IRAQ: How Long Will the Sunni Arabs Fight
December 1, 2004: American combat deaths in November reached the same level, 135, as last April. The fighting in Fallujah caused 53 of these fatalities, but a surge of Sunni Arab and al Qaeda violence throughout central Iraq produced the rest. What is often forgotten, when these casualties are mentioned, is that the enemy losses are much higher, by a factor of twenty or more. What effect does the death of over 3,000 Sunni Arab and al Qaeda gunmen in November have? And then there's nearly a thousand dead Iraqi civilians, the vast majority killed by Sunni Arab and al Qaeda attacks. On the streets throughout Iraq, the killing of civilians has made al Qaeda and the Sunni Arab "insurgents" increasingly unpopular. The majority of Iraqis have disliked these guys from the beginning, because the gunmen are basically trying to bring back the Sunni Arab dictatorship that meant only death and poverty for the majority of Iraqis. The Sunni Arabs are suffering most of the deaths, and are not united in supporting this one sided battle.
For most of this year, the Iraqi government thought they could convince enough Sunni Arab leaders to give democracy a try, and shut down the gunmen. After all, the Kurdish and Shia Arab militia leaders, who control far more armed men than the Sunni Arabs, have kept their armed men quiet. The Shia Arab militias of Muqtada al Sadr resisted, but were quickly put down with a combination of Iraqi negotiations and American firepower. But it turned out that the Sunni Arab leadership could not control their gunmen. A faction of the Sunni Arab community believes the fairy tales they see on al Jazeera about the "Iraqi uprising" and believe they are the vanguard of a larger rebellion. However, more and more of these men are realizing that they are hated even by the majority of Sunni Arabs, and are supported mostly by Sunni Arabs outside of Iraq. The foreigners that comprise most of the al Qaeda forces in Iraq have been particularly brutal against Iraqi civilians, police and soldiers.
The Iraqis are fighting back. While the Iraqi police and soldiers will often desert, so do many of the Sunni Arab and al Qaeda gunmen. No one issues press releases about that, but it's common knowledge on the street. Iraqis keep joining the police and army, and more and more of them do fight back. Historically, when it's Iraqi versus Iraqi, it's a test of wills, as well as tactics and body count. Saddam's Sunni Arab Republican Guard and tribal gunmen defeated the Shia Arabs in the 1991 rebellion fought after the Kuwait war. That war, which has been largely ignored in the West, went on for over a year. The only outside support for the Shia Arabs came from Iran, and it wasn't a whole lot. The current Sunni Arab rebellion receives even less outside support. Syria and Iran allow individual volunteers to cross into Iraq, along with some weapons and cash. The Sunni Arabs have been at it for over a year, and November and April were months in which they cranked up the violence. In both cases the Sunni Arabs took a beating, killing far more Iraqi civilians than American soldiers. The Sunni Arabs tend to declare victory because they are still able to issue a press release and set off another car bomb. But more Sunni Arab neighborhoods are being patrolled by Iraqi police and American troops. Every Iraqi household is, by law, allowed at least one AK-47. With over half a million Sunni Arab households, there are plenty of potential gunmen to oppose the government. But not all the Sunni Arabs want to fight, or even believe in the fight. How long will the gunmen keep fighting? Some will never stop. Unlike the dictatorships or monarchies that govern most Arabs, an Iraqi democracy will allow Sunni Arabs to keep on arguing for their version of Iraq's future. The government is sticking with the late January national elections. This means it is forcing the armed Sunni Arabs to come out and fight to try and stop the vote in Sunni Arab areas. Otherwise, the gunmen will be seen as impotent and irrelevant. But if the gunmen come out and fight, they will die in large numbers. After the battle of Fallujah, not to mention the fighting in Najaf and other cities, every Iraqi understands that. The government is maneuvering for a crucial, if not absolutely final, battle with the Sunni Arabs during, and before, the January elections.
