On a less humorous front.
"Late Summer 1980. Roughly 5,000 Iraqis - mostly northern Kurds - were detained by Saddam's army never to be seen again. According to numerous Kurds interviewed by the Independent of London, they were killed in gas and chemical weapons experiments . The newspaper interviewed one Iraqi Kurdish refugee in Lebanon who said, "It is now clear, that during the war with Iran many of the young detainees were taken to secret laboratories in different locations in Iraq and were exposed to intense doses of chemical and biological substances in a myriad of conditions and situations. With every military setback at the front causing panic in Baghdad, these experiments had to be speeded up – which meant more detainees were needed to be sent to the laboratories, which had to test VX nerve gas, mustard gas, sarin, tabun, aflatoxin, gas gangrene and anthrax." The refugee also claimed that Western intelligence was fully aware of what happened to the 5,000 detainees. [Independent, 12/13/02]
September 1980. Iraq invaded Iran.
1980. A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document reported that since the mid-1970s, Iraq had been 'actively acquiring' chemical weapons. [Financial Times 2/23/83 cited in Phythian 1997]
1982. President Reagan ordered the Defense Department and the CIA to supply Iraq's military with intelligence information, advice, and hardware for battle after being advised to do so by CIA Director William Casey. Former Reagan National Security official Howard Teicher said that Casey "personally spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war." The U.S. continued to provide thi type of intelligence to Iraq until 1988. [Teicher Affidavit, Knight Ridder 2/24/1995; NBC News 8/18/02; New York Times 8/18/2002]
1982. Iraq began using chemical weapons against Iran. [Shultz 1993, p. 238; see also Cole 1997, p. 87; Jentleson 1994 p. 48] By the end of the decade, some 100,000 people would die as a result the chemical warfare waged by the Iraqis [New York Times, 2/13/03].
February 1982. The Reagan administration - despite stern objections from Congress- removed Iraq from the U.S. State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism. [Freudenheim, Slavin, Rhoden 2/28/1982; Washington Post 12/30/02; The Times 12/31/02] This cleared the way for future U.S. military aid to that country. [Financial Times 2/23/83 cited in Phythian 1997]
1983. The U.S. State Department reported that Iraq's support of terrorist groups continued unabated. [Jentleson 1994, pg. 52]
1983. The Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 civilian Hughes helicopters to Iraq, in spite of the fact it was widely understood that the helicopters could be weaponized with little effort. Critics regarded the sale as military aid cloaked as civilian assistance. [Phythian 1997, pgs. 37-38]
1983. Secretary of Commerce George Baldridge and Secretary of State George Shultz successfully lobbied the National Security Council (NSC) advisor to approve the sale of 10 Bell helicopters to Iraq in spite of objections from the rest of the NSC. It was officially stated that the helicopters would be used for crop spraying. These same helicopters were later used in 1988 to deploy poison gas against Iranians and possibly the Kurds. [Washington Post 3/11/1991; Phythian 1997, pgs. 37-38]
1983. Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran increased significantly. The U.S. was informed of Iraq's use of chemical weapons later that year. [Shultz 1993, p. 238; see also Cole 1997, p. 87; Jentleson 1994, p. 48]
"Early 80s." Diplomats brought photographs to the United Nations and several national capitals showing the swollen, blistered and burned bodies of injured and dead Iranians who had been victims of Iraqi chemical attacks. [New York Times, 2/13/03]
1983. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt supplied Iraq with U.S. howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons with the secret approval of the Reagan administration. [Phythian 1997, pg. 35] President Reagan personally requested Italian Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti to funnel arms to Iraq. [Friedman 1983, 51-54 cited in Phythian 1997, pg. 36]
August 1983. Iraq was using mustard gas. It is not clear if the use of this weapon was known by the U.S. State Department and National Security Agency [Profile] at that time. [CIA Declassified Report ca. 1997]
Late 1983. According to the memoirs of then Secretary of State George Shultz, U.S. intelligence began receiving reports that Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran had increased . [Shultz 1993, p. 238; see also Cole 1997, p. 87; Jentleson 1994, p. 48]
November 1, 1983. U.S. State Department official Jonathan T. Howe told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports indicated that Saddam Hussein's troops were resorting to "almost daily use of CW [Chemical Weapons]" against their Iranian adversaries. [Washington Post 12/30/02; The Times 12/31/02]
December, 1983. By the end of 1983, 60 Hughes MD 500 "Defender" helicopters had been shipped to Iraq in spite of objections from four Republican Senators. The U.S. Department of Commerce had decided that the exporting of aircraft weighing less than 10,000 pounds to Iraq did not require an export license. [Middle East Defense News, 11/9/92]
December 2, 1983. The U.S. State Department invited Bechtel officials to Washington to discuss plans for constructing an Iraq-Jordan oil pipeline. Former Bechtel president George Shultz was U.S. Secretary of State at the time. [Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03]
