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To: bob zagorin who wrote (21370)7/19/2004 10:35:44 AM
From: bob zagorin  Respond to of 57684
 
July 19, 2004
The MSN Butterfly Begins to Break Free
By SAUL HANSELL

At an October 2002 gala to introduce Microsoft's MSN 8 Internet service, Bill Gates showed a video of himself wearing a butterfly costume and handing out software for the service.

His point was that after seven years of floundering in the Internet access market, Microsoft would do whatever it took to beat its longtime rival America Online. That included pouring $500 million into MSN to match AOL's most popular features and another $300 million into marketing, featuring MSN's butterfly mascot and a concert highlighted by rocker Lenny Kravitz singing "Fly Away."

But all that flew away was the better part of a billion dollars. Microsoft's share of the Internet access market has declined steadily since.

In the years since the start of what was first called the Microsoft Network, Mr. Gates has tried dozens of different business models, from Internet access to Web sites to monthly software subscriptions. They all had one thing in common: they lost money.

Over the last year, however, MSN has finally started to see some profits. The unit began making money last fall and is expected to post an operating profit of about $200 million for the fiscal year that ended June 30, compared with a loss of about $531 million last year.

The reason has little to do with any of Microsoft's more ambitious Internet strategies. Instead, it was one of the businesses that it had put on the back burner - Internet advertising - that really started to take off.

Even without a lot of new investment, MSN's Web site has long been the third most popular destination on the Internet, bringing together its Hotmail e-mail service, the MSNBC news operation and a variety of other channels. Recently, it has worked to repair a frayed relationship with Madison Avenue, putting the company in a good position to gain as the ad market rebounded. Over the last year, MSN has ranked second in online advertising revenue, behind Yahoo and ahead of the longtime leader AOL, a unit of Time Warner.

Mary Meeker, the Morgan Stanley Internet analyst, said that MSN's revival was an indicator of the company's trademark doggedness.

"They began their attack on AOL 10 years ago," she said. "Since then they have lost billions, and now they are making money. It gives me a real sense of just how patient they are." Now basking in its newfound profitability, MSN is again on the offensive, competing with Yahoo, the Internet portal, even more than with AOL. It has a three-prong strategy: continue to cash in on the advertising market, sell software services for people who have broadband Internet access from cable or phone companies, and build a better Web search engine. MSN, which uses Yahoo's search technology, is trying to develop search technology to take on Google. It hopes to introduce that technology by the end of the year.

As investors consider Google's public stock offering, some worry that Microsoft will be able to squeeze out the plucky search company just as it pushed aside Netscape in the Internet browser market. After all, it plans to include links to its new search service on the Windows desktop and in many other products and services.

Yet that same considerable Windows advantage led many observers to predict that Microsoft would cause more trouble than it actually did for AOL and Yahoo. It turned out that most Internet users were willing to skip past the default services offered by Windows in favor of brands they preferred.

"There was a concern that Microsoft would always win because they owned the desktop," said David Card, the research director of Jupiter Research. "If the desktop is so important, then Microsoft should have beaten AOL, but they didn't."

One drag on MSN over the years, said several people who worked there, is that Microsoft has been conflicted about whether to treat the Internet as a media business or a form of software. It is not a simple either-or proposition because so much of the Internet is a hybrid - free software paid for by advertising.

"One thing that amazed me is that the organization changed annually," said Merrill Brown, the former editor in chief of MSNBC. "They seize upon a good idea, and throw lots of resources at it until it's time to move to the next idea or acquisition."

Microsoft certainly has had some successes on the Internet, including Hotmail, MSNBC (a joint venture with General Electric), the Slate opinion journal and Expedia, the online travel agency it sold to InterActiveCorp.

But there have been at least as many failures, ranging from Mungo Park, an adventure travel site, to the CarPoint automobile buying service, to the controversial Hailstorm system for connecting information from different Web sites.

But Microsoft's biggest online failure has been its Internet access business. It lost several billion dollars over the years by paying people $400 rebates to sign three-year contracts for MSN dial-up accounts, according to Internet industry executives. Those customers have quit the service in droves as their commitments expire.

