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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/3/2005 10:02:47 PM
From: SiouxPal  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
Gonzales Torture Memo Controversy Builds

By Jesse J. Holland / Associated Press

WASHINGTON - Attorney General nominee Alberto Gonzales' confirmation hearing this week may become more contentious because the White House has refused to provide copies of his memos on the questioning of terror suspects.

"We go into the hearing with some knowledge of what has occurred because of press reports or leaks but without the hard evidence that will either exonerate or implicate Judge Gonzales in this policy," complained Sen. Richard Durbin of Illinois, the Senate's No. 2 Democrat, on Monday.

Durbin and other Democrats plan to question Gonzales on his involvement in the crafting of policies concerning questioning — policies that the Justice Department has backed away from.

Still, the issue probably won't be enough to stop Republicans from confirming Gonzales as the first Hispanic attorney general.

Republicans hold 55 seats in the new Senate, while Democrats control 44 seats and there is a Democratic-leaning independent. The Democrats have not yet decided whether to try to block Gonzales' confirmation.

"I think the hearing will be contentious, but in the end Judge Gonzales will be confirmed because he deserves to be confirmed," said Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, who will introduce Gonzales at the confirmation hearing.

The Justice Department in 2002 asserted that President Bush's wartime powers superseded anti-torture laws and treaties like the Geneva Conventions. Gonzales, while at the White House, also wrote a memo to President Bush on January 25, 2002, arguing that the war on terrorism "renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions."

Gonzales also received several memos on the subject, including one from then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee arguing that the president has the power to issue orders that violate the Geneva Conventions as well as international and U.S. laws prohibiting torture.

Durbin, who sits on the Judiciary Committee, says the White House has refused to give those memos to Democrats so they can determine exactly how the policies were crafted.

"We asked them to produce the memos that they have and can release that were given to Judge Gonzales or were generated by him, and so far they have not claimed executive privilege but have refused to produce this documentation," Durbin said.

The White House says it has shared several documents with the committee's ranking Democrat, Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, and plans on working with Democrats to see if their questions can be resolved.

The Justice memos have since been disavowed and the White House says the United States has always operated under the spirit of the Geneva Conventions that prohibit violence, torture and humiliating treatment.

But critics say the original documents set up a legal framework that led to abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, in Afghanistan and at the U.S. prison camp for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

"What they're trying to do is continue their attacks on President Bush because of his policies since 9/11 that the people didn't buy on Nov. 2," Cornyn said. "They also are trying to muddy the water to make it harder for the president to nominate him for the Supreme Court later on."

On New Year's Eve, the Justice Department made public a new policy backing off those memos.

"The fact that officials in this administration's own Justice Department felt compelled to repudiate an earlier torture memo approved by Mr. Gonzales should itself be sufficient to persuade the senators that he is not fit to be the top law enforcement official in the land," said Ron Daniels, executive director of the Center for Constitutional Rights.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/4/2005 8:14:18 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Global: The Lessons of 2004
_______________________________

By Stephen Roach (New York)

morganstanley.com

It has long been said that financial markets are the ultimate mousetrap — designed to embarrass the largest number of people, the greatest amount of time. That old adage was certainly in rare form in 2004. As I look back on the year, I do so with mixed emotions. From my global perch, it was largely a year of half-baked themes — macro trends that were great to debate but ones that gained only partial traction in world financial markets. It is often claimed that we learn more from our mistakes than from our triumphs. I couldn't agree more. The key, of course, is to convert that knowledge into personal and professional growth. In that spirit, I present my annual effort at personal inventory: the five lessons of 2004.

For me, many of last year's lessons are interrelated — part and parcel of the general framework of global rebalancing that has guided my macro view over the past few years. First is the timeworn debate over global imbalances. In many respects, I have led the charge in arguing that imbalances matter — especially the unprecedented disparities between the world's current account deficits (mainly the US) and surpluses (Asia and, to a lesser extent, Europe). I still have deep conviction on that count. But I certainly have to confess that this call has gained only partial traction, at best, in world financial markets. When I speak with equity investors, they look at me as if I have come from a different planet. Suffice it to say, the resolution of global imbalances has hardly had a major impact on share prices. The same can be said of bond investors, as yields on longer-term securities barely budged in the face of unprecedented global imbalances. Of course, it was a different matter altogether in foreign exchange markets as the dollar came under renewed pressure over the course of last year. The broad dollar index fell about 7% in real terms in the second half of 2004, bringing the cumulative decline from the early 2002 peak to about 16%.

It its simplest sense, global rebalancing argues for a narrowing of disparities between current account deficits and surpluses. This boils down to nothing short of a fundamental realignment of the world's US-centric growth dynamic — a shift in the mix of global growth away from America back toward the rest of the world. Implicit in this adjustment would be a related shift in the mix of global saving — namely, an increase in the anemic US national saving rate and a reduction of excess saving in Asia and Europe. The rebalancing model assigns a key role to financial markets in sparking such a realignment.

From the start, I have felt that currency adjustments would be the trigger to market-driven rebalancing. Currencies are emblematic of the world's relative price structure, and a lopsided US-centric world was certainly in need of a weaker dollar. As such, I viewed the dollar's renewed decline in late 2004 as an encouraging development on the road to rebalancing. But I never thought that currency adjustments could do the job, alone. Instead, I argued that adjustments in foreign exchange rates were basically a Trojan horse, likely to usher in adjustments in other asset prices that would provide a more decisive impetus to global rebalancing. Interest rates were at the top of my list in that regard — having a much greater potential than currency shifts to spark meaningful adjustments in aggregate demand.

And that takes me to the second lesson of 2004 — a shockingly benign climate in US and global bond markets. Take yourself back a year ago: If you had known that the Fed would tighten by 125 basis points (I publicly urged Chairman Greenspan to go by 200 bps), that the US core inflation rate would essentially double, that crude oil prices would shoot up into the mid-$50 range, that the US economy would grow by nearly 4.5%, that America's twin deficits (budget and current-account) would soar, and that the dollar would come under renewed pressure, the bearish call for longer-term US interest rates would have been a no-brainer. And yet yields on 10-year Treasuries basically ended the year where they began at approximately 4.2% — with a modest increase in inflationary expectations largely offset by a surprising decline in real interest rates (as captured in the inflation-indexed TIPS market). Hard as it may be to admit, this result basically turns the art of interest rate forecasting inside out.

For me, the circle gets squared through global capital inflows — the seemingly open-ended bid for dollar-denominated assets by non-US investors. In the 12 months ending October 2004 (latest US Treasury data available), net foreign buying of long-term US securities totaled $850.6 billion, well in excess of the cumulative current-account deficit of $603 billion recorded over the four quarters ending in 3Q04. Yes, there was an increase in the share of dollar-denominated assets purchased by foreign central banks, from 18% to 27% over the past year; this was a conscious policy choice, largely aimed at preventing Asian currencies from rising and thereby impeding the region's export-led growth dynamic. But the bulk of the flows still came from non-US private investors seeking return and/or security in dollar-denominated assets. And nearly 97% of the net flows were concentrated in fixed income securities, as foreign buying of US equities remained de minimus. Little wonder US interest rates stayed so low. Needless to say, if this voracious foreign appetite for US bonds remains intact in 2005, another interest rate surprise could well be in the offing. I doubt it, but stranger things certainly have happened.