December 19, 1983. President Reagan dispatched U.S. envoy to the Middle East Donald Rumsfeld, to express the administration's intention to “resume [U.S.] diplomatic relations with Iraq.” [American Gulf War Veterans Association 9/10/2001]
December 20, 1983. U.S. Special Envoy Donald Rumsfeld, who at the time was CEO of the pharmaceutical company, Searle, personally met with Saddam Hussein in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq.[See video footage; Newsweek 9/23/2002; NBC News 8/18/02; Washington Post 12/30/02; The Times 12/31/02] Other issues that were discussed included plans for the construction of an Iraq-Jordan oil pipeline to be built by Bechtel [Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03; New York Times, 4/14/03] and an Israeli offer to help Iraq in its war against Iran. [Teicher Affidavit; Newsweek 9/30/2001 cited in Baltimore Sun 9/26/2001] According to a declassified State Department cable, Rumsfeld “conveyed the President’s greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad.” [Newsweek 9/23/2002] Commenting on the meeting, Newsweek noted, "Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak.)" [Newsweek 9/23/2002] Declassified documents revealed that Rumsfeld's trip happened at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons against Iran "almost daily" in defiance of international conventions.[Washington Post 12/30/02] On September 19, 2002, almost two decades later, Rumsfeld was questioned in Congress about this visit. He stated, "I was, for a period in late '83 and early '84, asked by President Reagan to serve as Middle East envoy after the Marines--241 Marines were killed in Beirut. As part of my responsibilities I did visit Baghdad. I did meet with Mr. Tariq Aziz. And I did meet with Saddam Hussein and spent some time visiting with them about the war they were engaged in with Iran. At the time our concern, of course, was Syria and Syria's role in Lebanon and Lebanon's role in the Middle East and the terrorist acts that were taking place. As a private citizen I was assisting only for a period of months." In his testimony he also denied any knowledge of the role the U.S. would play in helping Iraq develop its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons capabilities. [U.S. Congressional Record: September 20, 2002 (Senate) Page S8987-S8998]
1984. The CIA secretly provided Iraqi intelligence with instructions on how to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. [Washington Post 12/15/1986]
August 1984. The CIA established a direct intelligence link with Iraq . [Washington Post 12/15/1986]
February 1984. An Iraqi military spokesman warned Iran, "The invaders should know that for every harmful insect, there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it . . . and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide." [Washington Post 12/30/02]
February 1984. Western journalists reporting on the war between Iraq and Iran verified the use of chemical weapons. [New York Times, 2/13/03]
March 1984. European-based doctors examined Iranian troops and confirmed exposure to mustard gas. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76]
March 1984. The United Nations dispatched experts to the conflict zone on a mission that documented Iraq's use of chemical weapons. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76]
March 6, 1984. The U.S. State Department reported that "available evidence" indicated Iraq was using "lethal chemical weapons", specifically mustard gas, against Iran. [Gwertzman 3/6/1984 cited in Cole 1997; pg. 24; New York Times, 2/13/03]
March 9, 1984. U.S. State Department desk officer, Frank Riccuardone, urged the Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with short-term loans "for foreign relations purposes." [Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03]
March 20, 1984. U.S. intelligence officials claimed to have "incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and has almost finished extensive sites for mass-producing the lethal chemical warfare agent" [Hersh 3/30/1984 cited in Cole 1997; pg. 243]
March 23, 1984. Iran accused Iraq of poisoning 600 of its soldiers with mustard gas and Tabun nerve gas. On that same day, the UPI wire service reported that a team of UN experts had concluded that "Mustard gas laced with a nerve agent has been used on Iranian soldiers. Meanwhile, Donald Rumsfeld held talks with foreign minister Tariq Aziz." [UPI 3-23-1984 cited in American Gulf War Veterans Association 9/10/2001]
March 24. In a memo to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State George Shultz expressed concern that relations with Iraq had soured because of the State Department's March 6 report that Iraq was using chemical weapons. [Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03]
March 26, 1984. The Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad again. [American Gulf War Veterans Association 9/10/2001] While in Iraq, Rumsfeld discussed the proposed Iraq-Jordan pipeline that was to be built by Bechtel. That same day, a UN investigation reported on Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iraq. "[C]hemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iraq by the specialists," the report said. [New York Times, 3/27/84 cited in Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03]
April 6, 1984. During a meeting in Jordan with Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon, U.S. diplomat James Pecke in Jordan asked that Iraq halt its purchasing of chemical weapons from U.S. suppliers so as not to "embarrass" the U.S. [Institute for Policy Studies, 3/24/03]
November 26, 1984. The United States Government re-established full diplomatic ties with Baghdad [Gwertzman 11-27-1984] even though it was fully aware that Iraq was using chemical weapons in its war against Iran.
