These clowns apparently have a great talent for pissing Judges off too! OMG, this is just so hilarious!
but the GECC thing was so ridiculous, and GECC "management" harassed RB so relentlessly, that they changed their policy
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
WESTERN DIVISION S W.
ARKANSAS BUSINESS LIMITED PLAINTIFF!
PARTNERSHIP COUNTER-DEFENDANT
v. NO. 4:03-CV-00313 GTE
ARKANSAS BUSINESS PUBLISHING GROUP,
INC.; JIM BOLT; ARKANSAS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, INC.; NORTHWEST ARKANSAS
BUSINESS JOURNAL, INC.; JOHN DODGE; DIEFENDANTS/
and JUAN GOMEZ COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ RULE 37 MOTION AND
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL TO SHOW CAUSE UNDER RULE 11
Presently before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed and sanctions be imposed against the Plaintiff. For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the Motion. The Court also orders the Defendants’ attorney, John Dodge,’ to show cause as to why he and the Defendants themselves have not violated Rule 11. The Court also requests further briefing from the parties on the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows a court to order an attorney to pay attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses if the attorney’s conduct “multiplies the proceedings. . . unreasonably and vexatiously.”
The Defendants’ Motion stems from Plaintiffs objections to numerous requests for production of documents and interrogatories submitted by the Defendants. It appears that the
1The Court notes that Mr. Dodge represents all of the Defendants and is also a party Defendant himself.
parties will be unable to resolve their discovery disputes without court intervention. That being the case and since both parties have stated their positions on whether the requested discovery must be produced, the Court will construe the Defendant’s Motion as a Motion to Compel and rule on each individual request for production and interrogatory.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Arkansas Business Limited Partnership (“ABLP”) alleges the following claims in its May 1, 2003 Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction: dilution and infringement upon Plaintiffs federal trademark, ARKANSASBUS1NESS.COM; infringement of Plaintiffs common law rights in “Arkansas Business Publishing Group” (“ABPG”); dilution and infringement of Plaintiffs state trademarks; tortious interference; defamation; and conversion. Plaintiff also filed a separate Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
On May 27, 2003, the Defendants filed a Counterclaim. The Defendants filed an Amended Counterclaim on October 8, 2003. The Court dismissed some of Defendants’ claims in its Orders of September 19, 2003 and July 21,2004. As a result of those Orders, the Defendants’ remaining counterclaims are as follows: Three separate Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTP”) Claims that the Plaintiff sought to deprive Separate Defendants Arkansas Business Publishing Group, Inc., Arkansas Business Journal, Inc. and Northwest Arkansas Business Journal, Inc. of the right to use its corporate name exclusively in the state of Arkansas; and a claim for a declaratory judgment that the Plaintiff does not have a federal trademark in “arkansasbusiness.com” because that mark is the combination of two generic names and the mark has been diluted by others.
The Court’s July21 Order denied the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike certain interrogatories, requests for production of documents and requests for admission. Since the Plaintiff sought to strike this discovery solely because it was filed after the discovery cut-off date and since, by the time of the July21 Order, the discovery cut-off date had been continued, the Court denied the Plaintiffs motion.2
On July 30, 2004, the Defendants filed a Motion, pursuant to Rule 37, requesting dismissal of the Plaintiffs complaint and sanctions. The Plaintiff responded on August 12, 2004. That motion and the discovery dispute to which it refers is now before the court.
