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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 10:04:48 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Business week's cover story is on pension obligations. GM's pension and health-care costs for retirees are $1784 per vehicle. Compare that with Toyota's $200/vehicle. "GM's margins are now 0.5%, among the worst in the industry. But without the burden of pension and retiree health-care costs, the auto makers' global margins would be 5.5%.... closer to Asian carmakers like Honda Motor Corp., which earns 7.5% on its global sales."



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 10:38:10 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Solbes says ECB has no reason to raise interest rates, warns against alarmism
Monday, July 12, 2004 12:02:44 PM

MADRID (AFX) - Spanish Economy Minister Pedro Solbes said the ECB has grounds for leaving interest rates unchanged, and he criticised "alarmist" comments on the subject

The ECB is adopting "a correct stance by not making any decision (on interest rates) at the moment", the former EU economic and monetary affairs commissioner told reporters at a conference

If inflation in Europe "increases, there is a major risk of a rise in rates" but "I do not have the impression that this is the case at the moment." "Sometimes, I have the impression that people come to slightly alarmist views on the subject of interest rates," he added

He said the situation in Europe has "nothing to do" with the one in the US, where interest rates are higher and the pace of growth is faster

It makes no sense to assume the interest rate in Europe will follow the trend in the US, he said



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 10:43:00 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
WTO trade talks show signs of faltering
Monday, July 12, 2004 11:47:59 AM
fxstreet.com

GENEVA (AFX) - Trade ministers stepped up a campaign to overcome deadlock on agriculture at a meeting of developing countries, amid signs that attempts to revive global free trade talks by the end of this month were faltering

"The work in front of us is the size of a mountain. Everybody is willing to make an effort but this is an uphill battle," Argentina's ambassador at the WTO in Geneva, Alfredo Chiaradia, told Agence France-Presse

US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy were due to take part in the meeting of G90 developing nations in Mauritius, along with WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakhdi

The 147 WTO members have set themselves an end-July deadline to agree on the broad outline of the way ahead for the current round of trade liberalisation talks

The meeting on the Indian Ocean island came hours after a weekend gathering of five trading powers ended in Paris without a breakthrough on the issue of agriculture, a major obstacle in the talks at the WTO

Negotiations on the current trade round launched by ministers in Doha, Qatar in 2001 were meant to last three years, with a final accord on reducing trade barriers in key sectors at the end of 2004

Supachai Panitchpakdi said today that the main participants might lose interest if they could not see results by the beginning of next year

He told the French La Tribune newspaper that a meeting of the WTO general council to be held in Geneva July 27 and 28 was "a historic opportunity and it would be deplorable if this is missed"

"The main participants in the round risk losing all motivation if they do not have a guarantee that it will end, as planned at the beginning of 2005," Supachai added

While Supachai noted "clear signs of political will", pointing to pledges by the US and EU in recent months to eliminate their subsidies for farm exports, trade rounds are notoriously laborious

The previous Uruguay Round, which set up the WTO in 1995, was concluded years behind schedule, and the agricultural issue is a leftover from disagreement during those negotiations

The informal meeting that ended in Paris Sunday brought together chief negotiators from Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India and the United States in an attempt to forge a common position on farm subsidies and tariffs

"The meeting was useful and possibilities of covergence between the different points of view were identified," Brazilian trade minister Celso Amorim told journalists

Like most of the other obstacles in the overall Doha trade round, the farming issue pits rich countries against poor countries

Developing nations and agricultural exporters in the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters want industrialised states -- mainly the EU and US -- to get rid of subsidies that they blame for pricing their produce out of world markets

There is also pressure to improve market access by bringing down tariffs imposed on agricultural imports to protect domestic farmers. "I don't see the US moving on domestic support, I don't see the EU moving on market access, I don't see the light in many sectors," Chiaradia said

Indian Trade Minister Nath Kamal underlined that talks on market access must take into account the basic needs of 600 million Indian subsistence farmers

"Otherwise, it will not be possible," Kamal added

EU officials gave a positive account but Lamy also warned in the French daily Le Figaro that "one should not expect a miracle"

The drive to overcome the deadlock that led to the collapse of a WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 has shifted to Mauritius, where the G90 were due to lay out a united front on agriculture

The WTO chief agriculture negotiator has delayed a proposal for a compromise on the agriculture talks to take account of the outcome of the meetings



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 11:03:23 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Global: Payback Time

Stephen Roach (New York)

World financial markets have only just begun to raise questions about the sustainability of the current global upturn. Forward earnings expectations imbedded in global equities have been ratcheted down slightly in recent weeks and global bonds have rallied back to levels prevailing at the start of the year. In the first half of 2004, a vigorous global upturn was taken for granted — as were the earnings vigor, inflation risks, and central bank tightening that such an outcome would spawn. Now some doubt is starting to creep in on all counts — and with good reason, in my view.



The issue is an old one but ultimately the most important bone of contention in the forecasting community — the staying power of the current upturn in the global economy. Reflecting the impetus of one of the greatest policy-stimulus campaigns in modern history, the global economy roared back with a vengeance in 2004. By our latest estimates, world GDP is likely to increase 4.6% this year — just shy of the 4.7% spike in 2000, which was the strongest gain since 1984. Certainly, the vigor of this year’s global resurgence caught most forecasters by surprise — especially those of us in the pessimistic camp, such as yours truly. Fortunately, I was outvoted by most members of the worldwide team of economists that I head. For the record, our forecast for 2004 global growth at the start of this year was 4.2%, not all that different from the official estimate of the IMF at 4.1%. The world economy has obviously been stronger than we had thought — especially in Japan, Asia ex Japan, and Latin America — but by forecasting standards, this does not qualify as an extreme error.



