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To: unclewest who wrote (55112)	7/19/2004 7:14:43 PM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 793752

Transforming the Military: A SOF Pilot Speaks by Guest Author at July 19, 2004 05:32 AM - Winds of Change Blog JK: On July 9, 2004, Robin Burke published a must-read article on the transformations underway in America's military and intelligence communities. It was good enough to make our all-time Best Of... category, and the outstanding discussions that Robin led made it even better. Helicopter pilot and Air Force Special Operations Command planning officer John Lance was invited to stitch some of his comment posts into a Guest Blog article. My Thoughts On Military Transformation, Done Right by John Lance As an Air Force special operations guy since 1995, I might be able to shed some light on this whole 'transformation of the military' thing. 'Transformation' has turned into one of those buzzwords that comes along every couple of years, becomes the trendy new 'in' thing, then fades away to be replaced by a new one. 15 years ago, it was 'Quality', we were going to use TQM concepts to improve the military and use the 'peace dividend' wisely. 10 years ago, it was RMA, 'Revolution in Military Affairs. 5 years ago, it was 'Jointness'. Now, it's 'Transformation' and everybody is jumping on the bandwagon. I definitely think tech has a big role on the battlefield (hell, I'm a SOF helo pilot, I love having Blue Force Tracker, IDAS/MATT, DIRCM and all the other alphabet-soup toys on my Pave Low helicopter). I think the 'conventional' military would do well to emulate the way SOF does business. The problem that I see is one of prioritization. All of the money that should be used to 'transform' the most important piece of tech on the battlefield, communications, is being wasted on high-priced major weapons programs with huge cost overruns. People always say you should criticize something if you don't have a plan. Well, here's my idea of what the military needs to concentrate on in order to 'transform' in the middle of a shooting war: [1] Comms is super-important. Every trigger-puller in Afghanistan and Iraq and anywhere else should have, as a minimum, a user-friendly version of Blue Force Tracker and a secure radio that can talk on squad, platoon and company nets. The Army is working on something called Transformational Communication System. Project originally started out at 6 billion, now it's up to 18 billion and no tangible results in the field. This is criminal, we need to fix tactical comms NOW! See Obelus' comment for his "Hummvees & cell phones" story from Iraq. [2] UAVs. I think Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are great for certain types of defined missions (I would never use them for Close Air Support, for instance, but think they work great for recon and scouting). More and better UAVs, just don't let them turn into the overrun pork festivals that the F/A-22 and F-35 are at the present. [3] Defensive systems for aircraft. Remember all the helicopters shot down back in the winter? The U.S. Army is scrambling to put Special Operations-level defensive systems on all it's helos. Same goes for the C-130s/C-17s/C-5s used by the US Air force. Having air superiority doesn't mean shit to scattered insurgents using shoulder-fired IR missiles. [4] Logistics. In this age of computers, I still can't figure out how Americans deployed to a combat theater can be missing things like body armor, ammo, food, gun lube, hell, even water. Something is broken in the logistics system and needs to be addressed quickly. Also, the services apparently didn't realize that things wear out faster in combat ops than in peace-time (duh) and is now scrambling to fix the vehicles and equipment that is being worn to the nub in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, stuff that should be caught if we're using this computer-centric new model for warfighting. [5] The Basics. We can't concentrate on turning our soldiers, airmen, sailors and marines into computer-savvy networkers, but let their 'basic skills' slide (ie. discipline, fitness, marksmanship, land navigation, etc). The services should immediately start copying the good things from Marine Corps Recruit Depot training. Segregate the sexes during Basic. More unarmed combat, Close Quarters Battle training and Immediate Action drills. Tougher Physical Training standards. More language/cultural training. And for the love of God, higher standards when it comes to discipline and responsibility. Is it too much to ask that people in the military actually look and act like professional war-fighters? If you hate running and resent people telling you what to do, maybe you need to find another line of work. You might notice there isn't much here for the Air Force or the Navy. Those two services actually have the luxury of looking ahead to the next crisis and planning accordingly. The biggest danger to the USAF and