American Future Middle East Nukes
By Marc Schulman on Syria
Much has been said and written about the Iranian nuclear program, but what about the possibility that other Middle East states -- Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, all three of which have acquired sophisticated delivery systems for non-conventional weapons, courtesy of North Korea, the former Soviet Union and China? My thoughts are at the end of this post, but, first, here are excerpts from an article in The Spectator (UK) that addresses the issue:
On Saudi Arabia
. . . when the conversation turns to nuclear issues, the most arched eyebrows are directed at Saudi Arabia, where the clues are in the messenger rather than in the message. One senior intelligence source speaks of Saudi Arabia’s ‘strange behaviour at times’ which ‘appears to defy logic’. As an example, he points to the purchase of about 50 CSS-2 missiles from China at a price of some $3 billion. Similar missiles in China’s arsenal were equipped with nuclear warheads, but the Chinese insist that the Saudi missiles carry conventional payloads. Maybe. My intelligence source, however, insists it simply does not make sense to use hugely expensive, high-tech missiles to carry a conventional high-explosive bomb. It only makes sense, he says flatly, if they are tipped with nuclear warheads.
In addition to the missile deal, there are also suggestions of a direct nuclear link between the Saudis and China. A senior China analyst at the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Thomas Woodrow, noted in a research paper that Saudi Arabia was ‘buying nuclear capability from China through a proxy state, with Pakistan serving as the cut-out’. But the likeliest source of serious nuclear assistance for the Saudis is Pakistan itself. The Saudis are reported to have been major funders of Pakistan’s own nuclear weapon and, in light of the developing threat from Iran, it is believed to be calling in those favours.
The US State Department says it has ‘not seen’ any information to substantiate claims of a nuclear agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but a former high-ranking Pentagon official noted that ‘very senior Saudi officials have held conversations with officials involved in the Pakistan nuclear programme, and possibly with similar officials in other countries’.
On Syria
Alarm bells also went off last year over reports that Syria, Iran’s closest regional ally, might have acquired centrifuges that would provide Damascus with the ability to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Concern about Syria heightened when an experimental American electronic eavesdropping device picked up distinctive signals which indicated that the Syrians were actually operating the centrifuges.
Experts believe that Syria went on a mini-shopping spree in the nuclear souk of A.Q. Khan, who is known to have visited Damascus several times from late 1997. By 2001, Syria became concerned that the contacts would be exposed and switched the venue of future meetings to Iran. An unclassified CIA report to the US Congress in mid-2003 noted that ‘broader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities to expand indigenous capabilities and we are looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern’. But a senior Arab source doubts that Syria’s economic resources could run to an independent nuclear weapons programme. More likely, he says, Syria and Iran might be involved in a joint venture — with Iran bankrolling Syrian scientists or Iranian scientists working on a joint nuclear programme in Syria.
On Egypt
Just last week, the IAEA found evidence of secret nuclear experiments in Egypt that could be relevant to a nuclear weapons programme. Much of the Egyptian work was carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, but the agency is examining fresh evidence suggesting that at least some of the activity occurred in the past year. Two months earlier, the IAEA is reported to have discovered particles of plutonium near an Egyptian nuclear facility. Egypt denies it is nurturing a nuclear weapons programme and insists the material found by the IAEA inspectors relates to nuclear programmes for medical research purposes.
My Thoughts
The specter of a nuclear Iran is bound to have repurcussions elsewhere in the Middle East. Iranians aren't Arabs, and they are Shi'a -- not Sunni -- Muslims. Throwing in a post-election Iraq dominated by Shi'a Muslims, it's not difficult to understand why Sunni Saudi Arabia and Sunni Egypt would fear an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. And toss in Syria, whose people adhere to a Muslim sect that is neither Shi'a nor Sunni, and you have all the necessary ingredients for a truly poisonous brew.
Before jumping to the conclusion that this dangerous situation is the result of an Iraq invasion-induced destabilization, consider this: the Iranian nuclear program would be underway had the invasion not taken place. And take this into account: had Saddam not be overthrown, it would have been only a matter of time before sanctions would have been removed, and, when that happened, Iraq would have restarted its nuclear effort. That situation would, if anything, be even more dangerous, as there would then be two countries bordering on each other that fought an eight-year-long war in the 1980's that would now be armed with nuclear weapons. Iran and Iraq would eventually bear a stark similarity to India and Pakistan. We know how close those two nations have come to firing their nuclear-armed missiles at each other. So, while the current situation is fraught with danger, the alternative would be still more perilous.
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