The growth spurt of 2004 is now old news. Financial markets were quick to embrace it and probably went to excess in discounting the boom scenario that an extrapolation of this trend might suggest. And with good reason — at least in the eyes of momentum-driven investors. Upside earnings revisions set a new record and a surprising acceleration in core inflation fueled concerns in fixed income markets over an aggressive monetary tightening. Brimming with mounting confidence over such possibilities, a growing sense of complacency became evident in world equity markets. Moreover, spreads remained tight in most segments of the fixed income markets, even though government yield curves started to discount the coming monetary tightening. In the eyes of most investors, it looked as if nothing could stop a classic cyclical revival from morphing into a full-fledged synchronous boom in a long sluggish global economy.



That was then. Suddenly, the world tilted. Surging oil prices were a classic early warning sign. China’s efforts to slow an overheated economy were another. The imperatives of Fed-policy normalization were the icing on the cake. After spending most of the past year, revising our global growth numbers up, downward revisions are now starting to creep back into our baseline forecast. We just lowered our 2004 US GDP growth estimate to 4.6% (from 4.8%) — the first reduction in a year. I wouldn’t be surprised to see similar adjustments to some of our Asian numbers, especially for Korea and Taiwan. And there are new disquieting signs coming out of Russia, which suddenly has been blindsided by the double whammy of problems in a high-profile bank and a major energy producer. And, of course, the debate over the China slowdown rages — not whether it will occur but whether the coming landing will be soft or hard. The latest indications on China’s industrial output growth — a further deceleration to a 16.2% Y-o-Y gain in June — paint a picture of a Chinese economy that is only in the early stage of either type of landing.



All this raises the distinct possibility that the boom of 2004 was nothing more than a one-off growth spike that fails to get traction in spurring a sustainable, synchronous upturn in the global economy. Our baseline forecast is not terribly far away from depicting just such a possibility. Our current estimates call for a 3.9% increase in world GDP growth in 2005 — a downshift of 0.7 percentage point from the 4.6% increase expected in 2004 and only 0.3 percentage point above the post-1970 longer-term trend of 3.6%. World financial markets are now in the process of digesting the ramifications of just such a downshift. Equity markets have been hit by a peaking of earnings revisions, and fixed income markets have now all but dismissed the possibility of an aggressive monetary tightening cycle. For the broad consensus of investors, complacency has now given way to a more balanced assessment of risks. The shift in sentiment, however, has stopped short of the ultimate capitulation to fear — that sense of panic, which ultimately sets the stage for major market moves.



I wouldn’t rule out just such a possibility over the next several months. As I see the world, the risks remain decidedly on the downside of our own forecast as well as that of the broad consensus of investors. There are three important reasons to worry about a global relapse, in my view: First, the powerful global policy stimulus that pushed the world to the upside in 2004 will not be in play in 2005. Outsize fiscal deficits in the US, Europe, and Japan are unlikely to widen further, and monetary policy is now in the process of moving away from the lower bound of the nominal interest constraint. Second, much of this year’s global growth surge was concentrated in durables goods — motor vehicles, housing-related outlays, and capital equipment. By definition, these are long-lived items that are purchased infrequently. To the extent that such spending gets distorted to the upside, it typically borrows from future demand. There are signs that just such a blow-out has occurred — especially in the US; durables consumption rose at a 23% annual rate in the two middle quarters of 2003; capital spending is being artificially stimulated by tax cuts that expire at the end of this year; and the homebuilding sector appears to be in the final stages of its boom, especially as interest rates now start to rise. Consequently, there is good reason to believe that the US durable goods impetus is likely to be short-lived.



The third potential source of a global relapse is one that has long disturbed me the most — the continued and worrisome build-up of global imbalances. It’s on this count that complacency remains very much intact. Views are widespread in policy and investor circles that the world has learned to live with a permanent state of disequilibrium in national saving balances. Yet another new paradigm is perceived to be at work, this one driven by globalization and the concomitant integration of world financial markets. We are urged not to look at America’s massive current account deficit, but more at its capital account surplus as a demonstration of the world’s insatiable demand for dollar-denominated assets. Never mind that such external demand for dollars is no longer coming from private investors but mainly from Asian central banks that wish to keep their currencies cheap and their exports competitive. Never mind that such tactics also subsidize US interest rates, thereby providing the sustenance for debt-intensive wealth extraction from asset markets — a key factor that keeps America on an excess consumption path. Needless to say, these conclusions are very much at odds with a more sanguine consensus. After all, since imbalances haven’t mattered yet, goes the logic, the odds are they won’t matter for the foreseeable future either.



Anything, of course, is possible in this Brave New World. But my guess is that is that this boom will be short-lived — likely followed by the payback that invariably comes when demand is artificially pulled forward. To the extent that this resurgence reflected the impact of unusual policy stimulus, then it is about to be starved of its fuel. To the extent that this resurgence was skewed to the upside by durable goods, then a pause is likely as consumers and businesses digest their recent excessive purchases of long-lived goods. And to the extent that the US-centric strain of the latest growth resurgence has exacerbated the imbalances of an already seriously unbalanced global economy, then the imperatives of rebalancing can only mount.



