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Politics : I Will Continue to Continue, to Pretend.... -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 8:43:48 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
OK Tom, you just keep listening to Josh Marshall. He leans
almost as hard left as you. Considering the deep denial the
two of you share, there's a good chance you two will help
increase the margin of victory for Republicans next time
around.

Spread the word around your peers. Please!

:-)



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 9:17:07 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
CIA plans to purge its agency

Sources say White House has ordered new chief to eliminate officers who were disloyal to Bush

BY KNUT ROYCE
WASHINGTON BUREAU

November 14, 2004

WASHINGTON -- The White House has ordered the new CIA director, Porter Goss, to purge the agency of officers believed to have been disloyal to President George W. Bush or of leaking damaging information to the media about the conduct of the Iraq war and the hunt for Osama bin Laden, according to knowledgeable sources.

"The agency is being purged on instructions from the White House," said a former senior CIA official who maintains close ties to both the agency and to the White House. "Goss was given instructions ... to get rid of those soft leakers and liberal Democrats. The CIA is looked on by the White House as a hotbed of liberals and people who have been obstructing the president's agenda."

One of the first casualties appears to be Stephen R. Kappes, deputy director of clandestine services, the CIA's most powerful division. The Washington Post reported yesterday that Kappes had tendered his resignation after a confrontation with Goss' chief of staff, Patrick Murray, but at the behest of the White House had agreed to delay his decision till tomorrow.

But the former senior CIA official said that the White House "doesn't want Steve Kappes to reconsider his resignation. That might be the spin they put on it, but they want him out." He said the job had already been offered to the former chief of the European Division who retired after a spat with then-CIA Director George Tenet.

Another recently retired top CIA official said he was unsure Kappes had "officially resigned, but I do know he was unhappy."

Without confirming or denying that the job offer had been made, a CIA spokesman asked Newsday to withhold naming the former officer because of his undercover role over the years. He said he had no comment about Goss' personnel plans, but he added that changes at the top are not unusual when new directors come in.

On Friday John E. McLaughlin, a 32-year veteran of the intelligence division who served as acting CIA director before Goss took over, announced that he was retiring. The spokesman said that the retirement had been planned and was unrelated to the Kappes resignation or to other morale problems inside the CIA.

It could not be learned yesterday if the White House had identified Kappes, a respected operations officer, as one of the officials "disloyal" to Bush.

"The president understands and appreciates the sacrifices made by the members of the intelligence community in the war against terrorism," said a White House official of the report that he was purging the CIA of "disloyal" officials. " . . . The suggestion [that he ordered a purge] is inaccurate."

But another former CIA official who retains good contacts within the agency said that Goss and his top aides, who served on his staff when Goss was chairman of the House intelligence committee, believe the agency had relied too much over the years on liaison work with foreign intelligence agencies and had not done enough to develop its own intelligence collection system.

"Goss is not a believer in liaison work," said this retired official. But, he said, the CIA's "best intelligence really comes from liaison work. The CIA is simply not going to develop the assets [agents and case officers] that would meet the intelligence requirements."

Tensions between the White House and the CIA have been the talk of the town for at least a year, especially as leaks about the mishandling of the Iraq war have dominated front pages.

Some of the most damaging leaks came from Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, who wrote a book anonymously called "Imperial Hubris" that criticized what he said was the administration's lack of resolve in tracking down the al-Qaida chieftain and the reallocation of intelligence and military manpower from the war on terrorism to the war in Iraq. Scheuer announced Thursday that he was resigning from the agency.

Copyright © 2004, Newsday, Inc.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 9:25:26 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
The CIA’s new banana republic

November 14th, 2004 - AMERICAN THINKER

In its heyday, the CIA was famous for mucking around in the affairs of banana republics, manipulating this, toppling that, and in best cases, achieving the political aims (usually leaders, actually) that the President of the U.S. sought. Iran, Philippines and Guatemala in the 1940s and 1950s were prime examples. But more often than not, these operations went wrong, horribly wrong - Bay of Pigs, Congo, Indonesia, Nicaragua come to mind, leaving the U.S. in a worse position than it started. The CIA may even have been involved in the botched coup d’etat attempt against modern banana republic Supremo Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, in 2002. At least he thinks so.

And sadly enough, the CIA’s banana-republic fiascos, which attracted a lot of public attention, obscured the real failure of the CIA, which was its abysmal capacity to understand what was happening in the U.S.’s leading enemy, the Soviet Union.

But they haven’t played that risky covert action card all that much in the past 20 years, and for obvious reasons – the Wall has fallen, and these operations usually don’t work.

But don’t think CIA has changed. Like Aesop’s scorpion, it looks like they do what they are going to do. And more to the point, they are showing their incompetence again, this time mistaking an incredibly strong target for a banana republic, pretty much showing that they are even more inept than ever.

