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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Michael Watkins who wrote (152224)	11/21/2004 3:06:01 PM
From: Nadine Carroll	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 281500

In the early 70's Sadat himself was still openly opposed to Resolution 242 - perhaps a notional move to placate the masses, or perhaps he actually believed in in that stance. Let's see...in your history Sadat just advanced in moderation throughout the 1970s, is that right? Has the 1973 war, aka The Yom Kippur War and The Ramadan War been airbrushed out of your history books, then? Just to recap, in 1973 the Syrians and Egyptians achieved a surprise attack on Israel, and had several days of advances before the Israelis turned the tide and began to win. Just after the Israeli army had cut off the Egyptian 3rd army and was in position to kill it, Kissinger called "Time!" on the war. The Egyptians teach themselves to this day that the Ramadan war was a victory, and are always surprised to learn that in Europe and the USA it is more accurately depicted as a defeat. Though the Egyptians achieved tactical surprise, by the end of the war they were decisively losing and had to have their butts saved by US-Soviet diplomacy. Sadat was one who knew what had actually happened. His economy was pretty shambolic, he could not afford another war, so by 1979 he tried a peace. The peace netted him a cool $2 Billion a year in US aid, which Egypt collects to this day. The Israelis overlooked his 1973 aggression and his Nazi past in order to make peace, which they greatly desired. In short, Sadat turned to peace because four wars (48, 56, 67, and 73) had taught him that the war option had been exhausted. If that's what you choose to call a 'process of moderation', so be it. But I suspect you are nowhere near that realistic about the situation.