It is always possible, of course, that the world squeaks by without having to endure the pain of any payback. For that to occur, in my view, a US-centric world would have to weaned from the life-support measures of policy stimulus, asset-market-induced wealth effects, and an open-ended appetite for debt. A sustained pick-up in job creation — and the income generation that would spark — is both a necessary and sufficient condition for such a renewal to occur. That condition has not been satisfied, in my view. Even though US hiring has picked up over the past four months I have my doubts that such an organic, internal growth dynamic is about ready to kick in. As I see it, the quality of job creation has remained so low that the case for a spontaneous regeneration of earned labor income growth remains a real stretch (see my July 9 dispatch, “America’s Job-Quality Trap”).



Yes, financial markets have lost some of the complacency evident earlier this year. But by no means has there been a capitulation to the type of fear that often spawns major investment opportunities. Yet as I see the fundamentals, the case for just such a shift in the markets remains compelling, in my view. Macro is at its best in defining a framework of adjustment. Macro is at its worst in identifying that point in time when critical turning points occur. As I continue to see it, the current global upturn has all the trappings of the boom that begets the bust. For a world economy beset with record imbalances and supported by artificial policy stimulus, I continue to worry that the payback is coming sooner rather than later.

morganstanley.com



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 11:08:21 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
United States: Pent-Up Demand
Richard Berner (New York)
[I think this guy is a complete idiot. But... If you do not like Roach, you might believe this viewpoint - mish]

Investors and analysts fear that the emerging growth slowdown in the US economy may only be the start of something bigger. After all, according to the conventional view, the now slowly fading stimulus from monetary and fiscal policies provided the main impetus to growth. While the Fed has only raised short-term interest rates by 25 bp so far, arguably financial conditions in some other respects — such as a flat equity market and a slight appreciation of the dollar’s trade-weighted value — have become less favorable this year. The early-2004 spate of mortgage refinancing has ended. Moreover, with the exception of the “bonus depreciation” feature of current tax law, the impact of last year’s tax cuts is also on the wane. In addition, growth in Federal nondefense/non-homeland security spending has slowed significantly in the past two years (to 6% annualized), and will probably slow further if, as it now appears, Congress is unable to adopt a budget resolution and appropriation committees work from the current baseline. With a “perfect storm” still menacing, growth worries are thus understandable (see “Growth Scare,” Investment Perspectives, July 8, 2004).



Nonetheless, I think those worries are misplaced because I look at the economic landscape through a different lens. In my view, pent-up demand for hiring and capital spending is a key force driving the US economic expansion, and is a major reason that I think the upswing is sustainable. Analysts are right to observe that because consumer spending on durable goods hardly declined in the recession, the traditional sources of pent-up consumer demand are largely absent in this recovery. In my view, however, they are looking for pent-up demand in all the wrong places. Here’s why.



My long-standing logic in this regard is straightforward. Aggressive actions by Corporate America to eliminate the post-bubble headwinds of overhiring and overinvestment have in my view gone overboard, just as the excesses themselves went too far in the other direction. Notwithstanding the recently stepped-up pace, companies have only begun to push up hiring to satisfy demands for people; previously, fixed benefits costs were too big a deterrent. Pent-up demand likewise fueled a “maintenance and repair” capital-spending revival, first in technology, and now in traditional industrial equipment. Both have a long way to go, and the expansion phase of capital spending still lies ahead.



But how should we judge the existence and extent of pent-up demand? The metrics required are subjective. For example, ratios of hiring or spending to GDP don’t account for changes in productivity or technology and its effects on relative prices. As evidence, the 2.2% annualized average increase in nonfarm productivity over the past two decades in my view understates the current trend, and would thus be inappropriate for judging whether labor inputs are consistent with today’s economy and thus pent-up hiring demand. As a result, and notwithstanding their subjectivity, I prefer model-based measures. And although they are crude, such measures for hiring and for capex suggest ample pent-up demand for both. For example, by my reckoning, and using the cumulative errors from a relationship between the economy and labor inputs as a guide, excess hiring reached 4½% of the workforce early in 2000. Fast forward to mid-2004: Even with a rebound of 1.3 million private nonfarm payrolls since December, the loss of 3.3 million private jobs from the peak late in 2000 had turned the excess into a deficit of 1.6%, pointing to ongoing pent-up demand for hiring for some time.



Likewise, for capital spending, the ratio of nonresidential investment to GDP sank by 260 basis points to just under 10% by the first quarter of 2003, a threshold often seen as one associated with capex rebounds. Ideally, however, we’d like to compare the stock of capital in relation to output with capital/output ratios consistent with fundamentals. For example, in March I calculated that the bust in equipment and software investment and depreciation brought the stock of non-tech equipment in relation to output down by more than a percentage point in relation to its peak in 2001; just to bring it half way back would require steady, 15% annualized gains.