November 29, 2004: Military and police operations south of Baghdad and up north in Mosul continue. The government is convinced that many Sunni Arab religious leaders have joined with anti-government forces and allowed their mosques to be used as bases for gunmen and terrorists, and is raiding mosques suspected of supporting violence. In Fallujah, 60 of 100 mosques in the city were found to be used for supporting anti-government forces. Since many mosques are large, walled, complexes, they lend themselves to being military bases. Technically, this sort of use is forbidden under Islam, but in times of unrest in Iraq, mosques frequently become centers of military activity. So the government has dropped any pretense of mosques being off-limits. As a result, mosques are now regularly being raided. In southern Baghdad, a mosque was found to house a suicide car bomb workshop, which had seven cars rigged and ready to go. That's a weeks worth of car bomb attacks in Baghdad.
In Mosul, the battle is between the Iraqi security forces and the Sunni Arab terrorists. In the last ten days, about fifty Iraqi soldiers and policemen have been killed, often executed, by Sunni Arab terrorists. Unlike Fallujah, the Sunni Arab gunmen are not doing a "stand and fight," but rather a "hit and run." But they need places to sleep and store their weapons. American and Iraqi intelligence efforts are closing down on these. More and more Kurds, and other non-Arab minorities, are being recruited into the police and army in Mosul. While this angers the Sunni Arabs up there, the non-Arab troops are more persistent, and speak Arabic. As more gunmen are arrested, interrogations provide more information on the anti-government groups. There was also a lot of information, on Mosul rebel groups, obtained from gunmen and documents captured in Fallujah.
November 27, 2004: Sunni Arab rebels continue to concentrate their efforts on those who work for the new government, especially the security forces, and for the coalition. Hundreds of such "traitors" were murdered in Fallujah over the past year, and that cowed the population. American troops will remain in Fallujah until Iraqi police can arrest enough of the bullies and take them out of circulation, to enable police to get, and keep, control. The same drill is being applied to other towns in Sunni Arab areas. Some Sunni towns and neighborhoods have resisted the Saddam thugs. But this is difficult. The Baath Party has had several decades to develop effective ways to terrorize a larger population. But the Sunni population is divided. Until last month, the government thought they could convince enough tribal and religious leaders to take on the thugs in Fallujah. Didn't work. Words often don't work against people who live by intimidation.
There's a slightly different situation in Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, and the largest city in the north. The population is about half Sunni, with the rest mostly Kurdish, plus a number of other minorities. The Sunni Arab gangs in Mosul managed to destroy the 5,000 man police force (most of them simply walked away from their jobs rather than fight). The army and security forces have been harder to deal with. So in the past week, 41 members of the security forces have killed, many were beheaded as well. Threats were made to families of those in the security forces. At the same time, money was offered for those who would spy for the Baath Party while serving in the army or security forces. This sort of thing is not as distasteful to Iraqis as it is to Americans. The use of corruption in public life is an ancient custom in the area, and was a basic governing tool throughout the Saddam period. The government is fighting back in kind. This is why the government has some of its best troops guarding the oil fields. Corruption is another way of saying you are using money as a weapon, and Iraqs oil is what everyone is fighting over. So far the government is winning, mainly because enough Iraqis are willing to step up and join the security forces, or work for the coalition. They risk their lives to support a change from the old ways of terror, intimidation and corruption. Al Jazeera and the Arab media will not admit this until the very end, because the Sunni Arab world wants the Iraqi Sunnis to be running Iraq again. So in the meantime, the real war goes on behind the stories of fighting and "brave Iraqi guerillas."