This case is currently set for trial on December 6, 2004 and the discovery cut-off date was September 23, 2004. The Court is presently under the assumption that the parties will be prepared to go to trial on December 6.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Ru1e37
The Defendants premise their motion on Rule 37(a) and (d). However, Rule 37 is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case. Rule 3 7(a) outlines the appropriate circumstances and procedure for filing a Motion to Compel. The Defendants have not filed a Motion to Compel. Rule 37(d) allows a court to issue orders or take action including dismissal of the action where a party fails “to serve answers or objections to interrogatorics. . .“ In this case, the Plaintiff responded to some 125 interrogatories and 36 requests for production of documents. They did so in a timely fashion, given the procedural circumstances of this case.3
2 As of the Court’s July 21, 2004 Order, the interrogatories and requests for production propounded by the Defendants to the Plaintiff were not yet in the record. The only information the Court had concerning these documents was the Plaintiffs argument that they should be stricken for being untimely. ThE interrogatories and request for production themselves were not before the Court until the Defendant filed its Rule 37 Motion on August 12, 2004.
3 The Defendants propounded their Interrogatories and Requests for Production on October 30, 2003. On November 17, 2003, the Court stayed this action due to Separate Defendant Bolt’s filing of bankruptcy. The Court lifted the stay on March 24, 2004 and reopened discovery by
Although the Defendants may be unsatisfied with the Plaintiffs responses, the Plaintiffs have responded to the discovery as required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Rule 37(d) clearly has no application to the Plaintiffs conduct.
The Court understands that the Defendants are of the opinion that the Plaintiff has not adequately responded to written discovery. Despite this belief, the Defendants’ behavior is completely out of line. The Defendants should have engaged the Plaintiff in a discussion regarding the Plaintiffs specific objections to the immense amount of discovery requested. Instead, the Defendants chose to send a curt letter generally stating that they viewed the discovery responses as inadequate and threatening to involve the Court.
When the Plaintiff responded to this letter by suggesting that the Defendants elaborate as to why they believed certain of the Plaintiffs responses were inappropriate, the Defendants again responded generally and filed the instant motion. The Defendants’ conduct does not constitute a good faith effort to resolve this discovery dispute. It is the Defendants who violated Rule 37 by failing to confer in good faith with the Plaintiff prior to filing this motion.
In view of the history of this case, it does not appear likely that the parties will be able to reach any agreement regarding discovery. Therefore, despite the manner in which the Defendants brought this discovery disagreement before the Court, the Court will address the merits of the Plaintiffs objections and rule on whether the information and documents sought by the Defendants are discoverable.
B. Defendants’ Interrogatories and Requests for Production
Before discussing each interrogatory and request specifically, the Court will address the
issuing a new scheduling order on April 12,2004. The Plaintiff responded to the outstanding discovery on May 12, 2004, within 30 days of the reopening of discovery.
Defendant’s general contentions. First, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs discovery responses were improperly signed. Defendants’ objection to Plaintiffs attorney signing the discovery rather than an officer of the Plaintiff is unfounded. The Plaintiffs answers to the interrogatories pose no verification problem. Nor have the Defendants contended that someone other than the Plaintiff provided the answers. The Plaintiffs attorney, who is an agent of the Plaintiff, signed the discovery and this complied with the letter and spirit of Rule 33. Moreover, the Plaintiff has now provided the Defendants with an affidavit from an employee and representative of the Plaintiff
The Plaintiff is also not required to seek a protective order. Though protective orders may facilitate discovery in some cases, Plaintiff is under no obligation to pursue such an order. Rule 37 certainly does not require one. Under Rule 26(b), information or documents must be relevant to be discoverable and a protective order does not alter this threshold limitation on discovery.
Rule 26 focuses the Court on relevance in assessing whether information or documents are discoverable. Rule 26(b)(l) ftirther elaborates that “relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The Court may also limit discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. . .“ Since the Defendants’ Motion is actually founded on Rule 26 (despite Defendants’ repeated reference to Rule 37), the Court is entitled to engage in such a balancing test when assessing the specific discovery items at issue. The Court bears Rule 26(b) in mind as it addresses the specific discovery requests and interrogatories at issue.
At the outset, the Court notes that the both the claims and counterclaims in this case are quite narrow. The Plaintiffs state, federal, and common law trademark infringement and dilution claims relate to the Defendants’ use of the names or trademarks “Arkansas Business Publishing Group, Inc.,” “Arkansas Business Journal, Inc.” and “Northwest Arkansas Business Journal, Inc.” The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ use of these names conflicts with its trademarks in “ArkansasBusiness.com,” “Arkansas Business Publishing Group,” “Arkansas Business,” and “Northwest Arkansas Business Journal.”