Lack of adequate macroeconomic data in the wake of the comprehensive revision to the National Income and Product Accounts now precludes such model-based exercises. But a look at capex-to-depreciation ratios, adjusted for inflation, hints at the dynamics of such analytics. When capex falls close to depreciation, the capital stock is barely growing, and the capital/output ratio is falling. Looking at such ratios for computers and software and for other equipment investment helped us identify what I’ve called Phase I (in IT) and II (in industrial equipment) of this ‘maintenance and repair’ spending revival (see “The Capex Revival Enters Phase II,” Global Economic Forum, March 1, 2004). And both are still signaling that pent-up demand will last at least through 2005.



Measures of pent-up demand for capital spending in the S&P universe are even more compelling. Here, while we cannot adjust for inflation, we can also look at capex/sales. Capex/sales and capex/depreciation are not only both at two-decade lows, but stood well below any reasonable downtrend at the end of 2003. Sector detail suggests that pent-up capex demand is still strong in IT, industrials, materials, and some consumer discretionary industries. Even in telecom services — the poster child for capex excess in the bubble — the fundamentals of pent-up demand now point to a revival, with both ratios at two-decade lows. According to Morgan Stanley telecom services analyst Simon Flannery, telecom balance sheets are now in relatively good shape, and telecom capex has certainly bottomed. Announced 3G wireless and fiber upgrades, as well as network enhancements, are contributing to a modest capex revival. The deflationary environment rules out sizable rebounds, but for investors, that external discipline is a good thing.



Four implications flow from my analysis: First, with pent-up demand still ample, the slowing in growth is temporary, courtesy of the energy shock that may have trimmed as much as $80 billion from consumers’ discretionary income. More widespread job and thus income gains will provide robust support for consumer spending in coming months. Still-sizable reservoirs of pent-up demand suggest that the recovery will mature into expansion in time-honored cyclical fashion, weathering the storms of elevated energy prices, a China slowdown, and rising interest rates. Second, Corporate America’s newfound capital discipline seems likely to stretch the resulting capital spending revival well into 2005. Indeed, the third, expansion phase for capital spending lies ahead. Catalysts for this phase include sustained high levels of profitability, a significant rebound in operating rates, and a real rebirth of pricing power. All three seem to be on track, although challenges abound.



The last two implications are critical for investors. For their part, investors may welcome those challenges as they relate to lasting strength in capital spending; after all, capital discipline has begun to restore ROICs in Corporate America after overinvestment and high operating leverage crushed them beginning in the late 1990s. And investors have every reason to want such discipline to continue nurturing sustained improvements in returns, rather than a new, more expansionary phase that will undermine returns. Such investment deficits along with capital discipline hint that hearty capex gains won’t erode returns on invested capital (ROICS). Finally, hearty capex gains suggest that external financing needs may come back soon after declining over the past year (see “Business Borrowing: On the Way,” Global Economic Forum, April 30, 2004). In my view, the associated rebound in corporate credit demand will be a catalyst for higher real interest rates in the coming year.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 11:20:48 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
After the very quiet economic data calendar of the past week, there are a number of key releases due out in coming days, highlighted by retail sales Wednesday and CPI Friday. We expect the data to be market friendly. The sharp fall in motor vehicle unit sales and sluggish chain store sales results suggest a very weak headline retail sales number and a stagnant ex-autos number, and we look for some further signs of stabilization in core CPI inflation after the early-year surge. Similarly, on Thursday, the softness in manufacturing in the employment report suggests a weak IP reading, and we expect to see moderation in headline and core PPI. Beyond the near-term friendly data, the next market focus will be Fed Chairman Greenspan's semiannual monetary policy testimony on July 20 and 21. We expect that the tone of Greenspan's testimony will not be nearly as pessimistic on the medium-term growth outlook as the market seems to have become recently. Fed officials have consistently struck a more moderate middle ground — arguing for solid sustainable growth and inflation moderating to hold within the 1% to 2% comfort zone — the past couple of months during the market's manic-depressive swings between inflation scare and growth scare. When investors became worried about the Fed's falling behind the curve on inflation last month and moved to price in a decidedly unmeasured near-term FOMC policy as a result of — with October fed funds futures plunging to a worst level of 2.04% on June 14 — Fed Chairman Greenspan and other Fed officials continued to argue that inflation had been artificially boosted by temporary factors and would moderate in the months ahead, allowing a policy of measured 25 bp rate hikes. Now that the market has swung so far in the other direction — with October fed funds down to 1.71% at Friday's close, not even fully pricing in 25 bp moves in August and September — comments from Fed officials the past week remained similar in tone to their prior remarks. Vice Chairman Roger Ferguson and Kansas City Fed President Hoenig both downplayed the recent slowing in growth, with the former saying the economy has moved to a "path of self-sustaining growth" and the latter predicting a reacceleration to "at least" 4.5% GDP growth by year-end. We do not expect to see any major changes in Fed Chairman Greenspan's recent assessment of the economic and inflation outlooks on July 20 either, which relative to the market's recent pessimism would now likely seem to be a relatively hawkish outlook.

Key data due out in the coming week include trade and the Treasury budget Tuesday; retail sales Wednesday; PPI, IP, Empire State, and Philly Fed Thursday; and CPI and Michigan consumer sentiment Friday:

* We look for a modest widening of the trade deficit in May to $49.0 billion, with imports rising 1.1% and exports up 1.0%. The bulk of the import gain should be accounted for by a price-driven surge in oil and natural gas. Otherwise, a pullback in auto imports in line with the recent production slowdown should largely offset gains in other goods categories. The export gain is likely to be led by a rebound in aircraft shipments and price-related gains in industrial materials and food that should more than offset a drop in shipments of other capital goods.



