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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: TimF who wrote (150667)	11/2/2004 5:31:08 PM
From: Michael Watkins	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

The explosives in question would not normally qualify as weapons of mass destruction. The explosives in question were important enough to warrant IAEA monitoring. The explosives in question have specific utility in the production of nuclear weapons, advanced or not. They were not secured. The facility, Al Qa Qaa, was a principle manufacturing site for all sorts of arms-related components, and included what had been their nuclear research facility. It was not secured. A facility containing old Uranium stores (acquired decades prior, and inventoried) was broken into, materials dumped out by looters looking for interesting things. It was not secured. A facility containing viruses - the equivalent of Centers for Disease Control - was looted. It was not secured. And on the list goes. Get with the picture - the Al Qa Qaa explosives issue was not the only evidence that there was no actual overarching plan to secure materials which could be used as terrorist weapons or weapons of mass destruction. No, instead there is a very clear picture demonstrating that securing potential WMD sites was not the primary goal of the mission. Since the war was ostensibly all about WMD - components or finished products, yet no plan was put in place to quickly secure WMD components or finished products, then what was the war for? I can't wait for the inquiries and indictments. I will bring the popcorn.

To: TimF who wrote (150667)	11/2/2004 6:33:55 PM
From: Michael Watkins	Respond to of 281500

CIA Report Proves That Bush War Plan Was Deficient If you read through the CIA Report on WMD it becomes very obvious that the Bush-approved war plan did not put any special emphasis on securing weapons of mass destruction, or their components, from falling into the hands of terrorists. Here are but a few extracts, verbatim [except for comments inserted by me from time to time] that show a pattern of theft of materials. In many cases the CIA Iraq Survey Group confirms that materials were stolen after Operation Iraqi Freedom was "mission accomplished", thus confirming charges that the Bush admnistration failed to properly plan to secure the country. I think the failure is more than a staffing issue - more than a complete under-estimation of the challenges at hand - I think the lack of adequate plans to secure WMD or suspected components suggests more than mere incompetance. Congressional Researchers - I hope you are looking at the details that we in the public do not have access to... * ISG site visits to many locations found not only destruction resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom, but also looting that rendered many facilities inoperable. * All of the G&C [guidance and control] systems and related components were stored at the Al Quds Factory of the Al Karamah General Company immediately before OIF. Although some examples of this hardware were recovered, the Al Quds Factory itself has been completely looted and no items remain. * the Al Quds Factory [Uranium conversion] itself has been completely looted and no items remain. * The Al Tahadi site was heavily looted after Operation Iraqi Freedom, and no documents or equipment remained at the site. * An ISG team visited the Al-Nida site in late August 2003 [after Operation Iraqi Freedom] and found that the entire plant had been systematically looted of all equipment, computers, and documents * In April or May of 2003 [what, no precise record? what kind of specialists are these anyway???], the underground facility adjacent to the main Al-Razi facility was visited and found to have been looted, and equipment was missing. The Iraqi scientist stated that after the CVL demonstration he worked on a barium vapor laser up until Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although Al-Razi was not damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was heavily looted afterward. * Warheads and peripheral hardware for brass and recyclable metals are still being looted. [While the ISG team is still doing its survey in 2003!] * The disposition of the 152mm and/or the 155mm artillery projectiles after the Gulf war is unknown, although it is possible that the rounds remained at the Al Muthanna complex and were looted after OIF. * Hazim stated that he would not be surprised if smallpox isolates were found in Iraq and identified two culture repositories where viral cultures could be maintained over extended periods of time: Al Dawrah FMDV Plant and the Baghdad CPHL. None were found by ISG. However, the CPHL seed stock repository was reported to have been systemically looted post-OIF * [At a possible DGS laboratory in Baghdad] During the first exploitation in April 2003, the exploitation team found large quantities of liquid and dry chemicals, equipment, documents, and other materials—some of which were partially destroyed. A visit to the site in July [2003, after O.I.F.] revealed a completely looted warehouse complex with no remaining evidence of chemicals, equipment, or documentation. And here's the smoking gun, well, one of many as it turns out, as if one is needed: * Triggered by a series of site exploitations and detentions in March 2004, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) began investigating a network of Iraqi insurgents—referred to as the al-Abud network—who in late 2003 and early 2004 actively sought chemical weapons for use against Coalition Forces. By June 2004, ISG was able to identify and neutralize the chemical suppliers and chemists, including former regime members, who supported the al-Abud network. It seems that US, pardon, "coalition forces" didn't start proactively start trying to prevent chemical weapons remnants from falling into terrorist hands until this year - 2004 - over a year after the start of the war!!! Summary: * Stated purpose of war: To prevent dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. * Was the goal achieved? No. * Was there a reasonable plan in place to even achieve the goal? No. Conclusion: Gross incompetence on the part of war planners and/or by extension a case to start digging for evidence that the real goal of the war was not as stated. Sources: CIA report on WMD