The Defendants’ Counter-Claims concern the Plaintiffs alleged efforts to deprive the Defendants of the right to use Arkansas Business Publishing Group, Inc., Arkansas Business Journal, Inc. and Northwest Arkansas Business Journal, Inc. exclusively in the state of Arkansas. The Defendants’ final counter claim alleges that the Plaintiff does not have a federal trademark in “arkansasbusiness.com” because that mark is the combination of two generic names and the mark has been diluted by others.
Discovery on both the claims and counter-claims shall generally be limited to the Plaintiffs and Defendants’ use of the disputed trademarks. The Court will not allow the Defendants to conduct a fishing expedition into the financial background and personnel files of the Plaintiff Such information is not relevant to the claims and counter-claims at issue.
The Court notes that the Plaintiff has conditioned production of some documents and answers to some interrogatories on the approval and entry of a protective order. As stated above, Plaintiff is under no obligation to seek a protective order. However, it appears that Plaintiff feels such an Order may be necessary. If the Plaintiff feels a protective order is needed for it to comply with the rulings set forth below, it should confer with the Defendant and move for the entry of a protective order as soon as possible. The Court hopes that the parties will complete discovery left outstanding by this Order in a timely manner since the discovery cut-off date has
passed.
Turning to the specific interrogatories and requests for production propounded by the Defendants, the Court will structure its rulings on an item by item basis, as those items are addressed in the Defendants’ Requests for Production and in the various Defendants’ separate interrogatories.4 Specifically, the Court makes the following rulings:
a. Defendants’ Reuuests for Production
1. This request is overly broad and unduly burdensome. The Plaintiffs providing of “a copy of its certificate and Articles of Limited Partnership and two amendments thereto” is sufficient.
2. The documents attached to Plaintiffs complaint appear to satisfy this request. If the Defendants’ request further documents they should specifically identify the documents they seek.
3. This request is overly broad and irrelevant. The Defendants may not obtain minutes of all meetings the Plaintiff has had since its inception.
4. This request is also overly broad. Although the Defendants may discovery some information related to the ownership of the Plaintiff, they may not discover “any correspondence” as requested. Detailed and non-public information regarding the Plaintiffs
4 The Court will not elaborate on each of the 125 Interrogatories and 35 Requests for Production propounded by the Defendants to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the parties may find it helpful to refer to either the Requests for Production, Interrogatories and Responses themselves or to the Charts provided by the Plaintiff in Exhibit E to its Response to Defendants’ Rule 37 Motion. Plaintiffs Exhibit E may be particularly helpful as the parties follow the Court’s rulings. When the Court refers to “the Plaintiffs response” or states that “the documentation and information the Plaintiffs have agreed to provide is sufficient,” the Court is specifically referring to both the Plaintiffs responses to the propounded discovery and the Plaintiffs additional responses found in Exhibit E. The parties should also note that the numbers in this Order correspond to the numbers given the requested discovery in the Defendants’ requests for production and interrogatories.
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ownership is irrelevant. The issue in this litigation is the Plaintiffs ownership and use of the disputed marks. The owners of the Plaintiff and their corporate structure are only peripherally relevant to the trademarks at issue and discovery of such information will be limited accordingly. The Court will only allow discovery of publicly available information and documents related to the owners of the Plaintiff
5. The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs response. The documentation the Plaintiffs have agreed to provide is sufficient.
6. The documentation the Plaintiffs have agreed to provide is sufficient. The Court previously dismissed the Defendants’ claim that the misstatement of the date of first use of the mark “ArkansasBusiness.com” somehow impacted Plaintiff’s right: to use that mark. Only Plaintiffs claims that the mark has been diluted and is the combination of two generic names remain.
