite-dominated.

At the moment the Sunni Arabs have few identifiable leaders. The Kurds, however, are well organized. They have an elected parliament and two regional governments, their own court system, and a 100,000 strong military force, known as the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga, whose members were principal American allies in the 2003 war, are better armed, better trained, and more disciplined than the minuscule Iraqi army the United States is now trying to reconstitute.

Early in 2005, Iraq will likely see a clash between an elected Shiite-dominated central government trying to override the interim constitution in order to impose its will on the entire country, and a Kurdistan government insistent on preserving the de facto independent status Kurdistan has enjoyed for thirteen years. Complicating the political struggle is a bitter territorial dispute over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk involving Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Sunni Turkmen, and Shiite Turkmen.

It is a formula for civil war.

3.
How did we arrive at this state of affairs?

I arrived in Baghdad on April 13, 2003, as part of an ABC news team. It was apparent to me that things were already going catastrophically wrong. When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9 last year, it found a city largely undamaged by a carefully executed military campaign. However, in the two months following the US takeover, unchecked looting effectively gutted every important public institution in the city with the notable exception of the Oil Ministry. The physical losses include:

• The National Library, which was looted and burned. Equivalent to our Library of Congress, it held every book published in Iraq, all newspapers from the last century, as well as rare manuscripts. The destruction of the library meant the loss of a historical record going back to Ottoman times.

• The Iraqi National Museum, which was also looted. More than 10,000 objects were stolen or destroyed. The Pentagon has deliberately, and repeatedly, tried to minimize the damage by excluding from its estimates objects stolen from storage as well as displayed treasures that were smashed but not stolen.

• Hospitals and other public health institutions, where looters stole medical equipment, medicines, and even patients' beds.

• Baghdad and Mosul Universities, which were stripped of computers, office furniture, and books. Academic research that took decades to carry out went up in smoke or was scattered.

• The National Theater, which was set ablaze by looters a full three weeks after US forces entered Baghdad.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Even more surprising, the United States made no apparent effort to secure sites that had been connected with Iraqi WMD programs or buildings alleged to hold important intelligence. As a result, the United States may well have lost valuable information that related to Iraqi WMD procurement, paramilitary resistance, foreign intelligence activities, and possible links to al-Qaeda.

• On April 16, looters attacked the Iraqi equivalent of the US Centers for Disease Control, stealing live HIV and live black fever bacteria. UNMOVIC and UNSCOM had long considered the building suspicious and had repeatedly conducted inspections there. The looting complicates efforts to understand and account for any Iraqi bioweapons research in the past. A Marine lieutenant watched the looting from next door. He told us, "I hope I am not responsible for Armageddon, but no one told me what was in that building."

• Although US troops moved onto the grounds of Iraq's sprawling Tuwaitha nuclear complex, they did not secure the warehouse that contained yellowcake and other radiological materials. Looters took materials that terrorists could use for a radiological weapon, although much of that material was eventually recovered. The looted nuclear materials were in a known location, and already had been placed under seal by the International Atomic Energy Commission.

• Ten days after the US took over Baghdad, I went through the unguarded Iraqi Foreign Ministry, going from the cooling unit on the roof to the archives in the basement, and rummaging through the office of the foreign minister. The only other people in the building were looters, who were busy opening safes and carrying out furniture. They were unarmed and helped me look for documents. Foreign Ministry files could have shed light on Iraqis' overseas intelligence activities, on attempts to procure WMD, and on any connections that may have existed with al-Qaeda. However, we may never know about these things, since looters scattered and burned files during the ten days, or longer, that this building was left unguarded.

The looting demoralized Iraqi professionals, the very people the US looks to in rebuilding the country. University professors, government technocrats, doctors, and researchers all had connections with the looted institutions. Some saw the work of a lifetime quite literally go up in smoke. The looting also exacerbated other problems: the lack of electricity and potable water, the lack of telephones, and the absence of police or other security.

Most importantly, the looting served to undermine Iraqi confidence in, and respect for, the US occupation authorities.

[continued in next post....]