Foggy Wars: The U.S.-Iranian Confrontation
August 09, 2004
Stratfor
By George Friedman
During World War II, there were massive armored battles that became less comprehensible with increasing amounts of information made available. The swirling battles made strategic sense, but the more you knew, the more you lost your sense of the main strategic threat. The notion "fog of war" has many meanings, but this is certainly one of the more important ones: The details themselves create an impenetrable fog, and it is necessary to discard details to understand the whole. This is the sense we get in trying to understand what is happening between the United States and Iran, and within Iraq -- between the Iraqi government, Iraqi Shia and the United States. Events have swirled, and the more deeply you dig into the details the less sense it all makes.
On a strategic level, when we step away from the details, the meaning of the events can be readily understood. Since April, the United States has executed a strategic shift away from the Iraqi Shia and a developed, more complex political posture, including relations with a variety of Sunni groups. It has been our view that the Iranian government, having crafted a decade-long strategy designed to allow it to dominate Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, would react vigorously to a massive geopolitical reversal. Iran would not simply accept its marginalization in Iraq.
Therefore, it was our expectation that two things would happen. First, there would be an intensifying crisis between the United States and Iran on the state-to-state level, including increasing military tension. Second, there would be increased tension within Iraq's Shiite community and between the Iraqi Shia and the United States. All of this appears to be happening. However, the details of this process -- like a World War II armored battle -- swirl before our eyes, obscuring the wider meaning.
Certainly, the evolution of events over the past few days has been difficult to fully understand. Consider the following list of events, taken in absolutely no particular order:
U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice said Aug. 8 on a Sunday TV talk show the United States would not rule out using covert force to eliminate Iranian nuclear facilities. "We will use many means to try to disrupt these programs. The president will look at all the tools that are available to us," she said.
Iraqi authorities on Aug. 8 issued an arrest warrant for former Iraqi Governing Council member Ahmed Chalabi, stemming from allegations that he had been counterfeiting old Iraqi dinars. Chalabi's nephew, Salem Chalabi -- head of a tribunal that will try Saddam Hussein on war crimes -- also was the subject of an arrest warrant; he is suspected of murdering Haitehm Faidel -- director-general of Iraq's Finance Ministry -- in June.
An Iranian diplomat was kidnapped by the "Islamic Army in Iraq," (IAI) a Sunni group that recently has carried out other kidnappings. The diplomat, Fereidoun Jahani, was identified as an Iranian Embassy official working in the Shiite holy city of Karbala. The IAI said he was kidnapped because "he had been involved in inciting sectarian strife and operating outside the sphere of diplomacy," Al Jazeera reported. According to Al Jazeera, "The group also warned Iran against flagrant interference in the affairs of Iraq."
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's senior Shiite cleric, left Iraq on Aug. 6, accompanied by three aides, for London, where he is seeking treatment for a cardiac condition. According to Sheikh Hamed Khafaf, al-Sistani's spokesman in Beirut, the ayatollah "needs special treatment, but he is not in a deteriorated state." Al-Sistani was well enough to meet with Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite Amal Party, during a stopover in Beirut.
Reports surfaced in Western media that Washington has learned that North Korea is developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and that these weapons are to be tested in Iran. This information clearly emanated from the Bush administration, which used the report to increase the sense of crisis over Iran.
Tehran issued a fresh warning to Iranian nationals Aug. 8 against making pilgrimages to Shiite Muslim shrines in Iraq, and appealed to Iraq to stop issuing visas to pilgrims. Iran's deputy interior minister in charge of security affairs, Ali Asghar Ahmadi, told state television the call was made "due to the adverse domestic situation in Iraq."
Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi visited the Shiite city of An Najaf on Aug. 8 and urged local militants to lay down their arms. Allawi said he did not believe those involved in the fighting were being led by radical Muqtada al-Sadr, but rather that they are "common criminals." The point was to give al-Sadr room to maneuver and not lock him into a civil war.
The Interim Iraqi Government reinstated the death penalty for various crimes, such as murder, kidnapping and drug-dealing.
Normally, any one of these events or statements would dominate the news. Right now, these things are coming so fast they appear as a blur, and the whole is submerged beneath the terrorism alerts and the U.S. presidential campaign. Nevertheless, these events are of extreme significance -- not only in themselves, but because they represent a major redefinition of the broader war and an intense and swirling battle, 2004-style.
If we attempt to make sense of this, the following seems to be happening. The United States' decision to shift alliances in April has split Iraq's Shiite community. Al-Sistani, who is ideologically opposed to direct rule by clerics, sought to find a basis for accommodation with the United States and the new Iraqi government, placing him at odds with the Iranians. Al-Sadr, whose rising in April triggered the U.S. reappraisal, first became passive and then, under Iranian prodding, became increasingly belligerent -- not only holding his ground militarily, but also threatening al-Sistani.
Since April, the United States has maintained a relatively "hands-off" policy toward al-Sadr. Al-Sistani originally hoped the United States would crush al-Sadr, solving his own problem and allowing him to condemn Washington for doing it -- but the United States wouldn't play that game. Washington wanted a deeper commitment from al-Sistani to the United States and the new government in Baghdad before taking any serious action against al-Sadr. It would appear the United States finally got what it wanted from al-Sistani in the past couple of weeks: Publicly, he took certain actions that Washington favored, including condemning the bombing of Christian churches in Iraq. As a result -- and fearing that Iranian support was strengthening al-Sadr beyond what was acceptable to Washington -- the United States launched a massive offensive against al-Sadr's forces in An Najaf, claiming to kill hundreds of his troops.