The third lesson of 2004 follows very much from the first two —an unusual venting of global imbalances. Up until now, currency realignments have borne the brunt of global rebalancing. Yet, as I noted above, the dollar's drop to date hasn't been sufficient to get the job done. That shouldn't be so surprising. Over the past decade, the responsiveness of trade flows and shifts in inflation to currency swings seems to have diminished, suggesting that it would take enormous, and politically unacceptable, moves in foreign exchange markets to force a narrowing of disparities in trade- and current-account imbalances. It's hard to know what accounts for this reduction in currency elasticities, but I suspect it has to do with globalization's impacts on trade flows and pricing.

Macro theory, as well as experience, suggests that the venting of global imbalances — especially the unprecedented strain that is evident today — cannot be permanently confined to one asset market. As such, spillover effects eventually should show up in other asset classes, especially bonds, where the bulk of dollar-denominated capital flows has been concentrated in recent years. There comes a point when private foreign portfolio investors demand to be compensated for taking outsized currency risk, and that compensation normally takes the form of higher real interest rates. There also comes a point when the offset from official capital inflows becomes politically and economically untenable; it perpetuates trade imbalances, thereby raising protectionist risks, and it also leads to a loss of control over the domestic money supply, thereby stoking inflationary pressures. So far, the dollar's 16% correction has been orderly and relatively muted, without major repercussion on other asset markets. Another downleg of 10–15% on a broad trade-weighted basis could well change that — ironically, just at a point when most market participants have concluded that the currency factor doesn't matter. I suspect that the venting of global imbalances is about to broaden into fixed income markets, underscoring the potential for collateral impacts on equity markets, as well.

The fourth lesson of 2004 bears on the power of the Asset Economy and the related resilience it has imparted to the seemingly unflappable American consumer — long the major engine on the demand side of the global economy. Despite sub-par wage income growth, anemic job creation, historical lows in personal saving, and record household sector debt loads, US consumption growth appears to have exceeded 3.5% over the four quarters of 2004. In my view, this latest outcome — along with comparable results that have generally persisted since the late 1990s — is very much an outgrowth of an asset-driven spending dynamic. First, it was the equity wealth effect, then more recently the impetus from property markets. In ever-rising asset markets, consumers have chosen to substitute wealth accumulation for income-based saving. This works for as long as asset markets do not go to excess and for as long as the interest-rate underpinnings of such markets remain favorable. With America's housing market now in bubble territory and with interest rate risks likely to tip to the upside, the staying power of its asset-driven consumer could be tested in 2005. I was wrong on that view in 2004, but in large part, I believe that was because the interest rate test never occurred. If that test now comes to pass, the long-awaited capitulation of the American consumer could well be at hand.

China gets the nod as providing the final lesson of 2004. The Chinese economy was very overheated a year ago, and as the authorities moved to rein in the excesses of runaway growth, fears of a hard landing intensified. Those fears turned out to be overblown. A judicious combination of administrative controls, banking reform, and modest macro tightening measures resulted in a well-managed cooling-off of economic activity. Chinese industrial output growth slowed from 19.4% in the first two months of 2004 to 14.8% by November. While a further moderation still seems likely, my take from my recent travels to Beijing is that the downside is likely to be limited from here — an important implication for Chinese-led pressures on global commodity markets and world trade flows.

China's major challenges in 2005 are likely to shift away from the management of its business cycle toward a re-emphasis on reforms. In a falling dollar environment, a re-working of China's currency regime could be an increasingly important item on its reform agenda. While China would prefer to wait until it is "ready" on this score, the rest of the world may not be nearly so patient. This underscores an increasingly critical juncture in China's extraordinary journey — the need to strike a better balance between its domestic objectives and the global implications of its remarkable transformation.

These five lessons only skim the surface of what I learned from the global economy in 2004. They overlook a number of other key developments —ranging from the emergence of India and the persistent stagnation of Europe to the lack of global policy coordination and long-awaited signs of cross-border productivity convergence. A dynamic and increasingly integrated world economy is hardly lacking in food for thought as we peer into the future. No matter how long I toil as a macro practitioner, I never cease to be amazed at the opportunity to learn new lessons every year. I have no doubt that the same will be the case in 2005.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/5/2005 3:38:41 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
New Years notes from the Idaho silver fields -

Pennaluna Prospector: Northwest Mining Stock News -- Coeur d’Alene, Idaho --

January 5, 2005

2004 was not exactly a sizzler for Northwest mining stocks, or most other mining securities either.

Prices for precious metals held up well enough, with gold and silver touching multi-year peaks. But most mining stocks started January on a high note and then slid slowly downhill the rest of the year, except for a brief spring rally.

While far from a disaster, it was a let down for many investors after the exhilaration they felt in 2003.

Now some folks are asking us what we see ahead for 2005. You may know that as a general rule we don’t publish market forecasts. Sophisticated technical and fundamental analysis is pretty much beyond us country boys.

Still, Pennaluna has been trading mining stocks since 1926 and our ten brokers and traders have close to 200 years of experience dealing with these securities. As a result, we get our fair share of hunches. Sometimes they’re even right.

So if by chance you’re curious, here’s our hunch about the coming year… bedecked with maybes, hung with disclaimers, and based on pure gut instinct.

In a nutshell, we’re cautiously optimistic. Baring global financial collapse or some other extraordinary disaster, we think precious metals and most commodities are likely to head higher in 2005. Not enormously… and not in a straight line, because we expect volatile corrections along the way… but trending upward nonetheless.

As for mining stocks, most probably won’t rise dramatically until a new group of investors joins the party. Of course there will be individual exceptions. But the fact remains that most hard asset fans are already fully invested, or close to it. Thus, money to fuel any broad-based rise must come from people and institutions that haven’t participated yet.

We think that will start some time this year, as more “mainstream” investors grasp the import of the world’s move toward tangible assets. We expect to see a trickle of new money that grows into a moderate, but not enormous, stream. Since the sector is so tiny relative to the general market, even such a modest tide of new investment would quickly lift most mining ships.

Regionally, we look for more corporate resurrections, as old firms are revived by improved market conditions or new managements step in to take charge. This has already happened with outfits like Mines Management, Idaho General, Little Squaw Gold, Timberline Resources and others.

A reviving market means any one of these born again juniors has a chance to hit the jackpot. The odds are mighty long, of course. But recall that Coeur d’Alene Mines was worth a couple of pennies a share in the late 1960’s and by 1980 was trading for $30 on the NYSE. More currently, Sterling Mining rocketed from under a quarter to over $13 in a handful of months.

