Americans care, some more than others
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:43 PM
¦"America, the Indifferent," editorial, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A26.
¦"When the Right Is Right: For the left, this is no time to sulk," op-ed by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 22 December 2004, p. A31.
The New York Times sees the U.S. essentially short-changing on aid while wasting money on foreign interventions, and by doing so, the editorial board there fundamentally misses the military-market nexus. To shrink the Gap is to engage in both building up security inside the Gap and increasing its market connectivity to the Core. Does the U.S. specialize in the former more than any other Core power? Yes. Can the U.S. be expected, therefore, to keep pace with the rest of the Core on foreign aid? No. Does that make America "indifferent"?
Ask someone in America who's lost a loved one in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Ask them if they can easily equate higher taxes to the death of a child, or spouse, or parent. America has sacrificed a significant number of their "only begotten sons" in this global war on terror, signaling that—in the truest sense—they love their enemies more than themselves.
Tell me Jesus wouldn't understand that one.
Tell me Jesus wouldn't also say, put your money where your mouth is. Does America pull its weight on foreign aid? Not in terms of official developmental aid. But frankly, that's a drop in the bucket anyway when compared to far more important and larger aid flows.
Take America's willingness to let in foreign workers and immigrants. What they send back in remittances is routinely 5-6 times what we spend in aid. Remember that when those immigration-hating Europeans lecture us on foreign aid.
Also remember that "crazy," "far too religious" America also gives a huge amount of private charity aid to the Gap. Foreign policy "experts" are constantly decrying the "indifferent, ignorant" American public that cares not for suffering throughout the Gap, and yet, where is all this charity coming from? Faith-based groups are the biggest providers. These red-state types are also the ones who agitate most regarding human rights abuses in places like Zimbabwe and North Korea. They're the ones who scream the most about the effective genocide going on in the Sudan.
Where are the liberal street protestors on any of this?
Here's Kristof's interesting take:
… a larger shift is also under way. Liberals traditionally were the bleeding hearts, while conservatives regarded foreign aid, in the words of Jesse Helms, as "money down a rat hole." That's changing. "One cannot understand international relations today without comprehending the new faith-based movement," Allen Hertzke writes in "Freeing God's Children," a book about evangelicals leaping into human rights causes.
America the indifferent? Or New York Times the clueless?
Uh … I mean, except for Kristof, of course, who frankly is kicking Friedman's ass right now in terms of being the foreign affairs interpreter of note on the staff.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:41 PM
The year-end good, bad and ugly on China
¦"China Expands, Europe Rises. And the United States . . . As the dollar falls and debt grows, America no longer seems indispensable," by Fred Kaplan, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. WK6.
¦"Canada's Oil: China in Line As U.S. Rival," by Simon Romero, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A1.
¦"A Corner of China in the Grip of a Lucrative Heroin Habit: Peasants find an escape from poverty in a new version of the opium industry," by Howard W. French, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. A4.
China's emerging as a global counterweight to the U.S., as is the euro. Is this a sign of "chaos" and "uncertainty" and "frightening" multipolarity where the U.S. isn't in charge of everything?
Yeah, I guess it is. It always amazes me that the same analysts who decry U.S. "unilateralism" and "empire" also seem to wax pessimistic whenever any real balance begins to emerge in the system.
This balance in the economic realm is not only necessary, it's absolutely essential for the Core to win this war on terrorism. America needs to be economically healthy and well-connected to the global economy if its going to continue being the lead military player in this effort. We won't discipline ourselves all by ourselves, so a rising balance in both Europe and Asia on this score is exactly what the doctor ordered, just so long as we don't dissolve into the usual paranoia about being held "hostage" to the demands of others. The global rule set is always a "test," whether it's Russia failing the test on the Yukos auction, or Asia adjusting to pass the test on the avian flu, or America checking the necessary boxes whenever it deems it necessary to push for regime change inside the Gap. Global "tests" are good, essentially the Core as a whole saying "this is how we define playing by the rules." China is, through its rise, playing a huge role in this, and that's very good.
Of course, China will engage in seemingly "bad" activities as it emerges, like daring to compete with the U.S. in oil markets around the world, and perhaps even in our backyard! But viewing this as zero-sum is stupid in the extreme. China securing oil is China continuing to develop economically and move increasingly in the direction of our political and social model, while simultaneously helping us maintain our standard of living through a complex series of economic transactions. Expecting them to somehow "get theirs" always at no competitive cost to the U.S. is bizarrely myopic. Again, there is no "free riding" anywhere in the Core; it's all one big system of checks and balances. If we want to remain the world's sole military superpower, then we have to accept certain economic realities vis-à-vis China.
