Where would kerry find help?
By Patrick Belton - THE HILL
Patrick Belton is an academic at Oxford, and writes daily on www.oxblog.com.
In the first American election fought on foreign policy since the Cold War, world capitals have been scrambling to assess how the foreign policies of a John Kerry and a second George W. Bush administration might be expected to diverge toward them and their interests. And in an election where the Democrat's principal claim to office has been his promise to restore the decent opinions of mankind to the nation, and the Republican's has been his willingness to do right (in democracy and counterterror) even when unpopular abroad, one of the principal ironies has been that a surprising number of foreign capitals actually want Bush to win.
In some instances, such as India and Pakistan, this is because of working relationships they have already brought up to speed with Bush and his advisors; others, such as China and Japan, worry about Kerry's vulnerability to domestic lobbies which Bush could ignore either from strength (congressional Republicans, Taiwan supporters) or neglect (labor). Africa prefers Bush because he as a Republican evangelical could push foreign aid through Congress, a miracle they believe beyond the intercessive powers of the Catholic Democrat. While public opinion supports the Democrat in most countries other than Russia and Israel, governments weigh different concerns, such as the value of established understandings and relationships with the current administration, and the susceptibility of each candidate to different forms of domestic pressure.
This article takes a round-the-world tour of how world capitals are assessing likely effects upon their interests of a Bush or Kerry result next week. Officials are understandably demure in expressing on-the-record preferences for either candidate, given their need to work with whichever candidate attains or retains the presidency, but in each capital people close to government have been willing to share the broad contours of discussions that are taking place.
East Asia
China is conflicted, but leans toward Bush. His controversial administration created a diplomatic vacuum for Beijing to build up influence in an historically pro-Washington Asian region, notes Adam Ward, Asian security fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Furthermore, Bush has reined in pro-independence tendencies in Taiwan, while Kerry may be more vulnerable to calls from labor to oppose Chinese trade practices. The Chinese government knows Bush, and sees advantages in continuity. On the other side of the ledger, Beijing is uncomfortable with Bush’s militarism, and in the past Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian has shown he will disregard Bush’s wishes when in his own electoral interest.
In Japan, several political leaders have generated controversy with public comments favoring a Bush victory, notes Christina Davis, a Princeton professor who studies Japan. President Bush publicly praises Tokyo’s contribution of troops in Iraq to emphasize that other nations are supporting the United States in stabilizing Iraq, while on the hustings Senator Kerry has taken a more combative tone toward trade issues of concern to Japan, going as far as to suggest revisiting existing trade agreements. Still, Tokyo foresees this protectionism giving way to pragmatism after the polls, and even though its leaders are slightly more comfortable with Bush, they do not believe American policy toward Japan would diverge markedly under either candidate.
On the Korean peninsula, Pyonyang fears Bush if re-elected would step up pressure to force nuclear concessions or even regime change, while Kerry would be more amenable to ‘grand bargaining’, perhaps to the point of negotiating a successor to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Both expectations are overblown, says Adam Ward, who adds, "North Koreans watch enough CNN to know that Iraq puts limits on what the US can do elsewhere militarily around the word right now," but fear non-military forms of containment. The Agreed Framework is roundly regarded as a failure in Washington, and a Republican-held Congress is unlikely to approve any descendant of it recommended by Kerry. Aidan Foster-Carter, a leading British Korea scholar, agrees, saying, "Both Korean governments want Kerry. They are doubly wrong: they won't get him, and he wouldn't be as soft as they imagine."
Russia and Central Asia
One of Bush’s strongest supporters, Putin has gone so far as to argue his defeat ‘would ‘give international terrorism a new impulse and extra power’ (Dushanbe, October 18). Why such unabashed Republican support, from a veteran of the KGB? Partially because of a Cold War stereotype of Democrats as anti-Russian and less given to pragmatism, and partially due to the Implicit Bargain: with Washington defining Russia as a counterterrorism partner, Moscow gains an entry ticket to the club of "civilized nations" it might otherwise be denied due to its marginal economic importance, apart from energy resources, and human rights violations, notes Russia scholar Jason Lyall at Princeton. The Bush administration’s criticism has been accordingly muted, whether over Russian nuclear dealings with Iran, the Yukos affair, and sluggish compliance with nuclear proliferation.