As we cited earlier, the estimable David Brooks chronicled the CIA’s pursuit of its latest target: none other than its own customer, President Bush. Brooks minced no words in calling them an enemy; planting leaks, slanting reports, and doing everything possible to alter U.S. voter perceptions of reality through the news. Not really different from what CBS did during the election that discredited them so thoroughly since. And it’s even less different than the CIA airdrops of leaflets on peasants in Guatemala ahead of elections. In short, like the CIA of old, unable to provide meaningful intelligence or covertly destroy their leading enemy, (which now is terrorism), today’s CIA substitutes banana republic shenanigans for real results.

But they miscalculated their new enemy. Now, the Washington Post is reporting the biggest personnel shakeup since the Schlesinger and Turner days in the 1970s, which decimated the CIA. Left unsaid in their report is that those fired turned their covert action skills against President Bush and tried to use American voters as their peasants. The result is heads rolling, even as the Washington Post whines about how ‘the level of experience and competence will go down’ Oh really? I see the normal wreckage of covert operation gone wrong along with the sour blowback. Playing politics against President Bush, did they really think they could succeed at this? Only if they were betting on a Kerry victory – something we reported not even the anti-Bush but carefully calculating French were willing to do. What a fascinating thing that for the first time in their careers, the CIA satraps are being held accountable for their losses. What a shock it must be. Toto, I don’t think we’re in Banana Republic anymore.


A.M. Mora y Leon



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 10:30:37 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
McCain is out front on this one. NYT

.....Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said the very reasons behind Mr. Goss's appointment to run the powerful agency after all its intelligence failures related to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq was undertaking deeply needed change.

"I think this kind of shakeup is absolutely necessary," Mr. McCain said on the ABC News program "This Week." "One thing that has become abundantly clear, if it wasn't already: this is a dysfunctional agency, and in some ways a rogue agency."

It was Mr. Goss's predecessor, George J. Tenet, who reportedly told President Bush that evidence that Iraq held unconventional weapons was a "slam dunk," or a sure thing, Mr. McCain said. And, the senator added, "We know very little more about North Korea and Iran than we did 10 years ago."

"This agency needs to be reformed," Mr. McCain said, adding, "Porter Goss is on the right track."


nytimes.com.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 1:19:34 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
How Dare They?

By Jed Babbin
American Spectator
Published 11/15/2004 12:09:19 AM


Juxtapose two images in your mind's eye. First, the dirty-faced young Marine, taking a cigarette break between skirmishes in Fallujah last week. Second, a CIA bureaucrat, taking tiny sips of chardonnay in those delicate intervals when he takes time out from writing his resignation to whine to the Washington Post. There is no way to reconcile those images. And there is no excuse for what CIA girlie men are doing.

Porter Goss, new Director of Central Intelligence and most recently chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, brought a few of his top Hill staffers with him to Langley. Some of them, like Goss, are former CIA men themselves. In the brief time they've been there, they have been doing what Goss said he would in his confirmation hearing. Goss told the Senate that there was too much bureaucracy in CIA headquarters, and that his management style would be "tough love," his language strong and blunt, and that changes would be made. Now, through the Post, the CIA bureaucrats are doing everything they can to weaken Goss. And some of them are resigning.

First was Deputy Director John McLaughlin, who resigned -- according to the Post -- because Goss's top guy and former hill staffer Patrick Murray was "treating senior officials disrespectfully and risked widespread resignations." Next was Deputy Director of Operations Stephen Kappes, who also resigned after a confrontation with Murray. The Sunday Post told us that four more senior undercover officials may resign as early as today. This is only the latest round of CIA disloyalty.

FOR MANY MONTHS, the CIA bureaucrats have been conducting a rather noisy mutiny against the Bush administration. Leak followed leak, each timed and designed to embarrass the president. Portions of National Intelligence Estimates were leaked to bolster the idea that the administration corrupted intelligence reports to justify the Iraq war. Never mind that NIE's are some of the most sensitive documents we ever create. They did their best to leak things designed to give credence to Amb. Joe Wilson's attacks on the President. Wilson went to Niger, drank tea with a few cronies, and returned to claim that Mr. Bush lied when he said Saddam had tried to buy yellowcake uranium there.

The leaks and attacks grew to book length when one CIA officer -- Michael Scheuer -- anonymously penned Imperial Hubris, and then published it with permission of CIA bigs. Scheuer's book argues that we are losing the war against terrorists and that the Iraq war is "a sham causing more instability than it prevents."

In truth, most of these guys should be fired for poor performance
. They didn't see that the Soviet Empire was about to fall before it did in 1989 and got pretty much everything that counted wrong ever since. They didn't uncover the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network or foresee 9/11. Then-DCI George Tenet told the president that the case against Saddam's WMD programs was a "slam dunk." And, thanks mainly to them, we have pretty much no damned clue about Islamic radicals' strength in Turkey, what Putin is going to do in Chechnya, or just how close the mullahs in Tehran are to having the ability to produce nuclear weapons. All they seem to do well is fight the Pentagon for control of the intel budget. Now they're leaking to the Post that Goss is a terrible boss, that his aides are "highly partisan," and that the new crew is wrecking the agency. Their answer is to this challenge is to resign. How dare they?

