Part 2 >>(•) The CIA's DO gave the former ambassador's information a grade of "good," which
means that it added to the IC's body of understanding on the issue, H B H ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I
m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m . The possible grades are unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good,
excellent, and outstanding, which, according to the Deputy Chief of CPD, are very subjective.
; reports officer said that a
"good" grade was merited because the information responded to at least some of the outstanding
questions in the Intelligence Community, but did not provide substantial new information. He
said he judged that the most important fact in the report was that the Nigerien officials admitted
that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerien Prime Minister believed
the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of
foreign government service reporting.
(U) IC analysts had a fairly consistent response to the intelligence report based on the
former ambassador's trip in that no one believed it added a great deal of new information to the
Iraq-Niger uranium story. An INR analyst said when he saw the report he believed that it
corroborated the INR's position, but said that the "report could be read in different ways." He
said the report was credible, but did not give it a lot of attention because he was busy with other
things.
(U) DIA and CIA analysts said that when they saw the intelligence report they did not
believe that it supplied much new information and did not think that it clarified the story on the
alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed
uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would
admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the
former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed
was to discuss uranium sales.
(U) Because CIA analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to
clarify the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical products or
highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, CIA's briefer did not brief the Vice
President on the report, despite the Vice President's previous questions about the issue.
-46-
On March 25, 2002, the DO issued a third and final intelligence report from the
same "[foreign] government service." The report said that the 2000 agreement by Niger to
provide uranium to Iraq specified that 500 tons of uranium per year would be delivered in f
As in the two previous reports, the government service was not identified as the
foreign government service. The foreign government service did not provide the DO with
information about its source and the DO, to date, remains uncertain as to how the foreign
government service collected the information in the three intelligence reports. There were no
obvious inconsistencies in the names of officials mentioned or the dates of the transactions in any
of the three reports. Of the seven names mentioned in the reporting, two were former high
ranking officials who were the individuals in the positions described in the reports at the time
described and five were lower ranking officials. Of the five lower ranking, two were not the
individuals in the positions described in the reports, however, these do not appear to be names or
positions with which intelligence analysts would have been familiar. For example, an INR
analyst who had recently returned from a position as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy in Niger told Committee staff that he did not notice any inconsistencies with the names
of the officials mentioned. The only mistake in any of the reports regarding dates, is that one
date, July 7, 2000, is said to be a Wednesday in the report, but was actually a Friday.
C. Contin uing Analysis
(•) Throughout the time the Niger reports were being disseminated, the m ^ | CIA Iraq
nuclear analyst said he had discussed the issue with his INR colleague and was aware that INR
disagreed with the CIA's position. He said they discussed Niger's uranium production rates and
whether Niger could have been diverting any yellowcake. He said that he and his INR
counterpart essentially "agreed to disagree" about whether Niger could supply uranium to Iraq.
The CIA analyst said he assessed at the time that the intelligence showed both that Iraq may have
been trying to procure uranium in Africa and that it was possible Niger could supply it. He said
his assessment was bolstered by several other intelligence reports on Iraqi interest in uranium
from other countries in Africa.6
Several intelligence reports I alleged Iraq wanted to purchase uranium from
countries in Africa. ^^^^^B^^^^^BB^^^^BMI^^^^MBII^^B said Iraq had offered the
Democratic Republic of the Congo^^^H^^^^Bl^^^^^Hl^^^l^HII^^I' Two CIA intelligence
reports from separate sources in March and April 1999 said a delegation of Iraqis, ^ ^ ^ I H ^ ^ ^ ^ H had arrived
-47-
(U) On May 10, 2002, the CIA's Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
(NESA) in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) prepared a Principals Committee briefing book
updating the status of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The document noted
that a "foreign government service says Iraq was trying to acquire 500 tons of uranium from
Niger."
(U) On June 24, 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Niamey published a cable, Niger's Uranium:
GON Signs IAEA Accord, But Keeps Looking for New Buyers as Price Falls. The cable reported
that, following prolonged lobbying, on June 10, 2002, the government of Niger signed a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The cable indicated that the agreement
would help ensure that Niger's uranium production is only used for "peaceful purposes."
(U) On July 22, 2002, the DOE published an intelligence product (Daily Intelligence
Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway?) which highlighted the intelligence on the
Iraq-Niger uranium deal as one of three indications that Iraq might be reconstituting its nuclear
program. The report added that there was "no information indicating that any of the uranium
shipments arrived in Iraq," and suggested that the "amount of uranium specified far exceeds what
Iraq would need even for a robust nuclear weapons program."
(U) On August 1, 2002 CIA NESA published a paper on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capabilities which did not include the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium
information.