By contrast, AOL's Internet access business has been hugely profitable, even amid turmoil from its merger with Time Warner and the decline in the dial-up, or narrowband, market.

"We said that narrowband is like the buggy whip business," said David Cole, the Microsoft senior vice president in charge of MSN. "We could try to be the best buggy whip maker, but that's not very aspirational. It's hard to get people rallied around that."

The broadband market, however, has proved exasperating for dial-up providers like MSN, AOL and Earthlink, all of which wanted to buy high-speed connections wholesale and market them to consumers.

After accounting for the customer acquisition costs, the costs paid to telephone companies and the support costs, Mr. Cole said, "there is nothing left over."

Microsoft has invested $6 billion in Comcast, the nation's largest cable company, but that has not led to an arrangement to distribute MSN services to Comcast customers. Comcast, in fact, edged out Microsoft this year to become the nation's second-largest Internet provider, with 10 percent of the Internet access market, according to Solomon Research.

Microsoft's share of that market has fallen from a peak of 13 percent in 2002 to 8 percent today. (AOL's share fell to 24 percent from 29 percent in the last two years.) Microsoft claims a total of eight million subscribers to its various MSN services, of which about five million are Internet access customers, according to ComScore Media Metrix, an Internet ratings company.

Now, the company hopes to sell extra services to people who buy broadband service from their local telephone or cable companies. For $5.95 a month, it offers MSN Plus, which mainly expands e-mail services. MSN Premium, for $9.95 a month, adds firewall and virus software, and access to some proprietary content, most notably Webcasts of Major League Baseball games. Microsoft paid a reported $40 million over two years for the baseball rights.

So far, that market has not taken off. Microsoft will not say how many broadband add-on subscriptions it has sold, admitting only that the vast bulk of its users come from deals it has struck with Verizon and Qwest to include MSN software as part of those company's basic broadband services.

Microsoft is also developing more services, including some for small businesses, and a new music download offering meant to compete with Apple's iTunes.

But it is MSN's advertising business that is really starting to pay off.

The company had a reputation on Madison Avenue of being unresponsive and forcing advertisers to use its own proprietary formats. But in late 2001, it hired an experienced magazine executive, Joanne Bradford, to run its advertising sales staff and to reach out to agencies. It also moved to embrace the industry's standard ad formats. As marketers discovered ways to use more interactive ads, MSN was one of the few sites that could deliver a mass audience.

Still, MSN's audience appears to be more transient than those of its rivals. According to ComScore Media Metrix, 111 million people visited some part of MSN at least once in May. That is just slightly behind Yahoo, which had 113 million visitors and Time Warner (including America Online), which had 112 million. But MSN's visitors spent 147 minutes, on average, looking at MSN pages in the month, far less than the 260 minutes that users spent on Yahoo or the 340 minutes they devoted to Time Warner sites.

Yusuf Mehdi, a vice president for MSN, concedes that the company needs to find a way to engage its audience more.

"We want to have the sort of evangelical feedback that people have for the iPod or the TiVo," Mr. Mehdi said. "I want people to say, 'I love MSN.' "

MSN hopes one way to achieve that is to customize its service to the interests of each user. For example, it has introduced trial versions of an automated news service that displays headlines for articles based on the topics that users have shown interest in.

Another part of Microsoft's Internet strategy is to combine Web searches with an improved application that lets users find documents and e-mail messages on personal computers. The enhanced search function will be a feature of the next major version of Windows, scheduled for 2006, but Mr. Mehdi said that MSN would make a desktop computer search feature available much sooner, probably as part of the free downloadable toolbar that it introduced earlier this year. And last week Microsoft bought Lookout, a tiny software company, to help with its desktop search effort.

But even with this new focus on searches, Danny Sullivan, the editor of Search Engine Watch, said that Microsoft will have a tough time catching up with Google. "To shift market share, Google has to get bad and they have to get good," he said. "People will not go to Microsoft, even if Microsoft is better than Google - if Google is good enough."