So it may pay to keep an eye on developments up here in the year ahead. And to that end, following is some of the recent news from our neck of the woods.

** Coeur d'Alene Mines (NYSE: CDE) reports it will start work on its $135 million San Bartolome silver project in Bolivia, where it hopes to produce eight million ounces a year beginning in 2006. Located in the famed Potosi region, the open pit operation could boost total Coeur silver output by over 40 percent annually.

The firm also received final environmental approvals on the Kensington gold project in Alaska, and may start work by March. In the midst of the activity, President Robert Martinez resigned at year-end and CEO Dennis Wheeler took over his position. CDE has traded lately at around $3.70, down from a 52-week high of nearly $7.70.

** Idaho General Mines (OTCBB: IGMI) of Spokane is a Rip Van Winkle that’s been around since the Roaring Twenties but took a long snooze during the bear market. A few months ago, it was awakened by Bob Russell and his team of mining veterans -- including son David, CEO of Apollo Gold, and Glenn Dobbs, President of Mines Management.

With prices skyrocketing, the old timer is now pursuing molybdenum. In November, it announced it had an option on Mount Hope Mines’ previously drilled and promising moly deposit down in Eureka County, Nevada. The firm says a pre-feasibility study will be ready by April. IGMI was about .30 last summer and trades now around .80.

** The Northwest Mining Association held its 110th Annual Meeting in Spokane in early December. Executive Director Laura Skaer tells us attendance was up around 30 percent from last year, while exhibitor numbers rose over 20 percent. The big turnout underscores the mining industry’s improved health. Special note: the all day silver session chaired by Hecla CEO Phil Baker drew rave reviews.

** Esperanza Silver (TSX:EPZ) CEO Bill Pincus and VP Bill Bond stopped by during the NWMA meeting. No strangers to North Idaho, both served stints at Sunshine Mining. They said something that struck us. It seems EPZ is a sort of “virtual” firm. Its headquarters are in Denver, where Bill P. lives. Bill B. lives up here. With property mainly in South America and Mexico, its geologists are in Peru. The stock trades in Canada, so it saves money by sharing corporate support services with a couple of Vancouver firms.

Esperanza works in the ancient industry of mining, yet it is a 21st century firm made possible by technology. This model holds promise for juniors seeking maximum efficiency with minimal cost. We expect to see it used more widely.

** Denver coverage? Many miners besides Esperanza Silver are officed around the Mile High City: Newmont Gold, Apollo Gold, Canyon Resources, Apex Silver and others. Should we expand Pennaluna Prospector coverage to include more Denver news? Email comments to tom@penntrade.com.

** Timberline Resources (PinkSheets:TBLC) of Spokane reached agreement with Hecla to earn 49 percent of Hecla's Snowstorm Trend Project up in the Silver Valley. Timberline says the project includes the Snowstorm Mine, which a century ago produced around 800,000 tons of ore averaging four percent copper and six ounces silver. It also includes unpatented claims recently staked by Timberline, plus patented mineral rights owned by Hecla. TBLC has traded lately in the .55 range.

* * Apollo Gold (AMEX:AGT/TSX:APG), which runs the Montana Tunnels Mine over by Helena, reports construction of its Standard Mine near Winnemucca, Nevada, is complete. Pad loading at the open pit gold operation began in October, heap leaching in November, and the first gold/silver dore bar was poured in December. Apollo hopes to produce over 40,000 ounces of gold there this year.

Meanwhile, Apollo stock -- under selling pressure for months -- has recently recovered somewhat. From a high last January of $ 2.59, it plunged to a low last fall of .51. Now it has climbed back up over .75.

* * Hecla Mining (NYSE:HL), the 113-year old granddaddy of all our local miners, recently declared a dividend of 87.5 cents a share on its Series B Cumulative Convertible Preferred to be paid in January. Past due dividends of about $2.4 million won’t be paid in order to save cash for future needs.

Earlier this fall, Hecla celebrated 40 years of Big Board trading when CEO Phil Baker and former CEO’s Art Brown and Bill Griffith rang the closing bell on the NYSE. Hecla shares were recently upgraded by CIBC World Markets and trade at about $5.57.

* * Montana said “no” in November, as Big Sky voters decisively quashed proposed pro-mining initiative I-147 by a margin of 59 percent to 41. The measure was backed by the Montana Mining Association and would have again allowed cyanide use in mining.

** Canyon Resources (Amex:CAU), which controls the big McDonald gold project near Lincoln, Montana, saw its stock price slashed by nearly two-thirds after voters gave
I-147 the thumbs down. Shares were $2.88 on Election Day and by early December had tumbled down to $1.09. They have since edged back up around $1.17.

Canyon vows to continue its $500 million lawsuit against the state over the cyanide ban. It also says it will review cyanide alternatives and keep on looking for other advanced-stage gold and silver properties.

* * Mines Management (AMEX:MGN) reported progress on re-permitting its massive Montanore project over near Libby, Montana. The property is estimated to hold up to 260 million ounces of silver and 2 billion pounds of copper. The Spokane firm says it’s not concerned about the defeat of I-147, since the Montanore is not an open pit mine and will not use cyanide, major issues in the initiative. MGN shares moved up to the AMEX last year and now trade around $4.21.

* * Trend Mining (OTCBB:TRDM), a long-time CDA firm that now works mainly out of Denver, reports it expanded land positions at two sprawling Saskatchewan projects. It added 6 square miles to the Cree Lake uranium project, bringing those holdings to roughly 16 square miles.

Trend also enlarged its Peter Lake platinum and palladium project to over 140 square miles. For two summers, the Geological Survey of Canada and the Saskatchewan Geological Survey have carried out extensive research on the Peter Lake area (reportedly including Trend's claims) and most results should be out by May. Now headed by Thomas Loucks, a geologist with degrees from Dartmouth and Stanford and a resume that includes the turn-around of Royal Gold, TRDM is trading at about a quarter.

** New Jersey Mining (OTCBB:NJMC) says it will exercise its option to lease the Golden Chest gold mine up near Murray, Idaho. Production from the Katie-Dora vein there may start before second quarter. The firm also says last year’s drilling suggests the Chest may host a large underground deposit, so it will continue exploring for deeper gold in 2005. Shares of Kellogg-based New Jersey trade for about .50, near the low end of their 52-week range.

** Minera Andes (TSX:MAI/OTCBB:MNEAF) reports discovery of new silver and gold mineralization -- some of it bonanza grade -- during underground construction and reserve development at the Huevos Verdes vein of its San Jose project in Argentina. The Spokane firm controls about 500,000 acres in that country. MAI also closed on $2 million of a $4 million loan facility. The shares are about US$ .55.

* * Stillwater Mining (NYSE: SWC) over in Columbus, Montana, posted third quarter earnings of a nickel a share, versus a two-cent loss a year ago. It says production for the first nine months of 2004 rose about eight thousand ounces at the East Boulder Mine, but fell about 29,000 ounces at the Stillwater Mine because of a labor strike and lower ore quality.

