Analysis and polls
A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi resistance retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition counterinsurgency operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.
Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons: many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counterinsurgency operations.
Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is largely eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. There has grown a sizeable support for Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical cleric who has advocated violent resistance, from about 1/3 of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas, and that support has grown dramatically, once numbering little more than 2%. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely drawing little more than 10% support in Najaf, a stronghold of the clerical establishment (which ironically has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), his support among the Shiites of Baghdad likely stands at 50%. However, support for violent resistance is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite than the Sunni community, who like the Kurds saw persecution under the Ba'ath regime and from the Sunnis. Shiite therefore been more hesitant, along with having a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated caution.
Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, believe in cooperation with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and peaceful protest instead of violence. Many Shiites and Kurds suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime which may cause a reluctance to use violence against Coalition forces. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes, the uneducated, and the Shiite urban population.
A series of polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the Coalition occupation. A poll in late 2003 showed that about one-third of all Sunni Arabs are staunch supporters of the guerrillas and consider armed attacks on occupying forces acceptable. In al-Anbar province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, solid support for the Iraqi resistance stood at 70%. Only about 10% of the Shiite Arab population supported violent resistance. Support was very minimal for attacks on Alliance forces among the Kurds. Curiously, the poll (which was supposed to cover an even distribution of the Iraqi population) showed more people stating that they are Sunnis (44%) than Shiites (33%), leading to speculation that the poll's sample was skewed. [3] (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2004/03/30/2003108502). The poll was also conducted before the spring 2004 occupation crackdown on the insurgency in Fallujah and the fighting in the Shiite heartland which was widely condemned by Iraqis, including normally pro-US members of the governing council, and turned more people against the occupation.
In another instance, in late January and early February 2004, a joint statement was distributed in leaflet form by a dozen resistance organizations vowing to take control of Iraqi cities after occupation forces withdraw, and portraying the Alliance's planned withdrawal as a defeat. Iraqi civilians' reaction to the statement were reported to vary widely, from being "hailed as the manifesto for a legitimate resistance movement" to being dismissed "as mere bravado".
U.S./Middle East historian Juan Cole assesses the recent outcome of the Najaf standoff of August 2004 as follows: the Americans (becoming more unpopular) and the Allawi government (more viewed as the indecisive neo-imperialistsist's puppet) are losers. Sistani has gained nationalist credentials as a national hero saving Najaf. Muqtada has neither lost nor gained. His southern cities slums movement is intact, even with a weakened paramilitary. [4] (http://www.juancole.com/)
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Scope and size of the insurgency
The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in Baghdad and a triangle stretching west from the capital to the town of Ramadi and north to Tikrit in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Guerrilla activity also takes place around al-Qaim in western Iraq and around the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk to the north, as well as some other areas of the country. Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas vary, and the number itself likely fluctuates, the latest assessment put the number at 20,000, including both the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies. In November of 2003 the Coalition military and the U.S. CIA put the total number of core fighters at 5,000, along with a network of 20,000 to 50,000 active supporters. This included only the Sunni insurgents since the Mahdi Army uprising had not yet occurred. The Iraqi police and insurgents have certain factors in common: they include a large number of veterans of the elite former military and security services, they are traditionally religiously conservative, and they have histories of strong tribalism. At various points, the Alliance has provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions (although these numbers likely fluctuate).
In Fallujah, a major safe-haven and base area for the guerrillas and considered the center of the Sunni insurgency, it was estimated in April of 2004 that 2,000 guerrillas were present. There were reportedly over 2,000 in Samarra. In Baquba, another Sunni city north of Baghdad considered a major flashpoint, a June 2004 estimate put the number of insurgents at 1,000. In December of 2003, the Coalition military reported that it believed there were 1,000 insurgents in Baghdad (this number has likely grown larger, especially including the Shiite insurgency) and 2,000 in Samarra, another Sunni guerrilla center about 25 miles south of Tikrit.
Guerrilla activity also takes place in a number of other areas. One is the city of Ramadi, which has seen some of the heaviest and most skilled resistance and is under guerrilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by the U.S Marines. Another is the region around al-Qaim, a Sunni city near the Syrian border and believed to be a foreign fighter infiltration route. Insurgents are also contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of Mosul, and both Sunni and Shiite insurgents have been known to operate in Kirkuk, another northern city with religious and ethnic tensions. The rural belt of land along the Tigris river stretching north of Baghdad to Tikrit has also seen concentrated Sunni guerrilla activity.
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Rate of attacks and Coalition casualties
Main article: Invasion and occupation of Iraq casualties
The total number of guerrilla attacks on coalition forces from June 2003 to March 2004 generally remained steady at between 12 and 20 attacks per day, with the exception of a surge of attacks in November 2003 during which as many as 50 attacks per day were reported on some days. The average number of attacks spiked to 70 a day during April, before stabilizing to 35-50 a day after the beginning of May, where it has remained since. As of September 8, 2004, 1,129 Coalition soldiers have been killed since the war in Iraq began, 1002 of them American. From the beginning of the war to August 14, 2004, 6,497 U.S coalition soldiers were wounded in action, with many more injured in non-hostile incidents such as vehicle accidents.
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