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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: h0db who wrote (133148)5/15/2004 9:46:59 PM
From: Dr. Id  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
The Buck Stops … Where?
Stop blaming your henchmen, Mr. President.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Friday, May 14, 2004, at 2:41 PM PT


And so it seems I, too, have misunderestimated the president. This past Wednesday, I wrote a column holding George W. Bush responsible for our recent disasters—the torture at Abu Ghraib and the whole plethora of strategic errors in Iraq. My main argument was that Bush has placed too much trust, for far too long, in the judgment of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, despite his ceaseless string of bad judgments.

However, two news stories that have since come to my attention—one that appeared on the same day, the other more than two months ago—suggest not merely that Bush is guilty of "failing to recognize failure" (as my headline put it) but that he is directly culpable for the sins in question, no less so than his properly beleaguered defense chief.

The first story, written by Mark Matthews in the May 12 Baltimore Sun, quotes Secretary of State Colin Powell—on the record—as saying Bush knew about the International Committee of the Red Cross reports that were filed many months ago about the savagery at the prison. Powell is quoted as saying:


We kept the president informed of the concerns that were raised by the ICRC and other international organizations as part of my regular briefings of the president, and advised him that we had to follow these issues, and when we got notes sent to us or reports sent to us … we had to respond to them.

Powell adds that he, Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice kept Bush "fully informed of the concerns that were being expressed, not in specific details but in general terms." (Thanks to Joshua Micah Marshall, whose blog alerted me to the Sun story.)

So much for Rumsfeld's protective claim, at last week's hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that he had failed to bring the matter to the president's attention. No wonder Bush, in turn, rode out to the Pentagon and praised his servant-secretary for doing a "superb" job.

It's amazing, by the way, how Colin Powell seems to have scuttled his good-soldier routine altogether, criticizing his president at first quasi-anonymously (through Bob Woodward's new book), then through close aides (Wil Hylton's GQ article), and now straight up in the Baltimore Sun. One wonders when he'll go all the way and start making campaign appearances for John Kerry.

The second news story that heaves more burdens on the president comes from an NBC News broadcast by Jim Miklaszewski on March 2. Apparently, Bush had three opportunities, long before the war, to destroy a terrorist camp in northern Iraq run by Abu Musab Zarqawi, the al-Qaida associate who recently cut off the head of Nicholas Berg. But the White House decided not to carry out the attack because, as the story puts it:

[T]he administration feared [that] destroying the terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam.

The implications of this are more shocking, in their way, than the news from Abu Ghraib. Bush promoted the invasion of Iraq as a vital battle in the war on terrorism, a continuation of our response to 9/11. Here was a chance to wipe out a high-ranking terrorist. And Bush didn't take advantage of it because doing so might also wipe out a rationale for invasion.

The story gets worse in its details. As far back as June 2002, U.S. intelligence reported that Zarqawi had set up a weapons lab at Kirma in northern Iraq that was capable of producing ricin and cyanide. The Pentagon drew up an attack plan involving cruise missiles and smart bombs. The White House turned it down. In October 2002, intelligence reported that Zarqawi was preparing to use his bio-weapons in Europe. The Pentagon drew up another attack plan. The White House again demurred. In January 2003, police in London arrested terrorist suspects connected to the camp. The Pentagon devised another attack plan. Again, the White House killed the plan, not Zarqawi.

When the war finally started in March, the camp was attacked early on. But by that time, Zarqawi and his followers had departed.

This camp was in the Kurdish enclave of Iraq. The U.S. military had been mounting airstrikes against various targets throughout Iraq—mainly air-defense sites—for the previous few years. It would not have been a major escalation to destroy this camp, especially after the war against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The Kurds, whose autonomy had been shielded by U.S. air power since the end of the 1991 war, wouldn't have minded and could even have helped.