November 25, 2004: Over a thousand tons of weapons and munitions have been found in Fallujah, as well as a chemical and biological weapons laboratory. The largest stockpile of weapons was found in a mosque. American and Iraqi troops will spend the next several weeks searching some 50,000 buildings and apartments in the city. Although some 1,450 men were arrested during the fighting in Fallujah, 400 have been released. About 60 foreigners were arrested in Fallujah. Dozens have been picked up in other parts of the country, and some may have already been killed while trying to make attacks elsewhere. A key aide of Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi was captured in Mosul. Today, five more (two Egyptians and three Libyans) were arrested in Basra. They admitted they had come south to get away from the fighting in Fallujah, and to make more attacks, with less risk. All of the fighters possess a blind hatred of the West and a desire to spread their brand of Islam (Sunni) throughout the world. This, alas, includes punishing Moslem heretics like the Shia, who comprise the majority of Iraqis (and Iranians).
November 24, 2004: A force of 5,000 American, British and Iraqi troops began moving through Sunni Arab towns south of Baghdad. More raids in Sunni Arab neighborhoods of Baghdad were being prepared as well. The raids are going after known hostiles and safe houses. Hundreds of men have been arrested, and many tons of arms have been collected.
In the last week, two members of the Sunni Arab Association of Muslim Scholars have been assassinated. The Association has taken the lead in preaching resistance to the new government, elections and any Shia control of the government. This has caused much anger among the Shia majority. While many Shia have expressed this anger by joining the police or army, others have formed death squads, and gone after notorious murderers and hate mongers in the Sunni Arab community. This includes many Sunni Arab preachers. Shia Arabs and Kurds have thousands of names of Sunni Arabs who personally took part in supporting Saddams decades of repression. Nearly all of these Sunni Arabs have fled to the traditionally Sunni areas in, around, and to the west of, Baghdad. But Shia death squads have been going in and killing the murderers and preachers of hate. There are plenty of recent murders and atrocities to motivate these killers. Sunni Arab gangs have taken to setting up roadblocks and stopping Shia Arab or Kurd drivers, and torturing or killing them. The Shia get the most attention, because Sunni Arab clerics preach that Shia are heretics and blasphemers. This is a common attitude among Sunni Arabs, but usually does not result in violence. An exception is the Wahabi form of Sunni Islam. The Wahabi strain is popular in Saudi Arabia, and among al Qaeda members, and has become common among Iraqi Sunni Arabs as well. It's not just revenge minded Shia Arabs who are on to the central role of Sunni Arab clerics; the government has also started to arrest those who are most prominent in preaching hatred against Shia Arabs, and against anyone who denies Sunni Arab domination. The discovery of so many mosques in Fallujah being used as combat headquarters, and full of anti-Shia propaganda, has made it easier to go after the Sunni Arab clergy. The discovery of twenty "torture chambers" in Fallujah horrified many Iraqis, who were already angry at Sunni Arab thugs. Seeing the pictures of the blood splattered rooms where Iraqi and foreign kidnap victims were tortured and killed has made it pretty obvious what kind of people Iraqis are fighting against.
The UN, Arab nations and Iran continue to complain of "excessive force" in fighting against the Sunni Arabs. But to most Iraqis, too much restraint is being used. It all depends on whether you did business with Saddam, or had a friend tortured and killed by him.
November 23, 2004: Al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi was recently spotted near Kirkuk, 260 kilometers northeast of Baghdad. Al Zarqawi had to go somewhere, and with a $25 million price on his head, many Iraqis are more than happy to let the police know where the Jordanian terrorist is. Al Qaeda is very unpopular in Iraq, mainly because most of the victims of al Qaeda attacks have been Iraqi civilians. Coalition troops offer smaller rewards for lesser information, like al Zarqawi being seen traveling in an ambulance south of Kirkuk, and possibly wounded. Money is a powerful weapon in Iraq, and has been used lavishly by the deposed Baath party officials who are directing the anti-government forces. Al Zarqawi is thought to be receiving some of that money. While al Qaeda and the Baath party rely on lots of volunteers, you still need cash to run a war. Some things, and some people, have to be paid for. For the last 18 months, coalition intelligence forces, and Special Forces units, have been developing informer networks. Tips from informants inside Fallujah were responsible for the rapid progress of the coalition attack, and the failure of many of the defenders ambushes and boob-traps. Now the coalition money is being spent all over central Iraq. With nearly 2,500 anti-government gunmen dead or captured in Fallujah, those who fled are shorthanded, out in the open, and a source of quick money for sharp eyed Iraqis.
