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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Sun Tzu who wrote (149932)	10/29/2004 10:21:41 PM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 281500

The Road to War ______________________________ 10.29.04 pbs.org The administration left no room for doubt about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Fall of 2002, pushing for strong action. Shortly after Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that Iraq's "deadly weapons programs" were "real and present dangers to the region and to the world," Congress voted to authorize the use of force against Iraq. But over the past two years, evidence has emerged indicating that the threat may indeed have been overstated. In June 2003, NOW addressed the question of evidence behind Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction. Increasingly since that time, the public, the media, and even intelligence insiders, have started calling on the Bush administration to come clean about whether Iraq's threat was exaggerated. In June 2003, Greg Thielmann — formerly of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, one of the offices charged with tracking Iraq's weapons of mass destruction — told Bill Moyers on NOW: The intelligence community as a whole in our considered wording and advice did not give the President the impression that there was an imminent threat.... The one thing that we should have made clear to the American people was that Saddam had no nuclear weapons. In October 2004, Thielmann speaks with Bill Moyers again, describing how the government presented a distortion of the intelligence agencies' findings to the public. And increasingly, evidence to this effect is coming out into the open. Congress has not yet been able to investigate to what extent the White House may have manipulated intelligence information. But recent reports have shown that despite the administration's unequivocal claims about the urgency of the Iraq threat, there was strong disagreement within the intelligence community. Below, take a look at some of the important U.S. reports that have been released over the past two years concerning intelligence on Iraq. *More info. and links at: pbs.org