We have to accept those realities because there is still a huge, interior chunk of China that is stuck in the Gap—otherwise known as its largely rural, agrarian, poor, interior provinces, or where my daughter came from. There, we're going to see very Gap-like behavior, like growing poppies and exporting them to the rest of the Core to support our continuing heroin habit.
Facilitating China's explosive growth is how that Gap gets shrunk. So again, there's no free riding here. There's only seeing the world in all its complexity and understanding the trade-offs. The U.S. wants China to be in charge of "in-Coring" its own internal Gap regions, as well as "in-Coring" those Gap states in the rest of Asia that line its very long borders. If America is going to focus on transforming the Middle East, we need a China to continue that process in East Asia. Shrinking the Gap is a Core-wide effort. China isn't a free rider. It's pulling its weight just fine, if only we take the time and effort to see the full spectrum of its interactions with the world outside, as well as with its interior Gap regions.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:41 PM
The year-end good, bad and ugly on Russia
¦"Getting Personal, Putin Voices Defiance of Critics Abroad: Heated words about an oil giant's sale and post-Soviet elections," by C.J. Chivers, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. A3.
¦"Why 'Contain' Russia?" op-ed by Eugene B. Rumer, New York Times, 17 December 2004, p. A33.
¦"State Company Buys Winner In Yukos Deal," by Erin E. Arvedlund and Simon Romero, New York Times, 23 December 2004, p. C1.
It's good for Putin to sound off on how hypocritically the West seems to be whenever it chooses to judge him or Russia's path in general. I mean, there's voter intimidation and there's voter intimidation, and when it occurs in either America or the Ukraine, it's wrong. When Europe tries to tell American voters who they should vote for, Americans tend to say, "shove it." And when the U.S. gets itself in the position of non-too-subtly seeking to influence election outcomes in Ukraine, just like Russia did, we can expect Putin to call this kettle "black."
What's just so good about this rather contentious end-of-year extended press conference is that Putin simply held it, seemed relaxed and in command of a wealth of details, and proved flexible throughout over a two-and-a-half-hour conference!
Is Russia still a meddling player throughout the former Soviet Union (how dare they?)? Sure. But the real point is how ineffective they've been most of the time (Rumer's point). So bad, yes, but not effectively so.
Of course, the Yukos auction was ugly. It's like the U.S. buying a distressed Microsoft after going after it with anti-trust legislation. It's ugly alright, but keep it in perspective. Russia is feeling shut out of the corridors of power in many places, and the government will do whatever it can to make itself seem important and a needed seat at the table, wherever it is set.
We want Russia at those tables, sitting in that seat. And we want that role to be defined economically, not militarily.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:41 PM
Islam: the opposition movement
¦"Europe's Muslims May Be Headed Where the Marxists Went Before: 'Ideology of Contestation,'" by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. WK7.
This is an interesting peak-ahead article of the sort I always clip, because it suggests how the scary thing (Islam in Europe) actually works out to become the positive force for change (I know, I know, yet another example of naïve optimism!).
Here is the key section:
When Assedine Belthoub was growing up in the shantytowns outside Nanterre, France, 40 years ago, the people who came to take the young North African kids to swim in the community pool, to register them for school and give them candy and comic books, were Marxists. The French Communist Party offered a political voice for the working classes, including the growing number of North African immigrants imported to fill labor shortages after the war.
Today, Islam plays that role, especially in France, where men like Mr. Belthoub, wearing long beards and short djellabas, reach out to the poor and disillusioned in the country's working-class neighborhoods. Young Arabs and African here have turned to Islam with the same fervor that the idealistic youth of the 1960's turned toward Marxism.
"Now religion has become our identity," Mr. Belthoub said last week, sitting in a friend's small apartment in a largely Muslim suburb north of Paris.
The question is whether Islam in Europe will follow the same path that Communism did here, shedding its revolutionary extremism, electing mayors and legislators and assimilating itself into normal democratic political life.
Of course it will. To shrink the Gap is to grow the Core and to grow the Core is to absorb new ideas from the Gap. To absorb the former Gap of the socialist bloc was to absorb some of its ideas, institutions, and general moderating influences vis-à-vis hardcore capitalism. The same will occur with radical Islam. To gain that population's acceptance of the dominant capitalist rule-set in the Core, we will have to incorporate some of their "contestations" about what's wrong or too harsh about capitalism's current version, or rule set.
This is not convergence or the "mongrelization" of the rule set, but simply its logical expansion. Globalization is like the Borg from Star Trek in that manner: you will be assimilated, but of course, we will be changed by that process. As the Borg threatened more than once to humans: "The best of what is you will be assimilated into the larger whole."