USN is blowing their money on [stuff] they don't need. The Army and US Marine Corps have a lot of areas they need to fix or modify and they have to do it while fighting the Global War On Terror. Again, I'm all for Tranformation, but it has to be done with an eye to not dropping the ball on your non-tech, basic skills type issues. Technology & Transformation The whole discussion on technology reminded me of a quote from Gulf War I (can't remember who said). "We (the coalition and Iraqis) could have traded equipment and the outcome would have been the same, it just would have taken a little longer." I think that's the proper attitude to take on military technology. I can't tell you how many times I've lost a SATCOM radio right at the precise time I really, really needed it to work. Same goes for GPS or INS navigation systems, mission computers, defensive systems, terrain-following radars, you name it. Personally, I would rather have a slightly obsolete piece of equipment that works 99.9% of the time than a cutting edge piece of high-tech that works 75% of the time (example: M-16 vs AK-47 during Vietnam War). Reliability will always be a big factor in military equipment and the anecdotes from the field tend to bear that out. Technolgy is great stuff and saves lives (both ours and theirs) but you can't forget that technology, especially the brand-new high-speed stuff, has a habit of letting you down when you really need it and that's when you have to depend on superior leadership and training. Same goes for intelligence. Does anyone these days really question the greater need for Human Intelligence (HUMINT)? Increased language skills? Better coordination between the myriad intel agencies? The U.S. has spent the last 25 years emphasizing the 'high-tech' part of intelligence gathering(satellites, signals intercepting stations, super-computers, etc...) Despite all that, 9/11 still happened. Now, leaders are starting to realize that there is no technological replacement for good old-fashioned spycraft. Unlike the Cold War, fighting groups like Al Qaida and Hezbollah is almost impossible without good HUMINT. Whether we can regrow ours in time remains to be seen. Conclusion In summary, tranformation is coming and it has great promise for the U.S. military. We just have to be careful and not let our enthusiam for advanced technology blind us to the non-technical qualities that are critical to a military force. So if Rumsfeld wants to 'transform' the military, fine, great, sounds cool. He can start by 'transforming' his boot into some of the military leader's asses and straighten out the lack of basic military competence that is starting to trip up operations overseas. Does anyone really think the military today is ready to 'transform' when you still have all of these entry-level problems? Computers are great, but computers don't fight wars. People fight wars. Fix the basics and the human element, and that will be enough of a 'transformation' for me. Final Note: Thanks for giving me the opportunity to post these views here, and thanks again to all who participated in the great discussion here on Winds of Change.NET. If you haven't read what some of my fellow commenters had to say on these subjects, I'd encourage you to do so. ------ The opinions in this article reflect only John Lance's personal understanding and beliefs. They are not intended to reflect or represent the official views of Special Operations Command, The U.S. Army, or any other official agency of the U.S. government. windsofchange.net

To: unclewest who wrote (55112)	7/19/2004 9:00:30 PM
From: sea_biscuit	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 793752

Bin Laden Hunt Hurt by U.S. Disrespect of Afghans, Experts Say Stefan Lovgren for National Geographic News March 30, 2004 By disrespecting Pashtun tribal culture in Afghanistan, the United States may have failed to gain a vital ally in its search for al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, according to experts, including National Geographic Adventure magazine's Robert Young Pelton. On a recent trip to Afghanistan, Robert Young Pelton went to visit a Pashtun tribal elder with whom he had spent time before. This time the intrepid adventurer and author of The World's Most Dangerous Places brought with him a U.S. undercover military contractor stationed in Afghanistan to hunt for Osama bin Laden and other fugitives. Pelton and his host, "Hajji"—a respected former mujahidin commander who fought the Soviet occupation in the 1980s—soon slipped into their thrice-daily pattern of long meals served on the floor, followed by endless cups of tea and hours of conversation through an interpreter. The contractor, however, was uncomfortable. He refused the food: mutton, fresh bread, and a dish, specially prepared by Hajji's wife, of what appeared to be curdled milk with oil poured into it. When the contractor finally left the room, Hajji turned to Pelton and asked, "What is wrong with your friend?" In