* We forecast a June budget surplus of $20 billion. A solid gain in corporate tax receipts is expected to be just about offset by the impact of a calendar shift on the outlay side. Thus, we look for a budget surplus that is little changed relative to the $21 billion recorded in the same period a year ago. For the fiscal year as a whole it appears that the deficit will be close to $425 billion — well below earlier official and private estimates in the neighborhood of $500 billion.



* We look for a 1.5% plunge in June retail sales and a 0.1% rise ex autos. A sizeable fall-off in June motor vehicle sales points to a big drop in overall retail activity. Meanwhile, nonauto sales are expected to post only a slight uptick with poor weather helping to hold down chain store results and lower gasoline prices leading to a flattening in the service station category. For the quarter as a whole, it now appears that personal consumption spending rose at only a 2.2% annualized pace.



* We forecast a 0.2% rise in the June producer price index and a 0.1% increase excluding food and energy. Quotes for food and energy items appear to have steadied in June following some outsized advances in prior months. This should lead to some moderation in the headline result. Otherwise, a pullback in motor vehicle prices — consistent with the seesaw pattern that has been evident for some time — should help restrain the core reading.



* We look for a 0.1% rise in June industrial production. The employment report showed a surprising dip in factory jobs along with a big drop in the average workweek. However, we believe that much of the latter softness reflected the impact of business closings due to the Reagan funeral — which took place during the survey week. So Fed statisticians are likely to discount the hours data when extrapolating the labor market figures to the full month. We expect the manufacturing category to show a 0.3% gain while a weather-related dip in electricity output should lead to a fall-off in the utility component.



* We forecast a 0.2% rise in the June consumer price index, overall and excluding food and energy. A slight pullback in gasoline prices and a flattening out of quotes for milk are likely to lead to a much tamer headline gain than seen in May. Meanwhile, a sharp pullback in hotel rates (due to a seasonal quirk) and a renewed decline in apparel prices should help to offset a rebound in quotes for used cars. Indeed, we see some downside risk to our estimate for the core since our unrounded figure is +.16%. Finally, if our forecast is realized, this would put the year/year core reading at +1.8%.

morganstanley.com



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 12:00:39 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
Global: Global: Imbalances, Take 2

Rebecca McCaughrin (London)

In contrast to a country’s financial account, which is a flow concept representing the change in assets owned and liabilities owed, the international net debt position is a stock concept, representing the cumulative financial account balances, adjusted for movements in exchange rates and asset prices. For this reason, a country’s net international investment position (IIP) is a more accurate mark-to-market gauge of indebtedness. It is also one of the indicators used in our FX team’s fair value models, and so any changes in the underlying position can be important from an FX standpoint. In addition, this metric is used to determine a country’s debt-servicing burden. Since US gross liabilities are not only larger than gross assets, but are also more heavily concentrated in debt securities (37% instead of 7% for assets), this will be a key issue for the US as global interest rates continue to rise.



Further Deterioration in Net Foreign Debt Position

The US net debt position deteriorated to a new record high of $2.4trn or 22.1% of GDP in current cost terms (24.1% in market value terms). In other words, the US now owes an extra 22.1% of its GDP to the rest of the world after subtracting the amount owed by foreigners to the US. Although a weak dollar and strong overseas market performance helped to limit the deterioration, financial flows were still larger, adding an additional $198bn to the US’s net liabilities between yearend 2002 and 2003. A depreciation in the dollar increases the value of holdings denominated in foreign currency, but has no impact on USD-denominated assets. Since liabilities (foreign holdings of US assets) are almost fully denominated in dollars, while assets (US holdings of overseas assets) are mostly denominated in foreign currencies, the depreciation of the USD in the last two years has inflated gross assets and has had a positive impact on the net debt position — but only enough to slow, not reverse, the deterioration.



Global Context Matters

The US tends to attract the greatest attention as a large debtor nation. But there are a number of other countries that have accumulated far greater mountains of external debt as a share of GDP. Among the 37 countries that our group tracks for which position data are available, at least fifteen have at some point or another in the last two decades run a larger net debt position as a share of GDP than the US. Finland takes the prize for the largest liabilities on record; at -168% of GDP in 1999, it was off the charts for reasons explained below. Among industrialized economies, Austria, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand are all currently running larger debt positions than the US. From this perspective — and one that we attribute greater importance to than flow concepts like the current account — the US is not nearly as ‘imbalanced’ as it is often portrayed.



Finland’s case is an extreme example of how valuation changes can create sharp swings in a country’s level of debt. Between 1998 and 1999, liabilities jumped by $139bn to $326bn even though FDI and portfolio inflows increased by just $2.3bn during that period. A small portion of the spike was due to the FX adjustment resulting from the introduction of the euro, but the bulk of the deterioration came from the 151% surge in Finish equity prices as the tech bubble inflated. This jump far exceeded the rise seen in other developed world markets. As the tech bubble burst, and Finland’s equity market plunged, the resulting revaluation yielded a halving of Finland’s net debt to -83% of GDP by the end of 2001. The net debt position halved again the following year, and by the end of 2003 was below -30%. Could the US see a similar price-driven swing in its own IIP? Probably not. Finland’s case is distinct in many ways from the US, the most obvious point being the small contribution of financial flows to its debt position. In the US, valuation and exchange rate changes have played an important role in inflating and deflating the overall level of indebtedness in the last five years, but the underlying mechanism of debt accumulation remains financial inflows.



