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Politics : High Tolerance Plasticity -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Bruce L who wrote (22202)	11/4/2004 10:37:05 PM
From: Sun Tzu	Respond to of 23153

Hi Bruce, I've always found it useful to write down detailed predictions so that I have a measuring stick for future events. It works quite well for stocks as well...any way, I think you will like this threekingdoms.com ST

To: Bruce L who wrote (22202)	11/4/2004 11:34:05 PM
From: Bruce L	Respond to of 23153

HUGO CHAVEZ AND VENEZUELA I have posted below a Stratfor article on the deteriorating situation in Venezuela. It may be that few are interested in developments in this "far away" country, but I am deeply moved by the plight of its people. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Venezuela: Is Chavez Operating 'Parallel' Security Forces? November 04, 2004 1521 GMT Summary The government of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is resorting to increased aggression in an effort to eradicate all remaining civilian and military opposition. Low-level political violence likely will start to increase in 2005 as some dissidents, including military personnel now in hiding, seek ways to strike back. Analysis Silvino Bustillos, a retired Venezuelan air force colonel and former senior judge in the armed forces (FAN) judicial system, has not been seen since he was kidnapped at gunpoint Oct. 31 by up to a dozen men who identified themselves as military intelligence (DIM) agents. The men, driving motorcycles, had chased Bustillos through the streets of a Caracas suburb and finally forced their way into the home of a Bustillos relative, where he had sought refuge. An eyewitness at the residence recognized one of the gunmen as a former FAN military academy classmate. However, DIM officials deny the military detained Bustillos. Several sources in the Venezuelan army and national guard said Bustillos could be dead. Bustillos' kidnapping, apparently by military intelligence agents, could be significant for several reasons. Bustillos was the first active-duty officer to speak out against President Hugo Chavez in 2000. He also is a senior member of an opposition group called the Democratic Block (BD), comprised mostly of former military personnel opposed to Chavez. Sources close to the BD said Bustillos might have been kidnapped because the Chavez government's intelligence operatives think he knows the location of several fugitive army generals who are trying to organize an armed clandestine resistance against Chavez. The Bustillos kidnapping, however, is just the latest in a series of disappearances in recent months. In all, at least 200 civilians and military personnel have vanished. A dissident source inside DIM said the Chavez government is believed to have established "parallel" security forces inside the DIM, the Interior and Justice Ministry's political police (DISIP), the national guard and some civilian law enforcement agencies, including the Libertador Municipal Police in Caracas (PoliCaracas). "These parallel groups have lists of military and civilian targets that the government views as threats to Chavez's future stability. No one has paid any attention yet to what is happening because the people that have disappeared so far have been local, low-level opponents of the Chavez government. Bustillos had a much higher public profile than the others, and he caused a public commotion by screaming for help as he fled from his pursuers. There were dozens of eyewitnesses to his disappearance," the DIM source said Nov. 4. Other military and security sources said Cuban military and intelligence personnel are supporting the Chavez government's political counterintelligence operations. At least 600 Cuban security and intelligence specialists are working inside the DIM, DISIP and FAN units, including the Presidential Honor Guard and the Military House battalions based around the Miraflores presidential palace. The commander of this group is Cuban Army Division Gen. Juan Goncalves, whose offices are located in the White Palace, a military facility across the street from the presidential palace. The group Goncalves commands reportedly is responsible for creating the parallel groups inside government and military intelligence entities. These parallel units, which include Venezuelans highly loyal to Chavez as well as Cubans, reportedly are responsible for the disappearance of government opponents such as Bustillos. The Chavez government's attempt to crush any possibility of radical opposition is not unfounded. In October, someone placed a C-4 bomb that could be detonated by wireless cell phone at the tomb of Defense Minister Julio Garcia Carneiro's late mother in the Eastern Caracas cemetery. Garcia Carneiro regularly visits her gravesite. The bomb did not detonate, possibly because it malfunctioned or the perpetrators were concerned innocent civilians could be killed in the explosion. Garcia Carneiro beefed up his personal security detail following that incident. The failed attempt against Garcia Carneiro suggests that some dissident groups might be seeking to strike back at the Chavez government. It remains to be seen if such attacks will be effective. Since Chavez assumed the presidency in January 1999 and launched his increasingly authoritarian Bolivarian revolution, the most outstanding characteristics of his civilian and military political opponents have been ineptitude and incompetence. Chavez remains one or two steps ahead of his foes, and every attempt to force him from power -- democratically or undemocratically -- has failed. However, if opponents like Bustillos continue to vanish, the risk of retaliation against Chavez likely would increase too. Low-level political violence between pro-Chavez and anti-Chavez groups could grow as well -- and investor perceptions of Venezuela's stability could be affected.

To: Bruce L who wrote (22202)	11/5/2004 12:45:26 PM
From: cnyndwllr	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23153

Bruce, re: This gets us to the "war" in Iraq. My brother Ed believes that the opposition is indigenous; but in any event that the U.S. has no "right" to influence events in Iraq, even while every other nation and power in the world does exactly that. You're about half right on both assertions. If by "influence events in Iraq" you mean the right to use blunt military force to do missionary work and help them see the light, then I don't believe we have that right. Maybe you'd be willing to set forth the broad outlines of a policy that you feel would be a fair standard for the world to use in undertaking such deadly military "influences." If by "influence" you mean the right to use diplomatic, economic and peaceful means to "influence" events in Iraq, then I would agree that we have a limited right to do so. Please note which path we are currently pursuing, how well it is working and how grateful much of the world is for our missionary zeal. As to whether the opposition is "indigenous," in my shades of gray world I know that there are some locals and some foreign jihadists working together in the insurgency. The estimates I've seen of the number of foreign fighters is not high but the level of their motivation may be very high. After all, if you travel to another country to insert yourself into a battle against armed soldiers with a high risk of fatalities, you are certainly highly motivated. If you think such foreign fighters are the root of the problem, however, you are wrong. Even Rumsfeld has stopped referring to the insurgents as "dead enders and foreign terrorists." In addition, our government's estimates of the total numbers of fighters in the insurgency are rising. As time passes there are numerous reports from our soldiers that the Iraqis seem to be viewing them with increasing distrust and even hatred. Polls reveal that the number of Iraqis who see us as liberators rather than occupiers has dropped from more than 50% immediately after the invasion to less than 5% now. Even our highest level spokesmen on the scene now say "of course no people like an occupying force." If you think the Iraqi culture will tolerate "occupation" without an active "indigent" insurgency then you will have to ignore your own vast knowledge of history and discount the teachings of the majority faith of the Iraqis. Ed