Ranking Russian military officers favor Bush, too. His doctrine of preemption has permitted Russia’s military to forge its own, justifying greater involvement in the former Soviet region. Bush’s muscular statecraft also has given the military a justification to demand increased defense expenditures, including new weapons systems such as the Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (capable of penetrating a missile defense shield), and increased assistance programs with Central Asian republics (to prevent further American encroachment). Human rights and anti-Chechen war organizations hope a President Kerry would reverse Bush’s decision to "graduate" Russia from the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which currently will eliminate American support for Russian non-governmental organizations, probably by 2006 or 2007. Kerry has not yet taken a stand.
In fact, he has not needed to take many stands on policy toward Moscow. Russia has not figured largely in the campaign, and as a consequence, notes Lyall, "Kerry’s official stance on Russia totals four sentences." A Kerry administration’s Russia policy would reflect a struggle between advisors ranging from former Clinton administration officials, such as Richard Holbrooke, pushing for "democratic engagement," to the more realpolitik-inclined Rand Beers, emphasizing Russia’s partnership in counterterrorism over democratic reversals and human rights abuses in Chechnya. Observers say that the latter seem ascendant, for now.
Central Asian governments feel similarly to Russia. Says Professor Christoph Bluth, director of the Centre for Post-Soviet Studies at the University of Leeds, "they see Bush as an ally that would support their measures for internal security against Islamist extremists without putting much pressure on them regarding human rights." The current administration also supports investment by oil companies in the region for its Caspian oil: in the Caucasus, the Azerbaijani government favors Bush because of his support for the Baku-Tbilsi-Ceyhan pipeline, and well as his success in suspending Section 907 prohibitions for US intergovernmental assistance to Baku. "They prefer Bush, not least because they want to keep the status quo and not to engage in building new relationships," adds Nazrin Mehdiyeva, a researcher at St Antony’s College, Oxford.
South Asia
India has played one of the more prominent international roles in the hustings, with an early burst of anti-India rhetoric on outsourcing from the Kerry campaign disappearing by the Democratic convention, after complaints from Rep. Joe Crowley (D-N.Y.), whose Queens district includes the heavily Indian neighborhood of Jackson Heights. "What you now have on the stump is Anti-Outsourcing, Version 2.0, which is to say, Indians are good, but corporations and tax loopholes are bad," observes journalist Arun Venugopal.
The major differences between Kerry and Bush will likely revolve around the nuclear issue. Says Dr Ashley Tellis, former director for Southwest Asia on the National Security Council, "a Kerry administration is likely to go back to the old view that India is a nonproliferation problem, and India’s nuclear weapons are likely to become important issues once again in the US-India relationship." Adds Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, a three-decade veteran of American diplomacy in South Asia, "This is something that worries Indians; in fact, however, I think that there would be opportunities to intensify our cooperation with India in this area, since India's own record on nuclear exports is very good."
A second Bush administration will produce greater continuity with established working relationships in the subcontinent, but whether India once again receives the attention from Washington it did in 2001 and 2002 will depend on the course of affairs in Iraq. Most public discussions among Indian and Pakistani elites suggest they prefer a Bush presidency, on balance. Changes under Kerry, though, may be minor. Kerry would pay somewhat greater heed to institution-building and democracy in Pakistan, and to nuclear non-proliferation; however, his changes in the system of taxing U.S. corporations would be unlikely to have drastic effects either on outsourcing or U.S.-Indian relations.
