To what extent can the post-war peace treaties be blamed for the collapse of democracy in various European countries in the inter-war period? (Discuss with reference to Europe as a whole or to a country of your choice)
The 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which settled the peace conditions between Germany and the Allies, has been universally described as overly harsh against the Germans. The massive reparations demanded by the Allies would cripple the German economy in the early 1920s, while the war guilt clause was viewed by the Germans as entirely hypocritical and illegal as they were found guilty of crimes that did not exist under international law at the time. However, it would be premature to describe the Treaty of Versailles as the primary reason for the collapse of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of the National Socialists in 1933. Many other factors such as the Great Depression from 1929-33; the enduring split between political ideologies within the Reichstag as well as lasting undemocratic feeling throughout the German population were of greater significance in the demise of the Weimar republic than the Treaty of Versailles.
Even though the Germans were under no illusions that they would be treated easily, and were quite prepared to pay compensation for the destruction suffered during the War as well as forfeiting a limited amount of territory, the harshness of the treaty was even questioned by the victorious powers. The aspirations of the various countries at the Versailles conference were very nationalistic. France was determined to secure their borders against future German invasion while they also wished to cripple the German economy and armed forces, which would relieve security concerns. Britain was also nationalistic in its demands from the peace negotiations, although they realised more than the French that the destruction on Germany may only 'give rise to such recrimination, resentment and misunderstanding that would contribute significantly to the outbreak of a new and more terrible war.'
The German reaction to the treaty was one of disgust, especially in relation to Article 231 in which Germany had to accept full responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. The war guilt clause was used by the Allies to provide a legal basis for the collection of reparations, and was in response to intense anti-German feeling among the general public in the Allied nations. This feeling was exemplified during the 1918 British General Elections when there were calls to hang that Kaiser, and a common feeling among the Allies that Germany should be 'squeezed until its pips squeaked'. It was decided that Germany would have to pay the Allies 132 billion gold marks, a staggering amount that would cripple the German economy for years to come.
The effects of the Treaty on the Weimar Republic became apparent quite early, due to the economic crisis caused by the overwhelming reparation payments. France's occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 to extract reparations led to hyperinflation in Germany. This economic disaster had an enormous cost for the German population as private savings were destroyed. This caused mounting anger against the Weimar republic because it had signed a Treaty which was destroying the country. Nevertheless, there was no immediate shift to the right as the memories of the war remained for Germans too. Therefore S.W. Halperin's conclusion that 'the Treaty of Versailles strengthened enormously the hand of the reactionaries and provided them with a propaganda weapon of supreme and lasting effectiveness' is a clear over-simplification of the events of the 1920s and early 1930s.
The economic revival of the mid-1920s refutes the idea of a continuance between the crisis of 1919-1923 and the crisis that would eventually lead to the downfall of the Weimar Republic. The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of 1929 diffused the reparations problem through American aid, although it did make the German economy reliant upon the American one, which would eventually lead to disaster in 1929 due to the sharemarket crash. The Locarno Settlement of 1925 and Germany's admission to the League of Nations in 1926 were other positive signs of recovery for the Weimar Republic.
There was, however, growing opposition to the Weimar Republic, although this sentiment was not inspired by the Treaty of Versailles but by the socialist economic policies of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Heavy industry magnates were mainly opposed to the class-based labour policies of the SPD, and general opposition to the government was growing as the SPD became increasingly isolated. Class interest and factionalism came before national interest, paralysing the German political process, especially their parliamentary system, whose proportional representation style of elections only exaggerated the splintering of political groups within the Weimar Republic.
A lasting ideological indifference towards democracy was evident in many sectors of German society, and contributed greatly towards the fall of the Weimar Republic. The imperial bureaucracy, judiciary and officer corps had not been reformed by the new regime in 1918 and they acted as a basis for anti-democratic feeling. The defeat of Germany in November 1918 came as a shock to the people, who immediately blamed the new regime and were thereafter fearful of a social-democratic government. 'To accept the Weimar Republic would have meant to exchange elitism for egalitarianism; to admit that sacrifice and war had been for nothing and to concede that the Allies had won the Great War not only with bigger battalions and factions, but also with ideas.' To many Germans this was completely unacceptable as they felt the Republic was betraying all that was 'German'.
However, by the mid-1920s there was a far greater feeling of optimism and economic recovery. This may have been premature, as the economic recovery was based upon servicing debt, reparations and the accumulating trade deficit through borrowed money, mainly from the US private sector. Consequently, the German economy became very reliant upon the American one, which proved to be a fatal mistake in 1929. The sharemarket crash destroyed the relationship between Germany and America, forcing 'the German economy into a precipitate decline which soon burdened the social security budget very heavily indeed'.
It is plausible to argue that the Treaty of Versailles increased Germany's susceptibility to the disasters of the Great Depression. Owing to Germany's economic fragility, which had been enforced by the payment of reparations, the government was forced to rely upon the assistance of the US private sector which resulted in the Great Depression having an exceedingly disastrous effect on the economy. It was in the face of adversity that the inherent weaknesses of Weimar were cruelly exposed. The divided Reichstag was unable to cope with the huge economic problems, registered unemployment reached thirty percent, while during the winters of 1931-2 and 1932-3 it was estimated that half the population was effectively out of work.
Instead, the population turned towards politically radical parties to solve the economic problems caused by the depression. There was a gradual shift away from parliamentary power towards a more authoritarian style exemplified by the frequent use of Article 48 of the German constitution. Initially intended only to be used by the President in emergencies, the Article allowed the President to issue decrees without the consultation of parliament. However, it was increasingly used on a day-to-day basis 'leading to a move away from the republican parliamentary system of government towards an as yet undefined system of authoritarian rule'.
The role of the Treaty of Versailles in this new crisis is almost completely absent. 'The post-war order [had] manifested signs of better health in the mid-1920s, before its immune system was fatally undermined by the Great Depression. In this sense, the Versailles Peace Treaty itself can hardly be said to have 'caused' the Second World War.' This argument is even stronger if the events after 1933 are discounted; the effects of Versailles' territory changes and military restrictions played a far larger role in the events leading up to the Second World War than was evident in the events preceding the fall of the Weimar Republic.
Although the Treaty of Versailles was an excessively harsh Peace Treaty, which crippled the German economy throughout the early 1920s and undermined German ability to recover from the Great Depression in the early 1930s, it would be incorrect to assume that this instability was not overcome by the Weimar Republic, with the help of American aid, by the mid 1920s. Therefore the 'principle predicament of the Weimar Republic was not the defeat in World War One, or the difficulties which its governments faced in the post war years, but the social and political structure of German society'. Moreover, the crippling effect of the Great Depression destroyed the people's confidence in the Weimar Republic and democracy as a whole. Authoritarian leadership had historically brought Germany success, and it was not surprising that the German people chose to return to that style of government in 1933.
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