Let's assume everything these guys are saying is true. That they are all highly-skilled professionals whose lives have been dedicated to doing an important job for their country. That they are the best we have to do this job, and their failures are not their fault. That Porter Goss and his principal staffers are arrogant idiots from Congress who not only lack any clue about what they're doing, but are abusive and disrespectful to the pros. And let's toss in the assumption, as the Post quotes one former senior CIA official, that "[t]here's confusion throughout the ranks and an extraordinary loss of morale and incentive." So what should these troubled professionals do?

If they were as professional as they profess, if they were as dedicated as they declaim, if they were the leaders they would lead us to believe, they would do a whole bunch of things. But not resign. That's the selfish, unprofessional, and -- yes -- unpatriotic thing to do. What you do is tough it out, fight for what's right, and do everything you can to straighten your boss out and repair what damage he does while still following orders
.

In the hope that some of those who are thinking of resigning may read this, I want to address you directly. Each of you should ask yourself the following questions. Do you think your job is important to the war against terrorists and the nations that support them? Do you believe you're good at it, and are making a significant contribution to the nation's defense? Do you think that, by your hard work and experience, you may save one American's life or give the president one more option in any decision he has to make? Do you believe that your subordinates rely on your leadership and mentoring? If you answered any of those questions with a "yes," and you still dare to resign, you should hang your head in shame for the rest of your born days. It's all about duty, honor and country. If you think your personal gripes are more important, then go ahead and resign. And good riddance to you.

CONGRESS IS RETURNING for its lame duck session. One of the many things it wants to finish is the intelligence "reform" bill that would put in place many of the things that the 9-11 Commission recommended. It would be better if Congress didn't finish this now.

That the CIA needs reform, and that the reform will necessitate the replacement of many career professionals, is all too clear. Those who led the CIA in its failures need to be replaced, and the CIA culture changed to deal with the new global threats. But this needs to be well managed, not done haphazardly leaving key posts vacant. What "reform" aims to accomplish and how it is managed are the keys.

Congress is acting too quickly without addressing the primary question: How should reform be accomplished in order to improve the product of the CIA and the whole intelligence community? Is the 9/11 Commission's plan better than Pat Roberts' plan in that regard? Does Sen. Susan Collins (RINO-Me.), chairman of the Government Affairs Committee in the Senate, responsible for the intel reform bill there, have any clue what she's doing? (Hint: no). No one, to my knowledge, has even made the analysis of the various proposals necessary for that comparison. Why hasn't there been, as suggested here nine months ago, a thorough scrub of the intelligence community by intel and military RSGs, to determine what must be done to improve the intelligence product that the president has to rely on? Just what reforms are necessary to improve that product? Before that question is answered, all this talk of budget control and rearranging responsibilities is just so much political stuff and nonsense.


TAS Contributing Editor Jed Babbin is the author of Inside the Asylum: Why the U.N. and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think (Regnery Publishing).



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 3:49:44 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Roger L Simon - Local Yokels

You have to be amused at the LAT's coverage of the ongoing crise at the CIA (see below). Under the headline "CIA Tumult Causes Worry in Congress" they go on to quote for five graphs Rep. Jane Harman of Venice, CA who is the ranking Democratic member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. She spends most of her time dissing Porter Goss' staff. (Goss, the new DCI, was formerly the chairman of that committee.)

Not until paragraph eight does the LAT's loyal Lisa Getter arrive at the comments of Senator John McCain, who said on ABC's "This Week" that Goss was doing the right thing at the CIA. He described it as a "dysfunctional agency, and in some ways a rogue agency."

"This agency needs to be reformed," McCain said, adding that Goss was "on the right track. He is being savaged by these people that want the status quo. And the status quo is not satisfactory."

It seems satisfactory to Ms. Getter, however, who quickly gets back to the subject at hand - saving the jobs of failed bureacrats who just might be on the Democratic side - giving the last word (three more graphs, in which she blames, shockingly, Donald Rumsfeld) to the Congresswoman from Venice.

Nothing surprising here, of course. This is journalism as it is practiced by the LAT... and by this blog, for that matter, which would love to see the CIA seriously reformed, not cosmetically retouched (injected with Botox?). The difference is I state my position up front.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/16/2004 5:41:30 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
CIA Shake-Up Reveals Democratic Hypopcrisy ... Again

Captain Ed

Less than six months after the release of the final report from the 9/11 Commission, new CIA Director Porter Goss promises to deliver what the panel recommended and the Democrats demanded -- a shake-up of the intelligence community that received such harsh criticism for its overreliance on technology and closemindedness. Now that Goss has actually taken action, however, Democrats have been howling about the "purge" at Langley.

Today, though, Goss picked up important political support for the housecleaning from the one Republican that every Democrat hailed during the election cycle:

<<<
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) yesterday supported CIA Director Porter J. Goss's shake-up of the intelligence agency, which he described as "dysfunctional" and not providing President Bush with the information needed to conduct the war on terrorism.