Stillwater -- now controlled by Russia's Norilsk Nickel -- is the only U.S. producer of palladium and platinum, and the largest primary producer of PGM outside South Africa. The current work place of many Silver Valley miners, SWC has traded lately at about $10.58… well off a 52-week high above $18.

* * Sterling Mining (PinkSheets:SRLM), which took control of the Sunshine Mine about eighteen months ago, says it has started to rehabilitate part of the Silver Summit Tunnel there. The mile-long primary access to the Silver Summit hoist and shaft is a key part of the Shine’s ventilation and escape system, and important for redevelopment of the mine.

The Wallace outfit also reported it has finished construction of the Baroness tailings project in Mexico’s Zacatecas silver district; contracted for a Canadian 43-101 technical report on its Mexican exploration projects; added to properties in the Silver Valley and Montana; and plans geophysical exploration of its new Merger Mines property early this year. SRLM today is trading at about the $4.85 level.

* * Thunder Mountain Gold (OTCBB: THMG) of Spokane received a USFS appraisal in anticipation of the federal government’s purchase of the Thunder Mountain Mining District in Idaho’s Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness. Preliminary estimates of the value of the sale to THMG are in the $5 million to $5.5 million range. With only 10 million shares out, the stock trades at .30. The firm also has exploration interests in the western U.S. and rights to a polymetallic deposit in Nevada.

* * Kinross Gold (NYSE:KGC/TSX:K) at year-end agreed with Crown Resources (OTCBB:CRCE) to extend until May 31 the date for its acquisition of Crown and its Buckhorn Mountain gold deposit in north central Washington. Kinross also agreed to fund a $1 million private placement of Crown stock.

KGC plans to develop an underground mine at Buckhorn Mountain. The high-grade gold skarn has almost a million ounces of proven and probable reserves and is located about 40 miles from Kinross’ Kettle River mill. KGC traded above $8.50 in the past year. Recently upgraded by CIBC World Markets, it’s now about $6.80.

** Little Squaw Gold (OTCBB:LITS) is a long-time local favorite that got geared up with new management in 2003 when Dick Walters and his team stepped in. Last summer -- for the first time in two decades -- the Spokane firm conducted hard rock exploration at its 15 square mile gold property in Alaska’s Chandalar District. Last fall, it reported finding six new gold veins (bringing the known total to thirty) and several dozen new potential drill targets. LITS is trading now a bit under .40.

* * WGI Heavy Minerals (TSX:WG), the Coeur d’Alene miner and marketer of industrial grade minerals, breathed a sigh of relief that its two Indian plants suffered no loss of life and only mild damage when the tsunami battered South Asia. WG in the past year has ranged between CDN $12.00 and $4.00 and is trading now around CDN $5.00.

** Oh great, tax season. The bad news is it’s almost time to send your yearly tribute to our rulers. The good news is you can still fund your traditional IRA for last year and cut your tax bill this spring. You have until April 15.

“All you need in life is ignorance and confidence; then success is sure.”
Mark Twain

Editor: Tom Wobker

Disclosure: Pennaluna & Company is a NASD broker-dealer and market maker. As such, it frequently buys or sells stocks for its own account, or in order to make a market. Consequently, Pennaluna may at any time buy or sell or make a market in any stock mentioned herein, and associated persons may also buy, sell or hold such stock at any time. The firm and/or associated persons may also engage in private placements or other investment banking activities with any company mentioned. This publication is intended solely to provide readers with information. Mention of a company does not in any manner constitute a recommendation, unless specifically so stated. Information is believed accurate but accuracy is not guaranteed.

Copyright © 2004 Pennaluna & Company

pennaluna.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/6/2005 12:17:01 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Dollar Gains, Heading for the Longest Rally in More Than a Year

Jan. 6 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar rose against the euro for a fifth day, the longest advance in more than a year, on optimism an acceleration in U.S. job growth will bolster the case for higher interest rates.

The U.S. currency also gained versus the yen on the eve of a Labor Department report that may say employers added 175,000 workers last month, according to median forecast in a Bloomberg survey. The Federal Reserve said two days ago that its target interest rate is too low to slow inflation.

``Nobody wants to be aggressively selling the dollar ahead of a jobs report that could be very strong -- that's likely to keep the dollar on the front foot for the rest of the week,'' said Kamal Sharma, a currency strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in London. ``We could get down to $1.3130 this week, but then we'd be looking to buy euros again.''

Against the euro, the dollar rose to $1.3186 at 10:24 a.m. in London, from $1.3261 late yesterday in New York, according to electronic foreign-exchange trading system EBS. It hasn't gained for five straight days versus the euro since October 2003. The U.S. currency also advanced to 104.84 yen, from 104.14.

Fed Bank of Kansas City President Thomas Hoenig, who doesn't vote on rates this year, will speak today on the economy to business leaders in Kansas City. The Fed lifted its target rate for overnight bank loans five times last year, to 2.25 percent, a quarter point above the European Central Bank's benchmark.

``You have to watch Fed comments closely for any additional support they may give to the idea they want to be more aggressive in raising rates,'' said Richard Yetsenga, a currency strategist in Hong Kong at HSBC Holdings Plc. ``That would build on the yield differential argument for the dollar.'' HSBC forecasts the dollar at $1.34 at the end of March.

`Spectacular Number'

The dollar has this week risen more than 3 cents against the euro. It rose by 2 yen two days ago. Such a movement is ``wild,'' and Japan will act on currencies as necessary, Vice Finance Minister Hiroshi Watanabe told reporters in Tokyo today.

Further gains in the dollar may be limited as some traders will probably place fresh bets on the dollar to slide, said Kristjan Kasikov, a currency strategist in London at Calyon, the investment-banking unit of Credit Agricole SA.

Tomorrow's U.S. job growth figure would have to exceed 200,000 for the dollar to extend gains, Kasikov said. ``It will take quite a spectacular number to inspire any more buying.'' Calyon predicts the dollar will fall to $1.35 per euro and 102 yen at the end of the first quarter.

The euro stayed lower after the Bloomberg purchasing manager index for the 12-nation euro region showed retail sales rose for the first month in five in December. The gauge compiled for Bloomberg by NTC Research Ltd. climbed to a seasonally adjusted 50.6 from 48 in November.

Volkswagen's Loss

Volkswagen AG, Europe's biggest carmaker, lost 1 billion euros ($1.3 billion) in the U.S. last year, partly because of a falling dollar, Chief Executive Officer Bernd Pischetsrieder said in an interview. An aging product line and rising rebates also contributed, he said at the Los Angeles auto show yesterday.

The company reported a seventh consecutive decline in quarterly profit in October. Pischetsrieder said Volkswagen still met its 2004 profit target as cost cuts balanced a drop in the dollar that cut its earnings in the U.S. and China.

