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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: yard_man who wrote (20696)1/7/2005 11:59:27 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 116555
 
Global: Game Over?

Stephen Roach (New York)

The unraveling of the Asset Economy could well be at hand. America’s Federal Reserve has finally woken up to the perils of the risk culture that its reckless accommodation has spawned. The Fed has sounded simultaneous alarms on two fronts -- inflation and excesses in asset markets. Such explicit warnings from the US monetary authority are rare and should be taken seriously. This has important implications for the interest rate outlook, as well as for the asset-dependent US economy.

As many have already noted, the recently-released minutes of the December 14, 2004 Federal Reserve policy meeting were an eye-opener. The tone of the discussion was far more important than the policy action itself -- a fifth 25 basis point rate hike in the past five months. While the stilted language of the policy action, itself, made reference to balanced risks with respect to growth and inflation, the debate was laced with a very different distribution of concerns. The Fed made special note of inflation risks, citing recent weakness in the dollar, still-elevated oil prices, a cyclical slowing of productivity, and signs of deteriorating inflationary implications signaled in the TIPS market. At the same time, the Fed’s newfound concerns over “excessive risk taking” focused on unusually narrow credit spreads, a notable pick-up in corporate finance activity (both IPOs and M&A deals), and what the policy minutes referred to as “anecdotal reports” of excess speculation in residential property markets. Better late than never, I guess.

Rarely does the US central bank cast aside the rhetorical shackles of Fedspeak and express its concerns with such candor and fervor. Two earlier instances in the recent past stand out as intriguing precedents -- late 1993 and early 2000. In the second half of 1993, the Fed warned repeatedly of excess speculation in the bond market and the coming normalization of monetary policy. Market participants all but ignored the warnings until the Fed finally delivered in the form of a 300 bp rate hike over a 12-month time-frame beginning in February 1994. The result was the worst year of performance in modern bond market history. A similar, albeit belated, warning was sounded in early 2000, when the stock market was still bubbling to excess. At the time, the Fed couched its concerns in a framework that worried about potential imbalances between the excesses in demand and the growth in potential supply. But the 100 bp of monetary tightening in the first half of 2000 was more than enough for the equity bubble and the excess demand growth it spawned. In my view, the minutes of the December 2004 FOMC meeting follow these earlier precedents quite closely -- especially that of 1993-94. The Federal Reserve is sending a clear warning to speculators that should not be ignored.

And yet, as was precisely the case in the immediate aftermath of the two earlier warnings, an ominous persistence of denial is evident today. Financial markets have barely flinched in response to this sea-change in Fed risk assessment. Yields on 10-year Treasuries are up only about 7 basis points. Moreover, the bubble in risk products remains very much intact: While emerging market-debt spreads have widened by 9 bps, they remain extraordinarily tight by historical standards; the same can be said for investment-grade corporate spreads, which haven’t budged at an unusually low 94 bps; moreover, spreads on already tight high-yield debt have actually narrowed a bit in the immediate aftermath of the release of the FOMC minutes. A similar pattern is evident for bank credit spreads and equity market volatility -- a persistence of minimal risk aversion. And the real estate market remains red-hot, riding a national home-price inflation wave that hit 13% y-o-y in 3Q04, with double-digit appreciation in 25 states plus the District of Columbia.
[Remains red-hot? Roach did you look at the 14% drops in starts and new home sales in the face of interest rates that have not even risen. Unprecidented drops in starts and sales... Not just here but in the UK as well. Can you see the entire global economy slowing or not. It is led by housing. Excessive hikes now in the face of a slowdown is like pouring water on a house after it has alredy burnt to the ground and and the few coals left are already cooling. Mish]

As always, it takes more than words to crack investor denial -- especially with return-starved fund managers seeking refuge in the ever-present “carry-trades” on riskier assets. The Fed has attempted to be disciplined (e.g. “measured”) in its tightening efforts thus far. But that approach -- as was the case in the early stages of its 1994 normalization campaign -- has done little to alter the risk appetite of investors and the Fed’s perception of inflation risks.
[OK Roach I will grant you that, but let's see what happens when housing stalls. Mish]