1985. Christopher Drogoul of the Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro began embezzling funds to Iraq. The funds consisted of government backed loans meant for agricultural purposes as well as unreported loans that had been made in secret. While roughly half the funds were used by Saddam Hussein's government to purchase agricultural goods, the remainder was used to "supply Iraqi missile, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs with industrial goods such as computer controlled machine tools, computers, scientific instruments, special alloy steel and aluminum, chemicals, and other industrial goods." Additionally, the money spent on agriculture allowed Saddam's regime to divert a significant portion of its own funds to the task of weapons development. [U.S. Congress, 4/28/92 H2694; Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1993] Between 1985 and 1989 almost $5 billion made its way to Iraq from the U.S.. Memos obtained by reporters revealed that both the Federal Reserve and Department of Agriculture had suspected that Iraq was using these funds inappropriately. Iraq eventually defaulted on the government-backed loans, leaving U.S. taxpayers with $2 billion dollars in unpaid debts. [Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1993; Mother Jones 2/1993]
1985. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz successfully convinced Rep. Howard Berman to drop a House bill that put Iraq back on the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. Shultz argued that the United States was actively engaged in "diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues," and asserted that "Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism." The Secretary of State further claimed that if the U.S. discovered any evidence implicating Iraq in the support of terrorist groups, the U.S. Government "would promptly return Iraq to the list." [Jentleson 1994 p. 54]
Early -1985 thru late-1986. In addition to providing satellite photography to Iraq, which revealed the movements of the Iranian forces [Washington Post 12/15/1986; New York Times 8/18/2002], the U.S. secretly deployed U.S. Air Force officers to Iraq to assist their counterparts in the Iraqi military [The Nation 8/26/2002] as well as “more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency" who secretly provided "detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq.” [New York Times 8/18/2002] The U.S. also provided Iraq with intelligence gathered by Saudi-owned AWACS, which were being operated by the Pentagon [The Nation 8/26/2002]. The information provided by the U.S. was considered essential to Iraq’s military planning [Washington Post 12/15/1986] as it resulted in Iraq's improved "accuracy in targeting, hitting Iran's bridges, factories, . . . power plants relentlessly, and . . . Iranian oil terminals in the Lower Gulf." [The Nation 8/26/2002]
1986. The Central Intelligence Agency authored a then-classified report acknowledging that Iraq was using chemical weapons as an "integral part" of its military strategy and that it was a "regular and recurring tactic." [New York Times, 2/13/03]
May 2 1986. “[T]wo batches of bacillus anthracis - the micro-organism that causes anthrax - were shipped . . . along with two batches of the bacterium clostridium botulinum - the agent that causes deadly botulism poisoning”- to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education. [Sunday Herald 9/8/2002]
November 1986. U.S. intelligence learned that Iraq's "Saad 16" research center was attempting to develop ballistic missiles. This information was relayed by the Defense Department’s Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, to the Commerce Department’s (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration. In spite of this, the Commerce Department subsequently approved more than $1 million in computer sales to the Iraqi research center over the next four years. In 1991, The House Committee on Government Operations reported that 40% of the equipment at the "Saad 16" research center had come from the U.S. [Committee on Government Operations, House, "Strengthening the Export Licensing System," 2 July 1991, para.10. cited in Hurd and Rangwala 12-12-2002]
April- March 1987. The United Nations dispatched experts to the conflict zone on a mission that documented Iraq's use of chemical weapons. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76]
August 31, 1987. One batch each of salmonella and E coli was sent to the Iraqi State Company for Drug Industries with the approval of the U.S. Department of Commerce. [Sunday Herald 9/8/2002]
1988. The U.S. provided Baghdad with $500 million in credits to buy American farm products. [Wall Street Journal 7/10/2002]
1988. The provision of U.S. military intelligence to Iraq expanded in 1988. A significant portion of it was channeled to the Iraqis through the CIA's Baghdad office. [Francona 1999 cited in Washington Post 12/30/02]
July 1988. The United Nations dispatched two delegations of experts to the conflict zone on a mission that documented Iraq's use of chemical weapons. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76]
January thru February 1988. The U.S. Commerce Department allowed for the export of equipment to Iraq for its SCUD missile program. Iraq's acquisition of the new equipment allowed it to increase the range of its SCUD missiles. [Committee on Government Operations, House, "Strengthening the Export Licensing System," 2 July 1991, para. 25 cited in Hurd and Rangwala 12-12-2002]