The dollar dropped 7 percent in 2004 against a basket of major currencies, hurt by concern record U.S. current-account and budget deficits will undermine demand for the currency. It fell to a record $1.3666 per euro on Dec. 30.

Dollar `Battle'

``What we see currently is that there's a battle going on for people's attention, between growth and the interest-rate differential and the current-account deficit,'' said Michael Klawitter, a currency strategist at West LB AG in Dusseldorf.

``The selling pressure today is coming from hedge funds but I'm still fairly cautious about this trend,'' said Klawitter, who expects the dollar will fall to $1.35 per euro and 101.50 yen by the end of March.

Minutes from the Fed's Dec. 14 meeting released on Jan. 4 said rates are ``below the level'' needed to slow inflation. Fed policy makers are next scheduled to meet on Feb. 1-2.

Yields on interest-rate futures have risen as traders raised bets for U.S. rate increases this year. The yield on December Eurodollar futures contracts was 3.71 percent in Singapore, from 3.44 percent a month ago. The contract settles at a three-month lending rate that has averaged 0.22 percentage point above the Fed's target in the past 10 years.

`Another Sell-Off'

The shortfall in the current account, the widest measure of trade because it includes some investment flows, reached a record $164.7 billion in the third quarter. A wider deficit means more dollars need to be converted to other currencies to pay for imports. The U.S. also had a record $412 billion federal budget deficit for the fiscal year ended Sept. 30.

``A weak payrolls number will remind everyone about the twin-deficit problems facing the dollar and start another sell- off,'' said Tomohisa Kawaguchi, manager of foreign exchange in Tokyo at Citigroup Inc. The bank forecasts the dollar will decline by the end of March to a record $1.39 per euro and to 98 yen, a level not seen since 1995.

Last Updated: January 6, 2005 05:28 EST

quote.bloomberg.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/6/2005 1:41:03 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 


THE NAKED HEGEMON Part 1: Why the emperor has no clothes

atimes.com

By Andre Gunder Frank

Uncle Sam has reneged and defaulted on up to 40% of its trillion-dollar foreign debt, and nobody has said a word except for a line in The Economist. In plain English that means Uncle Sam runs a worldwide confidence racket with his self-made dollar based on the confidence that he has elicited and received from others around the world, and he is a also a deadbeat in that he does not honor and return the money he has received.

How much of our dollar stake we have lost depends on how much we originally paid for it. Uncle Sam let his dollar fall, or rather through his deliberate political economic policies drove it down, by 40%, from 80 cents to the euro to 133 cents. The dollar is down by a similar factor against the yen, yuan and other currencies. And it is still declining, indeed is apt to plummet altogether.

There was also a spate of competitive devaluations in the 1930s, called the "beggar thy neighbor policy" of shifting the costs for the neighbors to bear. True, as the dollar has declined, so has the real value that foreigners pay to service their debt to Uncle Sam. But that works only if they can themselves earn in currencies that have increased in value against the dollar. Otherwise, foreigners earn and pay in the same devalued dollars, and even then with some loss from devaluation between the time they got their dollars and the time they repay them to Uncle Sam. China and other East Asian nations do earn in dollars, to which they have pegged their currencies, so they have already lost a substantial portion of their dollar stake, by far the world's largest.

And they, like all others, will also lose the rest. For Uncle Sam's debt to the rest of the world already amounts to more than a third of his annual domestic production and is still growing. That alone already makes his debt economically and politically never repayable, even if he wanted to, which he does not. Uncle Sam's domestic, eg credit-card, debt is almost 100% of gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption, including that from China. Uncle Sam's federal debt is now US$7.5 trillion, of which all but $1 trillion was built up in the past three decades, the last $2 trillion in the past eight years, and the last $1 trillion in the past two years. Alas, that costs more than $300 billion a year in interest, compared with, for example, the $15 billion spent annually on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). But no worries: Congress just raised the debt ceiling to $8.2 trillion. To help us visualize, $1 trillion tightly packed up in $1,000 bills would match a building 40 stories high.

But nearly half is owed to foreigners. All Uncle Sam's debt, including private household consumer credit-card, mortgage etc debt of about $10 trillion, plus corporate and financial, with options, derivatives and the like, and state and local government debt comes to an unvisualizable, indeed unimaginable, $37 trillion, which is nearly four times Uncle Sam's GDP. Only some of that can be managed domestically, but with dangerous limitations for Uncle Sam noted below. That is only one reason I want you to meet Uncle Sam, the deadbeat confidence man, who may remind you of the film Meet Joe Black; for as we get to know him better below, we will find that he is also a Shylock, and a corrupt one at that.

The United States is the world's most privileged nation for having the monopoly privilege of printing the world's reserve currency at will and at a cost of nothing but the paper and ink it is printed on. Moreover, by doing so, Uncle Sam can export abroad the inflation he generates by the extra dollars he prints, of which there are already at least three times as many floating around the world as at Uncle Sam's home. Additionally, his is also the only country whose "foreign" debt is mostly denominated in his own world-currency dollars that he can print at will; while most foreigners' debt is also denominated in the same dollar, but they have to buy it from Uncle Sam with their own currency and real goods. So he simply pays the Chinese and others in essence with these dollars that already to begin with have no real worth beyond their paper and ink. So especially poor China gives away for nothing at all to rich Uncle Sam hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of real goods produced at home and consumed by Uncle Sam. Then China turns around and trades these same paper dollar bills in for more of Uncle Sam's paper called Treasury Certificate bonds, which are even more worthless, except that they pay a percent of interest. For as we already noted, they will never be able to be cashed in and redeemed in full or even in part, and anyway have the lost much of their value to Uncle Sam already.

In an earlier essay, I argued that Uncle Sam's power rests on two pillars only, the paper dollar and the Pentagon. Each supports the other, but the vulnerability of each is also an Achilles' heel that threatens the viability of the other. Since then, Iraq, not to mention Afghanistan, has shown confidence in the Pentagon not to be what it was cracked up to be; and with the in-part-consequent decline in the dollar, so has confidence in it and Uncle Sam's ability to use it to finance his Pentagon's foreign adventures (See Coup d'Etat and Paper Tiger in Washington, Fiery Dragon in the Pacific, which also conjures up the productive growth of China). Additionally we must realize that Uncle Sam's numbers above and below are also all literally relative. So far relations with other countries, in particular with China, still favor Uncle Sam, but they also help maintain an image that is deceptive. Consider the following:

A $2 toy leaving a US-owned factory in China is a $3 shipment arriving at San Diego. By the time a US consumer buys it for $10 at Wal-Mart, the US economy registers $10 in final sales, less $3 import cost, for a $7 addition to the US GDP. (Blaming 'undervalued' yuan wins votes, Asia Times Online, February 26, 2004)

Moreover, ever-clever Uncle Sam has arranged matters so as to earn 9% from his economic and financial holdings abroad, while foreigners earn only 3% on theirs, and among them on their Treasury Certificates only 1% real return. Note that this difference of 6 percentage points is already double what Uncle Sam pays out, and his total 9% take is triple the 3% he gives back. Therefore, although foreign holdings and Uncle Sam's are now about equal, Uncle Sam is still the big net interested winner, just like any Shylock, but no other ever did so grand a business.

