<<Cool. You are almost right....... Wrong on vietnam where nixon prolonged a war for five or six more years at the cost of an additional 20,000 american lives and untold vietnamese....... The only thing nixon proved is that the US was so stubborn that we could extend a losing operation for another 6 years for nothing...>>
Michael:
I am probably going to antagonize you with this post. Too bad because I generally like your thinking ... at least that which I've seen since I began to monitor this thread 2 weeks ago.
Not only are your statistics wildly off, but your analysis of "Vietnam" is shallow; probably because you relied on the thinking of shallow posters.
Vietnam
Between 1956 and 1993, there were 58,193 Americans who died in the SE Asia theatre of operations. 85% of these deaths occurred during the administrations of JFK and LBJ. Of these deaths, 47,359 were the result of "hostile" enemy action.
Nixon took office at the end of January 1969 at which time there were approximately 550,000 American combatants in South Vietnam. Several months later, Nixon and Kissinger becan negotiations in Paris with the North Vietnamese. These negotiations dragged on for three long years, during which American troops gradually disengeged. (For 10 of these months, I was an eyewitness; my impressions will follow later.) In January 1973, an agreement with the North Vietnamese was signed; by April 1973 American POWs were released and the last U.S. ground forces removed.
IN JANUARY 1969, AFTER THE DEATHS OF 46,000 AMERICANS, DO YOU THINK THAT HUMPHREY, OR ANY PRESIDENT, COULD HAVE JUST "WALKED AWAY?"
Nations, even ones as powerful as the U.S.A., require a "fig leaf." Do you imagine that any President, regardless of politics or worldview, could have survived a "walkaway?" As they say, 'hindsight is 20-20.' Such a president would not know of the panicked helicopter evacuation of our embassy in 1975. What he would KNOW to a certainty would be the inevitable backbiting of an army of critics: 'walking away when we had already won', making worthless the sacrifice of so many heroic Americans, etc. Such criticism would gain traction with a good portion of the American public, no?
When Kennedy took office in 1960, there were approximately 500 American advisors in South Vietnam. As he had shown in the crises of Suez and Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower was cautious when it came to 'foreign ' commitments. The plan when he left office was to 'let the South Vietnamese help themselves'; there were no plans in place to significantly enlarge our commitment. Although I cannot "prove" it to you, it is my considered judgment that if Nixon had won in 1960, there never would have been the massive intervention that in fact took place.
JFK was a president "on the make"; he relished the heroic gesture in response to the heroic challenge (e.g. Sputnik).
JFK had campaigned on the theme that the Soviets were a bigger threat than Eisenhower/Nixon let on, and that he could protect us better from that threat. On his inauguration, he began not just a 'race to the moon', a surrogate invasion of Cuba, but a massive, massive military buildup. (Anyone old enough to remember can remember his call to universities to crank up the output of engineers. Within a year, the number of Americans in South Vietnam increased a hundredfold.
And then JFK connived at, and approved, the overthrow of President Diem. Yes, I know that Diem was "corrupt" and that some in the Buddist majority considered him "unfair." But the fact is: Diem's overthrow destabilized and de-legitimized the subsequent SVN governments, a condition from which they never fully recovered.
At that point, the U.S.A. had irretrievably made a MORAL commitment to the South Vietnamese people. A 'Good Samaritan' on seeing another lying injured in a ditch can simply walk on. But if he should go down into that ditch and move the victim onto the road, he cannot in good conscience thereafter leave him alone and helpless. It is a principle that all people recognize.
When the American Military first came to Vietnam in force, they came with enthusiasm and arrogance. The SV Army, ARVN, already demoralized, its leaders angling for political power, was pushed aside. The American Military's mindset was, 'We will show them how it's done.' This is graphically set forth in my favorite book on the Vietnam, "A Bright Shining Lie."
LBJ, when he took over, reportedly made many statements to close associates to the effect, 'Vietnam is not going to fall on my watch.' It was in this context that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the massive buildup took place. You can argue - with the benefit of hindsight again - on what reasonable alternatives LBJ had - but you cannot argue IMHO that he did not feel the moral imperative discussed above: as president, he felt most closely that debt that the America People had to the South Vietnamese.
MY REMINISCENCES
I arrived at Long Binh in June 1970. I stayed 2 weeks in the Saigon area and saw hundreds of uniformed Americans wandering freely in this City of French colonial and Asian influences. And not just the fleshpits! The Saigon scenes in "Full Metal Jacket" are accurate. There were no special advisories or alerts. So far as I was aware, within limits, Saigon in my 10 months was safe for Americans.
I then was sent by unescorted bus to my assignment 60 -70 miles away: the 25th Infantry division ("Tropical Lightning") at Cu Chi near the Cambodian border. We passed uneventfully through rice paddies and villages.
The first 2 weeks at Cu Chi, I was given guard duty on the wired, fenced perimeter of this massive base. Guards out of boredom would fire CS gas shell/canisters at urchins scavenging in the camp garbage dump just without. (One of the most shameful episodes in my life was when I personally hit a child in the back with my canister and then saw him carried away by his little companions. I had been so caught up in the "game" that I had not recognized that child as human!!) This was the only soldierly duty that I performed in Vietnam and was the closest to "action" that I got.