(U) In September 2002, the DIA published an intelligence assessment (Defense
Intelligence Assessment, Iraq's Reemerging Nuclear Program) which outlined Iraq's recent
efforts to rebuild its nuclear program. The report focused on a variety of issues related to Iraq's
nuclear efforts, including procurement efforts, nuclear facilities, consolidation of scientists and
uranium acquisition. On the latter issue, the assessment said "Iraq has been vigorously trying to
procure uranium ore and yellowcake." The report described the intelligence on the Iraq-Niger
uranium deal and several other intelligence reports on Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from
Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The assessment said that "DIA cannot
confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources."
in Somalia in March to evaluate and discuss
-48-
(U) In a written response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on
September 11, 2002, National Security Council (NSC) staff contacted the CIA to clear language
for possible use in a statement for use by the President. The language cleared by the CIA said,
"Iraq has made several attempts to buy high strength aluminum tubes used in centrifuges to
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. And we also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has
resumed efforts to obtain large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which
is an essential ingredient of this process. The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric
tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single
nuclear weapon." The text was identical to the text proposed by the White House except that the
CIA had suggested adding "up to" before 500 metric tons. The President never used the
approved language publicly.
D. The British White Paper
-49-
On September 24, 2002 the British Government published a White
Paper on Iraq's WMD stating, "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant
quantities of uranium from Africa."
-50-
(U) In a response to questions from Committee staff, the White House said that on
September 24, 2002, NSC staff contacted the CIA to clear another statement for use by the
President. The statement said, "we also have intelligence that Iraq has sought large amounts of
uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa. Yellowcake is an essential
ingredient of the process to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons." The CIA cleared the language,
but suggested that "of the process" be changed to "in the process." The President did not use the
cleared language publicly.
(U) Some time in September a member of the NSC staff discussed the Niger uranium
issue with a CIA analyst. The CIA analyst told Committee staff that during coordination of a
speech (he was not sure which one) with an NSC staff member, the CIA analyst suggested that
the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa be removed. The CIA analyst said
the NSC staff member said that would leave the British "flapping in the wind." In a written
response to a question about this matter from the Committee, the NSC staff member said that the
CIA analyst did not suggest that he remove text regarding Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from
Africa. The NSC staff member said the analyst suggested that Saddam's meeting with his
"nuclear mujahedin" was more compelling evidence of Iraq's effort to resurrect the Iraqi nuclear
program than attempts to acquire yellowcake, but said the analyst never suggested that the
yellowcake text be removed. He said he had no recollection of telling a CIA analyst that
replacing the uranium reference would leave the British "flapping in the wind" and said such a
statement would have been illogical since the President never presented in any one speech every
detail of intelligence gathered on Iraq either by the U.S. or by the U.K.
E. The National Intelligence Estimate
At the same time
IC was preparing the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq 's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction. In mid-September 2002, in both hearings and in letters, Members
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) requested that the CIA publish an NIE on
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Committee Members expressed concerns
that they would be expected to vote on an Iraq Resolution shortly and had no NIE on which to
base their vote.
-51 -
(U) On September 12, 2002, the DCI officially directed the National Intelligence Officer
(NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs to begin to draft an NIE. The National Intelligence
Council (NIC) staff drew the discussion of nuclear reconstitution for the draft NIE largely from
an August 2002 CIA assessment and a September 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq's Reemerging
Nuclear Weapons Programs. The NIO sent a draft of the entire NIE to IC analysts on September
23, 2002 for coordination and comments and held an interagency coordination meeting on
September 25, 2002 to discuss the draft and work out any changes.
(U) Regarding uranium from Africa, the language of the NIE said:
Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at
Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously
trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the
time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.
A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger
planned to send several tons of "pure uranium" (probably yellowcake) to
Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out
arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of
yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement.
• Reports indicate Iraq has also sought uranium ore from Somalia and
possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or
yellowcake from these sources.
(U) At the NIE coordination meeting, the only analyst who voiced disagreement with the
uranium section was an INR analyst. Several analysts from other agencies told Committee staff
that they did not recall even discussing the uranium reporting at the meeting. All of the analysts
said that the bulk of the time at the meeting was spent debating other issues such as the
aluminum tubes, time lines for weapons designs, and procurement of magnets and other dual use
items. CIA, DIA and DOE analysts all said that at the time the NIE was written, they agreed with
the NIE assessment that Iraq was attempting to procure uranium from Africa. Some analysts
said, in retrospect, the language should have been more qualified than it was, but they generally
agreed with the text.