November 22, 2004: Sunni Arab gunmen continue to fight for control of towns and neighborhoods throughout central Iraq. While some gunmen remain in Fallujah, the majority of those who are active are in Baghdad and Mosul. Both of these cities have large Sunni Arab populations. But Mosul has a large Kurdish population, and Baghdad a large number of Shiites. These non-Sunni populations provide endless numbers of recruits for the army and police. Too many Shia Arab and Kurdish families want revenge on the Sunni Arabs for murder, torture and abuse in the past. While the Sunni Arab thugs have the edge in experience, and reputation, their violence is not overwhelming. The army and police are fighting back, killing and arresting thousands of Sunni Arab gunmen. The Sunni Arabs don't like to dwell on the fact that they are only a fifth of the population, or that they get slaughtered whenever they get into a fight with American troops. Trying to disrupt the January elections is now a major goal for the Sunni Arab extremists. They can do some of that in Sunni Arab areas. But in the next ten weeks, the number of Sunni gunmen available for this may be too low to make much of an impression. The Sunni Arabs are fighting a losing battle. Trying to bring back the good old days of Sunni domination will only work if the Shia Arab and Kurd majority is too weak to resist. No wonder the Sunni Arabs hate foreigners so much.
November 21, 2004: National elections will be held on January 30th. Many Sunni Arab groups are against holding elections, as this will formalize the fact that the Sunni Arabs are only about twenty percent of the population. Many Sunni Arabs want to vote, but those who do not are willing to use terror and force to prevent others from participating. However, to use terror, the terrorists must show themselves, and this makes them more vulnerable.
November 20, 2004: The war in Iraq is costing the United States some $160 million dollars a day, with over 90 percent of this being spent by the army. The Iraqi government has been able to get about $32 million a day in revenues from oil exports. However, about half of that goes to repairing damage done by Sunni Arab attacks on oil facilities, and paying for security. The oil industry has a private security force of 14,000 armed men, and pays $70,000 a day to various tribes to encourage them to prevent attacks on oil pipelines that go through their territory.
American troops now control all of Fallujah and have found extensive evidence of terrorist and criminal gangs using the city as a headquarters. Evidence was found of torture chambers, and video sets used for filming the execution of kidnap victims. Moreover, the body of a woman, thought to be foreign aid executive (Care International) Margaret Hassan, was also found in Fallujah. A video of her murder was recently released by her killers, and it appears that the killing was done in Fallujah. Without Fallujah as a “safe area” for keeping hostages, killing them, and getting away with it, the terrorists have to do their dirty work in cities where there is a strong police presence, and nearby American troops. That’s what’s happening in Baghdad, Mosul and other cities right now. The gangs are trying to control neighborhoods in these cities, and are not succeeding.
The government has ordered the police and army to enter mosques and arrest clerics who continue to preach violence against the government. This has led to a familiar drill where American troops surround a mosque, and Iraqi commandos go in and arrest those wanted, and often find weapons and other incriminating evidence.
Opinion surveys continue to show the majority of Iraqis determined to have elections, democracy and an end of terrorism and Sunni Arab dictatorship. Iraqis are not happy with the way the international (especially Arab) media portrays and anti-government forces and terrorists as “freedom fighters.” Iraqis know exactly what the fighters are fighting for, and it isn’t freedom. The violent gangs want to revive Sunni Arab rule over the Shia Arab and Kurd majority. Even many Sunni Arabs don’t care for this outcome, because only a minority of Sunni Arabs benefit when someone like Saddam Hussein is in charge.
