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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: KLP who wrote (139404)	7/8/2004 3:20:35 PM
From: GST	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Thank you for the link -- you seem to think I am not aware of the intel mess leading up to the invasion of Iraq -- I am aware. The period of time when we had no UN inspectors produced a black hole for intel from Iraq. That hole was filled by people currying favor at the White House by feeding trash into the political decision process. When the inspectors returned to Iraq, the intel began to improve again because we had eyes and ears on the ground. There was NO imminent threat and as Bush himself said, none was perceived. The wise course of action was to use the UN to build a coalition while allowing the inspectors time to build much better intel to fill the void left by there years of absence. There was zero need to invade when we did and plenty of reasons not to invade at that time in that way. Invading was a bad decision for America, not because the intel was faulty but because the faulty intel was used to build a ideological case for a bad policy decision.

To: KLP who wrote (139404)	7/8/2004 3:54:17 PM
From: GST	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

There is some clear and concise language in the link, notably the absence of any mention of WMDs other than the capability to develop them, and no mention of an active nuclear program, because there wasn't one. There was also recognition that the prospects for a quick transition to democracy had no foundation and stability would be hard to achieve in a post-Saddam Iraq: <The Situation in Iraq 15) What is the likelihood that Saddam Husayn will be in power one year from now? How good is the Intelligence Community's ability to ascertain what is going on in Iraq? What is the likeliest scenario for Iraq when Saddam is removed from the scene? How will Iraq and othe rneighboring countries react to Saddam's departure? What evidence does the Intelligence Community have that Iraq may have been involved in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks? If the US were to take military action to remove Saddam from power, what would be the likely reaction to this from US allies as well as other countries in the region? Is the Iraqi military's readiness at a high enough level to pose a significant threat to neighboring countries? What is the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability? [response] Saddam maintains a vise grip on the levers of power through a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force -- which is less than half its pre-Gulf war size -- remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups. In Baghdad, senior government and military officials view their fortunes as tied to Saddam and their allegiance is probably bolstered by the regime's decade long propaganda campaign against UN sanctions and the West which exalts Saddam as necessary for the survival and integrity of the state. Over the next year the regime will continue to use a carrot and stick approach to control the two main groups opposed to its rule: the Shias in the south and the Kurds in the north. The nature of post-Saddam Iraq would depend on how and when Saddam left the scene, but any new regime in Baghdad would have to overcome significant obstacles to achieve stability. If Saddam and his inner circle are out of the picture and internal opponents of the regime band together, we assess that a centrist Sunni-led government would be pressed to accept an Iraqi state less centralized than Saddam's. Iraq's restive sectarian and ethnic groups, however, would probably push for greater autonomy. Decades of authoritarian rule have deprived Iraqis of the opportunity to build democratic traditions and parliamentary experience that could help them master the art of consensus building and compromise. Even though the Iraqi military is at less than half its pre-war size--it remains capable of threatening Iraq's neighbors. Baghdad continues efforts to import military spare parts and dual-use items in spite of UN sanctions. Iraq's movement of forces to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 and its seizure of the Kurdish-held city of Irbil in August 1996 demonstrate that the military retains the capacity to organize and execute multi-division operations. We assess that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles similar to the type used to strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain during the Gulf war. Iraq is capable of producing and delivering both chemical and biological weapons with ballistic missiles, aircraft and artillery. Iraq continues to build and expand an infrastructure capable of producing WMD. Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to CW agent production, and retains a significant amount of dual-use infrastructure that could support a rejuvenated nuclear program.>