Reacting to stories about potential resignations of CIA officials in response to actions taken by Goss and his staff, McCain, appearing on ABC's "This Week With George Stephanopoulos," said, "A shake-up is absolutely necessary."
>>>

One of the continuing themes of the 9/11 Commission and the presidential campaign was the poor quality of the intel going to the President prior to both 9/11 and the Iraq war. Democrats pushed for change, and the Bush administration has delivered. Earlier, the Patriot Act (which received bipartisan support) changed the processes so that information could be shared between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, as well as allowing both to use investigative techniques for counterterrorism that were already legal in organized-crime and child-pornography investigations. Now Bush has named his own CIA Director, who is busily replacing career officers in order to effect a new mindset at Langley, and hopefully a decidedly less political one than had been demonstrated over the past few years.

The hue and cry from the left is instructive; having been given exactly what they wanted, they now complain about the solutions. They paint the Patriot Act as an entreé to Big Brother, even though it fixed the gaping hole in information-sharing and took the handcuffs off that the 9/11 Commission blamed for our lack of preparedness. Now they claim that Goss is politicizing the CIA with this housecleaning, which they claimed only told Bush what he wanted to hear in the run-up to Iraq. Nor do the Democrats reconcile how they regarded the CIA to be so incompetent prior to both 9/11 and Iraq but so spot-on regarding their assessment of post-Saddam Iraq, with the same people in place. (These people, by the way, were the ones that they complained the 9/11 Commission protected by not naming names.)

Only one consistent theme runs across the entire opposition: they're just sore they're not in power. Schizophrenic policy statements and contradictory allegations like this are a good part of the reason why.

UPDATE: Jon Henke at QandO, the essential neolibertarian blog, reminds those who are shocked, shocked! to see a housecleaning at the CIA that the last Administration did the exact same thing ten years ago. May this effort be more successful than the last.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/17/2004 11:20:41 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
Leakers of Langley - Part Infinity

Roger L Simon -

How do you run an intelligence agency when your internal memos are leaked to the press virtually the minute they are received? Beats me. But it's happened again... newly-appointed DCI Porter Goss's discussion of reforming the CIA having been slipped to The New York Times seemingly before the laser print dried. (Okay, it dries immediately, but you know what I mean.) The Times, of course, published their version of this memo via Douglas Jehl. That's their job. They're in the news business. The leaking is the leaker's fault, not theirs.

But I have a suggestion for The Times. In cases like this, why not also publish the memo in its entirety? If you're going to run leaks, take the CSPAN approach and run them unedited. Let us make our own judgments. It's impossible to know whether Jehl's selected quotes from the memo reflect an accurate view of the document without having read the whole thing.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/17/2004 12:52:50 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
Pentagon cheers CIA shake-up

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published November 17, 2004

The ongoing shake-up at the CIA is a welcome development for senior Pentagon officials that promises to end the agency's below-the-radar opposition to some aspects of President Bush's war on terrorism.

Defense Department sources privately complained that parts of the CIA's entrenched bureaucracy of analysts opposed the military's large role in a war against al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

Before the September 11 attacks, the CIA had the lead in hunting al Qaeda. Afterward, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld took over that role and put the military on a terrorist-hunting mission that trespassed on some CIA roles.

"Let's just say that a lot of folks over there were still committed to a pre-9/11 way of doing things," said a Pentagon adviser who has played a significant role in forming counterterror policy. "It still hasn't changed."

The adviser added: "They did not want to combine capabilities within the CIA that could improve their analysis and operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere."

A former senior Pentagon policy-maker said that in discussions with the CIA some analysts left the impression they still did not realize al Qaeda's growing threat.

"The feeling in the Pentagon was we had been saying for some time that these guys were dangerous and we didn't get any backing from the CIA," said the former official, who asked not to be named because he still does business with the Bush administration. "They had neglected the operational decision that they needed to go after these terrorists. If they saw terrorism as a threat, they ... sure didn't act as if they had to respond to it."

Defense officials said that while Mr. Rumsfeld and former CIA director George J. Tenet maintained a good working relationship, contacts between Pentagon policy-makers and CIA rank-and-file analysts were often testy.

They say analysts expressed opposition to going to war with Iraq and filed overly pessimistic reports that seemed to always leak to the liberal press.

One senior official told The Washington Times last year of an Iraq station chief's dire predictions on Iraq. The station chief's report leaked to the press within days of its arrival in Washington. What seemed odd to this Pentagon official was that the dispatch contained a long list of "CCs" all the way down to Navy battle group commanders at sea, meaning tens of thousands saw the report.

"This report was designed to leak
," the official charged.

Today, the CIA's Langley headquarters is in the throes of a major shake-up. New agency director Porter J. Goss, a former Republican congressman and CIA officer, has seen three top officials -- deputy director John McLaughlin and two top clandestine officers -- abruptly resign in the past week.