November 19, 2004: While the anti-government forces have been crushed in Fallujah, and in other cities where they have come out to fight, they have continued to be successful fighting the Iraqi police. Because the police are hired locally, many of them are either loyal to the Baath Party or pro-Sunni tribal or religious leaders. Bribes and threats are also used to make police support the anti-government forces. Bringing in men from other parts of the country to be police creates problems with these "foreigners" (even though they are Iraqis) not being accepted by the locals. Attacks continue on police stations, including kidnapping of policemen, as well as killing, policemen who cannot be bribed or otherwise intimidated. Yet Iraqis continue to apply for jobs in the police and security forces. Despite the continued media (mostly Sunni Arab outfits from outside Iraq) support for anti-government forces, inside Iraq, public opinion is growing increasingly hostile towards the Sunni Arab minority. This is a problem for the government, as it can lead to civil war, because the majority Shia Arabs and Kurds have an ancient hatred for the Sunni Arabs and would not mind a bloody campaign against the entire Sunni Arab community. But the continued Sunni Arab attacks, which mostly kill innocent civilians, increase the risks of large scale retribution by the majority population.
November 17, 2004: A week of fighting in Fallujah has left over 2,000 anti-government gunmen dead or captured. American and Iraqi casualties (dead and wounded) totaled less than 400. The gangs that dominated Fallujah for months had turned the place into a complex of weapons dumps, torture chambers and holding cells for kidnap victims. The gunmen took over peoples homes by force, and generally terrorized the population. American commanders noted that the gunmen in Fallujah had little in the way of leadership. The resistance was largely by young guys with guns and no commanders. Apparently the leaders of the gangs and anti-government organizations slipped out of Fallujah and just told the people they left behind to put up as much resistance as they could. The resulting battle was very lopsided, with some 25 gunmen getting killed for each American or Iraqi soldier lost. There was no reason to stand and fight in Fallujah, except to provide propaganda opportunities ("the evil foreign occupiers are murdering the valiant Iraqi freedom fighters.")
Having lost their base and rest area in Fallujah, anti-government forces are now trying to take control in other towns. Using the same tactics they originally used in Fallujah (driving out the police and then terrorizing the local population), they have found the resistance much stronger than in Fallujah. The attempts to dominate over towns has failed, and the anti-government forces continue to take heavy losses. When the gunmen come out to fight, they are quickly spotted by air reconnaissance (especially UAVs), and hit from the air and ground.
The Iraqi police in these Sunni Arab areas continue to be poorly trained, led and motivated. The Sunni Arab police too often just run. To a lesser extent, so do Iraqi soldiers. Such cowardice is traditional. The concept of "stand and fight" is not widely accepted in Iraq. This was a particular problem during the 1980s war with Iran. Saddam had to use all manner of incentives, and terror, to get Iraqi troops to effectively resist Iranian attacks. Had Iraqi troops not been able to take advantage of the waterways in the swampy battlefield, and had not chemical weapons been available, Iran would now be running Iraq (as it has done for most of the past few thousand years.)
The gunmen in Fallujah did so much stand and fight as run around trying to set up ambushes. Their problem was a lack of good tactics and leadership. They wanted to fight, but didn't know how, and got killed in large numbers as a result. The gunmen do adapt their ambush and roadside bomb tactics when they find that something obviously doesn't work very well. But coalition troops adapt quickly, quicker, in fact, and the gunmen continue to fight at a large disadvantage.
The war of wits, and the differences in training and leadership, have been the key factors in the Iraqi combat. The Sunni Arab community, which is the core of the anti-government fighting forces, is more concerned with regaining power than in reforming their inefficient and ineffective combat and political techniques. With great effort, American trainers have created some Iraqi infantry battalions that can fight. The war in Iraq comes down to which tradition will prevail; that of terror, or of good training and leadership.