7. The documentation the Plaintiffs have agreed to provide is sufficient. All other documents related to this request are irrelevant and unduly burdensome and are therefore not discoverable.
8. Defendants may not discovery this information.
9. This request is irrelevant. Defendants may not discovery this information.
10. This request is irrelevant, unduly burdensome and overly broad. Defendants may not discover this information.
11. This request is irrelevant. Defendants may not discovery this information.
12. The documentation the Plaintiffs have agreed to provide is sufficient. See Court’s Ruling on Document Production Request No. 4, supra.
13. The documentation the Plaintiff has agreed to provide is sufficient. All other
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documents related to this request are irrelevant and unduly burdensome and are therefore not discoverable.
14. The documentation the Plaintiff has agreed to provide is sufficient. All other documents related to this request are irrelevant and unduly burdensome and are therefore not discoverable.
15. The documents sought are irrelevant to the trademark infringement and dilution claims at issue. Although the parties were previously part of a defamation lawsuit involving articles published by the Plaintiff, those issues arc not before the court here.
16. Plaintiff’s response is sufficient.
17. Plaintiffs response indicates that it has provided all exhibits which it presently has. Plaintiff has complied with the Court’s Scheduling Order and has until November 5, 2004 to identify exhibits.
18. The documents sought are irrelevant to the trademark infringement and dilution claims at issue and are therefore not discoverable. See Court’s ruling on Request No. 15, supra.
19. It appears that the Plaintiff has provided the requested information with the exception of attorney’s fees. If this is the case, Plaintiffs response is sufficient.
20. The documentation sought is relevant and the Plaintiff must produce it.
21. Defendants have no evidence that Plaintiffs response is untrue. The Plaintiff has satisfied this request.
22. See Court’s Ruling on Request No. 2, supra.
23. This request is irrelevant, unduly burdensome and overly broad. Defendants may not discover this information.
24. This request is irrelevant, unduly burdensome and overly broad. Defendants may
not discover this information.
25. Plaintiffs response is sufficient.
26. Plaintiffs response is sufficient.
27. Plaintiffs response is sufficient.
28. This request is repetitive. See response to Request No. 19, supra.
29. This request is also repetitive. The Defendants may not discover the requested documents.
30. This request is repetitive, irrelevant, unduly burdensome and overly broad. Defendants may not discover this information.
31. Only the Defendants’ alleged infringements appear relevant. Defendants may discover documents in Plaintiffs possession relating to Defendants’ alleged infringements. However, it appears that the Defendants already have such documents. If the Defendants would like to provide legal support for their contention that any prior communications with third parties related to the trademarks at issue in this case are relevant, the Court will consider such authority.
32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. These requests are irrelevant. Defendants may not discover the requested documents and information.
b. Defendant Arkansas Business Publishing Group. Inc.’s Interrogatories
1, 2, and 5. Plaintiffs answers are sufficient.
6. Plaintiffs should further respond to this interrogatory by providing any factual information related to the alleged infringement. To the extent that this interrogatory calls for a legal conclusion, the Plaintiffs need not respond. Such issues are questions of law that will be addressed by the Court either upon consideration of dispositive motions or prior to trial.
7, 8 and 9. Plaintiffs answers are sufficient.
10. Plaintiffs answer is sufficient. See Ruling on Request No. 31, supra.
11, 12, 13, and 14. Plaintiff must provide any further information on the arrangement between Journal Publishing, Inc., its majority owner, and Plaintiff regarding use of the disputed fictitious name. All other requested information may not be discovered.
15, 16. Plaintiffs responses are sufficient.
17. This interrogatory is irrelevant. Only the Plaintiffs use of the disputed marks are relevant.
18. Plaintiffs response is sufficient.
20, 21, and 22. These interrogatories are all irrelevant. The requested information is not discoverable.
23, 24. Plaintiffs responses are sufficient.