Such a response leaves the central bank with little choice other than to up the ante on its tightening strategy. That’s what it will take to cope with looming inflationary pressures. And that’s what it will take to challenge the economics of the carry trade. Today’s Fed -- which has kept the real federal funds rate in negative territory for longer than at any point since the late 1970s -- is wildly behind the risk curve, in my view. Only after the 25 bp tightening of last December did the nominal funds rate match the core CPI inflation rate of 2.2%. For a central bank that has suddenly gotten religion in its concerns over inflation and speculative activity, there’s something very reckless about “zero” real short-term interest rates. Monetary policy must now move decisively into the restrictive zone if the Fed is serious about its newfound concerns. In my view, that could spell as much as another 200 bp of monetary tightening, requiring much larger incremental moves than the measured dosage of 25 bp per pop that has been applied so far.

The big question in all this is whether the Fed is tough enough to face up to the task at hand. Unfortunately, that’s a close call -- a sad comment on America’s so-called independent central bank. In large part, that’s because the US monetary authority is very much a part of the problem that it is now trying to address. By condoning the excesses of the equity bubble in the late 1990s, the Fed set the stage for the near-brush with deflation that was to follow in the post-bubble shakeout. The Fed fought the valiant fight during this period by slashing its policy rate by 550 bps to a 46-year low of 1%. But that then gave rise to the climate of costless short-term financing -- a degree of extreme monetary accommodation that has sparked the very concerns over inflation and speculation that made news in the December FOMC minutes. Unfortunately, this is all emblematic of the biggest shortcoming of modern-day central banking -- an inability to cope with asset bubbles. The Fed has put itself into a tough corner from which there is no easy exit.

Assuming that the Fed sticks to its guns, all this spells tough times ahead for the asset-dependent US economy. That’s especially the case for the income-short, saving-depleted American consumer. Lacking in wage-income-generated purchasing power, US households have relied on a combination of aggressive tax cuts and equity extraction from now-overvalued homes to support their open-ended profligacy. Both of those sources of support seem destined to dry up. The odds of any additional near-term fiscal stimulus are low, with the odds suggesting that the thrust of budgetary policy could, in fact, swing the other way. And a sharp increase in US interest rates spells game over for a now-over-extended US housing market and a related drying up of the equity extraction from this asset class -- a wealth effect that has played such an important role in powering the US consumption dynamic in recent years. All this points to a diminished growth impetus from US personal consumption expenditures -- an outcome that should lead to slower GDP growth in the US and weaker external demand conditions faced by America’s trading partners. There is a silver lining to such a scenario -- a reduced growth rate of US domestic demand, which should be helpful in providing some relief to America’s current-account dilemma. And America’s saving-rich trading partners will be hit with the combined impacts of stronger currencies and reduced demand for exports by US consumers -- impacts that could leave countries in Asia and Europe with little choice other than to implement pro-consumption strategies. In other words, Fed-induced pressures on the Asset Economy could well be an important catalyst for global rebalancing.

Many believe that the Fed would be over-reaching its mandate by squeezing carry trades. I don’t share that view. Unlike many central banks, America’s Federal Reserve is not a one-dimensional inflation targeter.Instead, it is charged by the US Congress with promoting price stability, full employment, and sustained economic growth.
[And wratching up interest rates will be good for jobs? mish]

To the extent that speculative excesses jeopardize the stability of the US economy, the Fed is well within its purview of addressing financial market imbalances. It did so in 1994 and belatedly again in 2000. Given the current state of excess in the US economy -- the saving shortfall, debt overhang, and twin deficits -- in conjunction with mounting excesses in asset markets -- property and fixed income markets, alike -- aggressive Fed action is entirely appropriate, in my view.
[How can you save money if you have no job? mish]

Investors won’t love the outcome, especially high-yield borrowers at home and abroad (i.e., emerging markets). But this was always the ultimate pitfall of the post-bubble shakeout. The Asset Economy has gone to excess, and it is high time to face the endgame before it’s too late. The Fed deserves credit for finally bringing these critical concerns to a head.
[No the FED should not have caused the problem in the first place. It should have let the recession happen. It should have let the market take care of the non-problem Y2K nonsense as well. Then we could have had a normal housing expansion to lead us out of that recession. Instead we FORCED an overly robust housing market compressing 7 years of growth in two years time IMO. If the FED does what Roach implies, I think we have a global depression.]

