The Syrian Accountability Act And The Triumph Of Hegemony [Part 1]
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On October 15, the U.S. House of Representatives--with an overwhelming bipartisan majority--passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which imposes strict sanctions against the Syrian government. (A similar bill was introduced earlier this year in the Senate and is pending.)
Both Republican and Democratic leaders in the House International Relations Committee agreed to not allow for any witnesses opposing the bill to testify at the committee hearings for the bill, which a major shift away from previous U.S. policy that stressed engagement with the nationalist government in Damascus.
Given the already somewhat limited trade between the United States and Syria, as well as Syria's growing commercial ties with western European countries, the impact of the sanctions will be minimal. What is noteworthy about the vote, however, is that a careful reading of the bill reveals a rather frightening consensus in support of the Bush administration's unilateralist worldview.
Only four of the 435-member House of Representatives cast a dissenting vote.
Ironically, both politically and economically, Syria has liberalized significantly over the past decade or so. The level of repression is far less than it was during its peak in the 1970s and is significantly less than a number of other Middle Eastern countries, including close U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the size and power of Syria's military has been reduced dramatically from its apex in the 1980s as a result of the dissolution of its Soviet patron. Syrian links to international terrorism have also declined markedly.
This begs the question as to why this resolution was passed now?
The answer may lie in today's unipolar world system where the United States, rather than supporting comprehensive and law-based means of promoting regional peace and security, insists upon the right to impose unilateral demands targeted at specific countries based largely upon ideological criteria. As the one-sidedness of the vote on this resolution indicates, both the Republicans and the Democrats--including the most liberal wing of the party--now accept this vision of U.S. foreign policy.
There are still many reasonable criticisms that can be directed at the authoritarian regime of Bashar Assad and its policies. However, the resolution imposing the sanctions is so filled with hyperbole and double-standards that it undermines its own credibility. In fact, its real purpose may be to simply demonize a government whose main offense appears to be its refusal to support the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda in the Middle East.
The primary grievances expressed in the legislation against Syria are in regard to the regime's alleged support for international terrorism, its ongoing military presence in Lebanon, its hostility toward Israel, the alleged military threat from its weapons of mass destruction, its alleged support for the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and those Iraqis resisting the U.S. occupation, and its status as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
Below are some excerpts from the recently passed legislation, sorted by category, followed by an analysis:
Support for International Terrorism
Among the Findings listed in the resolution include:
(4) The Government of Syria is currently prohibited by United States law from receiving United States assistance because it has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)) and other relevant provisions of law.
(5) Although the Department of State lists Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and reports that Syria provides "safe haven and support to several terrorist groups", fewer United States sanctions apply with respect to Syria than with respect to any other country that is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
According to the State Department's most recent annual Report on Global Terrorism, "the Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986." With the exception of Cuba--which is kept on the list for purely political reasons--all the other countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism (North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Libya) are either currently or were in the very recent past involved in direct support and sponsorship of terrorist activities.
It is noteworthy that, during the Syrian-Israeli peace talks in the 1990s, the Clinton administration offered to remove Syria from its list of states sponsoring terrorism if it agreed to terms offered by Israel. During that period, State Department officials admitted that keeping Syria on this list was not a result of direct Syrian support for international terrorism, but as a means of political leverage against the regime.
According to the same State Department report,
"The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect US citizens and facilities from terrorists in Syria. During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against US citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support for al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques."
In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Furthermore, Syria has passed on hundreds of files of crucial data regarding al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups in the Middle East and Europe to U.S. officials, including information on the activities of radical cells and intelligence about possible future terrorist operations. Seymour Hersh reported in the July 28, 2003 New Yorker that the CIA had told him that "the quality and quantity of information for Syria exceeded the agency's expectations" but that Syria "got little in return for it."
Congress has now decided to risk a suspension of such important cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism by imposing sanctions against the Syrian government. This is the same Congress that has continued to support close military and economic ties to the government of Saudi Arabia despite its lack of such cooperation.
Another Finding in the bill noted:
(6) Terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, maintain offices, training camps, and other facilities on Syrian territory, and operate in areas of Lebanon occupied by the Syrian armed forces and receive supplies from Iran through Syria.
Syria's role in promoting international terrorism is not as extensive as this finding makes it appear.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group that peaked in its popular support and terrorist activities in the 1970s and has been in decline ever since. The PFLP is now a legal opposition political party within areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Their limited military activities in recent years (which have been targeted primarily but not exclusively against Israeli police and military) have been launched from within the West Bank and Gaza Strip in areas controlled by Israeli occupation forces and the Palestine Authority. No military operations appear to have come from Syria.
The terrorist activities by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) have also declined markedly since their apex in the 1970s. There have been some minor incidents attributed to the PFLP-GC in recent years, such as two attacks on illegal Israeli settlements, one in the occupied Golan Heights in 2001 and the other in the Gaza Strip in 2003. There have also been some incidents along the Lebanese border that some reports link to the PFLP-GC, though these have not been confirmed. There is no evidence that Syria had any connection with the clashes, which originated in southern Lebanon in areas that are outside of direct Syrian military control.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the only two groups mentioned in the resolution that do engage in major ongoing terrorist activities, are based in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in areas controlled by Israeli occupation forces and the Palestine Authority. It appears that all of their terrorist attacks have originated within the areas under PA and Israeli control and none from areas of Syrian control. Hamas and Islamic Jihad have political offices in Damascus, as they do in the capitals of a number of Arab countries, and have done some political organizing in some Palestinian refugee camps, including those in Syria. Most of Hamas' outside support has come from individuals and organizations based in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf. Islamic Jihad has received most of its outside support from Iran. The Damascus regime has brutally suppressed Syrian Islamists that espouse similar ideological views as these two extremist Palestinian groups.