But Uncle Sam also earns quite well, thank you, from other holdings abroad, eg from service payments by mostly poor foreign debtors. The sums involved are not peanuts or even small potatoes. For from his direct investments in foreign property alone, Uncle Sam's profits now equal 50%, and including his receipts from other holdings abroad now are a full 100% of profits derived from all of his own domestic activities combined. These foreign receipts add more than 4% to Uncle Sam's national domestic product. That helps nicely to compensate for the failure of domestic profits as yet to recover even their 1972 level, because Uncle Sam has failed to boost productivity sufficiently at home.

The productivity hype of president Bill Clinton's "new economy" in the 1990s was limited to computers and information technology (IT), and even that proved to be a sham when the dot-com bubble burst. Also, not only the apparent increase in "profits" but also that of "productivity" were, at the bottom, on the backs of shop-floor, office and sales-floor workers working harder and longer hours and, at the top, the result of innovative accounting shams by Enron and the like. Such factors still compensate for and permit much of Uncle Sam's $600-billion-and-still-rising trade deficit from excess home consumption over what he himself produces. That is what has resulted in the multitrillion-dollar debt. Exactly how large that debt is Uncle Sam is reluctant to reveal, but what is sure is that it is by far the world's largest, even as net debt to foreigners, after their debt to him is deducted.

How has all this come about?
The simple answer is that Uncle Sam, who is increasingly hooked on consumption, not to mention harder drugs, saves no more than 0.2% of his own income. The Federal Reserve's guru and now you see it, now you don't doctor of magic, Alan Greenspan, recently observed that this is so because the richest 20% of Americans, who are the only ones who do save, have reduced their savings to 2%. Yet even these measly savings (other, poorer countries save and even invest 20%, 30%, even 40% of their income) are more than counterbalanced by the 6% deficit spending of the government. That is what brings the average saving rate to 0.2%. To maintain that $400-plus-billion budget deficit (more than 3% of national domestic product), which is really more the $600 billion if we count, as we should, the more than $200 billion Uncle Sam "borrows" from the temporary surplus in his own Federal Social Security fund, which he is also bankrupting. (But never mind, President George W Bush just promised to privatize much of that and let people buy their own old-age "security" in the ever-insecure market).

So with this $600-billion-plus budget deficit and the above-mentioned related $600-billion-plus deficit, rich Uncle Sam, and primarily his highest earners and biggest consumers, as well as of course the Big Uncle himself, live off the fat of the rest of the world's land. Uncle Sam absorbs the savings of others who themselves are often much poorer, particularly when their central banks put many of their reserves in world-currency dollars and hence into the hands of Uncle Sam in Washington, and some also in dollars at home. Their private investors send dollars to or buy dollar assets on Wall Street, all with the confidence that they are putting their wherewithal in the world's safest haven (and that, of course, is part of the above-mentioned confidence racket). From the central banks alone, we are looking at yearly sums of more than $100 billion from Europe, more than $100 billion from poor China, $140 billion from super-saver Japan, and many 10s of billions from many others around the globe, including the Third World. But in addition, Uncle Sam obliges them, through the good offices of their own states, to send their thus literally forced savings to Uncle Sam as well in the form of their "service" of their predominantly dollar debt to him.

His treasury secretary and his International Monetary Fund (IMF) handmaiden blithely continue to strut around the world insisting that the Third - and ex-Second, now also Third - World of course continue to service their foreign debts, especially to him. No matter that with interest rates multiplied several times over by Uncle Sam himself after the Fed's Paul Volcker's coup in October 1979, most have already paid off their original borrowings three to five times over. For to pay at all at interest rates that Volcker boosted to 20%, they had to borrow still more at still higher rates until thereby their outstanding foreign debt doubled and tripled, not to mention their domestic debt from which part of the foreign payments were raised, particularly in Brazil. Privatization is the name of the game there and elsewhere, except for the debt. The debt was socialized after it had been incurred mostly by private business, but only the state had enough power to squeeze the greatest bulk of back payments out of the hides of its poor and middle-class people and transfer them as "invisible service payments" to Uncle Sam.

When Mexicans were told to tighten their belts still further, they answered that they couldn't because they had already had to eat their belts. Only Argentina and for a while Russia declared an effective moratorium on debt "service", and that only after political economic policies had destroyed their societies, thanks to Uncle Sam's advisers and his IMF strong arm. Since then, Uncle Sam himself has been blithely defaulting on his own foreign debt, as he already had several times before in the 19th century.

Speaking of that, it may be well to recall at least two pieces of advice from that time: Lord Cromer, who administered Egypt for then-dominant British imperial interests, said his most important instrument for doing so was Egypt's debts to Britain. These had just multiplied when Egypt was obliged to sell its Suez Canal shares to Britain in order to pay off earlier debts and British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli explained and justified his purchase of the same on the grounds that it would strengthen British imperial interests. Today, that is called "debt-for-equity swaps", which is one of Uncle Sam's latter-day favorite policies to use the debt to acquire profitable and/or strategically important real resources, as of course also was the canal as the way to the jewel of the British Empire, India.

Another piece of practical advice came from the premier military strategist Carl von Clausewitz: make the lands you conquer pay for their own conquest and administration. That is of course exactly what Britain did in and with India through the infamous "Home Charges" remitted to London in payment for Britain administering India, which even the British themselves recognized as "tribute" and responsible for much of "The Drain" from India to Britain. How much more efficient yet to let foreign countries' own states administer themselves but by rules set and imposed by Uncle Sam's IMF and then effect a drain of debt service anyway. Actually, the British therein also set the 19th-century precedent of relying on the "imperialism of free trade" with "independent" states as far and as long as possible, using gunboat diplomacy to make it work (which Uncle Sam had already learned to copy by early in the 20th century); and if that was not enough, simply to invade, and if necessary to occupy - and then rely on the Clausewitz rule.
We shall note several recent instances thereof, and especially the Iraqi one, in the second article in this series.

Last but not least, oil producers also put their savings in Uncle Sam. With the "shock" of oil that restored its real price after the dollar valuation had fallen in 1973, ever-cleverer-by-half Henry Kissinger made a deal with the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, that it would continue to price oil in dollars, and these earnings would be deposited with Uncle Sam and partly compensated by military hardware. That deal de facto extended to all of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and still stands, except that before the war against Iraq that country suddenly opted out by switching to pricing its oil in euros, and Iran threatened do the same. North Korea, the third member of the "axis of evil", has no oil but trades entirely in euros. (Venezuela is a major oil supplier to Uncle Sam and also supplies some at preferential rates as non-dollar trade swaps to poor countries such as Cuba. So Uncle Sam sponsored and financed military commandos from its Plan Colombia next door, promoted an illegal coup and, when that failed, pushed a referendum in his attempt at yet another "regime change"; and now along with Brazil all three are being baptized as yet another "axis of evil").