-52-
(U) The uranium text was included only in the body of the NIE, not in the key judgments
section because the interagency consensus was that Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium were not key
to the argument that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. According to the NIO, the key
judgments were drawn from a CIA paper which only highlighted the acquisition of aluminum
tubes as the reason Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. The NIO said that at the NIE
coordination meeting, analysts added other reasons they believed Iraq was reconstituting, such as
acquiring magnets, machine tools, and balancing machines, and reestablishing Iraq's nuclear
scientists cadre. When someone, the NIO was not sure who,7 suggested that the uranium
information be included as another sign of reconstitution, the INR Iraq nuclear analyst spoke up
and said that he did not agree with the uranium reporting and that INR would be including text
indicating their disagreement in their footnote on nuclear reconstitution. The NIO said he did not
recall anyone else at the coordination meeting who disagreed with the uranium text, but also did
not recall anyone really supporting including the uranium issue as part of the judgment that Iraq
was reconstituting its nuclear program, so he suggested that the uranium information did not need
to part of the key judgments. He told Committee staff he suggested that "We'll leave it in the
paper for completeness. Nobody can say we didn't connect the dots. But we don't have to put
that dot in the key judgments."
(U) Because INR disagreed with much of the nuclear section of the NIE, it decided to
convey its alternative views in text boxes, rather than object to every point throughout the NIE.
INR prepared two separate boxes, one for the key judgments section and a two page box for the
body of the nuclear section, which included a sentence which stated that "the claims of Iraqi
pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."
(U) While formatting the final version of the NIE, the NIC staff decided to separate the
entire aluminum tubes discussion into a separate annex that laid out each agency's position.
When this formatting change was made, a text box INR had previously submitted for the body of
the NIE was split into a text box on reconstitution and a text box on the aluminum tubes. Both
the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs and the INR's senior WMD analyst told Committee
staff that INR's dissent on the uranium reporting was inadvertently separated from the
reconstitution section and included in the aluminum tubes box in the annex of the NIE. The NIC
staff disseminated a draft of the NIE in which those changes were made on September 26, 2002
7 Committee staff interviewed all of the analysts involved in coordinating the nuclear portion of the NIE and
none could recall who suggested that Iraq's interest in acquiring uranium from Africa be included in the key
judgments. A DOE analysts said he could have made that suggestion, because at the time he did believe that
uranium acquisitions attempts was an important sign of reconstitution, however, he could not be certain.
- 5 3 -
for coordination. An e-mail on September 30, 2002 indicates that INR made some further edits
to their text boxes, but did not change the placement of their dissent on the uranium reporting.
INR analysts told Committee staff they did not notice that the uranium dissent was included in
the aluminum tube section.
(•) On October 1, 2002, in preparation for an SSCI hearing on the NIE the following day,
a CIA NESA analyst prepared responses to questions anticipated from SSCI Members. The
WINPAC Iraq nuclear analyst sent the NESA analyst comments for inclusion |
(U) On October 1, 2002, the NIC published the NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The language on Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium from Africa
appeared as it did in the draft version and INR's position that "claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural
uranium in Africa are highly dubious" was included in a text box, separated by about 60 pages
from the discussion of the uranium issue.
(U) On October 2, 2002, the Deputy DCI testified before the SSCI. Senator Jon Kyi
asked the Deputy DCI whether he had read the British white paper and whether he disagreed with
anything in the report. The Deputy DCI testified that "the one thing where I think they stretched
a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from
various African locations. We've looked at those reports and we don't think they are very
credible. It doesn't diminish our conviction that he's going for nuclear weapons, but I think they
reached a little bit on that one point. Otherwise I think it's very solid."
(U) On October 4, 2002, the NIO for Strategic and Nuclear Programs testified before the
SSCI. When asked by Senator Fred Thompson if there was disagreement with the British white
paper, the NIO said that "they put more emphasis on the uranium acquisition in Africa than we
would." He added, "there is some information on attempts and, as we said, maybe not to this
committee, but in the last couple of weeks, there's a question about some of those attempts
because of the control of the material in those countries. In one case the mine is completely
flooded and how would they get the material. For us it's more the concern that they have
-54-
uranium in-country now. It's under inspection. It's under control of the IAEA - the International
Atomic Energy Agency - but they only inspect it once a year." The NIO told Committee staff
that he was speaking as an IC representative and was representing INR's known view on the
issue. He said at the time of his remarks, he did not believe that the CIA had any problem with
the credibility of the reporting, but said the CIA may have believed that the uranium information
should not be included in an unclassified white paper.
