Hi Neocon; Re: "French Canada exists culturally, but was, in fact, annexed by Britain, so I fail to see your point."
Your point was that Louisiana would have been culturally annexed by the US even without a purchase or a war. My point was that French Canada, despite its capture in a war, was never annexed culturally. What Great Britain, a great power, couldn't do in 1803, the US, a shitty little country at the time, certainly couldn't dream of doing.
Re: "Napoleon fought Britain on the high seas, which is why Nelson's victory was so important."
The Napoleonic wars went on for 10 years after Trafalgar, and about 15 years after the Battle of the Nile. The decisive battles were on the land.
Re: "Perhaps the experience in Haiti would have made Napoleon think twice about committing troops to the defense of New Orleans. Who knows?"
Two posts ago you were pretty sure that you knew. Let me quote you: "Since I doubt that, even during a truce, Napoleon would have left the Continent practically underdefended against the British, I question how big an armada he would have sent to protect New Orleans."
Re: "We were not discussing the Revolution."
In 1803, the American Revolution was the only major war the US had been involved in. As far as estimating American military strength, both the French and the Americans would have looked to that war. And the simple truth is that US losses in the Revolution (i.e. about 4400 KIA over 7 years), on the scale of the French superpower (they lost 2,300,000 during the 22 year long Napoleonic conflict) are a decisive indication of the relative power of the two countries you're talking about. France could beat us easily anywhere, anytime, except on our own territory, and that was only because we would resort to guerilla warfare. The US was a shitty little country at the time, not even a regional power capable of invading Canada, a land largely populated by elk, despite the fact that we didn't have to possess control of the sea to get there. New Orleans was way outside our realm of control. No one at the time would even think about it. It would have taken a George Bush squared or even cubed to make a move like that.
It's like a car with two unarmed 16-year olds deciding to get into a rumble with a van filled with 18-year olds. It just doesn't happen because humans aren't stupid enough to go into wars with that kind of odds against them.
Re: "I doubt that the French could have held the territory as the American population grew and moved westward."
The question is not whether or not France could have held it. The question is whether or not the US could have taken it. In 1803 it was out of the question. If they'd put it off, like they did the conquest of Canada, it's quite possible that it never would have happened.
If we hadn't bought the Lousiana territory, Napoleon would still have lost the Napoleonic wars. Control of New Orleans would have been decided by the British. It's not unlikely that they'd have returned it to the Spanish. There's no way in hell that they would have given it as a gift to the US, and there is no way in hell that we could have taken it from them until, maybe, around the time of the Mexican War.
With New Orleans under the control of the British, the US would have been prevented from expanding westwards in the same way that their control of Canada prevented us from expanding northwards. We'd be talking about the 20 United States instead of the 50.
Overall, our negotiators in 1803 got a great deal. They'd have been fools to listen to any advice not to buy Louisiana.
Re: "Yes, California was sparsely populated, before the Gold Rush. Louisiana was sparsely populated at the time of its purchase."
The population of the single town of New Orleans was about equal to all of California. The point about New Orleans is that it controlled essentially all the trade of a vast watershed. Let's put this into perspective. The population of New Orleans in 1803 was around 10,000 people. This is only insignificant if one fails to compare it to US towns at the time. For example, Boston was about 25,000. Los Angeles: 315. San Francisco: 900.
Heck, all of the western part of Canada was sparsely populated then and I don't see the US flag waving over it now.
Re: "Guerilla wars are irregular ..."
I don't know what you're trying to say here. Guerillas are also called "irregulars", and guerilla war is often called "irregular". You're just repeating a definition as if it were some sort of amazing truth.
Re: "... and often waged by non- state parties ..."
This is another empty statement.
Re: "... so I find some of your comments perplexing."
You've just made two obviously true statements, but they have no logical connection to your conclusion, LOL.
Look, if you had any logical complaints about any statement I've made about guerilla warfare, then let's hear it. What you're doing is complaining about my "comments" without bothering to quote any of my comments. Your complaint is empty rhetoric. Here, let me set you up with an easy target:
To estimate the probability of success of a guerilla war, you have to take into account several factors. This is not some sort of amazingly difficult thing, regular warfare also has a lot of factors. Here's a good list of things that tend to contribute to a government being unable to put down a guerilla war:
(a) At least a small percentage of the population supports the guerillas.
(b) At least half the population refuses to support the government.
(c) As much cultural differences between the guerillas and the government as possible.
(d) A long distance between the center of power of the government and the region being fought over (long lines of supply, low will to fight for territorial reasons).
(e) As many people living in the region being fought over as possible (potential enemies).
(f) Foreign superpower support for the guerillas.
(g) A quick war of maneuver where the guerilla side is defeated but with few casualties taken.
Re: "There was no resistance by the Hispanic population to annexation, and I doubt there would have been by the French. Period."
