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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: goldworldnet who wrote (660084)11/13/2004 10:45:10 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 769670
 
Arafat preferred chaos. It allowed him more leeway and secrecy. When people are fighting of struggling for their lives, they don't have time to scrutinize your's. His ability to shield the world from admitting that he died of AIDS is proof of it.



To: goldworldnet who wrote (660084)11/14/2004 6:09:12 AM
From: JDN  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769670
 
That is something I will NEVER UNDERSTAND. An opportunity of a LIFETIME, not only getting nearly all the LAND they wanted BUT THE GUARANTEE OF THE USA of SUCCESS in building their nation. INCREDIBLE turndown.
I won two more trophies with my jeep in a show yesterday, one for 2nd most trailworthy in modified vehicles and one for CLEANEST JEEP. jdn



To: goldworldnet who wrote (660084)11/14/2004 6:35:43 AM
From: E. T.  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769670
 
“Arafat Missed a Historic Opportunity When He Turned Down the Clinton Proposal”
Yes. It is true that Arafat did not “reject” the ideas the Clinton administration offered in December 2000. Instead, he pulled a classic Arafat: He did not say yes or no. He wanted it both ways. He wanted to keep talking as if the Clinton proposal was the opening gambit in a negotiation, but he knew otherwise. Arafat knew Clinton’s plan represented the culmination of the American effort. He also knew these ideas were offered as the best judgment of what each side could live with and that the proposal would be withdrawn if not accepted.
To this day, Arafat has never honestly admitted what was offered to the Palestinians—a deal that would have resulted in a Palestinian state, with territory in over 97 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem; with Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of that state (including the holy place of the Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary); with an international presence in place of the Israeli Defense Force in the Jordan Valley; and with the unlimited right of return for Palestinian refugees to their state but not to Israel. Nonetheless, Arafat continues to hide behind the canard that he was offered Bantustans—a reference to the geographically isolated black homelands created by the apartheid-era South African government. Yet with 97 percent of the territory in Palestinian hands, there would have been no cantons. Palestinian areas would not have been isolated or surrounded. There would have been territorial integrity and contiguity in both the West Bank and Gaza, and there would have been independent borders with Egypt and Jordan.

“The offer was never written” is a refrain uttered time and again by apologists for Chairman Arafat as a way of suggesting that no real offer existed and that therefore Arafat did not miss a historic opportunity. Nothing could be more ridiculous or misleading. President Clinton himself presented both sides with his proposal word by word. I stayed behind to be certain both sides had recorded each word accurately. Given Arafat’s negotiating style, Clinton was not about to formalize the proposal, making it easier for Arafat to use the final offer as just a jumping-off point for more ceaseless bargaining in the future.
However, it is worth pondering how Palestinians would have reacted to a public presentation of Clinton’s plan. Had Palestinians honestly known what Arafat was unwilling to accept, would they have supported violence against the Israelis, particularly given the suffering imposed on them? Would Arafat have remained the “only Palestinian” capable of making peace? Perhaps such domestic pressure would have convinced Arafat, the quintessential survivor, that the political costs of intransigence would be higher than the costs of making difficult concessions to Israel.

Written by:

Ambassador Dennis B. Ross is director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was the lead negotiator on the Middle East peace process in the first Bush and both Clinton administrations.