Mr. Goss, who chaired the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, publicly has criticized the CIA for a lackluster operations branch that has failed to recruit agents who can penetrate Islamist groups. Critics say Mr. Goss needs to change the culture at Langley.

"We were unable to recruit agents in the Middle East, so we had to rely on other countries' agencies," said the former Pentagon official who read the intelligence take. "We ought to rely on our own people, not just the intelligence of other countries. You don't really have a picture of where it's coming from."

This source said many reports on terrorists come from the intelligence services of Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

Pentagon officials said Mr. Rumsfeld was not always happy with the CIA's performance in the field. In response, he has worked to give U.S. Special Operations Command authority to collect its own intelligence on which commandos can act in hours or days to kill or capture terrorists.

Officials said Mr. Rumsfeld believed CIA paramilitary officers were too slow to prepare the battle space in the fall of 2001 before the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and ousted the Taliban. In fact, the CIA's paramilitary force was so poorly staffed, they said the Pentagon was forced to transfer scores of active duty special operations personnel to the CIA to fill out the army.

Mr. Rumsfeld signed a secret order to the Joint Chiefs and U.S. Special Operations Command in July 2002 authorizing commandos to perform some spying activities. Since then, SoCom has increased intelligence training for Green Berets at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Lewis, Wash.

A joint Senate-House Intelligence Committee report in 2002 disclosed that the CIA was never able to have a spy inside senior al Qaeda circles.

"Former [Counter-Terrorism Center] officers told the joint inquiry that before September 11 the CIA had no penetration of al Qaeda leadership, and the agency never got actionable intelligence," said the panel's report.

Meanwhile, some in the Pentagon are amused at complaints coming from the CIA about the rough treatment they are getting from Mr. Goss' imported personal staff.

A defense intelligence official said: "The CIA operations directorate should stop whining. If they can't stand up to a group of Hill staffers, how can they be expected to stand up to al Qaeda?"



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/18/2004 1:39:36 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Goss aims to rein in the rogues

November 18, 2004

BY ROBERT NOVAK SUN-TIMES COLUMNIST

After President Bush nominated him to be director of Central Intelligence, Rep. Porter Goss walked across the Capitol to meet with a senator he hardly knew and who had criticized him: John McCain. There he received advice confirming his determination to take a course that soon became the talk of Washington.

McCain told Goss the CIA is ''a dysfunctional organization. It has to be cleaned out.'' That is, the CIA does not perform its missions. McCain told Goss that as director, he must get rid of the old boys and bring in a new team at Langley. Moreover, McCain told me this week, ''with CIA leaks intended to harm the re-election campaign of the president of the United States, it is not only dysfunctional but a rogue organization.''

Following a mandate from the president for what McCain advised, Goss is cleaning house. The reaction from the old boys confirms those harsh adjectives of ''dysfunctional'' and ''rogue.'' The nation's capital has become an echo chamber of anti-Goss invective, with CIA officials painting a picture for selected reporters of a lightweight House member from Florida, a mere case officer at the CIA long ago, provoking high-level resignations and dismantling a great intelligence service.

Veteran CIA-watchers such as McCain regard the agency as anything but great and commend Goss for taking courageous steps that previous directors avoided. George Friedman, head of the Stratfor private intelligence service, refers to Goss's housecleaning as ''long overdue.''

That cleansing process has been inhibited by the CIA's fear factor as an extraordinary leak machine. Its efficiency was attested to when Goss appointed Michael V. Kostiw, recently staff director of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism, as the CIA's executive director. Before Kostiw could check in at Langley, the old boys leaked information that Kostiw was caught shoplifting in 1981 after 10 years as a CIA case officer.

Kostiw then resigned the agency's third-ranking post, though Goss retained him as a special assistant. Kostiw's treatment has enraged people who have known him during a long, successful career in Washington -- including McCain. The senator called Kostiw ''one of the finest, most decent men I have ever met.''

The story fed by Goss's enemies in the agency is that dedicated career intelligence officers have been replaced by Capitol Hill hacks. Their real fear is that Goss will put an end to the CIA running its own national security policy, which in the last campaign resulted in an overt attempt to defeat Bush for re-election (intensifying after George Tenet left as director ).

I reported on Sept. 27 that Paul R. Pillar, the CIA's national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, told a private dinner on the West Coast of secret, unheeded warnings to Bush about going to war. I learned of this because of leaks from people who attended, but many other senior agency officials were covertly but effectively campaigning for Sen. John Kerry.

That effort seemed to include Imperial Hubris, an anonymously published attack on Iraq War policy by CIA analyst Michael Scheuer. He has since left the agency, but he was still on the payroll when the CIA allowed the book to be published. The Washington Post on Election Day quoted Scheuer as saying CIA officials muzzled him in July only after they realized that he was really criticizing them, not Bush. ''As long as the book was being used to bash the president,'' he said, ''they gave me carte blanche to talk to the media.''