But the problem, from Bush's perspective, was that this was the only tangible evidence of terrorists in Iraq. Colin Powell even showed the location of the camp on a map during his famous Feb. 5 briefing at the U.N. Security Council. The camp was in an area of Iraq that Saddam didn't control. But never mind, it was something. To wipe it out ahead of time might lead some people—in Congress, the United Nations, and the American public—to conclude that Saddam's links to terrorists were finished, that maybe the war wasn't necessary. So Bush let it be.

In the two years since the Pentagon's first attack plan, Zarqawi has been linked not just to Berg's execution but, according to NBC, 700 other killings in Iraq. If Bush had carried out that attack back in June 2002, the killings might not have happened. More: The case for war (as the White House feared) might not have seemed so compelling. Indeed, the war itself might not have happened.

One ambiguity does remain. The NBC story reported that "the White House" declined to carry out the airstrikes. Who was "the White House"? If it wasn't George W. Bush—if it was, say, Dick Cheney—then we crash into a very different conclusion: not that Bush was directly culpable, but that he was more out of touch than his most cynical critics have imagined. It's a tossup which is more disturbing: a president who passes up the chance to kill a top-level enemy in the war on terrorism for the sake of pursuing a reckless diversion in Iraq—or a president who leaves a government's most profound decision, the choice of war or peace, to his aides.

Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate.



To: h0db who wrote (133148)5/15/2004 10:36:48 PM
From: Win Smith  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Hersh's piece explains a lot of things, but I have to note this one bit:

The notion that Arabs are particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation became a talking point among pro-war Washington conservatives in the months before the March, 2003, invasion of Iraq. One book that was frequently cited was “The Arab Mind,” a study of Arab culture and psychology, first published in 1973, by Raphael Patai, a cultural anthropologist who taught at, among other universities, Columbia and Princeton, and who died in 1996. The book includes a twenty-five-page chapter on Arabs and sex, depicting sex as a taboo vested with shame and repression. “The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of the women . . . and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world,” Patai wrote. Homosexual activity, “or any indication of homosexual leanings, as with all other expressions of sexuality, is never given any publicity. These are private affairs and remain in private.” The Patai book, an academic told me, was “the bible of the neocons on Arab behavior.” In their discussions, he said, two themes emerged—“one, that Arabs only understand force and, two, that the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation.”

Er. Somebody here has oft noted the true believers' obsession with this "Arab Mind" BS. I know it's unfair and everything, but somehow, it seems appropriate that it's all blowing up in their faces.



To: h0db who wrote (133148)5/16/2004 6:13:16 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
JAG Lawyers Say Bush Political Appointees Ignored Their Warnings on Prisoner Treatment
_______________________________________

By Jake Tapper and Clayton Sandell
ABCNEWS.com
May 16, 2004

abcnews.go.com

W A S H I N G T O N — Lawyers from the military's Judge Advocate General's Corps, or JAG, had been urging Pentagon officials to ensure protection for prisoners for two years before the abuses at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison came to light, current and former JAG officers told ABCNEWS.

But, the JAG lawyers say, political appointees at the Pentagon ignored their warnings, setting the stage for the Abu Ghraib abuses, in which military police reservists photographed each other subjecting Iraqi prisoners to physical abuse and sexual humiliation.
As the military's uniformed lawyers, JAG officers are in charge of instructing military commanders on how to adhere to domestic and international rules regarding the treatment of detainees.

"If we — 'we' being the uniformed lawyers — had been listened to, and what we said put into practice, then these abuses would not have occurred," said Rear Admiral Don Guter (ret.), the Navy Judge Advocate General from 2000 to 2002.

Specifically, JAG officers say they have been marginalized by Douglas Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy, and William Haynes II, the Pentagon's general counsel, whom President Bush has nominated for a judgeship on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

In an interview with ABCNEWS, Feith denied any tensions whatsoever with JAG officers. He also denied that military lawyers disagreed with rules and practices coming from his office that pertained to detainees. "That's not true in my experience or my understanding of what's happened," Feith said.

But asked about some of these issues during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Tuesday, the current Army JAG, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, was less dismissive, calling the charges "troubling" and saying, "We're trying to get to the bottom of it."