Mr. Mehdi said that Microsoft was betting that none of today's search engines are quite good enough to hold users and that Microsoft's strengths will give it a significant advantage as the Internet evolves.

"Search is not done until you can give users the answer they want instead of a list of 1,000 Web sites," Mr. Mehdi said. "That's a big, tough software problem. And we said, thank goodness we're software guys."



To: bob zagorin who wrote (21370)7/20/2004 9:13:25 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 57684
 
Global: The World's Biggest Hedge Fund
______________________________

By Stephen Roach (New York)
Morgan Stanley
Jul 19, 2004

The title belongs to America's Federal Reserve. Not only is the Fed the unquestioned leader in world central banking circles, but the US monetary authority has led the way in setting up the biggest macro trades of modern times. Highlights include Carry Trade I of 1993, the equity bubble of the late 1990s, and now Carry Trade II -- all direct outgrowths of trading strategies implicitly recommended by Greenspan & Co. So far, the world is no worse for the wear. But it's a world that now lives from trade to trade. And with that precarious existence comes the ever-present risk of breakage -- the aftershocks that follow the unwinding of every trade. We have the Federal Reserve to thank for that.

This transformation began in earnest in 1987. As the US equity market surged toward excess that summer, there was deep conviction that downside risks were not to be feared -- that they would be protected by the options strategies of the perfect hedge, "portfolio insurance." The Crash in October unmasked the flaws in that supposition. The Fed responded to this crisis by offering up the unconditional palliative of an open-ended liquidity backstop. Out of that chaos nearly 17 years ago, the dip-buying mindset of a generation of equity investors was borne. In retrospect, the buying opportunity created by the Crash of 1987 was a bargain that no serious investor -- especially the levered hedge fund community -- could afford to miss.

Five years later, financial markets were offered another learning experience. In response to what Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan dubbed "financial headwinds," the Fed slashed its policy rate to 3% in September 1992 and held it there until February 1994. The Fed believed that an unusually steep yield curve was the appropriate antidote for the credit crunch it thought was hobbling economic activity -- an outcome brought about by America's saving and loan crisis and widespread loan losses in the commercial banking system. With the federal funds rate pushed down to the inflation rate, overnight money was essentially "free" in real terms. For a troubled banking system, this was a great opportunity to re-liquefy balance sheets. For the levered hedge fund community, this was another no-brainer -- the only question was where to play the spread. The origins of the modern-day "carry trade" are traceable to this period.

Fast-forward to 2004, and it's déjà vu -- but with several important new twists. First, the financing of the current carry trade is now occurring on much more generous terms; the federal funds rate of 1.25% is fully 200 basis points below the headline CPI inflation rate (3.3% Y-o-Y as of June 2004) -- offering a negative cost of overnight money. The real federal funds rate hasn't been this low for this long since the late 1970s. In effect, levered investors are now being paid to play the yield curve. Second, suffering from a shortfall of income generation in a uniquely jobless recovery, American consumers have turned into the functional equivalent of heavily levered hedge funds -- going deeply into debt to extract purchasing power from their homes (see my 4 June dispatch, "The Mother of All Carry Trades"). Third, the carry trade has now become central to America's twin-deficit financing imperatives; record budget deficits and current account gaps have been funded "painlessly" -- in large part though purchases of dollar-denominated assets by Asian monetary authorities. The yield curve play has turned foreign central banks into hedge funds as well.

The Fed obviously sees its role quite differently. Fixated on inflation control -- yesterday's battle, I must add -- the US central bank pays little heed to excesses that emerge in financial markets. Favoring a reactive over a pro-active approach, the Fed believes it has both the skills and the tools to respond to problems in asset markets as they unfold. In the words of Chairman Greenspan in describing the Fed's conduct as the equity bubble expanded in the late 1990s, "...we chose...to mitigate the fallout when it occurs" (see his January 3, 2004 speech at the Meetings of the American Economics Association, "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy"). The Fed believes that this approach has been vindicated by the subsequent course of events. In light of America's surprisingly mild post-bubble recession, Greenspan argued (in this same speech) that it is reasonable "...to conclude that our strategy of addressing the bubble's consequences rather than the bubble itself has been successful."

