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Strategies & Market Trends : Booms, Busts, and Recoveries -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: brian h who wrote (52874)	8/31/2004 2:29:49 AM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 74559

Hello brian, <<I did not write or imply anything you imagine for me>> ... my misunderstanding then. Brian does not believe China offialdom will collapse. <<it does not take "all" to overthrow the officialdom ... just took one big movement>> ... given that you do not believe the China offiocialdom will collapse, whether "all" or "one big movement" is then moot. In any case, there is no "one big movement", with or without substance, credibility, or broad support. <<I want the officialdom to behave properly>> ... I do as well, as so far, they are simply doing better and better, as in improving all the time, two steps forward and one shuffle back. This is the way of the world. <<I feel sorry for the Chinese>> ... You shouldn't. In the aggregate, they are doing just fine. <<They should be the ones who enjoyed these treatments instead of you - a foreigner>> ... and now I am a foreigner. And to CB, I am a Chinese. Oh my, an identity crisis if I had the time :0) <<They are so many Chinese virtues are long gone forever>> ... you are wrong here, and very wrong. <<Hopefully I am wrong>> ... oops, there, even you have your doubts. <<Tiananmen ... How about you Jay? Still neutral?>> ... had the real potential to throw China back to the days of Cultural Revolution, and however fun that was, once, should not be repeated, and so, once again, the immediate interest of the majority comes before the blue sky wishes of the minority. Although at the time, in my days of immaturity, I encouraged my office mates to do the fax thing. <<The lost virtues like honesty and the forces that Maurice mentioned before will follow their own courses to breakdown the corrupted officialdom>> ... you sound like a pessimist. <<You mentioned I am for Taiwan Independence. You are dead wrong from your pondering>> ... OK, I am wrong. brian is not for Taiwan independence. <<Congratulations to be a future father. I know I have enjoyed every moment of my daughter's company. I know you will too>> ... thank you very much, with sincerity, and I figure Erita will be imbued with quite a lot of the 'lost' virtues :0) Chugs, Jay

To: brian h who wrote (52874)	5/5/2006 10:22:27 AM
From: TobagoJack	Respond to of 74559

FYI, a laughable read from Stratfor, for they are able to spin, and so unbelievably far from the truth :0) Geopolitical Diary: Diplomatic Snubs and Sino-U.S. Relations Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian made a refueling stop in the United Arab Emirates while en route to Asuncion, Paraguay, on Thursday. On each of his four previous presidential trips to Latin America, Chen made refueling stops at U.S. cities -- Seattle, New York and Los Angeles -- instead. The stop in Abu Dhabi resolved a diplomatic tiff between Washington and Taipei over where Chen could refuel (Washington had offered Alaska or Hawaii, with no overnight stay) that had delayed Chen's travel by a day -- and was seen as a diplomatic snub to the Taiwanese leader. Why would Washington see fit to snub Chen? The obvious answer stems from his flirtations with Taiwanese independence. Washington has warned Chen several times that he should not push too far, even hinting that Taiwan may find itself on its own if it intentionally instigates a conflict with China by declaring formal independence. While Taipei has denied there is a diplomatic rift, Chen's refusal to stop off in the less-desirable (politically speaking) Alaska was clearly a sign of frustration with Washington's restrictions. What is perhaps most striking about Washington's behavior, however, is that it closely follows another diplomatic snub -- that one delivered during Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to the White House in April. An announcer referred to China as the Republic of China (Taiwan's official name) and Hu was subjected to a three-minute barrage of criticism from a Falun Gong activist on the White House grounds. It seems odd that Washington would deliver insults to both Beijing and Taipei, rather than show affection for one and ire toward the other. The decision to keep Chen out of the Lower 48 would seem, at first glance, to be conciliation toward China after Hu's visit -- in essence, a way to make up for the pain and suffering of the diplomatic affront. But that would suggest the insults to Hu were accidental, which does not appear to have been the case. The question, then, is why Washington apparently is playing the bully to both China and Taiwan. And that draws back to the initial question of why Washington allowed, encouraged or orchestrated the breaches of protocol during Hu's visit. First, it must be noted that Hu's visit to Washington was not fully supported at home. Chinese officials saw the U.S. government (and Bush in particular) as weak, and felt that, while Hu had things to offer Washington -- including offers of movement on the yuan and the purchase of some $16 billion in American goods and services by a large business delegation -- Washington was in a position to make only more requests or demands of Beijing. When Hu arrived in Washington, D.C., after his flashy trip to Washington state, his critics at home appeared proven right. Bush realized there was little he could gain from Hu: The Chinese leader couldn't suddenly reverse the North Korean or Iranian nuclear crises or flip the trade imbalance. What Bush did, though, was demonstrate that China needs to be careful about betting that the United States is too pre-occupied with Iraq and internal political troubles to pick a fight with Beijing. It was a message about as subtle as when the Chinese knocked a U.S. EP-3 out of the sky and kept it on the runway in Hainan in April 2001, at the beginning of the Bush administration. This was the hammer that went along with Washington's requests for China to prove itself a "responsible stakeholder." Surprisingly, Hu took the affront delivered at the White House, without response. He did not skip out on joint press conferences, nor did he remind Bush publicly of the rules of protocol or offer to send a geography teacher to the White House to ensure no student is left behind in knowing where the People's Republic of China is. Absorbing the affront (which apparently garnered sympathy from even those Chinese leaders who were less than flattering of Hu before the trip) suggested that Hu's problems at home are bigger than they have appeared to most. Hu's number one concern was, is, and will remain internal stability -- holding together the vast nation of China. His problems are acute, but they stem from the same internal rifts that have torn apart dynasty after dynasty throughout Chinese history. The last thing Hu needs is a major fight with Washington, particularly on the economic level -- or at least, not so long as he thinks he can continue to shape and manage China's internal restructuring. For Hu, the time is not right to fight: Anti-Japanese nationalism remains sufficient to cover other domestic troubles, and the 2008 Olympics are supposed to be China's moment to shine. The decision by the White House not to let Chen set foot on the U.S. mainland suggests Washington is not ready for a fight either. The Bush administration has enough troubles, as the Chinese observed, but it will not allow itself to be pushed too far or drawn into a conflict that is not of its choice. The dual snubs -- one for each China -- are a way for the United States to manage potential crises without having to engage in any serious show of force or commitment of resources. Neither Beijing nor Taipei can walk away from Washington at this moment -- China for economic reasons, Taiwan for security reasons. And Washington is playing on these links, as well as the desire by both China and Taiwan to avoid a serious confrontation, in order to manage the balance of power in a changing East Asia.