Resistant to Reversing

Is there a threshold at which a country’s IIP becomes unsustainable? Oft-cited empirical work suggests that the US begins to test the limits of its sustainability as the current account nears 5% of GDP. (See Catherine Mann, Is the US Trade Deficit Sustainable?, Institute for International Economics, 1999. 5% is intended as a rough ballpark figure, not a precise target. Our US chief economist Dick Berner places the peak at a slightly higher 6%.) We looked at the same set of 10 industrialized countries used in the current account study (Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK, and the US) to determine whether there is also a ‘magic’ threshold at which the deterioration in a country’s net debt position tends to reverse. Excluding Finland, which is an outlier for reasons explained above, we found 6 episodes in which the net IIP narrowed. The average turning point for these instances was 24% of GDP.



Does that mean the US net debt position — which is just two percentage points shy of that threshold — will soon test its upper limit? That’s highly unlikely, in our view.



First, the range of turning points is fairly large for the countries we observed, extending from 9.1% to 43.4% of GDP. In addition, the ratio is much higher for later periods, and given the evolution in financial markets over the 1990s, these later observations are probably more representative of current thresholds.



This type of cross-country analysis overlooks the impetus for the expansion in liabilities. A temporary shock may make large liabilities more susceptible to a reversal, whereas a permanent shock, such as a boost in productivity, can have a permanent impact on the net IIP. Indeed, a recent Fed paper estimates that the increase in US productivity could easily account for 20% of the worsening in the US net debt to GDP ratio since 1994 (see Michael Kouparitsas, “How Worrisome is the U.S. Net Foreign Debt Position?,” Chicago Fed Letter, May 2004). This would imply that the US is capable of sustaining a higher net debt level than would have been the case prior to the mid-1990s.



Third, capital market deregulation and ongoing international portfolio diversification make historical comparisons moot. As the so-called home bias continues to decline, there will be more scope for investors to diversify their portfolios. Although there is no way to determine the composition of future diversification, the US is still an attractive option, given its asset market depth. Euroland capital markets have deepened since the introduction of the euro, but the US still accounts for 45% of the global equity market cap and 43% of the long-term debt market. Although capital market deregulation can contribute to an expansion in both liabilities and assets, there is greater potential at the margin for gross liabilities to expand by a larger amount, widening the net debt position. This is because US investors are closer to their ‘optimal’ overseas portfolio diversification (based on the traditional ICAPM) compared to their foreign counterparts.



Bottom Line

Based on the metric of the net IIP, the US is not as severely imbalanced as it’s often portrayed, with a host of other industrialized countries currently running larger net debt positions as a share of GDP. Moreover, ongoing capital market deregulation, international portfolio diversification, and the effects of permanent productivity gains have likely boosted the threshold for the US net debt position to a higher sustainable level, making both historical and cross-country comparisons moot.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 12:10:13 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Currencies: JPY--Medium-Term Risks to USD/JPY Tilted to the Upside
[Any thoughts on this Haim? - mish]

Stephen L. Jen

USD/JPY forming a medium-term bottom. Though USD/JPY could drift marginally lower to 105 in the near term, for 2005, I see USD/JPY trading toward 115.

First, a further clarification of my call. The Japanese economy is doing very well, enjoying a sustained structural recovery based on (1) grossly depreciated capital stock; (2) a generational recovery in risk-taking, and (3) corporate and other structural reforms. The surge in demand from China was clearly the trigger for this recovery. There will no doubt be risks along the way (e.g., recession scare in the US and the China Shock), and recovery will likely not be linear. But these cyclical matters should be considered in the context of a structural recovery.

My outlook for a sustained structural recovery in Japan implies that inflation expectations will rise before actual inflation rises. Given that the preconditions the BoJ has declared for ending ZIRP (zero-interest rate policy) are centered on actual inflation, this necessarily suggests that the yield curve in Japan will steepen, as the BoJ will intentionally fall behind the curve.

In this scenario, USD/JPY has the best chance of selling off in the early stages of the cyclical recovery, as capital inflows (mostly into the Nikkei) are front-loaded, in expectation of such an economic recovery. But when domestic demand actually recovers in Japan, inflation should rise and the current-account (C/A) surplus of Japan should start to decline. Add the China Shock, and USD/JPY could start drifting higher. This is why we have USD/JPY forecasts of 107 and 105 by end-Q3 and Q4 of this year, but 113 by end-2005.

My ‘multiple shadow prices’ framework revisited. Until recently, the level of USD/JPY required to clear the asset market was very different from that for the goods market. In other words, for years, the world loved Japanese goods but hated JPY assets. My personal guess is that, as recently as 2002, the market clearing price (shadow price) for Japan’s asset market was as high as 150, while that for the goods market was below 100.