Sound scary? Sure. Assimilation always is, but the larger process is hardly one of homogenizing the Gap, but rather one of diversifying the Core.
As the father of a "mongrel" family whose own very Irish-German Catholic rule set has been redefined by a small Chinese female who's remade our collective sense of who we are, I can tell you it ain't easy, but it sure is both rewarding and beautiful in the end.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:40 PM
In trade, bilats matter
¦"U.S.-Bahrain Accord Stirs Persian Gulf Trade Partners," by Michelle Wallin, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. W1.
America's freed trade accord with Bahrain is shaking things up in the Gulf, where Saudi Arabia has always acted like it was going to be the dominant economic player. But how can it possibly hope to play that role when all it offers is oil and nothing else? Trade is based on complimentarity and there is virtually none in the Gulf, because if there was, their intra-regional trade levels wouldn't be the lowest in the world.
So how to perturb that system? Give Jordan a free-trade agreement a few years back and watch it's exports to the U.S. soar many times over. Then do it again to Bahrain, and watch it redefine the Gulf Cooperation Council's flaccid customs union. And then watch the House of Saud get pissed.
Our long-term goal, a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. Insane you say? Ask Jordan and Bahrain, or any of the other GCC states now looking to replicate that bilateral treaty with the U.S.
Terrorism will haunt the Middle East and—by extension—the Core as a whole so long as the region remains fundamentally disconnected from the global economy save for the narrow oil trade. The U.S. can either wait on regionalism to emerge, with the self-preserving House of Saud "leading" the way, or for some massive global trade deal to emerge, or it can bilat the situation forward all by itself.
Of course, as I said in PNM:
Outside of military alliances, the United States need to continue doing exactly what U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has advocated and pursued over the past several years: bilateral free-trade agreements, regional free-trade agreements, and global free-trade agreements. None should be prioritized over another, and all should be pursued to their earliest common denominators. Bilateral agreements like the one the United States cut with Jordan more than half a decade ago can have huge demonstrative effects, even when the politics of the agreement far outpaces its economic logic.
I say, keep on "demonstrating" Bob, and when Bush asks you to be the new head of the World Bank, say "yes!"
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:40 PM
Adjusting the rule set for Argentina
¦"Economic Rally For Argentines Defies Forecasts: After Record '01 Default; Ignoring Orthodox Advice Results in 8% Growth for 2 Years Running," by Larry Rohter, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. A1.
People who hate PNM often like to describe the IMF and World Bank as agents of great evil, thus my praise for and reliance on them regarding the spread of rule sets within the global economy is described as a sort of economic "empire" by which the Core plots to keep the Gap poor and deny New Core powers a fair playing field
This is what I wrote in PNM on page 131:
Of course, always trying to play by globalization's evolving rule set does not guarantee success, it just makes success more likely—on average. But when states do follow the rule sets adequately and their economies still end up being abused in the global marketplace, as in Argentina or Brazil in recent years, then it is incumbent upon those international organizations and the largest economic powers that dominate them to adjut the rule sets accordingly. That is simply the squeaky wheel asking for grease, and that has to be allowed.
When Argentina comes out of it's '01 bankruptcy by following some IMF advice and outright countermanding large chunks of it, it is simply helping us refine and redefine the range of the A-to-Z system for processing economically bankrupt states. That rule set is logically under constant revision, as we build up experience over time. Since the data pool is very small, each new experience moves the pile of our understanding considerably.
Does this prove the IMF is bad and wrong? No, it simply proves it's not omniscient and learns like everybody else. The IMF is nothing more than an enforcer of conventional wisdom, which is nothing more than past experiences codified into coherent understanding. That understanding is subject to constant revision, and—not surprisingly—the main sources for that revision process will be New Core states, because in their successful transition from Gap to Core, they literally rewrite the book, adding new chapters of understanding.
So expect New Core states to "defy forecasts" and conventional wisdom regularly. This isn't a sign of the Core's stupidity or ignorance, but a mechanism by which the Core economic rule set improves systematically over time.
The entire Core benefits from Argentina's experience, and its willingness to forge new rules. America is hardly the only source of new rules, and over time, it will be only one of many such forces within the Core.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:39 PM
Zimbabwe: more bad signs on the horizon
¦"Zimbabwe Extends Crackdown On Dissent as Election Nears," by Michael Wines, New York Times, 24 December 2004, p. A1.
Mugabe is scared and it's showing. His ZANU-PF party was almost swept out of power in free elections in both 2000 and 2002, so he's taking no chances for 2005. According to this article, he's "taken a series measures designed to minimize the chances of another competitive ballot."
I know what you're thinking: just like the Republicans in 2004!
