Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Don't Blame Me, I Voted For Kerry -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Kenneth E. Phillipps who wrote (40229)	8/4/2004 12:35:14 AM
From: Richnorth	Respond to of 81568

Can US win future wars? THE United States' lopsided victories in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq last year, have been held up as outstanding examples of the transformation of warfare brought about by the so-called 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). US strategic culture, which tends to overemphasise the machine, is in need of a revolution. The capabilities of the RMA provides are no substitute for skilled and judicious statecraft. -- REUTERS Indeed, military analysts have been convinced since the 1991 Gulf War that the character and conduct of warfare has been fundamentally transformed by technology. But how effective is RMA against 'asymmetric threats', such as those posed by terrorists and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? How effective would a technologically-advanced form of warfare be against an opponent armed with WMD or cruise and ballistic missiles? RMA and 'transformation' are buzzwords for the shift in militaries from the heavy, slow-moving forces of old to the light, agile and swift units of today, employing cutting-edge technology. This transformation involves everything from using satellites and unmanned vehicles to networking ground troops. Superior information - that is, dominant battlespace knowledge or DBK - together with precision-guided munitions (or PGMs) are assumed to be the key to quick and decisive victories. RMA does undoubtedly make militaries stronger. In the case of the US, it is likely to ensure that it prevails militarily against any likely adversary. However, this very superiority is likely to lower the threshold for the use of missiles armed with WMD. Faced with America's overwhelming conventional military might, its potential enemies might be driven to 'use' rather than 'lose' their WMD. Once a state possesses even a small nuclear/WMD stockpile, it would become extremely difficult and dangerous for the US to carry out a disarming first-strike against it, as it can easily deploy 'dummies' at known military bases while deploying its WMD at isolated locations, ready to launch retaliatory (or pre-emptive) strikes. This fact may prevent the US from taking military action against states capable of retaliating with WMD-armed missiles - unless, of course, it has a functioning ballistic missile defence system (and even then success would not be guaranteed, for the system is not likely to be foolproof). RMA'S LIMITS A CURSORY look at military threats worldwide reveals that a strategy based exclusively on RMA-capable militaries is insufficient to counter new security threats. The proliferation of WMD and missile technology means that more countries and groups will have the ability to inflict mass destruction on their adversaries. About a dozen countries at present have offensive biological weapons programmes and some 17 countries were said to have chemical weapons when the Chemical Weapons Convention went into effect in 1997. Over 80 countries already possess cruise missiles, of which almost 62 imported them. Sixteen countries currently produce ballistic missiles, which have proliferated widely, in part because of their prestige value. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 showed that ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads can be important weapons of terror when used against cities. A number of factors have encouraged the spread of these dangerous weapons systems. To begin with, there is the growing disparity between military 'haves' and 'have-nots' when it comes to conventional military capabilities. As an Indian general was reported to have observed some years ago, the lesson of the 1991 Gulf War was: 'Never fight the US without nuclear weapons'. From the perspective of weaker states, there is no compelling rationale to eschew chemical and biological weapons, or intermediate-range nuclear forces, while stronger powers continue to invest in and maintain significant levels of strategic nuclear forces and enhance their RMA-type capabilities. For another, advanced weapons and technology now enter the marketplace more freely than they did before, thanks to their 'dual'(civilian as well as military) nature. Most of the material and equipment used to produce WMD, for example, have legitimate medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Cruise and ballistic missiles use technologies well-established in civilian aviation and space industries. It's inevitable that rival militaries will seek to balance what they perceive as regional imbalances, if not US military superiority, by acquiring these weapons. ACTIVE DIPLOMACY GIVEN this reality, it is obvious that RMA-capable states cannot afford to rest secure in their superiority, ignoring the perils of WMD and missile proliferation. The capabilities that RMA provides are no substitute for skilled and judicious statecraft. As seen in the Libyan case, active diplomacy will continue to be a key component of strategy. The fact is military conflicts involving high-tech belligerents have increased immeasurably the destructiveness of modern war. If a military conflict does break out between them, the stronger power is likely to pursue a strategy of limited political gains - for example, avoiding 'regime change', as it might prompt the losing regime to use its WMD. Modern strategy is likely to be a mixture of carrot and stick, including economic aid or sanctions, multilateral export-control regimes and confidence-building measures. Applying military force would be the last resort. The impressive capabilities of RMA notwithstanding, the law of unintended consequences is creating a fraught strategic environment. A Revolution in Military Affairs alone is incapable of redressing the dangers in such a world. American strategic culture, which tends to overemphasise the machine, is itself in need of a revolution. The writer (Manjeet S. Pardesi) is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. straitstimes.asia1.com.sg