To return to the main issue and call a spade a huge spade, all of the above is part and parcel of the world's biggest-ever Ponzi-scheme confidence racket. Like all others, its most essential characteristic is that it can only continue to pay off dollars and be maintained at the top as long as it continues to receive new dollars at the bottom, voluntarily through confidence if possible and by force if not. (Of course, the Clausewitz and Cromer formulas result in the poorest paying the most, since they are also the most defenseless: so that the ones sitting on/above them pass much of the cost and pain down to them.)

What if confidence in the dollar runs out?
Things are already getting shakier in the House of Uncle Sam. The declining dollar reduces the necessary dollar inflows, so Greenspan needs to raise interest rates to maintain some attraction for the foreign dollars he needs to fill the trade gap. As a quid pro quo for being reappointed by President George W Bush, he promised to do that only after the election. That time has now arrived, but doing so threatens to collapse the housing bubble that was built on low interest and mortgage - and remortgage - rates.

But it is in their house values that most Americans have their savings, if they have any at all. They and this imaginary wealth effect supported over-consumption and the nearly as-high-as-GDP household debt, and a collapse of the housing price bubble with increased interest and mortgage rates would not only drastically undercut house prices, it would thereby have a domino effect on their owners' enormous second and third remortgages and credit-card and other debt, their consumption, corporate debt and profit, and investment. In fact, these factors would be enough to plummet Uncle Sam into a deep recession, if not depression, and another Big Bear deflation on stock and de facto on other prices, rendering debt service even more onerous. (If the dollar declines, even domestic price inflation is de facto deflationary against other currencies, which Russians and Latin Americans discovered to their peril, and which we observe below.)

Still lower real US investment would reduce its industrial productivity and competitiveness even more - probably to a degree lower than can compensated for by further devaluing the dollar and making US exports cheaper, as is the confident hope of many, probably including the good Doctor. Until now, the apparent inflation of prices abroad in rubles and pesos and their consequent devaluations have been a de facto deflation in terms of the dollar world currency. Uncle Sam then printed dollars to buy up at bargain-basement fire-sale prices natural resources in Russia (whose economy was then run on $100 bills), and companies and even banks, as in South Korea. True, now Greenspan and Uncle Sam are trying again to get other central banks to raise their own interest rates and otherwise plunge their own people into even deeper depression.

But even if he can, thereby also canceling out the relative attractiveness of his own interest-rate hike, how could that save Uncle Sam? What remains the great unknown and perhaps still unknowable is how a more wounded, Ponzi-less Uncle Sam would react with more "Patriotic" acts at home and abroad with the weapons - including the now almost ready "small" nukes - he would still have, even if his foreign victims no longer paid for new ones. So, to compensate for less bread and civil rights at home, an even more patriotic, nay chauvinist, circus at the cost of others abroad is the real danger of the current policies to "defend freedom and civilization".

So, far beyond Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and all the terrorists put together, the greatest real-world threat to Uncle Sam is that the inflow of dollars dries up. For instance, foreign central banks and private investors (it is said that "overseas Chinese" have a tidy trillion dollars) could any day decide to place more of their money elsewhere than in the declining dollar and abandon poor ol' Uncle Sam to his destiny. China could double its per capita income very quickly if it made real investments at home instead of financial ones with Uncle Sam. Central banks, European and others, can now put their reserves in (rising!) euros or even soon-to-be-revalued Chinese yuan. Not so far down the road, there may be an East Asian currency, eg a basket first of ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, South Korea) - and then + 4 (India). While India's total exports in the past five years rose by 73%, those to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) rose at double that rate and sixfold to China. India has become an ASEAN summit partner, and its ambitions stretch still further to an economic zone stretching from India to Japan. Not for nothing, in the 1997 East Asian currency and then full economic crisis, Uncle Sam strong-armed Japan not to start a proposed East Asian currency fund that would have prevented at least the worst of the crisis. Uncle Sam then benefited from it by buying devalued East Asian currencies and using them to buy up East Asian real resources, and in South Korea also banks, at bargain-basement reduced-price fire sales. But now, China is already taking steps toward such an arrangement, only on a much grander financial and now also economic scale.

A day after writing the above, I read in The Economist (December 11-17, 2004) a report on the previous week's summit meeting of ASEAN + 3 in Malaysia. That country's prime minister announced that this summit should lay the groundwork for an East Asian Community (EAC) that "should build a free-trade area, cooperate on finance, and sign a security pact ... that would transform East Asia into a cohesive economic block ... In fact, some of these schemes are already in motion ... China, as the region's pre-eminent economic and military power, will doubtless dominate ... and host the second East Asia Summit." The report went on to recall that in 1990, Uncle Sam shot down a similar initiative for fear of losing influence in the region. Now it is a case of "Yankee Stay Home".

Or what if, long before that comes to pass, exporters of oil simply cease to price it in ever-devaluing dollars, and instead make a mint by switching to the rising euro and/or a basket of East Asian currencies? That would at one stroke vastly diminish the world demand for and price of dollars by obliging anyone who wants to buy oil to purchase and increase the demand price of the euro or yen/yuan instead of the dollar. That would crash the dollar and tumble Uncle Sam in one fell swoop, as foreign - and even domestic - owners of dollars would sell off as many of them as fast as they could, and other countries' central banks would switch their reserves out of dollars and away from Uncle Sam's no-longer-safe haven. That would drive the dollar down even more, and of course halt any more dollar inflow to Uncle Sam from the foreigners who have been financing his consumption spree. Since selling oil for falling dollars instead of rising euros is evidently bad business, the world's largest oil exporters in Russia and OPEC have been considering doing just that. In the meantime, they have only raised the dollar price of oil, so that in euro terms it has remained approximately stable since 2000. So far, many oil exporters and others still place their increased amount of dollars with Uncle Sam, even though he now offers an ever less attractive and less safe haven, but Russia is now buying more euros with some of its dollars.

So also many countries' central banks have begun to put ever more of their reserves into the euro and currencies other than Uncle Sam's dollar. Now even the Central Bank of China, the greatest friend of Uncle Sam in need, has begun to buy some euros. China itself has also begun to use some of its dollars - as long as they are still accepted by them - to buy real goods from other Asians and thousands of tons of iron ore and steel from Brazil, etc. (Brazil's president recently took a huge business delegation to China, and a Chinese one just went to Argentina. They are going after South African minerals too.)

So what will happen to the rich on top of Uncle Sam's Ponzi scheme when the confidence of poorer central banks and oil exporters in the middle runs out, and the more destitute around the world, confident or not, can no longer make their in-payments at the bottom? The Uncle Sam Ponzi Scheme Confidence Racket would - or will? - come crashing down, like all other such schemes before, only this time with a worldwide bang. It would cut the present US consumer demand down to realistic size and hurt many exporters and producers elsewhere in the world. In fact, it may involve a wholesale fundamental reorganization of the world political economy now run by Uncle Sam.