[Although Roach writes well, he almost seems like a contrary indicator. He called for a double dip recession that did not occur. He kept calling for it for almost two years after. Last month he lowered his probability of recession next year at a time housing is clearly stalling and job growth remains anemic. Now is calling for aggressive hikes without regard to jobs. mish]

morganstanley.com



To: yard_man who wrote (20696)1/7/2005 12:19:04 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Global: More Tales of Three Central Banks
Joachim Fels (London)

Of old, young and Fed ladies
Contrasting and comparing various central banks’ approaches and policy stances can yield insights over and above those gained from focusing on each of them in isolation. I find it particularly instructive to compare the holy trinity consisting of the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England. The first manages the world’s reserve currency, the second is the new kid on the block, and the latter is the ‘Old Lady’, who has a history going back to (yes) 1694 but also has perhaps the most modern policy and communication strategy of the three. Some of you may remember my piece A Tale of Three Central Banks of 21 July 2003, in which I pointed out a puzzling inverse relationship between the three banks’ transparency and predictability. The most predictable of the three in terms of interest rate changes (the Fed) was the least transparent, while the most transparent bank (the 'Old Lady') was the least predictable.

More predictability here, more transparency there
As I heard through the grapevine, the ‘Old Lady’ took this finding quite seriously, despite the fact that Mervyn King pooh-poohed my study in his inaugural press conference as Governor in August 2003. In any case, the Bank’s interest rate moves (five hikes since then) became almost perfectly predictable, with well-timed speeches and carefully crafted minutes providing good guidance. At the same time, the Fed has made progress on improving transparency, as highlighted by the FOMC’s decision in December to release its meeting minutes on an accelerated schedule as of this year. The first release on the new schedule -- three weeks after the FOMC meeting rather than only after the following meeting -- occurred earlier this week and has already received much attention by markets and commentators (see also Steve Roach’s Game Over? 7 January 2005, on this Forum). Here is my own take on the transparency and the broader monetary policy issues facing the Fed in the light of the minutes, as viewed against the backdrop of the ECB’s and the Bank of England’s respective approaches and stances.

When the Fed lady sings
As I see it, there are three main themes that emerge from the Fed minutes and from a comparison with the other two central Bank’s commentary and approaches. First, despite the accelerated minutes release schedule, the Fed still lags way behind the Bank and the ECB, especially in terms of goal transparency. Do you know what exactly the Fed is targeting? (Some say the Fed funds rate, but that's beside the point). Second, as the Fed keeps us all guessing about its precise goals, here is my own guess: the majority of FOMC members want inflation to creep higher from current levels and will thus be less aggressive in hiking rates than markets are pricing in, notwithstanding the hawkish tone of the minutes. Third, more policy divergence between the three central banks lies ahead this year, which should have interesting implications for bond markets. Let me elaborate.

More transparent now, but still hazy
If you have ever watched Big Brother, you may agree that more transparency is not always a good thing -- some things I just don’t want to know. But when it comes to watching central banks, most people would agree that more transparency is a good thing. Undoubtedly, the Fed’s move to publish the FOMC minutes before the following meeting enhances transparency as it gives markets a more up-to-date snapshot of policymakers’ views on the economy and markets. So far, markets had to infer the evolving views at the Fed from the short post-meeting statement, from individual policymakers’ speeches and from certain newspaper and newswire articles quoting “Fed sources”. The complete account of the meeting discussions was released only after the following FOMC meeting. As I showed in my July 2003 article, however, this way of drip-feeding information still enabled markets to get the Fed’s next interest move right almost 100% of the time since 1999. So, predictability has never been the Fed’s problem in recent years. Having said that, it is clearly preferable to get the official account of the internal discussions in the form of the FOMC minutes as soon as possible, rather than having to rely on second-hand accounts in the run-up to the next meeting.