The alleged Islamic Jihad "training base" located in a Palestinian refugee camp near Damascus that was bombed by Israel in early October appears to have actually been an abandoned PFLP-GC facility. The Bush administration defended the attack by claiming that there were active military facilities at the site, though they could only show evidence of some anti-aircraft batteries, which are usually considered to be defensive weapons rather than instruments of terrorism. Given that Islamic Jihad's mode of operations is strapping explosive devices to the bodies of suicide bombers who walk into public areas with high concentrations of civilians, it is unclear why they would need a "training base" in a foreign country anyway.
State Department reports of some limited Syrian logistical support for these groups may indeed be accurate. However, there is little to back the resolution's claim that Syria--at least at any time in the past decade and a half or so--"has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Syria is at most a very minor player in this regard.
The only group mentioned in the resolution that has received significant Syrian support for its operations is the extremist Lebanese Shiite group Hizballah, though Syria's principal Shiite ally in Lebanon has traditionally been the rival Amal faction. Most of Hizballah's support has come from Iran and even that has declined markedly since the early 1980s.
During the 1982-84 U.S. military intervention in Lebanon, terrorist cells that later coalesced into Hizballah engaged in a series of kidnappings and assassinations of Americans as well as bombings against the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks, among other terrorist operations. However, Hizballah has since become a legally recognized Lebanese political party and serves in the Lebanese parliament. During the past decade, its armed components have largely restricted their use of violence to Israeli occupation forces in southern Lebanon and in disputed border regions, not against civilians. Since attacks against foreign occupation forces is considered legitimate under international law, it is unclear as to why Congress still considers Hizballah to be a "terrorist" group.
Military Presence in Lebanon
Among the Findings of the resolution is the following:
Article 7: United Nations Security Council Resolution 520 (September 17, 1982) calls for "strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon."
A reading of the full text of this resolution reveals that this was actually in reference to Israel, which had launched a major invasion of Lebanon three months earlier and at that point held nearly half of the country, including the capital of Beirut, under its military occupation. Indeed, Israel was the only outside power mentioned by name in the resolution. Though the Israelis pulled out of Beirut shortly thereafter and withdrew from most of central Lebanon by the following year, Israel kept its occupation forces in southern Lebanon until May 2000 in violation of this Security Council resolution and nine others calling for their unconditional withdrawal.
At the time UN Security Council resolution 520 was passed, there were also Syrian troops in the country. (Palestinian forces had been withdrawn shortly beforehand.) These Syrian forces entered Lebanon six years earlier as the primary component of an international peacekeeping force authorized by the Arab League to try to end Lebanon's civil war. The United States quietly supported the Syrian intervention as a means of blocking the likely victory by the leftist Lebanese National Movement and its Palestinian allies.
Having already abused their mandate by that time, one can certainly make the case that this resolution applied to Syria as well and--given that Syrian troops remain in Lebanon to this day--that Syria is still in violation of this resolution. While not formally an occupying army, the Syrian military presence makes it possible for Damascus to exercise an enormous amount of influence on the Lebanese government, particularly in foreign affairs, in a manner similar to that of the Soviet Union in relation to the Warsaw Pact nations of Eastern Europe during the cold war.
It is interesting to note, however, that none of the supporters of the Syrian Accountability Act--the vast majority of whom were in office during at least some of the nearly eighteen years that Israel was in violation of this resolution--ever called on Israel to abide by UN Security Council resolution 520, much less called for sanctions against Israel in order to enforce it. Indeed, virtually all of the backers of this resolution then in office were supporters of unconditional military and economic aid to the Israeli government during this period when Israel was in violation of this very same resolution for which they have now voted to impose sanctions on Syria for violating.
It is also worth noting that there are currently over 90 UN Security Council resolutions being violated by countries other than Syria, the vast majority of which are by governments for which this same Congress has allocated billions of dollars worth of unconditional military and economic aid.
In short, virtually the entire Democratic Party in the House of Representatives has joined its Republican colleagues in supporting the Bush administration's contention that UN Security Council resolutions should only be acknowledged or enforced in regard to governments the United States does not like, but UN Security Council resolutions should not be enforced or even acknowledged in regard to America's allies.
The operational part of the bill reads:
(3) the Government of Syria should immediately declare its commitment to completely withdraw its armed forces, including military, paramilitary, and security forces, from Lebanon, and set a firm timetable for such withdrawal;
While this is a very reasonable demand in itself, given the support by the vast majority of this resolution's supporters of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, it would be naïve to think that most sponsors of the bill actually care about Lebanese sovereignty. If they did care about Lebanese sovereignty they would have demanded that Israel abide by UN Security Council resolution 520 and nine other resolutions demanding Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon prior to Israel's long-overdue pullout in May 2000. They did not, however. This seems to indicate that Congress is using the ongoing presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon as an excuse to isolate one of the few countries in the Middle East that dares challenge Washington's policy prerogatives in the region.
In a final irony, the star witness in the House International Committee hearings in support of this bill, particularly in regard to the Syrian role in Lebanon, was Michel Aoun, the Lebanese general who seized the post of prime minister of a military government in 1988 and unsuccessfully tried to block the Taif Accords which brought an end to that country's bloody 15-year civil war. He was ousted by Lebanese troops with the help of Syrian forces in the fall of 1990, just prior to the launch of the 1991 Gulf War. What none of the committee members bothered to point out during his testimony was that the United States quietly supported the Syrian assault against his regime since Aoun's chief foreign backer during his time in power was none other than Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. |
