Hello orkrious, <<you're not shorting this market?>>
... is not a simple question :0)
I think we are all marching through the Valley of the Shadow of Death worldmarket.blogspot.com
The basic situation is that the world is still definitely in some but certainly crumbling order:
(a) Its Keeper of Order is going deep into debt to finance the growth of its Strategic Competitor, assuring eventual nuclear parity and nullifying conventional military supremacy; and
(b) Get deeper in sink in the sands of Mesopotamia, spending billions without any strategy, and only sound bites.
(c) A Clash of Civilizations, by definition can only end in utter exhaustion or wholesale slaughter, even for the ‘winner’, if a winner can be;
(d) A guerrilla war, by convention, will be ‘won’ by the side with the most people arranged everywhere all sharing conviction, and not to the side with the technology and conventional expertise, especially when engaged from a long distance away on very unfamiliar terrain using very involuntary soldiers; and
(e) A religion-tinted conflict, by design, is endless;
(f) The financial economy is dependent and hooked on low interest rate, and the disease is covering a large portion of the developed and organized world;
(g) Continued low interest rate depends on continued fiat money printing;
(h) Fiat money printing leads to … stagflation and depression … so simple and so complicated, in any and all cases, so dangerous; and so
(i) Here we are, waiting for the script to play out.
Here is a nonsensical script from that house of wishful thinking:
China and Iran: Best Chance for a 'Multipolar World'Nov 12, 2004http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=239281SummaryTalk of a "multipolar world" generally describes a world in which the United States does not call the shots. For those who support such a paradigm, cold geopolitical facts will prevent it from happening. States that would form the various other poles are more than willing to sabotage each other. In most cases, even simple bilateral partnerships are impossible. There is one exception, however -- a pairing between China and Iran, which could rewire a large portion of the international system.AnalysisSince the end of the Cold War, U.S. power -- economic, political, military and cultural -- has done nothing but increase, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the world. This has generated resentment among other would-be powers. Therefore, there has been a lot of talk about a possible "multipolar world," with countries such as Brazil, India, China and France forming some of those poles. The idea is, if the United States were one part of the international system -- as opposed to a hegemon -- then other poles would have a louder voice in international affairs and would not feel so dominated by the United States.For a wide variety of reasons, most of this talk is just that -- talk. The states in question not only lack the economic, military and political heft to make a go of the idea, but also have so little in common -- aside from their dislike of the United States as a hegemon -- that there is not much ground for cooperation. Also, like any states, they look out for themselves first, which makes alliances on anything but the most superficial issues problematic at best. Their relationships tend to be heavy on rhetoric and extremely light on military contact, cultural interchange and, above all, the trade that might lead to a deeper, more constructive affiliation.France is the quintessential supporter of the multipolar ideal (only North Korea is better at rhetoric). Paris' European connection grants the idea of multipolarism an air of respectability, the promise of "European" backing and -- because Europe is almost America's economic equal -- a tantalizing hope of realization. But France is in it for France. To Paris, the European Union is not an end in itself but a way for France to wield more influence on global affairs than it would be able to do alone. Its economic interests are similarly egoistic. France's status as an EU member (by French design) has erected a massive tariff wall around its markets, and potential partners can forget getting any sort of trade concessions. While the French purport to be reliable, they also publicly say "France has no allies or enemies, only interests." An alliance with France means you are disposable.India, which will be the world's most populous state within a decade or so, is another supporter of multipolarism. Its sheer size gives it weight on the international stage; unfortunately, size is the only thing that lends the country credence. The instability of its government gives India serious attention-span issues, and its economy has been mismanaged for more than 50 years -- it remains smaller than the U.S. state of Illinois. As far as trade is concerned, the one thing India has to offer the outside world is English-speaking call centers, which almost exclusively serve the U.S. market -- hardly the kind of thing to be proud of if you want to mitigate American influence. While occasional bursts of rhetoric suggest otherwise, New Delhi is content to be the big fish in the small pond of South Asia. It has no real presence, much less expertise, outside its backyard. Its obsession is Pakistan, not the United States.Russia has an abundance of weapons and petroleum and is willing to sell either or both to anyone. Its possession of European and Asian property, and its legacy of having gone toe-to-toe with Washington, also makes it an indispensable member of any multipolar alliance. But, rhetoric aside, cooperation with Russia does not go beyond your checkbook. Russia accepts cash for its products, not credit -- it learned that lesson during the Soviet era and is still in debt (to the tune of tens of billions of dollars) to such economically dynamic countries as Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam and Syria. Perhaps the biggest reason why Russia will never truly join, much less lead, a multipolar alliance is that its president sees Russia's future linked to the West, particularly the United States. President Vladimir Putin would