Beauty and the beasts
Note, however, that despite this move, the Fed is still lagging the ECB and the Bank of England in terms of transparency on three important counts. First, both European institutions still inform the markets earlier of their discussions than the Fed, which now releases its minutes three weeks after the FOMC meeting. The ECB publishes a detailed statement intended to summarize the Council’s views and holds a press conference with a (lengthy) Q&A session on the very day of the meeting. The Bank of England releases the detailed MPC minutes and votes 13 days after its meeting. Second, the ECB publishes a (lengthy) Monthly Bulletin with a detailed analysis of all the economic and market factors influencing its decisions two weeks after the Council meeting; and the Bank publishes a detailed quarterly Inflation Report followed by a press conference and Q & A. Nothing comparable is published by the Fed. Third, and I think most importantly, the Fed is highly intransparent when it comes to its precise goals. Yes, it’s mandate is to preserve price stability and to care about sustainable growth and high employment. But what inflation rate does the Fed target, and which measure of inflation, and how does it trade off (if at all) between the growth, employment and inflation objectives? Like beauty, the answer is largely in the eye of the beholder. By contrast, the ECB has a clearly defined objective (price stability, defined as an increase of HICP inflation of below but close to two percent) and the Bank of England has a precisely defined target (2% CPI inflation), even though taming these beasts isn’t always easy. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that long-term inflation expectations in the US are more volatile than in the euro area or in the UK. We don’t know what they aim at in Washington!

My guess: the Fed wants higher inflation
Clearly, the lack of transparency about the Fed’s inflation objective is a standing invitation to speculate about it. I beg our US economists, who are genuine experts on the Fed, to forgive me in advance. But my own guess is that, for most FOMC members, the current 1.5% or so increase in the core PCE deflator is simply too low for comfort over the medium term. Once the next negative shock hits, the rate of price increases would quickly fall back towards the deflation danger zone of below 1%, which it touched briefly in late 2003. By contrast, a gradual rise in inflation would keep the highly leveraged US economy afloat -- the more debt you have, the more you love inflation. How high the Fed wants to see inflation drifting, I don’t know. It probably depends on the economic circumstances. But I guess that the Fed implicitly has a significantly higher inflation goal than the ECB or the Bank of England. And if so, the Fed will probably lag market expectations in raising rates this year to ensure that inflation keeps creeping higher. I realize that this appears to stand in sharp contrast with the tone of the FOMC minutes, which were widely seen as hawkish. My reading, however, is that while “a number of participants” worried about upside risks to inflation and “some” worried about low rates fuelling asset price inflation, this was by no means a majority view among the voting members. Bottom line: US rates are headed higher in the next few meetings, but I think eventually rates won’t rise as much this year as the market is now pricing in (for a different view, see Steve Roach’s piece quoted above).

The three ladies don’t sing from the same sheet
My third theme is that the monetary policy paths in the US, in the euro area and in the UK are likely to diverge more this year than they did over the past few years. Just look at the rhetoric in the three banks’ December policy statements and minutes. According to the FOMC minutes, some members (though a minority) have expressed worries about upside risks to inflation and about asset price inflation. At the same time, the ECB moved from “strong” vigilance regarding inflation risks in November to “continued” vigilance in December and even dropped the phrase expressing concerns about asset price inflation. Meanwhile the December MPC minutes showed that some members were starting to worry about downside risks to the (benign) inflation outlook, which suggests to me that the odds of a rate cut this year have risen. The reasons for this emerging divergence are not difficult to find: currency appreciation reduces inflationary pressures in the euro area, and the developing downturn in the UK housing market could weigh down on UK consumer spending and inflation. With the Fed likely to raise rates at the next several meetings and inflation creeping higher, the ECB likely on hold at least until the middle of the year, and the Bank of England possibly starting to cut rates this year, my guess is that UK gilts will outperform both Bunds and US Treasuries. And, even though the trade has worked well for some time now and appears to be a high-consensus trade, Bunds have some more room to outperform US Treasuries, I think. It ain’t over until the Fed lady stops singing…