Monday, June 21, 2004
9-11 Commission Staff Report Confirms Administration's Views of al-Qaeda/Iraq Ties
A 9-11 Commission staff report supports the Bush Administration's longstanding conclusion that there was no evidence of "collaboration" between Iraq and al-Qaeda on the 9-11 attacks against the United States. The Administration has never suggested that Iraq "collaborated" or "cooperated" with al-Qaeda to carry out the 9-11 attacks.
"We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States." (9-11 Commission Staff Statement 15, June 16, 2004)
"We've had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with...September 11th." (President Bush, September 17, 2003)
The Administration has said, however, that it was worried about a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda, including contacts between senior Iraqi intelligence officers and senior members of al-Qaeda.
"I don't think there's any doubt but that there were some contacts between Saddam Hussein's government and al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden's people." (9-11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, News Hour with Jim Lehrer, June 16, 2004)’
"We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression. Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad. (CIA Director George Tenet, Letter to Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Graham, October 7, 2002)
The Commission's investigation does not dispute that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda occurred. Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton have said that there "definitely" were a number of contacts. Chairman Kean called these contacts "shadowy" -- and the Administration agrees with him. These were contacts between a deadly terrorist organization that was seeking support and a country that the Administration knew had supported other terrorist organizations.
"[Y]es, there were contacts between Iraqi and al-Qaeda, a number of them, some of them a little shadowy. They were definitely there." (9-11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, News Hour with Jim Lehrer, June 16, 2004)
"Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein's secular regime... A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting Bin Ladin in 1994." (9-11 Commission Staff Statement 15, June 16, 2004)
"Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda also occurred after Bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship." (9-11 Commission Staff Statement 15, June 16, 2004)
The Administration also knew that Iraq was harboring a terrorist network headed by Zarqawi. Zarqawi, the senior al-Qaeda associate who was known to be in Baghdad for medical treatment in May 2002, continues to undertake indiscriminate acts of terrorism today.
"[P]art of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian Islamic Jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda -- operatives who are aiding the Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in Baghdad since last May. Now, whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in Europe and around the world. So these people have been operating there. And, as you know.... a foreign service went to the Iraqis twice to talk to them about Zarqawi and were rebuffed. So there is a presence in Baghdad that is beyond Zarqawi." (Director Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - February 11, 2003)
The Administration knew Saddam had longstanding, direct, and continuing ties to a number of terrorist groups, including groups responsible for killing Americans.
"We know a great deal about [Saddam's] terrorist activity. We know that he, as I said before, tried to assassinate President George H.W. Bush. We know that he pays Hamas terrorists $25,000 for suicide bombings that led to suicide bombings against American citizens with five American deaths at Hebrew University. We know that he is acquiring weapons of mass destruction, that he has extreme animus against the United States." (Dr. Condoleezza Rice, CNN, September 8, 2002)
"Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al- Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action." (CIA Director George Tenet, Letter to Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Graham, October 7, 2002)
The Abu Nidal Organization, headquartered in Baghdad until 1983, has been responsible for terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured 900 people, including 12 Americans. Abu Nidal and his organization returned to Baghdad in 1998, where they remained until Nidal's death in August 2002.
"Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, has said Iraq will grant $US25000 in cash to the families of each Palestinian killed in clashes with Israeli troops in the West Bank and Gaza. 'President Saddam Hussein has recently told the head of the Palestinian political office, Farouq al-Kaddoumi, his decision to raise the sum granted to each family of the martyrs of the Palestinian uprising to $25,000 instead of $10,000,' Mr. Aziz told Arab politicians and representatives of non-government organizations on Monday." ("Hussein Vows Cash for Martrys," Reuters, March 13, 2002) |