(U) Also, on October 4, 2002, CIA published an unclassified White Paper, Iraq 's
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. The NIO for NESA started work on the white paper in
the spring of 2002, well before efforts began on the classified NIE. A CIA NESA analyst drafted
the body of the White Paper and did not include text on Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from
Africa.
(U) In October 2002, CIA's NESA published a classified Iraq handbook as a repository of
reference material that policymakers, intelligence officers, and military personnel could easily
access. In the section on Iraq's nuclear program NESA wrote, "Iraq may be trying to acquire 500
tons of uranium - enough for 50 nuclear devices after processing - from Niger."
E. The Cincinnati Speech
(U) On October 4, 2002, the NSC sent a draft of a speech they were preparing for the
President to deliver in Cincinnati, Ohio. It was draft six of the speech and contained the line,
"and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide
from Africa - an essential ingredient in the enrichment process."
(U) The CIA's former Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence (ADDI) for Strategic
Programs, told Committee staff he was tasked by the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) to
handle coordination of the speech within the CIA. On October 5, 2002, the ADDI brought
together representatives for each of the areas of Iraq that the speech covered and asked the
analysts to bring forward any issues that they thought should be addressed with the NSC. The
ADDI said an Iraq nuclear analyst - he could not remember who - raised concerns about the
sourcing and some of the facts of the Niger reporting, specifically that the control of the mines in
Niger would have made it very difficult to get yellowcake to Iraq.
( | ) Both WINPAC Iraq nuclear analysts who had followed the Iraq-Niger uranium issue
told Committee staff they were not involved in coordinating the Cincinnati speech and did not
participate in the speech coordination session on October 5, 2002. The WINPAC Deputy
-55-
Director for Analysis also told Committee staff he did not recall being involved in the Cincinnati
speech, but later clarified his remarks to the Committee in writing saying that he remembered
participating in the speech, but did not recall commenting on the section of the speech dealing
with the Niger information. Committee staff asked the CIA to identify who might have attended
the Cincinnati speech coordination meeting and raised concerns with the ADDI about the
sourcing and facts of the Niger reporting. The CIA told Committee staff that the NESA Iraq
j
believes he may have been the one who attended the meeting and raised concerns
about the Niger reporting with the ADDI.
(U) Based on the analyst's comments, the ADDI drafted a memo for the NSC outlining
the facts that the CIA believed needed to be changed, and faxed it to the Deputy National
Security Advisor and the speech writers. Referring to the sentence on uranium from Africa the
CIA said, "remove the sentence because the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it
can be acquired from the source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue.
Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory."
Later that day, the NSC staff prepared draft seven of the Cincinnati speech which
contained the line, "and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase substantial amounts
of uranium oxide from sources in Africa." Draft seven was sent to CIA for coordination.
i The ADDI told Committee staff he received the new draft on October 6, 2002
and noticed that the uranium information had "not been addressed," so he alerted the DCI. The
DCI called the Deputy National Security Advisor directly to outline the CIA's concerns. On July
16, 2003, the DCI testified before the SSCI that he told the Deputy National Security Advisor
that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him
the "reporting was weak." The NSC then removed the uranium reference from the draft of the
speech.
Although the NSC had already removed the uranium reference from the speech,
later on October 6, 2002 the CIA sent a second fax to the White House which said, "more on why
we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points
(1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the
uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French
authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions
because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we
-56-
have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown
and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British."
(U) On October 7, 2002, President Bush delivered the speech in Cincinnati without the
uranium reference. On the same day, the CIA prepared comments on a draft White House paper,
A Grave and Gathering Danger. The comments suggested a change to the draft language saying
"better to generalize the first bullet as follows: Sought uranium from Africa to feed the
enrichment process." The original text from the White House had said "sought uranium oxide,
an essential ingredient in the enrichment process, from Africa." The White House did not
publish the paper.
G. The Niger Documents
On October 9, 2002, an Italian journalist from the magazine Panorama provided
U.S. Embassy Rome with copies of documents8 pertaining to the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium
transaction. The journalist had acquired the documents from a source who had requested 15,000
Euros in return for their publication, and wanted the embassy to authenticate the documents.
Embassy officers provided copies of the documents to the CIA'j
| because the embassy, which did collect the information, was sending copies of the
documents back to State Department headquarters.
8 d ) The documents from the Italian journalist are those that were later passed to the IAEA and discovered
to have been forged. In March 2003, the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Rockefeller, requested that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigate the source of the documents, ^ ^ ^ H H I ^ ^ H H I ^ ^ H H
^ | ^ | , the motivation of those responsible for the forgeries, and the extent to which the forgeries were part of a
disinformation campaign. Because of the FBI's investigation into this matter, the Committee did not examine these
issues.
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