November 16, 2004: Interrogations of Saddam Hussein, and examination of the tons of Iraqi government documents have revealed more details of how Saddam ruled Iraq, and misjudged American concern over Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, and support of terrorism. Saddam stayed in power via combination of paranoia, and a shrewd use of terror and rewards. He was always in fear of assassination, a fear that was confirmed by over a dozen serious attempts to kill him. Saddam safeguarded himself by constantly moving around, and letting very few people know where he was. He used his intelligence agencies and secret police to constantly look for disloyalty, and swiftly punish any they found (either real or suspected.) Offenders could lose a limb, or other body part (like their tongue, ear or an eye), or be jailed for months or years. Executions were frequent, and the next of kin were often kept in the dark, to prolong the terror effect. But Saddam knew how to reward loyalty as well, especially with family members or fellow Sunni Arabs. Investigators believe Saddam stole $21 billion via scams like smuggling and stealing from the oil-for-food program. He used that money to keep his followers happy. Most Iraqis learned that it was best to say nothing bad about Saddam, and do whatever he asked (as he would usually give a generous reward for any service.) Saddam was also an astute manipulator of the media, and knew how to put on a good show. Many Iraqis found it convenient to believe his proclamations, like the one where he said Iraq had won the 1991 Gulf War.
But the strain eventually caught up with Saddam, and by the late 1990s he was increasingly withdrawn, and dependent on his two eldest sons to take care of his security. It was understood that one of those two sons would succeed him, but in typical fashion, Saddam never made it clear which one it would be. Saddam was also very inept when it came to predicting the reaction of foreign governments. He pretended he still had a chemical and biological weapons program because he feared an Iranian invasion otherwise. Iranians hated Saddam because of the 1980s war with Iraq, but were not interested in another one. Saddam also misunderstood the impact of September 11, 2001 on the United States, and, until the end, did not believe American troops would invade Iraq. He thought, at worst, there would be another extended bombing campaign. He also believed that the rest of the Arab world would come to his aid if American troops did invade. Saddam still considers himself the president of Iraq, and capable to maneuvering himself back into power.
November 15, 2004: American and Iraqi troops entered Mosul to battle some 500 gang members who attacked and destroyed six police stations, and ran wild in Sunni parts of the city. Only armed Kurds resisted the Sunni Arab gunmen. The gangs also killed the head of the organized crime effort in Mosul. Seeing what is happening in Fallujah, where gang headquarters have been captured and cleaned out of weapons and other gear, the Mosul groups apparently see themselves threatened and forced to fight. The gangs are better armed, paid and led than the police, and have fewer restrictions on who they can kill, torture or kidnap. This is particularly true in the Sunni Arab areas of central and western Iraq. In the Kurdish areas to the north, and the Shia Arab region in the south, where most of the population lives, the police have established and maintained control. The battles in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Samarra and other Sunni cities is mainly about breaking the power of the gangs. While some of the gangs are political, most are business enterprises, and the government offensive over the last week has been bad for business.
In Fallujah, some 1,200 gunmen have been killed and another 400 captured. About 50 American and Iraqi troops have died. Several hundred gunmen are trapped inside the city, and refuse to surrender, so far. American troops continue to hunt these holdouts, but expect that to be done with in a few days.
November 14, 2004: The major fighting in Fallujah is over, with about 30 American and Iraqi troops, and over 1,000 anti-government gunmen, dead. There are still several hundred gunmen hiding in different parts of the city, trying to get out. But the night vision devices, and large number of American sensors out in the desert surrounding Fallujah, make it very difficult to sneak away. The Arab media are already looking for editorial angles they can use to turn Fallujah into an Arab victory. Despite the fact that phone and cell phone access to the city was cut off when the fighting began, some Arab media are claiming "massive civilian casualties" and a "catastrophe" inside the city. Most Iraqis wanted Fallujah destroyed, seeing the Sunni Arab city as a source of support for over three decades Baath Party tyranny. Fallujah has always been a very religious city, providing support for al Qaeda and the idea of religious war with the rest of the world. This is also unpopular with most Iraqis. But most nations in the region are run by Sunni Arabs, and their media will portray Fallujah as a "martyr" to Sunni Arab ideals (which include persecution of Shias and Kurds, who comprise 80 percent of the Iraqi population.)