this tradition-bound society, the contractor had just committed a major cultural faux pas. Pelton describes the episode in "Into the Land of bin Laden," his article in the April National Geographic Adventure magazine. He believes the scene illustrates how Americans have misread the Pashtun culture. By disrespecting the Pashtun culture, the Americans have failed to gain a vital ally in their search for bin Laden and other suspected terrorists, Pelton says. "Once you establish trust with the Pashtun elder, you can marry his daughter," Pelton said in a telephone interview. "But [the Americans] have failed to make connections with the tribal elders. We are not playing by their game." Lawlessness The rugged and mountainous Pashtun tribal land where Osama bin Laden is believed to be hiding straddles the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was drawn up by the British in 1893. "It's an imaginary line designed to separate the Pashtun people down the middle," Pelton said. "The Pashtuns are not really under the jurisdiction of either Afghanistan or Pakistan. It's a lawless area like a sovereign nation." It's a region that has repeatedly repulsed foreigners bent on domination, from the British more than a hundred years ago to the Soviets in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden was one of the scores of Arabs who went there to fight the Soviet occupation, and stayed. Now U.S. military forces are occupying this same tribal land. Some believe they are making the same mistakes as the previous occupiers. "I guarantee you that Americans will not succeed," Hajji tells Pelton in the story. "They have turned away from the tribal elders and made bad friends." Most of the Pashtun elders supported the Taliban, the extremist Islamic regime that was driven out of power by a U.S. military campaign following the 9/11 terror attacks. But while the Taliban was made up primarily of Pashtun people, it was controlled by members of the Wahhabi sect, a Saudi-backed group of Muslim puritans. Today both U.S. and Afghan forces are routinely attacked by Arab fighters and remnants of the Taliban regime. Code of Honor The Pashtun culture is guided by a code of honor called Pashtunwali. Among the system's tenets are the jirga (council of elders), a punishment system based on revenge, hospitality, and sanctuary, which says Pashtun should provide protection to someone who has taken refuge with them. The Pashtun tradition of offering sanctuary partly explains why many Pashtun are reluctant to give up Osama bin Laden—assuming he is in fact among them. "If they have given sanctuary to people who came to them during the Afghan war, they must abide by that," said Saeed Shafqat, a Pakistani expert on Pashtun military and cultural issues. "It becomes an issue of honor." The Pashtun tradition of taking revenge may further complicate U.S. efforts. Some U.S. bombing raids have killed civilians. In the Pashtun culture, if someone kills your family member, you have inherited a duty to take revenge. Also, a wrong that has been done to one person is considered to have been committed against the entire tribe. "It's like the old Wild West, where honor, revenge, rivalry, and gunfights were a way of life," said Shafqat, who currently teaches at Columbia University in New York City. "In a family dispute, you had to stand up to defend your manly honor." Squandering Goodwill Pelton says the lawlessness of the region also fuels the mistrust of outsiders. The rugged mountain land is rife with smuggling, drug trafficking, and kidnappings. If a stranger shows up, Pelton says, "He's usually up to no good." "Like any tribal society, it's a protective mechanism that keeps people who shouldn't be there out and welcomes and protects people who are there to help them," he said. Visitors must pass a form of low-tech credentials check—while eating dinners and drinking tea, sometimes for days—before Pashtuns will warm up to them. Outsiders who show up unannounced and without referrals are met with mute stares. Pelton believes the United States has squandered the goodwill that it generated after toppling the strict Taliban, which many Afghans despised. One of the problems, he says, is that experienced U.S. military personnel who understood Pashtun cultural nuances have been rotated out of Afghanistan and replaced with people less in tune with the local customs. "We stopped listening to what the Afghans were telling us, and we started imposing our own sense of law and order," Pelton said. "We shifted our system away from cultivating relationships with people who are in a position to help us to a system of payoffs and informants." Pelton believes raising the U.S. government's bounty on Osama bin Laden from 25 to 50 million dollars illustrates cultural ignorance of the Pashtun people. "If bin Laden is a criminal, and he killed thousands of people, why do we need to pay someone 50 million dollars to turn him in?" Pelton asked. "To the Pashtuns, that's an insult."