sell out any multipolar partner in a heartbeat for a seat at a White House dinner.As far as Western allegiance is concerned, the opposite of Russia is Brazil, which defines its very existence under the current government by the fact that it is anti-American. As the only non-U.S. power in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil is a critical piece of any multipolar effort. The problem, of course, is that Brazil does not produce -- or even import -- anything that anyone really cares about. It is a commodity-based economy that is eminently replaceable. Its admirable success in pioneering an ethanol-based vehicle fleet makes it a black hole to many types of trade, since no one else is interested in the technology. Also, there is the fact that even if Brasilia had all of Latin America lined up behind it (which it does not), it collectively would pack only as much economic punch as U.S. President George W. Bush's home state of Texas. Attempts at cooperation among all these players are sometimes so strained they border on the comical. In the late 1990s, Russia and China often pledged their undying loyalty to the multipolar ideal, only for Russia to realize that much of its Siberian territory not only is nearly unpopulated, but also used to belong to China, the same China that has an overpopulation problem. This keeps Chinese-Russian relations on the back burner and prevents the Russians from selling any military equipment that might be a bit too useful to Beijing in, say, land campaigns.Similarly, Russian-Brazilian "cooperation" is about to be "sealed" with a Nov. 21-23 visit to Brasilia by Putin in a deal involving the swap of Sukhoi fighter jets for passenger planes. This might sound nice, but it really means that Brazil and Russia are having problems finding buyers for their planes on the open market. The Komsomolsk-on-Amur factory where the Sukhois will be made has no orders after 2006. That has forced the two to depend on barter -- the province of the desperate, the dilettante and the destitute -- to keep their respective industries alive.The net result is that the problems built into all the would-be multipolars -- and into relations between them -- ultimately limit their cooperation to mere rhetoric. Of course, as with all rules, this one has an exception that proves it. Among the various would-be poles in a multipolar world, two states have the potential to form a functional, multitiered and ultimately successful relationship: China and Iran.The two share no borders, so there is no geographic competition between them as there is between India and China. Iran's core interests are limited to the Middle East -- the Persian Gulf region, specifically -- while Beijing's almost exclusively are East and Southeast Asia. The only countries in which they both have interests are Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even there their interests are largely complementary. China wants its Pakistani ally to keep India penned in geographically, while Iran simply wants Pakistan to hold together.Their economies also are complementary. China is the world's second-largest consumer of crude oil, while Iran is the world's third-largest producer. Iran has made no secret of its desire to shift its economic loyalties from Japan -- currently its largest customer, but one with annoying links to the "Great Satan" -- to China.So far in 2004, China has penned a number of energy deals with Iran. The biggest was a deal to purchase 10 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually for the next quarter century -- a $100 billion agreement. The two already are discussing potentially doubling it if all goes well with the startup, scheduled for 2009. The Chinese state-owned oil firm Sinopec also won rights to develop the Yadavaran oil field, which should hit 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) within four years.This is only the tip of the iceberg as far as energy cooperation is concerned. China is already importing some 2.4 million bpd of crude, about 15 percent of which comes from Iran. With consumption increasing by 7 percent annually for the past 15 years and domestic production stagnant, China can take every drop of crude that Iran can pull out of the ground.China has a strong competitive advantage in getting access to the Iranian energy sector. So long as the threat of U.S. sanctions makes Japanese and European investors think twice before toeing Iranian waters, China -- far less concerned with political niceties -- can surge ahead. Technologically, it also is a nice match. The Persian Gulf is not particularly deep, perfect for the Chinese who have only elementary offshore capabilities.In fact, an energy marriage between China and Iran could provide a launching point for additional cooperation. The one location where their future interests are likely to overlap, Central Asia, is more likely to be a point of cooperation than contention. Both want the United States and Russia out, but neither is gunning to get in and take over. What both must consider, however, is how to secure their energy cooperation. Currently, any Iranian exports must pass by India -- and the U.S. Fifth and Seventh fleets -- potentially jeopardizing the entire relationship should China find itself in a serious military tussle. A more secure route would arc through Central Asia and come in through China's back door.The most likely route would be a pipeline heading due north to Kazakhstan's Caspian coast, where the network would pick up Kazakh crude before snaking east toward China. The Chinese and Kazakhs already are cobbling together existing infrastructure to cover the Caspian-China section, which probably will be greatly expanded as finances come available. All told, such a grand project would likely have a price tag in excess of $15 billion, but it would become China's only supply route not dependent upon rivals for its security. For a Beijing with ambitions of ultimately challenging the United States, that is a bill it ultimately will have to pay unless it is content to be just a failed "pole."
Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved. |
