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To: LindyBill who wrote (72516)9/22/2004 8:43:19 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 794367
 
Bush's wild card: The religious vote
USA Today

A footnote to the 2000 presidential election results contains a key to whether President Bush will be re-elected this year.
That is, the turnout among a core Republican constituency — conservative, white evangelical Protestants — was lower in 2000 than it was in 1996.

Put another way, the hapless Bob Dole did a better job than Bush at mobilizing the religious right. Had Bush merely equaled Dole's success among this group of voters, there would have been no Florida recount, no contested outcome, no Bush vs. Gore.

Bush would have clearly won.

Why retell this story today? Because as some recent polls show Bush in the lead, it is likely that the election is his if he can successfully mobilize this constituency. The math is simple. Bush and John Kerry have largely secured their base constituencies. Pollsters report that the remaining voters, about 6%-8% of the electorate, are the ones who can decide the race. More than two-thirds of those voters have negative views of the president, a finding that is potentially devastating for Bush.

But many undecided voters hold little enthusiasm for Kerry. Translation: They very well might end up sitting on their hands on Election Day or voting for Ralph Nader while the president successfully mobilizes a big turnout among his base. This base, however, is the real wild card of this election. It includes those conservative evangelicals who sat on their hands on Election Day in 2000.

A religious disconnect

Why Bush did so poorly in 2000 at mobilizing this group of voters is a mystery to most political observers. Recall that in 1996, religious conservatives were hardly enthusiastic about Dole, whom they considered too moderate.

In 2000, during the GOP primaries, Bush ran as a social conservative and stood out in his use of "God talk" in the campaign. The exit polls showed that in every primary state, a majority of non-religious-right voters preferred John McCain over Bush. But among the smaller group of Republican voters who identified with the religious right, Bush was hugely favored over McCain. Thus, the religious right delivered the GOP nomination to Bush.

So why the tepid turnout among religious-right voters in the general election? Here was a candidate who spoke openly about his faith, said his favorite philosopher was Jesus, supported the core policy positions of religious conservatives, and yet could not deliver as many religious-conservative votes as Dole had.

It makes no sense.

The answer is that Dole did not deliver the religious-right vote in 1996 so much as the Christian Coalition did. The religious right's leading organization was at the height of its power in the mid-1990s, especially after the huge GOP triumph of 1994 and President Clinton's veto of the so-called partial-birth-abortion bill in 1995. It was organized to the precinct level throughout the country, was flush with cash and produced about 40 million voter guides for the general election.

By the late 1990s, the Christian Coalition was barely a shell of its former self. The organization was overcome by multiple lawsuits, high-level-staff infighting and departures, including the loss of its once-successful executive director, and substantial losses in revenue.

By the 2000 election, the Forbes magazine review of influential lobbies had dumped the Christian Coalition from one of the country's most influential to the bottom third of its list.

Christian Coalition's fade

The Christian Coalition just wasn't much of a player in 2000, and the loss for Bush was real. The percentage of the electorate identified as "religious right" declined from 17% in 1996 to 14% in 2000. The turnout among white evangelicals fell 6% from 1996 to 2000.

And it is potentially bad news for the president that the organization still looks like a weak presence. Bush's campaign is trying, in effect, to replace the role of the Christian Coalition by doing direct outreach to churches. But this controversial tack is not going to be as effective as the mobilization efforts led by an established interest group.

One does not have to accept the infamous Washington Post description of religious conservatives as "easy to command" to realize that the Christian Coalition used to prove that this group of voters could be delivered on Election Day. But that required an effective national grassroots-oriented organization that had the credibility and resources to reach its supporters.

Indeed, the polls look good for Bush, but in the event that the race tightens, he will need help from every corner to win in November.

Mark J. Rozell is a professor of public policy at George Mason University. His latest book is The Christian Right in American Politics.










Find this article at:
usatoday.com