Traditional bipartisanship in intelligence has been the victim, with Democrats cheering the CIA Bush-bashing. Rep. Jane Harman, ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, abandoned pretense of bipartisanship, and Sen. Jay Rockefeller, the Senate committee's vice chairman, never pretended. Both are attacking former colleague Goss.

McCain's use of the word ''rogue'' carries historical implications. A long, debilitating time of troubles began for the CIA in 1975 after Sen. Frank Church called it ''a rogue elephant'' that is out of control causing trouble around the world. The current use of the word refers to the intelligence agency playing domestic politics, which is an even more disturbing aberration.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/18/2004 4:50:09 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
Time-Saving tip: Run NYTimes Editorials on Corrections Page

Questions & Observations blog
Posted by: Jon Henke


NYTimes "Editors’ Note" Correction: [Nov 18, 2004]

<<<
A front-page article yesterday reported on an internal memorandum at the Central Intelligence Agency in which Porter J. Goss, the new chief, told employees their job was to "support the administration and its policies in our work." In some copies, the editors’ headline referred to the instruction imprecisely, saying, "Chief of C.I.A. Tells His Staff to Back Bush."

In the New York region, the headline format allowed space in late editions for a more accurate summary of the article: "New C.I.A. Chief Tells Workers to Back Administration Policies." All editions should have made it clear that Mr. Goss was referring to policies and not to President Bush personally, or to his politics.[emphasis added]
>>>

So, the memo referred to "policies" and not Bush or his politics? Simple enough. Unfortunately, not everybody reads the NYTimes Corrections Page
...

NYTimes Editorial [Nov 18, 2004]

<<<
But it’s inappropriate for [Porter Goss] to suggest that it’s the job of the C.I.A. "to support" a particular administration and its political decisions.[emphasis added]
>>>

Hey, look! Bush and his politics are back on the table! Neat.

Perhaps we could arrange a meeting between the "Editors’ Note" editors and the "Editorial" editors, so they can work this out.

Or, perhaps they could just start reading their own paper.


qando.net



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/18/2004 7:48:42 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Memo to Spies and Diplomats; Stop Whining and Do the Jobs You're Paid To Do

By Clifford D. May
Scripps Howard News Service
November 18, 2004

The professionals at the CIA and the State Department are dedicated, hard-working, committed, patriotic, brave, clean and reverent. Now that I've said that plainly, can we talk candidly about all that is glaringly dysfunctional at these agencies?

Start with the CIA which in the 1970s and ‘80s didn't foresee the Khomeini revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the collapse of the Soviet Union. The CIA didn't know that Saddam Hussein was close to developing nuclear weapons – a fact discovered only as an unintended consequence of the first Gulf War. The agency underestimated the threat posed by a growing radical Islamist movement in the 1990s. Its Directorate of Intelligence didn't grasp how menacing al Qaeda was becoming, and its Directorate of Operations did nothing about the Afghan training camps that were graduating thousands of terrorists.

Astonishingly, its analysts never imagined terrorists using hijacked passenger planes as guided missiles. If they had, surely they would at least have recommended reinforcing cockpit doors, arming pilots, more effective passenger screening – something.

The CIA failed to track Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction – weapons he once had but, apparently, destroyed secretly at some point before the American-led invasion in 2003.

That's only a fraction of what the CIA didn't accomplish. Yet the organization had plenty of time this year to leak information intended to damage President Bush's re-election chances.

In addition, the CIA permitted one of its most senior analysts to write, publish and promote a book called “Imperial Hubris” – an undisguised attack on the policies of the Bush White House. Whether you agree or disagree with Anonymous is beside the point (I disagree, but that's for another day). The CIA is supposed to provide intelligence to policy makers. The CIA is not supposed to make policy for policy makers, nor tell the President how they think he should do his job.

Shockingly, the CIA leadership not only permitted this – they let taxpayers finance it. Anonymous didn't even take a leave of absence from his day job.

And what can one say about the use of the pen name “Anonymous”? Only that it was intended to mislead the public into thinking the writer was some kind of undercover operative when, in fact, it's no secret that Anonymous is Michael Scheuer, a desk-bound analyst at Langley, who had long been making these arguments around town (including, at one dinner, to me and a few others select guests).

So now, President Bush has given the CIA new leadership. Porter Goss, a former CIA operative himself, resigned from the House where he had chaired the intelligence oversight committee to take on the enormous challenge of whipping the CIA back into shape.

Such transformations are never easy. The Los Angeles Times reported this week that two senior CIA officials quit because of confrontations with Goss's new chief of staff, Patrick Murray, “who many accuse of having a brusque manner.”

What kind of spy quits because his boss is “brusque”? And what does this suggest about the CIA's descent from the world's toughest espionage agency to another sclerotic Washington bureaucracy?

Meanwhile, over at Foggy Bottom, Condoleeza Rice also has her work cut out for her.

The career employees at the State Department and in the Foreign Service are mostly liberal Democrats who have been as susceptible as other readers of the New York Review of Books to the widening of the ideological and partisan divides.