In the case where there is no progress on structural reforms, domestic deflation would be sustained. Exporters face a gradually declining cost structure, which should allow them to remain competitive with a declining USD/JPY. At the same time, the quality of the balance sheets of banks would continue to deteriorate. This would make JPY assets less and less attractive, increasing the level of USD/JPY required to ‘entice’ foreign investors to buy JPY assets. The end result is that, with deflation, the two shadow prices will diverge. This helps explain why USD/JPY has been so volatile in the last decade, as spot USD/JPY varied within this wide range.

Conversely, with progress on structural reforms and on fighting deflation, inflation should gradually rise, pushing up the shadow price for the goods market and JPY assets should become more attractive over time. This should bring about a USD/JPY that is more stable over time and one that no longer experiences sustained downward pressures from a perversely competitive goods market.

Back to the real world. How does this really apply to USD/JPY at present? First, the Japanese macro data have been strong recently. Risks on the horizon are coming from the external sector: a possible growth relapse in the US (which I don’t believe will materialize) and the China Shock. With domestic demand strong, while external demand is at risk of weakening, the ‘risk-adjusted’ goods market shadow price should drift higher, corresponding to a prospective modest compression in Japan’s C/A surplus.

Second, as I mentioned above, the more the BoJ delays taking back excess liquidity in the system, the higher expected inflation would be. The implications of a further steepening in the yield curve would exacerbate the ability of the MoF to service its debt. Rekindled angst concerning Japan’s fiscal affairs could weigh on JGBs and elevate the financial shadow price of USD/JPY.

Third, there are signs that net portfolio flows into Japan may be approaching a saturation point. The overall balance of portfolio flows has been negative since April.

While there is downside risk to USD/JPY in the near term, I am more confident that USD/JPY will trade modestly higher as soon as the US reaccelerates. A month ago, I abandoned the call that USD/JPY will break below 100. From a medium-term perspective, I believe a buy-on-dips strategy on USD/JPY is more logical.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 12:37:31 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
Asia Pacific: Should Central Banks Fight Stagflation Now?

Andy Xie (Hong Kong)

Asia is showing symptoms of stagflation. While the economies are decelerating quickly, inflation rates are picking up virtually everywhere. Should Asian central banks take stagflation seriously? We think so.

First, interest rates are just too low. The current negative real interest rates are causing excessive demand for property. The distortion in resource allocation compounds over time and may eventually trigger another global financial crisis. Thus, even if inflation does not last, it is increasing financial risks to the global economy.

Second, the cost push-led inflation could mutate into a wage-price spiral. This risk is especially acute for Korea. Its strong labor unions are likely to demand higher wages if inflation remains high. This risk is perhaps lower in countries that do not have strong unions.
[I think he misses the boat in general on this point. Korea is the exception not the rule, I see little chance of this in the US or Japan or China - Mish]

Third, if there is a major supply shock due to Middle East turmoil, the mild stagflation that we are currently experiencing could turn virulent. Asian central banks could be trapped into accommodating the higher oil price, as the Fed was in the 1970s.
[no question about this but way does he say Asian CBs as opposed to ALL CBs - mish]
The resulting weakness in currencies could perpetuate inflation.

However, Asian central banks appear poised to accept higher inflation, at least for a period, without raising interest rates, even as the Fed is normalizing the US interest rate. Korea and Taiwan, in particular, may not raise interest rates for the next four to six quarters as their central banks focus on weak domestic demand. China may take action before the end of the year but would likely raise interest rates by half as much as the Fed does. The stagflation scenario ahead would cause Asian bonds and currencies to weaken.

Stagflation is stalking the world. Governments and private forecasters are lowering GDP projections but raising those for inflation. China’s inflation has accelerated to about 5% from mild deflation in 2002. Korea’s inflation is at 3.6% now, up from 3% a year ago. The US inflation has also picked up by one percentage point to 3% from a year ago. Even the Euro zone’s inflation has risen by half a percentage point to 2.2% in a year.

In terms of GDP growth, the US was at about 4% in 1H04 versus 6% in 2H03 and will at best deliver the same in 2H04, we estimate. The Chinese economy is beginning to decelerate, and the pace of deceleration may quicken in 2H04. Korea’s domestic demand is still falling. Only Europe is improving a bit.

The overall economic trend is diverging from the inflationary trend. As inflation is a lagging indicator, this sort of divergence happens in a typical cycle. When a central bank normalizes interest rates, inflation generally decelerates and the GDP growth rate normalizes after a period of above-trend growth during the initial cyclical recovery.

The difference this time is that the growth surge was intense and concentrated because monetary stimulus led to a global property bubble and a Chinese capex bubble.
[While the above is true there is another BIG DIFFERENCE: Another big difference this time is where interest rates are currently. There is next to no room to cut and one pissy little hike with the threat of more has already slowed things considerably. Furthermore the FED is so far behind the curve on this that they are finally hiking just as all sort of other stimulus is wearing off. A double whammy. Mish]

The former prompted consumers in Anglo-Saxon economies to spend feverishly; the latter caused commodity prices to skyrocket, lifting Asian manufacturing economies and commodity-based economies elsewhere.

Bubble-induced growth can reverse quickly. The Chinese government deliberately popped the bubble, fearing a financial catastrophe if the bubble remained unchecked. The Chinese economy is now cooling; sales of auto and property are slowing and production is beginning to ease. Production is likely to slow more quickly in coming months as inventories rise under sluggish sales.