NEXT: The center of the doughnut

Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/7/2005 1:56:40 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
"I want to talk about one problem"
__________________________

By Richard Russell .. Dow Theory Letters .. January 6, 2005

Extracted from the January 5th, 2005 edition of Richard's Remarks ... The questions are now coming from all directions. What would happen if the country sinks into deflation? What about the dollar? What if inflation heats up? Should I hold foreign paper currencies? Isn't inflation still the real danger? On and on, and the sad fact is that NOBODY EVEN KNOWS THE RIGHT QUESTIONS.

321gold.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (70536)1/17/2005 8:48:35 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Why We Must Question Our Elections

_______________________________________________

By Arlene S. Ash, Ph.D.
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Monday 17 January 2005

I am a statistician. When I testified about electoral tampering in Martin County, Florida, in November 2000, I focused exclusively on the fact that the number of disputed ballots would have changed the outcome. That was shortsighted. As U.S. newspapers have written about the Ukraine, an election's outcome may be less important than how it was conducted. Democratic elections must be verifiably fair.

Before November 2, several U.S. newspapers pursued concerns about election integrity. They reported on the vulnerability of electronic voting to simple errors and malicious hacking, and the unnecessary dangers posed by non-verifiable touch-screen voting. They exposed obstructionist maneuvers, such as Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell's telling election commissioners to reject voter registrations submitted on thin paper.

Post-election, though, the mainstream media has largely ignored or ridiculed concerns about U.S. electoral errors and fraud.

For example, a front page article by Tom Zeller, Jr. in November 12's New York Times told us that the "elections department in Cleveland set off a round of Web-blog hysteria when it posted turnout figures on its site that seemed to show more votes being cast in some communities than there were registered voters." But, the figures did show over 93,000 more votes than voters. Why is it hysterical to be disturbed by this?

On the evening of November 2, Election Day ("exit") poll data showed comfortable margins for Kerry. These figures disappeared shortly after midnight, replaced by numbers very close to the final tallies. In Ohio, for example, as late as midnight the Bush/Kerry split was 47.9%/52.1%. Later, it was 50.9%/48.6%. The official vote tally is 51.0/48.5. The press has published speculation about how the early numbers might have come to be wrong, yet, two months after the election, there is still no convincing explanation of the discrepancy.

Polls and the official tabulations each measure the voters' collective intent. Each is imperfect. Differences between poll results and final tallies raise legitimate questions about the accuracy of the tallies.

In Florida 2000, the polls identified more Gore voters than Bush ones, while the official tally declared Bush, just barely, the winner. Which was right? Recall that Palm Beach County's infamous butterfly ballot nullified thousands of ballots intended for Gore. Statewide, 3% of ballots were "spoiled" - that is, not counted. While only 11% of Florida voters, African-Americans contributed 54% of the 180,000 spoiled votes. Since 87% of African-Americans in Florida vs. 45% of whites voted for Gore over Bush, these ballots alone likely represent a Gore advantage of approximately 60,000 votes - more than 1% of the statewide total.(1) If more Florida voters cast their votes for Gore, but more Gore ballots were invalidated, then the polls and the tallies would each have captured a different truth.

Although "Bush Would Have Won" headlines blanketed the country in April 2001, the articles belied their headlines. Bush would have won under the counting standards advocated by Gore, while Gore would have, under other counting rules - including the one proposed by Bush! The media chose reassurance (the system worked!) over the more important message in Florida 2000: referees, not voters, determined the outcome. When different counting rules produce different Presidents, reform is desperately needed.

Statistics can flag anomalies and provide efficient methods for studying them. For example, some analysts questioned this year's vote tallies in Florida's Broward and Palm Beach counties. Well-conducted audits could resolve such questions, using probability sampling to examine only a small fraction of the votes cast in districts with the most reason for concern. Unfortunately, about 30% of the votes in the last election - and all in Broward and Palm Beach - used non-verifiable, touch-screen voting.

Snohomish County, Washington, also used non-verifiable touch screen voting in all precincts (polling locations) on election day 2004. Among about 100,000 touch screen votes in the famously close governor's race, Republican candidate Rossi had an 8,000 vote advantage; while among about 200,000 paper (absentee) ballots, Democrat Gregoire had 2,000 more votes.(2) Some voters spoke of the touch screen machine changing their vote. Countywide, there were 19 formally reported instances of machine switching; every one favored the Republican. Could these be random errors, equally likely to go either way, like tosses of a fair coin? Well, fair coins just don't come up the same 19 times in a row!(3) However, Rossi did not have a "touch screen advantage" everywhere. Among 90 precincts with no reported machine problems (vote switching, machine freeze-ups, or repairs within two weeks of the election), 44 had touch screen vote counts more favorable to Rossi than paper ballots, while 46 had a touch screen advantage for Gregoire. However, among the precincts with reported voting machine problems, Rossi had a touch screen advantage in 56 out of 58 (96.6%). Such differences demand an explanation.(4)

While reported e-voting problems have mostly disadvantaged Democrats, Republicans have also been harmed by prematurely adopting non-auditable technology. In Fairfax County, Virginia, a Republican-endorsed school board member, Rita Thompson, appears to have lost because her name appeared on the edge of the screen and was difficult to select. In many races the margin of victory was smaller than the number of spoiled, lost or discounted votes. Improved electoral quality requires investigating all important sources of errors, not just those that may have produced a different winner.

Voting machines are less secure than slot machines; voter registration lists, less reliable than many other government and commercial lists. Why have we - democracy's customers - not demanded better? Sadly, our media chooses to deride the doubts rather than report the problems.

Electoral audits must not be ad hoc enterprises assembled only reluctantly and only when the outcome of an already-held election might plausibly be overturned. Improvement requires looking systematically at the current reality, acting to fix problems, and continuing to monitor and act until we get to where we need to be. The media does us no favors by pretending that the current situation is not messy.

I accept that about half the nation's voters chose George Bush in each of the last two elections. Not every anomaly is an error, and not every error is malicious. Still, I look for the mainstream media to join my statistical colleagues and myself in insisting on meaningful election oversight.

With fair electoral administration and credible audits, only the fringe will doubt winners of close races; without this, any reasonable person should. When will Americans demand elections that truly deserve our trust?


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Arlene S. Ash, Ph.D. is a Fellow of the American Statistical Association and a Research Professor at Boston University's Schools of Medicine and Public Health.

1. Voting Irregularities in Florida During the 2000 Presidential Election, usccr.gov.

2. votersunite.org.

3. More precisely, the chance of a fair coin toss coming up the same 19 times in a row equals 1/2 to the 18th power, approximately 4 in a million.

4. Using a contingency table analysis: If there were no systematic association between having a polling problem and the Republican having a touch screen advantage, the probability that we would see an association this strong is less than 1 in a million (Chi-square = 36.6, 1 df).

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truthout.org