To: TimF who wrote (148407 ) 10/20/2004 9:46:08 PM From: cnyndwllr Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500 Tim, we see many of the same things but the devil is in the details. For instance, you say:Absent US support the ARVN had insufficient confidence and determination to fight off the North's conventional invasion, and it was a conventional invasion that defeated the South. I agree. But I also remember that when the ARVN DID have our supply and air support as well as our on the ground advisors, they largely DID NOT fight with passion and will. I think if you ask American men who fought the war what they thought of the ARVN forces, many of them would spit on the ground. There lack of will did not originate in the U.S., it never seemed to have existed at all. Similarly you say that "a large part of the US decided the war could not be won" after 68 Tet. I agree, but I would use a little different language. I would say that we realized that the war "could not be won." And I say that knowing that in the extreme "nuke em" or "do it no matter what the costs" sense, we might have destroyed their will to fight on. But remember, the length of time that will would have been dampened would have depended on how utterly we'd destroyed their spirit, because the ideas wouldn't have died no matter how many of them we killed. So while it might have been a lower level war, I think we'd still be fighting it. Another thing to remember is that we won the peace. If winning means that your old enemy is no longer a threat and looks and acts like a friend, then we won by leaving. You say that "[t]he real sanctuary they had was in the North, and for a number of years in Laos and Cambodia . You're absolutely right and, if that made any sense, it was only because we didn't want to expand the war to involve China or Russia. Whatever the reason, it was bad news for our troops and a silly way to try to fight a war. My point was, however, that even in the south we had tremendous difficulties in digging them out of the jungle or separating them out from the local populations. We should face the fact that we were fighting an idealistic, nationalistic and determined resistance that wasn't going to quit until we'd won or they were ALL dead. That's a tough one to "win." Finally you say, again correctly, that "n the later years of the war such "search and destroy" missions and other activity to try and actually defeat the enemy declined a lot. After our "incursion" into Cambodia in 1970 that was true. I think that was, however, simply a natural response by a country that had "learned" that it was on a wrong-way track that led nowhere and gained it nothing. In contrast, long before that we'd sent in our young to die in droves, stayed the course, ignored the realities and pridefully dug a hole that we could not easily escape. It was only political expediency that kept us there, kept our young men in harm's way and extended that meat-grinder of a fruitless war. I think that's inexcusable and if there's a hell I hope Nixon and Johnson share a room there. The thing I find interesting is that you and I have the same feeling for the men who died there, we have the same sense of loss, and we share the same passion for a war gone bad even though we disagree on what should have been done to make it better. I think we should have been pragmatic and understood human nature better. I think we should have seen the realities on the ground long before tens of thousands of men died there. I suspect that you think we could have saved more men by extending and expanding the war and fighting harder. It's two sides of the same coin. I respect that. Ed