Success at what cost? That is really the ultimate question in all this. To the extent that the Federal Reserve continues to set the stage for one risky macro trade after another, I believe there is great peril in its strategy. Last year's deflation scare was a case in point. As disinflation approached the hallowed ground of price stability, nominal interest rates moved down to rock-bottom levels. But as the risk of "unwelcome disinflation" stoked fears of a Japanese-style deflation, the Fed went into a fire drill that pushed its policy rate perilously close to the zero boundary. Yet another carry trade became a sure thing in this climate. As the risk of deflation receded, the debate turned to the Fed's exit strategy -- the so-called normalization of an extraordinary monetary accommodation. By telegraphing that the ensuing shift in policy would be "measured," the US central bank put financial markets on notice that it will be taking its time in raising interest rates. For those playing the carry trade, time is money.

To date, of course, the Fed has taken but one small step in returning its policy rate toward a more neutral setting. This has done next to nothing to discourage the vast array of carry trades that are still on the books in financial markets. Amy Falls, our global fixed income strategist, argues that most of these levered bets are now almost back to positions prevailing before the Fed's late June move. That's especially the case, in the view of our fixed income team, insofar as most spread products are concerned -- namely mortgage-backed securities, high-yield bonds, emerging market debt, and even investment grade paper. Our European equity strategists, Teun Draaisma and Ben Funnell, make a similar point -- that with sharply negative real short-term interest rates, it takes a lot more than 25 bp of monetary tightening to unwind the carry trade (see their July 13 essay, "The Crowded Carry"). They underscore the weakest link in this daisy chain -- that the risks to the levered community are likely to fall most acutely on banks and consumers, where the need for carry-trade-induced income generation is most acute. That pretty much fits with my own concerns, especially with respect to the over-extended American consumer.

What worries me the most in all this are the mounting systemic risks toward carry trades and the asset bubbles they spawn. To the extent that such trading strategies create artificial demand for assets, a seemingly unending string of bubbles is a distinct possibility. That's precisely what's occurred in recent years -- from equities in the late 1990s, to sovereign bonds, a host of spread products, and now possibly to a global housing bubble (see my 15 July dispatch, "Global Property Bubble?" and the accompanying round-up of worldwide housing market conditions conducted by our global economics team). This profusion of carry trades would not have occurred were it not for the Fed's extraordinary degree of monetary accommodation and the steep yield curve it fostered.

It doesn't have to be this way. Both the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of Australia have adjusted their policies to take property bubbles into explicit consideration. Moreover, Ottmar Issing of the ECB has publicly stressed the need for central banks to do a much better job in grappling with the linkage between monetary policy and asset markets (see his February 18, 2004, editorial feature in the Wall Street Journal, "Money and Credit"). The Fed, by contrast, remains in denial on this key issue -- refusing to concede that monetary policy must take asset inflation into account.

Unfortunately, the role of the US central bank goes beyond benign neglect. Over the past several years, the Fed actually has been quite aggressive in arguing why excesses are not bad. That was the case when it repeatedly justified the equity bubble on the basis of the so-called productivity renaissance of the New Economy. It has also been the case when the Fed has argued that America is not suffering from a debt problem, nor a twin deficit financing constraint. By serving as a cheerleader when financial markets are going to excess, the Fed is losing its credibility as an objective observer. It is no longer the tough guy that relishes the role of "taking away the punchbowl just when the party gets going" -- to paraphrase the legendary mantra of former Fed Chairman William McChesney Martin. By condoning excesses, the Fed, in effect, has become a stakeholder in the carry trades it spawns. Investors, speculators, income-short consumers, and financial intermediaries couldn't ask for more. It's the ultimate moral hazard play that that has turned the world into one gigantic hedge fund.

morganstanley.com