25. Plaintiff has asserted a federal common-law trademark in “Arkansas Business Publishing Group.” Therefore, state or federal trademark applications regarding this trademark are not relevant.
c. Defendant Bolt’s Interrogatories
The Court finds the following interrogatories repetitive: 1-11, 18-20, 23-2 5. These interrogatories pose, in substance, the same questions posed in Defendant Arkansas Business Publishing Group, Inc.’s interrogatories. The Plaintiff need not provide any further answers to these interrogatories.
Some of the interrogatories propounded by Defendant Bolt touch on different issues. The Court’s rulings on these interrogatories are as follows:
12, 13, and 15. The Plaintiffs answer is sufficient.
14. The information sought is irrelevant.
16, 17. The Plaintiffs answer is sufficient. It appears that the Plaintiff has not ever used the symbol “TM” in connection with its alleged trademarks. The Plaintiff should confirm that this is true. By providing Defendants with examples of its usage of the “Arkansas Business Publishing Group” trademark, the Plaintiff will have properly answered the interrogatory.
21. The information sought is irrelevant.
d. Arkansas Business Journal. Inc.’s Interrogatories
Other Defendants previously propounded and the Plaintiff previously answered the substance of interrogatories 1, 2, 6, 9, and 23. To the extent these interrogatories had not been previously answered, the Court finds the Plaintiffs answers sufficient.
The Court also finds the Plaintiffs answers to the following interrogatories sufficient: 4,
5,7,8, 11, 15, 17, 19,21,22,24,and25.
The Complaint itself provides the answers to interrogatories 13 and 14.
The Plaintiff properly responded to Interrogatory 16. The Court also notes that it dismissed that part of Defendants’ counterclaim that sought a declaratory judgment on the grounds that the business of the Plaintiff and the Defendants involve different classes of goods.
Finally, interrogatory 20 calls for a legal conclusion and, as such, is not an appropriate issue for discovery.
e. Defendant John Dodge’s Interrogatories
Every interrogatory propounded by John Dodge has either already been asked by another Defendant, is irrelevant, or was properly responded to by the Plaintiff. Therefore, Dodge’s interrogatories are largely superfluous. Specifically, Plaintiffs revenues, profits, and losses are irrelevant. Plaintiffs interaction with one Bill Black is irrelevant. Most of the other interrogatories had been covered numerous times in discovery propounded by the other
12
Defendants. Plaintiff is not required to further answer any of Defendant Dodge’s Interrogatories.
III. Rule 11 Sanctions and Imposition of Costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
The manner in which the Defendants have conducted written discovery in this case is simply inexcusable. Although some of the requests for production and interrogatories touch on legitimate issues, most of the written discovery propounded by the Defendants seeks information and documents irrelevant to this case. As stated, the issues involved in the Plaintiffs claims and the Defendant’s counterclaims are quite narrow.
The manner in which the Defendants proceeded is more objectionable than the content of the propounded discovery. All of the Defendants are represented by one attorney: John Dodge. There is no reasonable explanation as to why Mr. Dodge did not consolidate the interrogatories posed by the Defendants to avoid unnecessary duplication and to avoid unduly burdening the Plaintiff
The Court is aware that each separate Defendant may propound 25 interrogatories under Rule 33(a). If all of the 133 interrogatories sought independent, relevant information, the number of interrogatories would be acceptable. However, many of the interrogatories and seek the same information. Much of that information is irrelevant. Instead of seeking discovery of relevant information in a non-repetitive manner, it appears that Mr.. Dodge and the Defendants set out to propound the maximum number of interrogatories allowed under Rule 33(a). It also appears that the Defendants requested a large volume of irrelevant documents in an effort to burden the Plaintiff
Afler a thorough review of the discovery propounded by the Defendants, it is obvious to the Court that the Defendants have abused the discovery process in an attempt to antagonize, burden, and harass the Plaintiff Discovery relating to the issues relevant to this case could have
13
been conducted swiftly and easily had the Defendants’ discovery come remotely within the limitations imposed by Rule 26 or had the Defendants communicated with the Plaintiff in a good faith effort to agree upon discovery of at least arguably relevant documents and information.
