SPEAKING FREELY
Northern Iraq - calm like a bomb
By W Joseph Stroupe
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As negotiations at the United Nations on a new resolution for Iraq apparently near a close, developments with respect to the Kurds and north Iraq, where there has been relative calm until now, are looking more and more ominous. Recently, the People's Congress of Kurdistan (the former Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK), announced an abrupt end to its five-year ceasefire with Turkish forces, warning that it would soon resort to violent means to achieve its ends.
Within a few days of the announcement, Kurdish forces in southern Turkey did attack Turkish forces, prompting a violent response. Additionally, according to a recent Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, "Kamis Djabrailov, chairman of the International Union of Kurdish Public Organizations that represents the Kurdish minorities in Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], told Interfax on 31 May that his organization approves the announcement three days earlier by the People's Congress of Kurdistan that it will end on 1 June its five-year ceasefire in hostilities with the Turkish armed forces."
Hence, the regional political, diplomatic and even military mobilization of Kurdish forces, in an attempt to secure its own interests as the June 30 date for the handover of sovereignty to Iraq nears, appears to be under way. In verification of that fact, on June 7, Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan threatened to pull out of the interim government unless the new United Nations Security Council resolution guarantees Kurdish autonomy and a veto over the direction of the interim government as promised in the draft interim constitution, which was very reluctantly signed by the Shi'ite representatives, but which is something the Shi'ite majority refuses to accept under any circumstances.
The Kurdish representatives also expressed their bitter disappointment over the fact that no Kurd was chosen to fill the positions of either prime minister or president. Hence, in the Kurdish view, their interests are being severely slighted as the June 30 date nears. Whether a political and diplomatic compromise can be reached that satisfies all the parties is not at all assured. The Sunnis and Shi'ites appear to be mostly content with the look of the new interim council and with Iraq's direction, but the Kurds are certainly not content. They have been marginalized before, by the United States itself, and intend to take care of their own interests, by violence if need be. This is indeed ominous.
The pointed Kurdish demands threaten to disrupt the relative contentment with the transition process, which now exists among the Sunni and Shi'ite populations, among Iraq's neighbors and within the international community at large. In actuality, there is little sympathy for the cause of the Kurds in Iraq and the surrounding region.
That is especially so in Turkey, Syria and Iran, where Kurdish groups are viewed as nothing more than destabilizing terrorists, threatening the national security of the three nations, which have recently deepened their cooperation in the effort to subdue such groups. And in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the last thing that is wanted is for such Kurdish groups to push the region toward violence and instability in the pursuit of Kurdish autonomy.
An independent Kurdistan is, therefore, anathema to all but the Kurds themselves. It is the United States which has greatly exacerbated the current situation by raising Kurdish hopes for an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq. Months ago, in the atmosphere of violent insurgency in Iraq and the approaching handover of sovereignty, the US-drafted interim constitution significantly raised such Kurdish hopes, giving them a veto over the direction of any Iraqi interim government, as well as over the final Iraqi government to be seated in 2005.
Fearful of the influence of Shi'ite religious fundamentalism as the transition to sovereignty progressed, the administration of President George W Bush evidently saw the Kurds as an entity it could use to keep such Shi'ite influence in check, to limit its power in any new Iraqi regime, so as to prevent the formation of an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. However, as matters are turning out, the most powerful positions being filled in the interim government are occupied by mostly secular Sunnis and Shi'ites.
So, the United States now has little use for the Kurds, who see clearly that once again they are being abandoned by the US. All the parties see the Kurds, therefore, as possible spoilers of the solution currently being put together under UN auspices. Hence, little sympathy exists for them. Realizing this fact, the Kurds are already resorting to threats and violence in an effort to get a satisfactory hearing. By its short-sighted, ad hoc approach to Iraq's complicated situation, first using the Kurds and then casting them aside, the United States may have sealed both its own and Iraq's fate.
There appears little hope that the Kurdish demands can be sufficiently taken into consideration without at the same time losing the already cautious and tentative support of the Sunnis and Shi'ites. And there also appears little hope that the Kurds will suddenly satisfy themselves with what the other two factions are comfortable in giving them. Hence, whether the Kurds might temporarily tone down their demands for the time being, or whether they more likely will ratchet up their demands as the UN negotiations proceed and the June 30 date nears, one thing that appears certain is that they will hold a major key to how events proceed in Iraq.
The United States has let loose a Kurdish "monster", not only on Iraq itself, but also on the region at large, a "monster" which cannot easily be put back into the box. If a diplomatic solution cannot be crafted that satisfies all of Iraq's three factions, and it is doubtful that one can, then a great deal of military muscle will be needed in the entire region to keep the disenfranchised Kurds "in check". And that muscle will have to come increasingly into play in northern Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In the end, the handover of sovereignty on June 30 may not change anything, except that it may well accelerate Iraq's descent into sectarian violence, with Turkey and Syria cooperating militarily to secure their interests in northern Iraq by taking control of that region, and the southern regions of Iraq moving significantly closer into cooperation with Iran, with the US military caught in the middle. The relative calmness of northern Iraq is very likely to be much like the calmness of a large bomb - its calmness very deceptively masks the huge explosion which is likely imminent.
W Joseph Stroupe is editor-in-chief of GeoStrategyMap.com, an online geopolitical magazine specializing in strategic analysis and forecasting. He may be reached by e-mail at editor_in_chief@geostrategymap.com.
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