March 1988. According to several accounts, Iraq used U.S.-supplied Bell helicopters [Washington Post 3/11/1991; Weinstein and Rempel 2/13/1991] to deploy chemical weapons during its campaign to recapture lost territories. One of the towns that was within the conflict zone was the Kurdish village of Halabja, which had a population of about 70,000. Between 3,200 and 5,000 Halabja civilians were reported killed that spring by poison gas. Other accounts, however, suggested that the Kurds at Halabja died from Iranian gas [Johnson and Pelletiere 12/10/1990; New York Times, 1/31/03] , an account that was at the time favored by the Reagan administration in order to divert the blame away from its Iraqi client-regime. While some believe that the story was "cooked up in the Pentagon," citing a declassified State Department document which had "demonstrate[d] that U.S. diplomats received instructions to press this line with U.S. allies, and to decline to discuss the details," [International Herald Tribune 1/17/03] Stephen Pelletiere, a former senior political analyst for the CIA, maintains the position that it was likely Iranian gas that killed the Kurds. [New York Times, 1/31/03]
March-April 1988. The United Nations dispatched experts to the conflict zone on a mission that documented Iraq's use of chemical weapons. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76]
May 1988. During a symposium hosted by the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum, Assistant Secretary of State Peter Burleighin encouraged U.S. companies to do business in Iraq. The business forum reportedly had strong ties to the Baghdad. [Jentleson 1994 p. 84-85]
August 1988. Iraq reportedly used chemical weapons against northern Iraqi Kurds. [Jentleson 1994 p. 38]
Mid-August 1988. The United Nations dispatched experts to the conflict zone on a mission to document Iraq's use of chemical weapons. [Jentleson 1994 p. 76] Baghdad refused to cooperate however, and the U.S. made no serious attempt to press Baghdad to comply with the UN’s Security Council’s decision. US Secretary of State George Shultz downplayed the charges against Iraq, saying that the interviews with the Kurdish refugees in Turkey, and “other sources,” only pointed toward Baghdad’s using chemical weapons, and were not conclusive in and of themselves. [The Nation 8/26/2002]
September 8, 1988. In a memo concerning the issue of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy wrote, "The U.S.-Iraqi relationship is . . . important to our long-term political and economic objectives. We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis." [Washington Post 12/30/02]
September thru December 1988. According to a document published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, titled "Approved Licenses to Iraq, 1985-1990", "Reagan administration records show that between September and December 1988, 65 licenses were granted for dual-use technology exports. This averages out as an annual rate of 260 licenses, more than double the rate for January through August 1988." [cited in Jentleson 1994 p. 38]
September 8, 1988. The U.S. Senate unanimously passed the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988" [Jentleson 1994 p. 78] which made Iraq ineligible to receive U.S. loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees, and items subject to export controls. It also made it illegal for the U.S. to import Iraqi oil. [U.S. Senate, "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988," 100th Congress, 2nd session, 8 September 1988 cited in Hurd and Rangwala 12-12-2001] Immediately after the bill was passed, the Reagan administration launched a campaign to turn it back. With the help of its allies in the House, the administration succeeded in killing the bill "on the last day of the legislative session." [Jentleson 1994 p. 78; see also New York Times, 2/13/03]
Mid-to-late-1988. A U.S. delegation traveled to Turkey at the request of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and confirmed that Iraq "was using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population." [Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive, October 1988 Hurd and Rangwala 12/12/2001]
October 1988. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmed concurrent and earlier reports that between 1984 and 1988 "Iraq [had] repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran" [Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive, October 1988 Hurd and Rangwala 12/12/2001]
December 1988. "Dow Chemical sold $1.5 million of pesticides to Iraq, despite U.S. government concerns that they could be used as chemical warfare agents," reported The Washington Post, adding that an "Export-Import Bank official reported in a memorandum that he could find 'no reason' to stop the sale, despite evidence that the pesticides were 'highly toxic' to humans and would cause death 'from asphyxiation'." [Washington Post 12/30/02]
March 1989. CIA director William Webster acknowledged to Congress that Iraq was the largest producer of chemical weapons in the world. [U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need for Remedies," Hearings, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1 March 1989, pp. 27-45 cited in Jentleson 1994 p. 106]