Middle East
Amy Hawthorne of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, perceives Arab regimes to "hope for Kerry because they think he will be more status quo on democracy." Israel supports Bush as a proven friend, while Kerry, who has signaled a desire to be even-handed in the region, received the endorsement of Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath. In the Gulf, Jamal Khashoggi, an advisor to the Saudi ambassador in London, has publicly criticized Kerry for his attacks on the House of Sa’ud. Bush received a curious endorsement from Hasan Rowhani, who leads Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and recently told state television, "We do not desire to see Democrats take over." The Iranian government blames the Clinton administration for imposition of economic sanctions, while viewing Bush’s opposition as largely rhetorical.
Arabs are pessimistic on whether either candidate will bring better relations. Observes Laura James, a researcher at Magdalen College, Oxford who divides her time between England and Egypt, "Most people in Cairo will say, if you ask them specifically, that it makes no political difference whether Bush or Kerry wins; neither will implement policies that are favorable to the Middle East. (Their main concerns here are the Iraq and Palestine issues.) However, the personal feeling against George W. Bush is so strong that I think on the whole they would welcome his defeat, even if they anticipate no benefit from it. Whether Kerry, in the event of victory, would be able to use that feeling to improve the US image in the Middle East is an open question."
Western Hemisphere
Political relations with Mexico City have chilled in the latter years of the Bush administration, after the failure early on of a proposal to legalize thousands of Mexican nationals working in the U.S., and Mexico’s refusal to support the war in Iraq. Several Central American capitals are relatively pro-Bush, particularly El Salvador and Costa Rica. Of the Andean nations, only Colombia’s Uribe seems to favor the incumbent. In the Southern Cone, Argentina’s Kirchner views Bush as his principal supporter in wrangles with the IMF and World Bank, while Lagos of Chile has been fending off domestic complaints he is too close to the president. No such problems for the president of Brazil, points out regional commentator Randy Paul, where "Lula has scored points with nationalists from across the political spectrum with the cotton and sugar subsidy victories in the WTO," in April of this year. Finance ministers in the region fear that regional free trade initiatives would lose momentum under Kerry. On the other hand, Julia Sweig, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues the Bush administration’s antipathy to left and populist regimes in the region, in Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, and occasionally Brazil, have left America’s image in those nations "probably as bad in the region now as it was when Richard Nixon’s motorcade was stoned in Caracas in 1958." Latin America is an area of personal interest for Kerry, who devoted a campaign speech to the area, the only region other than the Middle East to receive such attention. It is unlikely, though, that for either administration the demands of Iraq would leave substantial time for major hemispheric initiatives.
A source close to the government in Ottowa noted that Canada has learnt from its experience in 2000, when Prime Minister Chrétien closely aligned himself with Gore and made no secret of his low estimation of Governor Bush. Following Bush’s election, Canada was duly punished with years of softwood lumber embargoes, for which the Canadian public blamed Chrétien. Accordingly, Paul Martin’s first official state visit was to Washington, and the Canadian government is taking pains to preserve its export access to the American lumber and pharmaceutical market by taking pains to "make clear that it will work with whoever leads the U.S."
Africa
Ambassador Princeton Lyman, a former envoy in Nigeria and South Africa, fears a Kerry victory "might spell difficulty in obtaining congressional support for Bush’s various initiatives for Africa—President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Millennium Challenge Account—since Republicans in Congress would be less likely to support these for a Democratic Administration at the same level."
Many African leaders, accordingly, prefer Bush. According to an official in the Central Intelligence Agency who studies the region, he has shown greater interest in Africa than its predecessor. Africa policy has been largely guided by energy interests, combined with a need for military support for regional peacekeeping missions such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bush has formed close personal relationships with many west African heads of state, including the evangelical Christian Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon, whose invitation to a state dinner in Washington in March 2003 represented a breaking point with his country’s traditional alignment with the Elysée. (The shift was reinforced one year later, when Biya visited London and was greeted by working sessions with ministers and a reception by the Queen.) Conversely, there is growing discontent in Nigeria with the increasingly authoritarian and corrupt Obasanjo, whom the same analyst notes in 2003 received from Washington and London "a free pass in a very flawed election." Whichever administration finds itself in power during the next cycle of African elections in 2007 will have to choose whether to side with Washington’s friends, or withhold its blessing should elections again result—as in 2003—in massive irregularities and evidence of violence and voter intimidation.