Months of intelligence work had concluded that there were some 3,000 armed, hard core fighters in Fallujah. Only about half of those have been killed or wounded. The rest either got away before the battle began, or are among the few hundred gunmen still playing hide and seek with American troops inside the city. Many of the rest went to other cities and attacked local police stations, and set up roadblocks. This has caused a momentary loss of control in some neighborhoods. But these hard core fighters are, like their buddies in Fallujah, going to die out in the open. The death of so many gunmen in such a short time makes it difficult to recruit more of these guys. This has been seen happening before. As a result, the battle of Fallujah is about more than just one city.
November 13, 2004: In Fallujah, most of the remaining hostile gunmen have been forced into a small section of the city. Other gunmen are still operating in areas already fought over. This is a common situation in this kind of fighting, especially with a foe that often uses suicidal tactics. American troops encountered this a lot while fighting the Japanese in the Pacific, particularly when fighting in towns and cities of the Philippines. The situation is different, of course, in Iraq. The Iraqi fighters are poorly trained compared to the World War II Japanese, and much more poorly equipped. American night vision equipment and UAVs provide a tremendous edge, which is why some 25 Iraqi gunmen die for each American death. Very few civilians have been encountered in Fallujah. Those that claim to be civilians are given a "residue test" to see if their hands have fired a gun or handled explosives recently. Very few young men in Fallujah come away clean.
Up north in Mosul, the Sunni Arabs in the city are trying to drive out the Kurds, just as Saddam had done for several decades. The largely Sunni police often refused to oppose the Sunni Arab gunmen. More armed Kurds, and American troops, are headed for Mosul. With the Sunni Arab gangs of Mosul now out in the open, they can more easily be destroyed.
Al Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who long operated from Fallujah, released a statement condemning Shias and Kurds for supporting the "American invaders." Zarqawi had long supported the idea of getting a civil war going in Iraq, which would somehow make it easier for al Qaeda to take over. It hasn't worked out that way, with the Sunni Arab resistance being a lot less than Zarqawi expected. Now Fallujah is lost and Sunni Arab gunmen are unable to take control in any other cities. The Sunni Arab violence just makes more Shia, Kurds and even Sunnis, support the new government.
November 12, 2004: Five days of fighting in and around Fallujah have left 25 American and Iraqi troops dead, as well as over 600 anti-government gunmen. There appears to be some coordination among the anti-government forces. There have been attempts by the anti-government fighters to break the cordon around Fallujah, so that hundreds of trapped gunmen can escape. So far, this has not worked. In Mosul, and elsewhere in central Iraq, gangs of anti-government gunmen attacked police stations and began openly prowling the streets. Coming out into the open like this, makes it easier to kill off the hostile gunmen.
The anti-government forces are partially run on illusions. For example, the halting of an American offensive in Fallujah last April is portrayed by anti-government forces as a military victory. This ignores the fact that the fighting was stopped in order to allow for a negotiated return of government control to Fallujah. The anti-government forces never intended to honor any pledges that came out of the negotiations, and portrayed their deception as a victory as well. This shows the cultural differences between the thugs who have run Iraq, and are trying to regain control, and reality.
Flushed out of their bases, the anti-government forces are much more easily killed, and a lot more quickly. This has an adverse impact on recruiting for the anti-government gangs. Battles like this are a reality check for the young men who have become mesmerized by the pro-Sunni propaganda, which portrays the gangs as valiant freedom fighters who are taking back control of Iraq for the Iraqis.
More...
strategypage.com |