March 24, 1989. Secretary of State James Baker received a memo from the State Department informing him that Iraq was aggressively developing chemical and biological weapons, as well as new missiles. In spite of this disturbing intelligence, the memo also instructed Baker to express the administration's "interest in broadening U.S.-Iraqi ties" to Iraqi Under-Secretary Hamdoon. [State Department memorandum, "Meeting with Iraqi Under Secretary Hamdoon," 24 March 1989, cited in Jentleson 1994 p. 107]
1989. Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex) stated that in spite of the CIA and the Bush administration's knowledge that Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) "controlled entities were involved in Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and missile programs ... the Bush administration [approved] dozens of export licenses that [allowed] United States and foreign firms to ship sophisticated U.S. dual-use equipment to MIMI-controlled weapons factories". [Statement by Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex), "Details on Iraq's Procurement Network," 102nd Congress, 2nd session, 10 August 1992 cited in Hurd and Rangwala 12/12/2001]
August 1989. Christopher Drogoul, the manager of the Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's branch in Atlanta, was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq. The loans had been used by Iraq to develop its weapons programs. [Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 1993]
October 2, 1989. By this date, all international banks had cut off loans to Iraq. Notwithstanding, President Bush signed National Security Directive 26 establishing closer ties to the Baghdad regime and providing $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government. These funds allowed Iraq to continue its development of weapons of mass destruction. [U.S. President 10/2/1989; Frantz and Waas 2/23/1992; Wall Street Journal 7/10/2002]
1990. In response to a U.S. company's concerns that their product might be used by Iraq to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the U.S. Department of Commerce simply asked Iraq's government to provide a written guarantee that the company's product was to be used for civilian purposes only. The Commerce Department told the company that a license and review was unnecessary, and that there was no reason why the product in question should not be exported to Iraq. [Jentleson 1994 p. 110]
July 18 thru August 1 1990. The Bush administration approved $4.8 million in sales of advanced technology products to Iraq's "MIMI" and "Saad 16" research centers. "MIMI" had been determined two years prior to be a development facility for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. And in 1989, the U.S. had learned that "Saad 16" was also involved in the development of chemical and nuclear weapons. [Committee on Government Operations, House, "Strengthening the Export Licensing System" cited in Hurd and Rangwala 12/12/2001]
July 25, 1990. U.S. ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, met with Saddam Hussein and promised him that Bush "wanted better and deeper relations." She also claimed that the president was an "intelligent man," adding, "He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq." [Washington Post 12/30/02; The Times 12/31/02]
August 1, 1990. The Bush administration approved the sale of $695,000 in advanced data transmission devices to Iraq. [Washington Post 3/11/1991]
August 2, 1990. Iraq invaded Kuwait. This same day, the U.S. suspended National Security Directive 26, which had established closer ties with Baghdad and mandated $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government. The directive had been put into force by President Bush less than one year before. [Frantz and Waas 2/23/1992]
1992. The last shipment of Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin, was sent to Iraq. [Sunday Herald 9/8/2002]
March 1992. Iraq received its last shipment from the U.S. of Pralidoxine, an antidote to nerve gas which can also be reverse engineered to create actual nerve gas. [Sunday Herald 9/8/2002]
June 23, 1992. Frank DeGeorge, inspector general for the Commerce Department, conceded that the department's officials had altered 66 export licenses for Iraq prior to turning them over to congressional investigators. The export licenses, which had approved the sales of vehicles to Iraq, were changed from "VEHICLES DESIGNED FOR MILITARY USE" to "COMMERCIAL UTILITY CARGO TRUCKS." [Covert Action Quarterly]
July 9, 1992. The House Judiciary Committee asked U.S. Attorney General William Barr to appoint an independent counsel to investigate Iraqgate. [Covert Action Quarterly]
August 1, 1992. U.S. Attorney General Willliam Barr rejected the House Judiciary's request for him to appoint an independent counsel, alleging that the committee's accusations were too "vague". He informed them that the Justice Department would instead continue with its own "investigation" of Iraqgate. [Covert Action Quarterly]
November 4-5, 1992. Rita Machakos, a paralegal at the Department of Justice's employment office, witnessed an employee of the U.S. Department of Agriculture "spending an entire weekend shredding documents that described the administration's role in obtaining $5.5 billion in U.S.-taxpayer-guaranteed agricultural loans for Iraq from the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL)." [Mother Jones 2/1993]"
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