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Pastimes : Neocon's Seminar Thread -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: TimF who wrote (987)	6/16/2004 9:55:21 AM
From: Neocon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 1112

Good questions raised. I would say that the ships could not be identical, for the simple reason that they occupy different positions in space. That makes them similar. With a single object, there is identity when the difference produced is regarded as not substantial. If it is regarded as substantial, then there is continuity, but not identity. An object that seems identical in the short term may, when regarded in a longer time frame, be regarded as merely continuous, because change is gradual but substantial. In the event that there is a reconstruction, for example, an historic building burns but is replaced, it can only claim similarity. When there is no similarity, identity, or continuity, there is destruction. In the case of human beings, the claim to identity rests primarily on the idea of experience belonging to one actor. In a sense, people change substantially over time, but in another sense, they remain the subjects of their accumulated history, which is why there may be unresolved issues from childhood still haunting persons of substantial age.

To: TimF who wrote (987)	6/16/2004 11:42:36 AM
From: Neocon	Respond to of 1112

To continue: The personality, which is the "self" constituted in interaction with experience, is clearly not the same over time. It is continuous, in most cases, although there are sometimes crises making change more abrupt, but it is clear that change over time is substantial, and that the child is quite different from the man. In what sense, then, can we claim identity? Identity depends on the view that the basic functions of the mind or soul, as it may be viewed, are the "self" in the deepest sense, and that they remain substantially the same over time. To support this, we have to assume that even the perceptual/conceptual development of the mind is not quite the substance of "self", but that the qualities of consciousness/ self- awareness/ choice, which may be present within the chaos of early infant experience, and which certainly are present as the child grows to toddlerhood, constitute the "I". It is rather like saying that the house remains the same, although furnishings and occupants may change.