South Africa, which harbors ambitions of a global role via a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, is in the opposing camp and prefers Kerry as more likely to support the institution, notes Murray Wesson, a South African law researcher at Oxford.
Europe
Given Tony Blair’s status as President Bush’s principal foreign ally, would he be imperiled domestically by a Bush loss? Downing Street actually stands to gain in either case, whether from electoral validation of the Iraq war, or from a Kerry White House easing tensions between the trans-Atlantic special relationship and Europe.
The prime minister has confided in close associates his disappointment with the Pentagon’s subsequent handling of the occupation. Whichever party controls the White House, one gathers, he would be happy enough to see a new secretary of defense.
Continental governments would face pressure to share financial and military burdens in Iraq and Afghanistan if a congenial, Atlanticist Kerry administration arrives in the White House, or else risk seeing their influence wane in Washington as superfluous allies. One set of officials in Berlin is eager to restore warm transatlantic relations as in keeping with German trade, cultural, and tourism interests, and French Finance Minister Nicolas Sarkozy is known to hold similar views in Paris. Dr. Olivier Roy, a frequent consultant to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is more skeptical: "Kerry will launch multilateral discussions, but the result will be asking us to endorse an unchanged U.S. policy we don't like."
Bush fares much better in Eastern Europe. Professor Peter Hall, who directs the Center for European Studies at Harvard, notes, "Not surprisingly given their history, the nations of east central Europe have expressed more interest in seeing the United States retain a willingness to intervene militarily around the globe, especially to protect democracy, and they seem more willing than the larger powers of western Europe to accept an element of unilateralism in American foreign policy, if necessary to ensure this commitment." Other Central and Eastern European officials hope not to need to decide in the future between the US and European Union, as in 2003. "In effect, all the Central European states with the exception of Poland are followers rather than being in a position to play an active foreign policy role," says György Schöpflin, an academic and Hungarian member of the European Parliament. "But then, what can a small state do?" In Turkey, Ankara has traditionally felt passionate about a "special partnership" with Washington, but the Iraqi war has in some ways stained this relationship. The ruling AK (Justice and Development) party prefers Kerry in the hope that Ankara would get a greater say in deciding the fate of the Kurdish areas, suggests Mehdiyeva.
Global issues
In a ritual of American political life, a Kerry administration will move in its first days to liberalize U.S. assistance for family planning overseas, as Clinton did on his second full day of office, a move Bush then repealed on his own second day. Other significant differences on global issues involve arms control and non-proliferation. Kerry has pledged to increase funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and his first summit with Putin would center around removing bureaucratic and legal obstacles which have slowed cooperation on nuclear counter-proliferation to date. He also is likely to push for another reduction in Russian and American nuclear arsenals: a measure here would be more formal and intrusive than the Moscow Treaty Bush and Putin signed in May 2002. Tantalizingly, Democratic foreign policy hands with ties overseas are quietly being dispatched abroad to play down expectations that a Kerry victory could immediately resolve all differences on counter-terrorism and the democratic reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.
And thus we are faced with the irony that a president who is not terribly popular with public opinion in most nations in the world is strikingly popular with most of their governments. The two candidates, furthermore, represent divergent policies toward many capitals, which may not matter greatly to an American electorate next week, but will matter precipitously for the governments who will be effected. In a handful of regions, such as the Korean peninsula, it is unlikely that next week's result will change much in terms of American policy. Elsewhere, though, the election might truthfully be said to make all the difference in the world. |