Under condition of anonymity, one current JAG officer told ABCNEWS that for the last two years, "the military lawyers have always been the ones speaking for greater protections and recognitions of rights for detainees — and the political appointees have argued for no recognition of rights and careful control of the process. That's an argument, to date, that the political appointees have won."

Several JAG sources report that, to form the rules for military tribunals, the Pentagon initially created a "Tiger Team" of Army JAG officers. But that team was soon disbanded by Haynes and the political appointee attorneys took over the process. JAG sources interpreted the move as being the result of military lawyers' insistence on greater rights and protections for detainees than what Haynes, Feith and others wanted to permit.

According to Guter, Pentagon political appointees often would call JAG officers just so they could claim military attorneys had been consulted. "Determinations had been made and they were just seeking to make a call to assure that they had buy-in," Guter said. "If you didn't agree, I think you were marginalized."

One time a political appointee called Guter to inform him about an issue pertaining to military tribunals for prisoners held there. Guter says the appointee told him he couldn't discuss the matter with anyone else, "including the team that had been put together to help work on the tribunals who worked for me." Guter says the appointee gave him a deadline, but "when I looked at my watch I had just 20 minutes to respond."

Matters got so frustrating that in May and October 2003, eight senior JAG officers took the rare step of going outside the chain of command to meet secretly with the New York City Bar Association, warning of a "disaster waiting to happen".

"They felt that there had been a conscious effort to create an atmosphere of legal ambiguity surrounding these detention facilities, and that it had been done to give interrogators the broadest possible latitude in their conduct of operations," Scott Horton, former chair of the New York City Bar Association's Committee on International Human Rights, told ABCNEWS. Horton's meeting with the JAG officers was first reported by Salon.com.

This "atmosphere of legal ambiguity," JAG officials told ABCNEWS, began in early 2002, when the Bush administration decided the Geneva Conventions' rules for humane treatment of prisoners did not apply to the war on terror, and to the suspects seized in Afghanistan and held at Guantanamo. For the war in Iraq, the Geneva Conventions were supposed to apply … but JAG sources say there was little to no clarification of that.

"When you say something down the chain of command like, 'The Geneva Conventions don't apply,' that sets the stage for the kind of chaos that we've seen," said Rear Admiral John Hutson (ret.), who was the Navy Judge Advocate General from 1997 to 2000.

"War is the most difficult of human endeavors under the best of circumstances," Hutson said, "and if the rules aren't clear, it makes that most difficult endeavor even more difficult. And the result is that things break down at the bottom. If you throw the rules out, if you throw the gloves off, and you say these people are terrorists and beneath our dignity and beneath our rule of law, then you shouldn't be surprised when bad things happen."

Feith denied all of these charges. "There has not been, ever, any ambiguity about the strong support that the leadership of this department gives to the Geneva Conventions," he said.

Other decisions JAG officials disputed included using private contractors for interrogations — thus further blurring the lines of the chain of command — and keeping JAG officials away from Iraqi interrogation centers.

Rep. Steve Buyer, (R-Ind.), a JAG in the Army Reserves, wanted to offer his services in Iraq. But even though the Army wanted him there, Pentagon political appointees vetoed him going. Buyer told ABCNEWS' John Cochran that he tried to convey to his Pentagon civilian contact how important it was to ensure against the abuse of Iraqi prisoners and detainees, telling him: "You have to get somebody that's qualified in international law and the Geneva Conventions to serve in that brigade … I'm pretty shocked that this never happened."

Buyer was referring to the 800th Military Police Brigade, seven of whose reservists are now facing charges in the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal.

Buyer isn't the only one to question why there didn't seem to be a significant JAG presence for interrogations at detention centers like Abu Ghraib. Horton says the JAGs who reached out to the New York City Bar Association complained about a new "practice" of keeping JAGs away. And Admiral Guter says when he was Navy JAG from 2000 until 2002, "JAGs were clamoring for assignments of this kind of importance, so I know they were available. And if they're available and you don't send them, then I have to say you don't send them on purpose."