Moreover, as stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions against the Plaintiff is clearly baseless. There is no legal or factual basis for the motion. Irrespective of the frivolity with which the Defendants have conducted discovery, the Defendants could have raised this discovery dispute through a Motion to Compel. Rule 37 is inapplicable, as the Defendants’ counsel should have known. The Defendants’ Rule 37 Motion appears to have been intended to harass, delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation.
This is not the first time the Defendants or their attorney have behaved in an unacceptable manner in this litigation. In its September 19, 2003 Order, in the context of ruling on the Defendants’ August 25, 2003 Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions against the Plaintiff, the Court previously warned the Defendants and their counsel:
The Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is completely without merit. Indeed, a close question exists as to whether the motion itself should be deemed frivolous. Nevertheless, the Court will not sanction Defendants at this time. Defendants are placed on notice, however, that if they continue to rehash these allegations under the guise of bringing to the Court’s attention legitimate issues, the Court will not hesitate to impose sanctions upon Defendants and/or their counsel.
As the discovery addressed in this Order evidences, the Defendants did not heed the Court’s warning. It appears to the Court that the Defendants’ Rule 37 Motion violated Rule ll(b)(l), which states:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certif~’ing that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of Litigation; Under Rule 11, the Court is authorized to impose sanctions on its own initiative upon allowing the person or parties against whom the sanctions are to be imposed to respond. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(l)(B). Therefore, the Court directs John Dodge to show cause as to why he, in his capacity as counsel for the Defendants, and the Defendants themselves have not violated Rule 11 (b)(1) by submitting the Motion for Rule 37 sanctions.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 also appears applicable and states:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisf~’ personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The record indicates that the Defendants have behaved in an unreasonable and vexatious manner in propounding written discovery and filing the Rule 37 Motion. The Defendants’ attorney should include in his response to the Court’s show cause order a separate discussion explaining why the Plaintiffs costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees related to written discovery and regarding the Rule 37 Motion should not be taxed against him under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The Court also requests that the Plaintiff brief the issues of Rule 11 sanctions and taxing of costs, expenses and attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against Defendants’ attorney.5 The Plaintiff, the Defendants, and John Dodge, in his capacity as attorney for the Defendants, should respond to this Order not later than Wednesday, September 29, 2004.
‘The Court notes that the Plaintiff has recommended that the Court impose sanctions against the
Defendants as a result of the Rule 37 Motion and the manner in which Defendants have
conducted written discovery. See Plaintiffs Response to Rule 37 Motion at 7.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Defendants’ Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (Doc. No. 71) be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the parties finalize discovery consistent with this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Defendants and the Defendants’ attorney respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed against the Defendants and the Defendants’ attorney under Rule 11 and as to why costs, expenses and attorney’s fees should not be imposed against the Defendants’ attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Said responses shall be filed not later than Wednesday, September 29, 2004. The Plaintiff should also brief these issues by September 29, 2004.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2tf~tay of September, 2004.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District of Arkansas
U.S. Court House
600 West Capitol, Suite 402
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201-3325
September 27, 2004
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * *
Re: 4:03-cv~-00313.
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the following:
Amy Lee Stewart, Esq.
Rose Law Finn
120 East Fourth Street
Little Rock, AR 72201-2893
Kathryn Bennett Perkins, Esq.
Rose Law Firm
120 East Fourth Street
Little Rock, AR 72201-2893
Byron Jansen Walker, Esq.
Rose Law Firm
120 East Fourth Street
Little Rock, AR 72201-2893
John C. Dodge, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 107
Lowell, AR 72745-0107
J. Robin Pace, Esq.
Attorney at Law
2106 South Walton Boulevard
Suite D
Bentonville, AR 72712
press, post
Date: 9/27/04
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