China’s slowdown is affecting Asian manufacturing economies initially, as the demand for equipment and components is the first to slow. As production slows further, demand for raw materials could decline and raw material-based economies would be affected next. Just when higher raw material costs are being passed on to the CPI, these economies are beginning to slow sharply. This is why stagflation appears a realistic scenario for in Asia.

Consumer-led economies tend to decelerate more slowly than production or commodity-based economies. Their property markets generally remain resilient as real interest rates stay very low and normal interest rates rise slowly.
[That is an interesting idea. Any thoughts? mish]

Furthermore, China’s slowdown would benefit consumers as commodity prices decline. However, these economies are still slowing more quickly than in a normal cycle. When property prices stop rising, consumption decelerates quickly. So, there is a feel of stagflation in these economies too.

Should Central Banks Worry About Stagflation?
There is a good case for structural deflationary forces to remain (see our “Today’s Inflation May Lead to Tomorrow’s Deflation,” dated April 14, 2004). Hence, one could argue that central banks could wait until a cooling global economy brings down commodity prices and inflationary pressure passes. This approach is dangerous, in my view, because it does not address the risks that would magnify the cost of high inflation today.

First, negative real interest rates are causing massive distortions of resource allocation, which could lead to financial crises. Major central banks set out to fight deflation with monetary stimulus three years ago. Instead, the excessively low interest rates triggered a global property bubble and a capex bubble in China. Both caused the prices of raw materials to skyrocket. The current cost-push inflation is the echo from asset bubbles around the world.

Not to deal with inflation is not to deal with asset bubbles. Prolonged asset bubbles will eventually lead to financial crises.
This risk is especially high in China and the US – the two economies that led the global economy in this cycle. The buoyant asset markets have sustained the US consumption boom, causing its trade balance to deteriorate further despite the dollar weakness. The endgame for the US is either a property crash or a dollar crash.

[The endgame for the US is a property crash or a US$ crash... what about both? Neither? thoughts - mish]

The earlier the Fed tightens, the smaller the crash is likely to be. The Fed is raising interest rates now. It would be a mistake if it stops when the economy slows. Now is the time to rein in the systemic risk by raising interest rates.
[Aren't we more than a bit late with stimulus arlready wearing off - mish]

China’s financial institutions’ loans to the non-financial sector increased by 45% between December 2002 and May 2004, rising twice as fast as in the preceding 29 months. China has been experiencing a credit bubble with all its attendant symptoms – negative real interest rate, rapid growth of the property sector, energy shortages, and high commodity prices. The consequence of the bubble is another pile of bad debts. The longer the bubble lasts, the more bad debts China will suffer.

The Chinese government has tightened credit and its land policy to cool investment. The economy is beginning to decelerate. However, the quantity approach to credit tightening has led to a black market that distributes credit at much higher interest rates.
China is targeting interest rates, money supply, and the exchange rate. It is very hard to accomplish this and it could result in the creation of black markets. It would be much better for China to raise interest rates and make this consistent with credit policy.

Exhibit 1
[There is an exhibit in the article if you look it up - not all that significant - mish]

Second, in economies with strong labor unions, cost push-induced inflation could turn into a wage-price spiral. In Asia, Korea is particularly vulnerable to this risk. As inflation pressure continues, labor becomes anxious about losing purchasing power and demands wage increases. Korea has seen a number of such incidents. Hence, central banks should pay close attention to the risk that strong labor unions pose.

I believe that Korea should raise interest rates soon to convince labor not to push hard for wage increases. However, Korea is unlikely to adopt such a stance. Instead, weakness in domestic demand drives policy-making. It is possible that inflation pressure will blow over, and some excess in wage growth would, therefore, not harm the economy. But, the risk of persistent stagflation in Korea is significant, in my view.

Third, if central banks do not deal with inflation now because of growth concerns, another oil shock may force them to accommodate more inflation. This would bring back the experience of the 1970s. This risk may not be very high. As the global economy slows, the oil price should come down (see "Oil Price May Fall Sharply,” May 23, 2004). However, central banking is about risk management. Interest rates are already too low and the Middle East is unstable. Central banks should build up some safety margin now by raising interest rates, even though it may speed up the economic deceleration.

Prudent Central Banking Is Unlikely to Prevail
Politics around the world increasingly is a focus on growth. China is the only country that acknowledges that it is growing too fast. Even robust economies like the US still desire more growth. High leverage, I believe, is the reason. Global indebtedness is at an unprecedented high because the world has experienced several bubbles in the past two decades without a thorough shakeout.

[No completed shakeout is right - mish]

The debt could be with the government, household, or business. Hence, politics actually favors stagflation, especially for economies with short-term debt (see “Could Stagflation Save Asia,” October 13, 2003), which would redistribute wealth from savers to borrowers.

Central banking is at a crossroads, in my view. The belief that monetary policy can smooth economic cycles led us down the path of asset bubbles. It also encouraged governments not to reform their economies structurally, looking for monetary bailouts instead. If central banks do not tackle inflation now, the world may be headed for the biggest redistribution of wealth in history through stagflation.

morganstanley.com
============================================================
Quite an interesting Article.
Thoughts Anyone?

Mish



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (9081)7/12/2004 12:54:05 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
Overcapacity on cars?
You bet!
sg.biz.yahoo.com

In other news...
It was reported that Daimler will cut a lot of jobs in Germany.
I didn't find a link yet.