Al-Sistani might indeed have a heart condition, but nothing we have seen indicates he needed an immediate trip to London for any but political reasons. First, as the situation in the Shiite community intensified and Iranian anger against al-Sistani flared, the United States was not certain it could provide security for the ayatollah in Iraq. The last thing the United States wanted was a dead ayatollah just after he had reached an understanding with Washington. Beyond security considerations, al-Sistani needed to be out of play while the United States moved against al-Sadr. By having a heart problem, al-Sistani could not be faulted if he was unable to effectively block the Americans as they moved in after al-Sadr. Going to London provided him with a degree -- imperfect though it might be -- of plausible deniability.
At the same time, the United States was orchestrating a two-tier policy. On one level, it raised the pressure on pro-Iranian Shia by having the Iraqi government issue arrest warrants for Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi, who was the front-runner to be the U.S.-anointed leader of Iraq just a year ago, had extremely close relations with Iran -- even assuming he wasn't simply an agent for Tehran. He had been regarded by the Iranians, even more than by the Americans, as their tool in Iraq. With Baghdad issuing arrest warrants, the Iranian government was to understand that the Chalabi connection was all washed up -- breaking a key communication link between Washington and Tehran.
On another level, the United States tried again to split the Iraqi Shia. Al-Sadr has, on occasion, shown signs of wavering. Allawi's visit to An Najaf involved both a threat and an olive-branch. By distinguishing the "criminal" fighters from al-Sadr's forces, Allawi was telling al-Sadr two things: First, that the wind from Baghdad and Washington was blowing much harder than the breeze from Tehran, which is why al-Sadr just lost a lot of troops in An Najaf; and second, that there still is time for al-Sadr to switch sides with no hard feelings -- a point driven home by the reintroduction of capital punishment in Iraq. If al-Sadr were to shift position, the Iranian position in Iraq would truly collapse.
Driving home this point, an Iranian diplomat was kidnapped. The group that claims to have carried out the abduction is a mortal enemy of the United States. At the same time, it is no friend of Iran's. There was no reason for the IAI not to have kidnapped an Iranian diplomat, but the timing -- from the U.S. viewpoint -- was simply splendid. With al-Sadr on the razor's edge, the signal has been sent to Tehran that its agents in Iraq are known and no longer invulnerable. How this stroke of luck originated is unclear to us, but is the exact message the United States would have wanted to communicate if it could have. The Iranians understand the deteriorating situation and have therefore ordered pilgrims to stay out of Iraq, since it is dangerous for them there. Whether this will include a withdrawal of other Iranian personnel remains to be seen and probably depends on decisions al-Sadr is going to make.
While this was going on, the United States increased the pressure for Iran directly. Rice's statement about the possibility of covert operations in Iran was designed to create an increased sense of embattlement for Iran without breaking new ground. It always has been understood that the United States would take action to prevent an Iranian nuclear device from being deployed; the subtle difference here is that the United States is now prepared to take covert actions to delay the program at any stage. In other words, Washington is telling Tehran the United States could commence covert operations at any time.
On a broader level, we would be very interested to have heard what al-Sistani told Berri. Berri, a significant Shiite leader, is Parliament speaker in Lebanon, where Hezbollah is a powerful force. Iran has said it is training suicide bombers, but Hezbollah has had a history of effective suicide and other operations against both Israel and the United States. As Parliament speaker, Berri has grown contented over the years and might not be eager for another round of Hezbollah operations that would upset his life. If our read on al-Sistani's position is correct, the meeting might not have been just a courtesy call, but also an attempt to see if there was the possibility of a Shiite alternative to Iranian policies.
If we step back from the crazy-quilt of activities, what we seem to have is an attempt by the United States to block Iran on a number of levels. From the streets of An Najaf to the Beirut airport to "Meet the Press," the United States has launched a full-court press against Iran. The goal is to force Tehran to accept the reality of a U.S.-dominated Iraq and abandon its own plans to redefine the situation next door. The key right now is how al-Sadr reads the situation: If he feels the Iranians can bail him out, he might fight on -- the dream of governing Iraq very much on his mind. On the other hand, if he feels the Iranians are hanging him out to dry, he might throw in his cards. If that were to happen, the entire Iranian position could unravel.
That is a huge "if." If we back away from the details, we see this: The United States has split the Sunni and Shiite communities. The tension between the anti-American fragments of both communities is enormous, and Washington is manipulating them. Iran has been unable to recoup as yet, but has substantial resources and huge stakes in the game. On the other hand, time is not on Iran's side. The United States is pressing it backward day after day. That makes Iran more, not less, dangerous -- unless it decides this round is lost and it needs to wait for the next round. But Tehran does have one huge card to play: alliance with al Qaeda. There are tremendous hurdles to overcome for that to happen -- ideology not the least among those. But it is the card Tehran holds, and it is one that will worry Washington the most. |