But seriously, in our political system both sides are free to push the envelope, and we've got the Congress and the courts to work out the rule sets. In Zimbabwe, there's no real restraints on the actions of the party in power, just a sort of distant "judgment of the international community."
Try some of these out: you can go to jail for practicing journalism without a license granted by the government. Compare that to the phenomenon of Matt Drudge and political bloggers in the U.S. and you begin to see why our system, slimy as it sometimes gets, is sparkling clean compared to your average Gap state.
Another: one measure gives the government direct control over churches, non-governmental groups and charities, to include the ability to investigate their finances, restrict their activities and ban them by fiat if desired. That ain't exactly like letter Michael Moore do his thing and sell $100m-plus in movie tickets in the process, now is it?
Zimbabwe is going downhill and fast. The president after Bush better be thinking of what that regime change will need to look like, because we will be sucked into that situation eventually, if we have a conscience.
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:39 PM
Pakistan and bomb-selling: implicit villains in the Core, plenty of customers in the Gap
¦"As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected," by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, New York Times, 26 December 2004, p. A1.
This article details—in a nutshell—why I think it's a waste of time trying to use arms control treaties to stop technology flows from the Core to the Gap.
Pakistan got the bomb a long time ago from the Chinese, who got it from the Sovs. Where they've sold it is entirely to countries inside the Gap: North Korea (okay, my outlier), Iran, Libya. Where else do we suspect atomic mastermind Khan to have possibly sold stuff? This is where he traveled in his duties: Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, Nigeria, Kenya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Kazakhistan—all Gap states. Middlemen were from Dubai and UAE, classic connectors inside the Gap.
Who helped in this process? Who sold the connecting technology? Here's the list from the Core: Switzerland, Netherlands, Germany, South Africa, Britain, Spain, Italy. Then there's a crew of Seam States that were involved: Malaysia, Singapore, and Turkey.
All in all, seem like non-proliferation treaties are working?
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at 01:39 PM
Postwar occupation planning in the Pentagon for Iraq: the magic cloud phenomenon
¦"Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan: Major Calls Effort in Iraq 'Mediocre,'" by Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post, 25 December 2004, p. A1.
In Pentagon briefings, when planners don't know how something is going to work out, they tend to put the "magic cloud" on the PowerPoint slide that signifies a sort of black-box experience where it all works out—we just can't describe it in advance. In economic planning, the equivalent is the "negative wedge," or the magical cost savings that will appear in the future. Why? Because we desperately need it, that's why!
There is a great bit that Mark Warren (yes, that evil man who is constantly strangling my "voice"!*) in the upcoming Esquire article where I talk about postwar occupation planning for another scenario and I describe it as "both PowerPoint slides!"
Of course, the reference is supposed to be a joke, but based on this Army major's official report, it seems it isn't. There basically was no written plan for "Phase IV," the Pentagon term for the second half, or the postconflict stabilization/occupation/rebuilding effort.
"There was no Phase IV plan" for occupying Iraq after the combat phase, writes Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq. While a variety of government offices had considered the possible situations that would follow a U.S. victory, Wilson writes, no one produced an actual document laying out a strategy to consolidate the victory after major combat operations ended.
"While there may have been 'plans' at the national level, and even within various agencies within the war zone, none of these 'plans' operationalized the problem beyond regime collapse"—that is, laid out how U.S. forces would be moved and structured, Wilson writes in an essay that has been delivered at several academic conferences but not published. "There was no adequate operational plan for stability operations and support operations."
This is stunning in the extreme. I have participated in several command post exercises in various military commands (particularly Pacific Command) and I find it amazingly hard to believe that the national leadership (Chairman of Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, President) let Central Command and Tommy Franks off the hook on that one. I am simply amazed. To me, that would have been the planning section that would have logically received the most attention and argument—especially from an Army that loathes nation-building and wants to ditch those situations as fast as possible.
As a result of the failure to produce a plan, Wilson asserts, the U.S. military lost the dominant position in Iraq in the summer of 2003 and has been scrambling to recover ever since. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces lost the momentum and the initiative . . . gained over an off-balanced enemy," he writes. The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."
It was only in November 2003, seven months after the fall of Baghdad, that U.S. occupation authorities produced a formal "Phase IV" plan for stability operations, Wilson reports. Phase I covers preparation for combat, followed by initial operations, Phase II, and combat, Phase III. Post-combat operations are called Phase IV.
Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt."
Yeah, and that condition is called the Powell Doctrine Syndrome. Tommy Franks, consider giving back your Medal of Freedom.
* Don't worry, I'm just kidding. This is my way of getting Mark Warren to give me a call. He'll read the bit above, trust me, and phone me immediately to complain. And no, he won't bother reading this far down . . . |