I heard in the first two moths that elememts of my division fought small scale actions near the Cambodian border. But after that we were told that the Division was "standing down." Huey and Cobra gunships were taking off all the time, but my understanding was that the 25th was no longer taking "hostile" casualties.
Cu Chi was quiet, comfortable and ....boring. Enlisted men like myself had private areas in our "hootches" with little refrigerators and stereo systems. "Hootch maids" shined our boots, made our beds and burnt our shit (literally). Marijuana use was endemic; it was not unknown for officers to join in, but otherwise it was not an "issue". ( Personally, finding it too strong, I spent my days planning "cocktail hour" with a subset of people.)
The only excitement we had to look forward to was Bob Hope's visit to Cu Chi in Decmber 1969 and "in-country"
R & R at Vang Tau. I spent 3 days in this coastal resort town with its broad seaside boulevards, cafes and massage parlours. Walking freely in this delightful town, we apprehended no threats to our personal safety.
In January 1971, Cu Chi was turned over to ARVN and we were sent to Long Binh. Here we clearly knew that we were being "warehoused;" awaiting the outcome of Kissinger's negotiations in Paris. All of us were being given "early outs" and as our DEROS dates approached we spent our days going to the giant PXs scattered throughout the Saigon area, looking at the latest in stereo or camera offerings and making appointments with our Hong Kong tailors.
I vivdly recall walking across a parade ground on Long Binh and hearing my combat boots crush the little empty glass vials used to hold powdered heroin for smoking. At this time, being caught with heroin was an Article 15 (slap-on-the-wrist) offense. I know: I was the division legal clerk.
My point in telling all of us? American military officers have claimed that in the "Tet"Offensive of 1968, the indigenous SV Viet Minh had "shot their bolt;" afterwards there simply were few local enemies to fear. In an objective sense, these officers claimed, the VC had suffered a huge defeat. From my own observations, I can partially (but subjectively) confirm this claim.
SO HOW FAIR WAS IT TO CLAIM - LIKE KERRY DID IN 1985 -THAT VIETNAM WAS "NIXON'S WAR"?
THE PARIS ACCORD
By the accord signed in January 1973, the U.S. was to withdraw its ground troops while NVN was to withdraw all of its main force NVA units from both SVN, Laos and Cambodia. Complicated provisions provided for future elections.
From the first day, North Vietnam violated this treaty. Today, their generals in their memoirs and military journals even brag about how they did it.
Adolph Hitler and Stalin shared similarities: both declaimed to associates that treaties were 'only scraps of paper'; that history and the world remember only the victor. They were, of course, correct, no?
When Nixon - and then Ford - received confirmation of NVN violations, they reacted: no longer having ground forces, they resumed bombing of Cambodia and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
I, for one, remember the paroxisms of rage with which "anti-war" demonstrators greeted this news.
Main force NVA divisions in massive force began coming south across the SVN border towards the end of 1974. For awhile ARVN - with American aerial support - fought hard. Man for man, however, they were no match. I have already in a post several weeks ago given it as my opinion that the North Vietnamese - along with the Israelis - were the finest soldiers in the past 50 years. <<Valour of a People <http://www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsg.aspx?msgid=20463837>>> In 1980, the Vietnamese fought a bitter border war with Communist China. The Vietnamese infiltrated, surrounded, outfought and cut up the vastly superior Chinese - who suffered 30,000 casualties. It was very similar to the treatment the Finns meted out to the Russians in Stalin's first steamroller invasion push of 1939.
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ROUT
ARVN finally "cracked" when they retreated from their stronghold at Pleiku in the Central Highlands: it became a panicky rout and the South Vietnamese never recovered.
This rout has many parallels to the French defeat of May 1940 at the outset of the Battle of France. The British and French began the battle with superiority in both numbers of troops and tanks (both numbers and quality). Only in the area of fighters and fighter bombers did the Germans have a marginal superiority. The Germans began their attack with a 'feint' attack through the Benelux countries. The British and French responded by moving their armies into Northern Belgium. It was now that the Germans unleashed their real attack: across the River Meuse at Sedan. Tactically and strategically the Germans had developed a new form of warfare. Their "schwerpunkt" - place of main effort - was not the place where major resistance was encountered. On the contrary, advance elements by-passed and and avoided opposition, wriggling and infiltrating wherever possible, fighting only where there was no alternative. As the Germans raced to the sea, across the lines of communication and support of the allies, the latter were frozen into immobilty from "shock and awe." The French "cracked" and there really was no resistance thereafter.
DOES MILITARY SUPERIORITY EQUATE WITH MORAL SUPERIORITY?
Reading this thread, that is the conclusion that clearly many posters have reached: By themselves, the South Vietnamese could not stand up to the NVN Armies; ergo, they are not "worthy" of support and their Peoples should be left to "work things out by themselves." Ditto for the Iraqis.
Bruce |