Early in the Bush administration, a retired Foreign Service officer who continued to maintain close ties with the department told me that many employees at State were simply refusing to put energy into furthering Bush policies of which they disapproved. She asked one why he didn't resign as a matter of principle. “Easy for you to say,” came the reply. “You don't have kids to put through college.”

Others referred to Bush and his foreign policy team as “the Christmas help,” meaning they were confident this President would soon be gone and then they'd be able to get back to business as usual.

The few Bush loyalists – and those who don't believe they're entitled to veto the decisions of a sitting President -- were referred to as “the American interests section.”

Can such a state of affairs continue? Unfortunately, it can. But it shouldn't, certainly not now, in this critical era.

Intelligence and foreign policy professionals need to stop being defensive about past mistakes. What's done is done and there's plenty of blame to go around -- to past administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, to Congress, and to the media.

Now is the time for these public servants to return to doing the jobs the public pays them to do. The intelligence agencies must find better ways to ferret out useful information and supply it to the White House – whose occupant has been re-elected by a majority of Americans. Diplomats need to implement and defend the policies of the President they serve – whether or not they voted for that President.

Sure, these professionals should be encouraged to advise, question and offer alternative approaches. But when the President says, “Here's what I've decided,” the only responses are “Yes sir,” or “I quit.”

It is the task of Porter Goss and Condi Rice to communicate this dramatically changed reality to the people who work for them. Doing so, won't make them popular. But they owe it to this President – and to future presidents as well.


- Clifford D. May, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is the president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies a policy institute focusing on terrorism.

defenddemocracy.org



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/19/2004 8:42:11 AM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
Allawi Backs Marines

Powerline -

A day or two ago, Iraq's Prime Minister Allawi was widely quoted as being deeply disturbed, or some such phrase, by the dispatching of a wounded terrorist by a Marine in Fallujah. Today he made a more complete statement in Arabic. Haider Ajina translated this quote from tomorrow's Al Nahrein newspaper:

Iraqi Prime Minister Dr. Allawi said that he would reserve all comments on the death of the injured Iraqi in Felujah at the hands of a U.S. Marine, until the U.S. reports the finding of the investigation. He also said, "The fighting that the Iraqi & U.S. forces (in Felujah) have contributed greatly to the improvement of security in Iraq. These forces protect the Iraqi civilians from the terrorists and armed thugs, which used Felujah as a base of operations. These Terrorists are murderers, criminals and need to be dealt with accordingly."

That is, I suspect, the majority view in Iraq.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/19/2004 4:44:56 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (8) | Respond to of 35834
 
Galley Slaves blog - Who Are These Guys?

By Jonathan V. Last

I finally yield to the Pro-Goss Super Posse, which consists of Steve Hayes, John McCain, David Brooks, and now Matt Continetti. Continetti reports that Michael Sheuer (that's "Anonymous," to you) has revealed who it was at CIA who gave him "carte blanche" to criticize the president in his books: None other than former CIA spokesman Bill Harlow.

Harlow reported directly only to George Tenet. Maybe there really is something rotten going on at the Agency.



To: Thomas M. who wrote (6262)11/22/2004 1:28:55 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
This is precisely why the CIA needs to be cleaned up. We
don't need liars or treacherous bastards harming our national
security purely for partisan political gains.

Scheuer pulls a "Wilson."

"Nothing"

What Michael Scheuer has to say about bin Laden and Saddam--and what that says about the CIA's performance.
by Stephen F. Hayes

- Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.

MICHAEL SCHEUER, head of the CIA's bin Laden unit and until recently a senior analyst, said something remarkable last week on Hardball with Chris Matthews.

Scheuer told Matthews that he "happened to do the research on links between al Qaeda and Iraq," and Matthews asked him, "and what did you come up with?"

"Nothing."

It was a strange and troubling response. As Thomas Joscelyn points out, Scheuer argued in his 2002 book, Through Our Enemies Eyes, that Iraq and al Qaeda worked together regularly. His claims were unequivocal. A few examples:

<<<
[Bin Laden] "made a connection with Iraq's intelligence service through its Khartoum station." (p. 119).

In Sudan, Bin Laden decided to acquire and, when possible, use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons against Islam's enemies. Bin Laden's first moves in this direction were made in cooperation with NIF [Sudan's National Islamic Front], Iraq's intelligence service and Iraqi CBRN scientists and technicians. He made contact with Baghdad with its intelligence officers in Sudan and by a [Hassan] Turabi-brokered June-1994 visit by Iraq's then-intelligence chief Faruq al-Hijazi; according to Milan's Corriere della Sera, Saddam, in 1994, made Hijazi responsible for "nurturing Iraq's ties to [Islamic] fundamentalist warriors. Turabi had plans to formulate a "common strategy" with bin Laden and Iraq for subverting pro-U.S. Arab regimes, but the meeting was a get-acquainted session where Hijazi and bin Laden developed a good rapport that would "flourish" in the late 1990s. (p. 124)