This came after Sloat annexed California:
Thus it is not surprising that the aggravated Californios did revolt, displaying a newfound martial rigor. They besieged Gillespie and his tiny garrison of 47 on a hill, and Gillespie was finally forced to capitulate, on the terms that he and his men would be able to march safely to San Pedro with weapons and military honors. The Californios, short on gunpowder and wanting to avoid an actual engagement, generously offered these terms, and thus the Americans evacuated towards San Pedro. However, in San Pedro, Gillespie met up with the captain of the American frigate USS Savannah, and a combined force of sailors and marines set off in a march back towards Los Angeles. The Americans soon came upon a force Californios, armed with a surprisingly effective brass gun, which had previously been used ceremoniously in the Los Angeles town plaza. This horse drawn mobile artillery piece proved impossible for the Americans on foot to capture, and thus they withdrew after suffering four men killed and another six wounded. Bloodied in the “Battle of Old Woman’s Gun,” also known as the Battle of San Pedro, they retreated and boarded the Savannah and sailed up the coast, leaving the Californio militia victorious.
learncalifornia.org
This is another revolt, this one in Santa Fe:
After a "foiled plot" in Santa Fe in December of 1846, the Taos Rebellion broke out on January 19, 1847. Governor Bent and others who were considered to be sympathetic to American occupation were murdered. The revolt spread to Turley's mill near Arroyo Hondo where Simeon Turley and several other Americans were killed. Padre Martinez provided sanctuary for several Americans who sought refuge at his house. When news of the revolt reached Santa Fe, Col. Sterling Price led a retaliatory force toward Taos. He defeated some of the rebels at Santa Cruz de la Cañada and then at Embudo, 23 miles south of Taos. Price then marched on to Taos. The final and decisive battle took place at the Taos Pueblo Church where the insurgents were fortified. The bombardment that followed killed at least 150 and destroyed the church, although its ruins still remain. Whether the insurgents were Indians or Spanish or both is one of the questions regarding the rebellion which have never been answered."
laplaza.org
But enough of the details of American history (frankly, I thought it was better taught than my having to make these posts would indicate). Let's get back to the subject of your comparing the actual guerilla war situation in the western territories with the potential guerilla war situation in New Orleans.
First, go back and look at the list of items I gave that make guerilla wars hard to beat. Here are the differences between the guerilla war that we fought, and won, in the territories annexed during the Mexican War, and the guerilla war we would have fought, and maybe or maybe not won, in New Orleans:
(a) No question that at least a small percentage of the population of New Orleans would assist a French guerilla war. The situation in places like California was far worse for the guerillas because gold was discovered there and thousands of Americans poured into the territories.
(b) It's not unlikely that half the population of New Orleans would refuse to support the US. All the guerillas have to do is to make the population too scared to support the government. In addition to the large French and Spanish population of the area (and do note that Spain was an ally of France at the time), there is the cultural difference between the Catholic French and Spanish, and the Protestant Americans. In addition, many of the Americans who had emigrated to the area were people who were running away from the American government. Texas and Louisiana attracted far more than their share of criminals. With the Mexican war in 1848, the thousands of American gold rush immigrants prevented any long term guerilla war from starting up.
(c) By 1848, the US was far less Protestant than it was in 1803. This was due to an increase in immigration from Catholic parts of Europe. Thus the difference between the US and New Orleans in 1803 was far greater than the difference between the US and California in 1848. This difference remains true today, New Orleans is still an odd place, California is not.
(d) California in 1848 was farther away than New Orleans was in 1803, but between those years, the US navy and merchant marine exploded in size. The world was effectively a lot bigger in 1803 than it was in 1848. In addition, in 1848 the US had a history of manifest destiny that it did not posses in 1803. This gave the US more willingness to fight for territory.
(e) Neither New Orleans nor California were significantly populated in 1803 and 1848. But this is the only factor in favor of the US against a guerilla war in New Orleans.
(f) But the real difference between your example of the region annexed by the US in the Mexican war and New Orleans is that France was a superpower, Mexico was not. After all the BS about how it was impossible to have a guerilla war in Iraq because there was no superpower going to support the Iraqis, I'd think you'd have thought of this one on your own.
(g) The territories in Mexico were taken with fairly high casualties, at least compared to the population of Mexico. They still remember us down there. I can't guess how many troops would die taking New Orleans, but if your point is that it would be easy, then that just makes the guerilla war more likely and more difficult.
Re "No uprising followed the reversion to the Spanish crown ..."
This was a transfer of control between kings. Subjects of kings do what they're told. If the Spanish or the French had told their subjects to rebel, they'd have rebeled. As far as conquering and occupying New Orleans, your observation (which is not quite true, but that's another story) does not shed light on the question of a fight over New Orleans.
Re: "... or the sale to the US."
Again, you can't compare a sale to a conquering and occupation. When the home fires tell you to give up, most people give up. The situation we're talking about with New Orleans is one of Napoleon either:
(a) sending a very small naval fleet capable of stopping our trade at a few important ports (and demanding money in return for New Orleans),
(b) sending a very small army to take New Orleans back from us. Note that when the British came in the war of 1812 they only sent about 14,000 men, and that's only 1/5th as many as France lost on Haiti. France was a land superpower, and had an army whose size no other nation, even Britain could come close to. France only lost the land war because Britain managed to come up with enough allies.
or (c) using French naval power to support a guerilla war against us.
None of these things were at all within the power of the Mexican government in 1848. Hell, in early 1848 there was no Mexican government at all, it had collapsed.
Your comparison between a guerilla war against us in New Orleans to the guerilla war against us in the Mexican war would make a better analogy if you also suggested that we, back in 1803, should have sent an overseas expedition to Paris to conquer the capital city, and then force Napoleon to sell us New Orleans. Oh yeah, that war would have been (a) a glorious victory for the US, and (b) a lot less expensive than simply paying him the $15 million.
-- Carl |