There is information showing that in the 1993-1994 period bin Laden began to work with Sudan and Iraq to acquire a CBRN capability for al Qaeda. (p. 124)

Regarding Iraq, bin Laden, as noted, was in contact with Baghdad's intelligence service since at least 1994. He reportedly cooperated with it in the area of chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear [CBRN] weapons and may have trained some fighters in Iraq at camps run by Saddam's anti-Iran force, the Mujahedin al-Khalq. (p. 184)

In pursuing tactical nuclear weapons, bin Laden has focused on the FSU (former Soviet Union) states and has sought and received help from Iraq. (p. 190)

We know for certain that bin Laden was seeking CBRN [chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear] weapons . . . and that Iraq and Sudan have been cooperating with bin Laden on CBRN weapon acquisition and development. (p. 192)
>>>

So how can Scheuer now say Iraq and al Qaeda did not collaborate
?

Tim Russert noted that Scheuer seems "to lay out a pretty strong case of connection between al Qaeda and Iraq," and asked him about the apparent contradiction on Meet the Press. Here is the entire exchange:

<<<
Russert: So you saw a link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden?

Scheuer: I certainly saw a link when I was writing the books in terms of the open-source literature, unclassified literature, but I had nothing to do with Iraq during my professional career until the run-up to the war. What I was talking about on "Hardball" was I was assigned the duty of going back about nine or 10 years in the classified archives of the CIA. I went through roughly 19,000 documents, probably totaling 50,000 to 60,000 pages, and within that corpus of material, there was absolutely no connection in the terms of a--in terms of a relationship--in the terms of a relationship . . .

Russert: But your book did point out some contacts?

Scheuer: Certainly it was available in the open-source material, yes, sir.


This is nonsense. Scheuer would have us believe that although he never saw an Iraq-al Qaeda connection in the classified intelligence as head of the bin Laden unit, he wrote a book in 2002 including numerous examples of that connection based solely on open sources. Is it true that Scheuer did not see classified intelligence about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship before 2002? That seems highly unlikely.

The Clinton administration cited intelligence on Iraq-al Qaeda to justify its strikes on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan on August 20, 1998. Those officials stand by their decision today
. Former Defense Secretary William Cohen told the September 11 Commission that he saw intelligence that the head of the al Shifa plant traveled to Baghdad to meet with the head of Iraq's VX nerve gas program. Such intelligence also led the Clinton Administration to include the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in its first indictment of bin Laden.

Scheuer implies--but does not say directly--that he now believes the open source information is wrong. Would he have written that he was "certain" that Iraq provided WMD assistance to al Qaeda based solely on reports in an Italian newspaper or in other open sources? (I wonder if Scheuer plans to write a new introduction to that book to alert readers that he now considers several important passages to be dead wrong.)

Just for the sake of argument, let's take Scheuer's comments yesterday at face value. Let's assume that he based the conclusions in his 2002 book solely on open sources and that he has since looked through 19,000 pages of classified material that gives not so much as a hint of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection. If he's right, then the intelligence failure on Iraq is far greater than we have thus far realized.

Consider what we have learned since the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003. I will include in this list only those facts that are beyond dispute--things we've learned from captured documents authenticated by U.S. intelligence and in debriefings with senior Iraqi intelligence officials.

We know that Iraqi Intelligence officials reported in 1992 that Osama bin Laden was an Iraqi intelligence an "asset" that had "good relations" with the Iraqi intelligence station in Syria.

We know that Sudanese government officials met with Uday Hussein at bin Laden's behest in 1994 to discuss cooperation on bin Laden's behalf.

We know that deputy Iraqi intelligence director Faruq Hijazi met with bin laden, at least twice.

We know that Saddam agreed to air anti-Saudi propaganda on Iraqi national television.

We know that the Iraqis considered the numerous "contacts" with bin laden a "relationship"--as revealed in their internal documents.

We know that in the mid-1990s an internal Iraqi intelligence memo revealed that Saddam sought "further cooperation" with al Qaeda.

And we know that meetings between high-level al Qaeda terrorists and senior Iraqi intelligence officials took place throughout 1998.

Would Scheuer have us believe that there was nothing--"absolutely no connection in terms of a relationship," to use his words--in the 50,000 to 60,000 pages of classified intelligence that he recently reviewed? If so, the intelligence failures on Iraq are far greater than anyone has imagined.

One final point: Scheuer told Russert that he "had nothing to do with Iraq during my professional career until the run-up to the war." That is a jaw-dropping admission. And it might go along way to explaining why, despite the mounting evidence of a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, the CIA for years overlooked or downplayed it.

We now know that the CIA never penetrated the inner circle of either Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. We know this because senior U.S. intelligence officials have admitted it.

And now Scheuer tells us that in all of his analytical work on bin Laden he never looked at Iraq until shortly before the war
.

Porter Goss has a big job to do.